Cost-Benefit Analysis On Why We Should Just Do Away With The TSA Completely
from the just-get-rid-of-it dept
One of the key points we've brought up repeatedly in discussing the current surveillance state we seem to live in, is that those in charge seem to have no concept whatsoever of a cost-benefit analysis. They look at the world as a situation in which "terrorists must be stopped at all costs." But that's obviously ridiculous. For example, if you really wanted to stop terrorists on commercial airplanes there's a simple way to do that: you end all air travel. That would knock out the issue of terrorists using commercial flights -- but would obviously create another set of headaches while probably doing very little to stop terrorism. That's an extreme example where the costs outweigh the benefits, that's so obviously crazy that it's not considered serious. Yet, by creeping and crawling along, we continually expand the surveillance state in similar ways without ever stopping to consider all the costs that are piling up.Over at the Washington Post's Wonkblog, Dylan Matthews recently wrote about his experience flying commercially without having to go through security. That's because he flew a small commuter plane that is exempt from having to send its passengers through TSA security. As he noted, the experience was a lot more like taking a bus or a train. You show up right before it's time to go, collect your ticket and get on board. He thankfully points out that this was both awesome and no one died.
That eventually leads to a fairly simple idea: just get rid of the whole TSA and make all air travel like this. He points out that, on a basic cost-benefit analysis, this is probably totally worth it, even if terrorists do go back to trying to use commercial airlines in their plots:
In short: there's little to no evidence that the TSA has saved a single life in stopping terrorism. While it may have prevented specific plots, that energy just went towards other plots and attacks. Yet the costs of the TSA are immense, and we're not just talking about hiring all those people to feel you up at the airport, or even the super expensive naked scanner machines. It's the costs to all of us -- the public who travel. The fact that you have to get to the airport hours before your flight, stand in a very long line to be scanned or felt up and generally humiliated -- that's a massive waste of time and productivity for everyone, for apparently no benefit at all, other than security theater.Would this increase hijacking? Probably. But there's no reason to believe it would increase casualties from terrorist attacks overall. That's because increasing airport security just leads terrorists to direct their assaults elsewhere.
The best literature review available on the efficacy of counterterrorism tactics found that, on average, adding metal detectors and security screenings at airports led to about 6.3 fewer airplane hijackings in the years examined (a hijinking-heavy period chronicled in Brendan Koerner's latest book, in case you're interested). But that was more than compensated for by an increase in "miscellaneous bombings, armed attacks, hostage taking, and events which included death or wounded individuals (as opposed to non-casualty incidents) in both the short and long run." In fact, metal detectors and security screenings at airports led to about 6.8 more of these substitute events. "When calculating the overall weighted mean effect size for all of the findings examining the effectiveness of metal detectors, the positive and harmful effects cancel each other out," the review's authors conclude.
Could that literature review be wrong? Sure. The evidence base on counterterrorism effectiveness is very thin because true experiments on it are hard to conduct. But you go to war with the data you have, and the data we have (including some from after that review came out) suggests that even the most rudimentary of security screenings have not saved any lives, all things considered. What they have done is waste countless hours and dollars, because we really needed a rock with which to scare away tigers.
Yes, in many ways, this is the same point that Bruce Schneier has been making for ages, but it's nice to see more mainstream publications, like the Washington Post, not just make this basic argument (the costs outweigh the benefits of the TSA) but to go all the way to the level of arguing that totally abolishing the policy probably makes the most sense.
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Filed Under: cost-benefit, flying, security, tsa
Reader Comments
The First Word
“We lost 30,000+ more to suicide the year after that.
And the year after that.
And the year after that.
And somewhere along the line to today, that became 33,000+, eleven times the 9/11 casualties, and then 36,000+, twelve times the 9/11 casualties. . .per year. . . .
And the Fed funding for the TSA in 2012 was what again, exactly? $7.4 Billion with a 'Carl Sagan B'?
Versus, what, some $68 million for suicide research and outreach?
Something like that?
Mike, when can we move from "cost-benefit analysis failure" all the way down to "basic grade-schooler allowance math failure"?
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I invite you to fly
The economic argument here is weak as well. There is no simple way to determine the actual number of hijackings that would have occurred. The late 60s and early 70s showed us that, without some semblance of a security system, hijackings were pretty much a normal part of life, and the risks were very high indeed. Even with today's secure cockpit doors, the other airplane staff and passengers can still be held hostage and the pilots coerced to fly to an alternate destination.
