Major Publishers Sue The Internet Archive's Digital Library Program In The Midst Of A Pandemic

from the not-a-good-look-guys dept

For many years, we've said that if the public library were invented today, the book publishers would sue it out of existence. It appears that the big book publishers have decided to prove me right, as they have decided to sue the Internet Archive for lending ebooks without a license.

Over the last few months, we've discussed why publishers and authors were overreacting in their verbal attack on the Internet Archive's decision to launch a "National Emergency Library" to help out during a pandemic. While many publishers and authors declared this to be "piracy," that did not square with reality. The Internet Archive was relying on a variety of precedents regarding the legality of libraries scanning books and lending books, as well as around fair use, to argue that what it was doing was perfectly legal. Indeed, the deeper you looked at the issue, the more it looked like the publishers and authors were upset with the Internet Archive for being a library, since libraries don't need special licenses to lend out books.

In other words, this was yet another attack on property rights. Publishers and some authors were trying to argue that the Internet Archive needed extra licenses to lend out legally made scans of legally obtained books. And to respond to a few common criticisms of the NEL: they were doing this since so many libraries and schools around the world were shuttered due to the pandemic, meaning that millions of books were literally collecting dust on shelves, un-lendable. More importantly, the NEL was not targeting recent releases (all books in the NEL are over 5 years old, and the commercial life of nearly every book is much shorter than that). Finally, contrary to some claims, the books in the NEL are not "bit for bit copies" of high quality ebooks. They are relatively low quality scans. If a more legit version is available, nearly any reasonable person would go for that instead (indeed, I've personally purchased multiple books after first borrowing copies from the Open Library before deciding to get a permanent copy). Also, most of the books available in the NEL are simply not available at all in ebook format, meaning that they're not available at all during the pandemic for many people.

There was some chatter that publishers might choose not to sue the Internet Archive over this, because losing this fight would seriously challenge a bunch of other copyright claims that they rely on. But, come on. These guys are so obsessed with copyright, how could they not sue? So, earlier this week, all the big publisher teamed up to sue the Internet Archive, represented by former RIAA lawyer Matt Oppenheim, who has a long history of being on the bad side of nearly every big copyright case.

Here's the thing, though: the publishers didn't just decide to sue over the National Emergency Library: instead they're also suing over the entire "Controlled Digital Lending" process. That's the program that the Authors' Guild has been whining about, which is the underpinning of the NEL. The CDL/Open Library program involves letting libraries lend out digital books if they retain a physical copy of the book on the shelf (so maintaining a one-to-one relationship between books lent out and books that the libraries have in their possession). The NEL took away that limitation, with the argument that this was allowed due to their reading of fair use in the midst of a pandemic with so many books locked up.

While I support the NEL -- I can recognize that courts may not buy their fair use arguments. On the CDL/Open Library front, though, that's just blatantly attacking a very standard library procedure. There can be no argument of "lost revenue" from the CDL, unless you're attacking the very basis of libraries themselves. And that's what the lawsuit appears to do.

The scale of IA’s scheme is astonishing: At its “Open Library,” located at www.openlibrary.org and www.archive.org (together, the “Website”), IA currently distributes digital scanned copies of over 1.3 million books. And its stated goal is to do so for millions more, essentially distributing free digital copies of every book ever written. Despite the “Open Library” moniker, IA’s actions grossly exceed legitimate library services, do violence to the Copyright Act, and constitute willful digital piracy on an industrial scale. Consistent with the deplorable nature of piracy, IA’s infringement is intentional and systematic: it produces mirror-image copies of millions of unaltered in-copyright works for which it has no rights and distributes them in their entirety for reading purposes to the public for free, including voluminous numbers of books that are currently commercially available.

Except the identical argument applies to public libraries lending physical copies as well. It does not "grossly exceed legitimate library services." It makes books it has in its possession available for borrowing. Just like a library. Yes, the books are digitized, but libraries also distribute exact copies of books in their entirety for reading purposes to the public for free. Including voluminous numbers of books that are currently commercially available.

That's a LIBRARY.

The lawsuit tries to pay lip service to libraries, and to argue that what IA is doing is somehow different than a library, but it doesn't hold up to much scrutiny. Instead, the lawsuit and the Publisher's Association's press release about this are filled with nonsense rhetoric about how crucial books are to society and how evil, evil piracy is. From the lawsuit:

Books have long been essential to our society. Fiction and non-fiction alike, they transport us to new worlds, broaden our horizons, provide us with perspective, reflect the evergrowing knowledge of humanity in every field, spark our imaginations and deepen our understanding of the world. Yet, books are not self-generating. They are the product of training and study, talent and grit, perseverance and creativity, investment and risk, and untold hours of work.

That's right: and for tons of people they way they read those books is from a library. The Association of American Publishers, led by fired former Copyright Register Maria Pallante is spitting fire over this:

Despite the self-serving library branding of its operations, IA’s conduct bears little resemblance to the trusted role that thousands of American libraries play within their communities and as participants in the lawful copyright marketplace. IA scans books from cover to cover, posts