America has a fetish with weapons, especially guns. Not scanning for these things is a recipe for disaster.
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Re: I invite you to fly
How often does this happen on buses, trains, ships, ferries and other forms of mass transit?
What makes you think it'd be a more frequent occurrence on air travel than other forms? Sure it'll probably happen, at the same rate as on other forms of mass transit. Does that risk stop you taking the train or bus? Why would it stop you taking a plane?
How much do you want to pay for perfect security? Safety? As the article states the most effective way to stop plane hijackings is to stop all planes.
Do you really think after the events of 9/11 where all the passengers died anyway that people would just sit passively by and allow this to happen? That the pilots would really allow a hostage taken from amongst the passengers/crew to coerce them into opening the cockpit door? They know that EVERYONE will die if they do that.
Since 9/11 there have been instances of passengers/crews foiling hijacking attempts (in some cases at cost of their own lives as in the plane in 9/11 that crashed in an empty field after the passengers heard about the other attacks as part of 9/11 and didn't let the terrorists use the plane).
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Re: Re: I invite you to fly
OK, two words.
Between air pressure, alcohol, and whatever else, it would likely be a bigger problem on an airliner flight than on a train or bus. And there's less options for anybody who just wants to get the hell away from the fracas.
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Re: I invite you to fly
No, the usa has a male suicide problem. The majority of firearm deaths in the usa are male suicides: http://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/leading_causes_death.html
Again, the majority of firearm deaths in the usa are suicide.
Furthermore, it's been that way for years. You have to go all the way back to 1996/7 before the rolling average drops below half. So considering the trends over the past few years, that's probably going to get pushed back even farther by the 2011/2/3 stats.
This is all basic, fundamental demographics. Minimum, lowest-common-denominator ADULT competence on the issue requires at least this much knowledge.
If you didn't know that, it means your sources for gun issues are exploitive anti-male bigots.
And if you don't change your attitude and behavior, so are you.
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Re: I invite you to fly
I absolutely would. I might even enjoy it for once.
You can imagine it, but it won't happen -- even with the gun fetish Americans have. I know this because it doesn't happen on buses, trains, etc., and it didn't happen back when you didn't even need to go through a metal detector or show ID to get on a plane.
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You mean...
Seriously, TSA agents must be lonely, horny people if they have to grope that many people.
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This is incorrect. What they really believe is that behavior outside their control must be stopped at any cost. Terrorism (child porn, infringement, drug use etc.) are just justifications they use in their pursuit for control.
One only has to look at the often convoluted length these people go to in their attempts to tie many of these justifications together that what they really hate is freedom (of both thought and action).
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Think of the needy.
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We lost 30,000+ more to suicide the year after that.
And the year after that.
And the year after that.
And somewhere along the line to today, that became 33,000+, eleven times the 9/11 casualties, and then 36,000+, twelve times the 9/11 casualties. . .per year. . . .
And the Fed funding for the TSA in 2012 was what again, exactly? $7.4 Billion with a 'Carl Sagan B'?
Versus, what, some $68 million for suicide research and outreach?
Something like that?
Mike, when can we move from "cost-benefit analysis failure" all the way down to "basic grade-schooler allowance math failure"?
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Re:
However, the total usa suicide deaths from 2001 to 2010 is 338,000+, making it the 11th largest cause of death. That's more than Liver Disease, Hypertension, Parkinson's, or Homicide, individually. After Homicide, it starts being more than any two causes, including HIV and Aortic Aneurysm.
How much do we spend on research and outreach against Liver Disease, Hypertension, Parkinson's, or, for that matter, Homicide?
Because that should be the real comparison here. How many lives do we estimate the TSA has saved,
versus,
how many lives we estimate would have been saved by spending the TSA's budget on research and outreach against Suicide, Liver Disease, Hypertension, Parkinson's, and Homicide?
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Initial Screenings
Expanding the program to stop terrorism was a knee-jerk reaction to 9/11. Terrorists do not care how they kill only that they kill many innocent victims. Also, trying to prevent all terrorist attacks is impossible because they are attacking and they can choose the time and place of any attack. No matter how vigilant one is unfortunately successful attacks will occur.
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What about the health of the screeners and fliers?
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1. Design all new planes so that the passenger compartment is completely and totally isolated from the cockpit. If there is no way for the hijackers to actually get to the cockpit, there's no way they can physically take control of the plane.
2. Institute a policy for all flights and have it clearly stated at the start of each flight that at the first sign of an attempted hijacking, the cockpit will cut off all communication with the passenger compartment, alert the authorities and land at the closest airport. It's kind of hard to make pilots give in to your demands if they can't hear them.
This wouldn't stop bombings or terrorists personally killing the passengers, but if strictly followed, would prevent anyone from hijacking a plane and using it as a weapon, or taking it to some other destination. Of course, it's possible that a terrorist could still get a job as a pilot, placing him in the cockpit from the start, but that would take a lot more planning and effort than just pulling out a weapon and threatening to kill people if their demands aren't met.
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One of the immediate reactions to 9/11 was to mandate reinforced cockpit doors that lock. That single change, if in effect on 9/11, would have prevented the hijackings.
They also expanded the Air Marshal program, which is another change that probably would have prevented the 9/11 attacks.
Likely, we could have stopped there. The real security hardening of commercial air flights did happen, and we didn't need to extend any additional screening to passengers.
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The Air Marshal program is, in my opinion, just more security theater. If it's impossible to take over the plane or communicate with the pilots, there is no need for Air Marshals at all.
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do you see that there is more than one form of terror.
Did unlocked doors help or hurt the Lockerbie plane crash ? or an air marshal? No both of those would have and were completely ineffective. But correct baggage records and baggage security applied correctly would have stopped that terrorist attack.
You seem to think that the TSA is ONLY trying to stop people gaining access to the cockpit and taking control of the place to fly it into a building. A very narrow (and incorrect) definition of their task.
again, locked doors is not going to stop the shoe bomber, or the underpants bomber, or the Lockabie bomber, or the terrorist who kills 1 person every minute until the cockpit doors are opened. But TSA actions and normal security MIGHT, its not about cost its about stoping the threat before it gets to that stage.
Sure I know the underpants bomber was stopped by another alert passenger, but what if that passenger was not alert, then possibly the air marshal would be alert enough instead.
But he cant be if he is not there, and no amount of locked doors is going to deter someone bringing a bomb on the plane in the first place.
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This is true, but it's also something that happens so rarely that taking extreme measures to prevent it is a stupid waste of resources and liberty. If we're going to go down that road, perhaps we'd do better to address equally (or more) deadly things that are orders of magnitude more likely.
As the article says, it's a cost/benefit thing. The TSA shows that nobody's doing any kind of cost/benefit analysis.
If people blowing up airplanes becomes something more common, then we can talk. Until then, these measures are nonsense.
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Sure, make the cockpit doors locked, but if you need those locks it's already too late right?
and no amount of lock on doors is going to stop a bomber who does not care if he is in the cockpit or not, a bomb on a plane is a bad thing, in the cockpit or not.
its about weakest links, not cost benefit, if the doors are lock but there is little or no terminal checking, then bombers will simply give up on trying to gain access to the cockpit, and set a bomb next to the centre fuel tank.
Or place a bomb in a suitcase as was Lockerbie.
Or forget cockpit doors, and place a bomb under the seat for the next flight.
its not about cost, its about effectiveness, and you can argue that I agree, but to make it a 'cost-benefit' is just stupid.. Using such a poor argument as 'cost-benefit' makes me think you don't have much else as a decent argument.. if you do why not present it instead.
There would probably be a favourable cost benefit analysis to use non-bullet stopping bullet proof vests in the middle east, but try to tell that to the people who are fighting there and wearing those 'cheaper' vests !
In many (most) cases when lives are involved it is not appropriate (or accepted either) to place it under a 'cost benefit' analysis.
sure cars might be cheaper to buy if they did not have to meet specific safety standards, or emission standards, or have seat belts, or compliant brakes so is that a valid reason to not have those safety standards in place ?
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So you assert, but what is your reasoning? I can't imagine cost/benefit analysis every being stupid. What's stupid is paying a lot (in term of money, liberty, and convenience) to get only a little in return.
Do you know what was done before those regulations were enacted? And do you know what was used to justify those regulations? That's right: cost/benefit analyses.
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One of the immediate reactions to 9/11 was to mandate reinforced cockpit doors that lock. That single change, if in effect on 9/11, would have prevented the hijackings.
Better than nothing, but still not very secure...
Terrorist: Open the door!
Pilot: Never!
Terrorist: Then listen to this woman scream as we cut off her fingers!
Woman: AAAAAAAAAAAHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH!!!
Pilot: OK! Stop it! I'll open the door!
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Don't thieves cut holes in roofs to steal tampons? I meant ipads. I think a jet would be a better payload therefore worth cutting a hole through the wall.
Why not just pump sleeping gas into the chamber after everyone is boarded?
My best suggestion is quit being afraid of the bogeyman. How the hell do half of americans cross the street safely?
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Right..
you yankies are pathetic
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you want to end all crime?
world debt 40.1 trillion of which in 2012 the usa part was 16.5 trillion
be interesting to see the interest the world has to pay for people all the world over being ripped off in a crime against the entire world....
what would we all do with all the added wealth...i know blow stuff up and hurt people right?
THAT NEEDS TO DAWN ON YOU ALL....
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Re: you want to end all crime?
[citation needed]
(Mostly because I want to to satiate my own curiosity.)
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We can all do our part and get rid of the TSA the easy way
I'm a married man so perhaps I'm wrong however. You'll have to ask her...
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Re: We can all do our part and get rid of the TSA the easy way
Mostly because the TSA makes what used to be a wonderful experience into one that is unpleasant in almost every way.
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Re: We can all do our part and get rid of the TSA the easy way
Consider also those of us who live in Alaska and Hawaii. We have no other (reasonable) way to access the rest of the country. Where the rest of you have the option of bus/car/train travel (which also could get the TSA treatment), we simply don't.
I do have a right to travel within my country, and if I don't do it by air, I can't.
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Re: Re: We can all do our part and get rid of the TSA the easy way
Really what it takes is a little will on the part of us, The People.
And regarding the jobs complaint, that sauce is a little weak. How many companies would like to see business travel take 2hrs less? That is a quarter of a normal work day, per traveler. Everyone is paying for the TSA, for their ineptitude and general douche-baggery, one way or another and it is not just our wasted tax dollars, it is with our time, our dignity, and our patience.
It seems to me there is a better way DHS knows it, TSA knows it and everyone here reading this likely knows it too.
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Re: Re: Re: We can all do our part and get rid of the TSA the easy way
I, like pretty much everyone I know who flies, already do this. I don't fly at all unless it is absolutely unavoidable. What you're talking about is more than "a little will." It would represent an enormous sacrifice.
In what way is it weak to argue that avoiding flying means you'd lose you your job?
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Re: We can all do our part and get rid of the TSA the easy way
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Re: We can all do our part and get rid of the TSA the easy way
Those TechDirt readers that fly often: compare the prices through http://privatecharterjet.com/ with major airline prices.
Just for fun: add your hourly pay rate for the amount of time you spend in "security theater" to the major airline prices.
Is this a viable option?
Disclaimer: I very rarely have to fly, so I really have no idea if this is viable.
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At All Costs
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Re: At All Costs
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Re: Re: At All Costs
For example, a congresscritter would never have to deal with being taken to a room and strip-searched/patted down/locked up for hours because a TSA agent thought there was something 'funny' about about them, or they objected to or refused to comply with something the agent was doing, so they'll never be able to understand why people might object to such treatment. It's easy to say 'It's not that bad' when you never have to experience or deal with it yourself after all.
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Only one cost matters
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Terrorists do what terrorists do
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Re: Terrorists do what terrorists do
Man, I hate fat fingers! :-)
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priorities...
1) won't someone think of the children?!?
2) if anything bad happens, I'm blaming the government for allowing it to happen
3) sheesh - Middle Eastern guy - must be a terrorist
4) well, I still want to fly so I can get to my destination faster...
5) wait a minute, it's taking too long to get through security!
So, as you can see, #1-3 will always trump #4-5. I think we're stuck with what we got folks.
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cost-benefit not a good argument
So if only a few planes fall out of the sky and a 1000 or so people are killed that's ok, because the cost to save those few thousand is too high.
So your using the same logic here, if the lives that are saved is (in your opinion) not worth the cost to save them, LET THEM DIE !!!!!
can you guess what the response to this argument was ? (Do you fly?)
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How much would you like to donate to my alien invasion relief fund?
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You want enough to stop someone who thinks they'll gain something from it, goes postal, etc; they're unlikely to rationally plan out what the best target to hit would be (as terrorists generally do).
The single change in security after 9/11 that I feel is useful is having the cockpit sealed upon takeoff. Threats to blow up the plane/kill hostages we can deal with and have in the past.
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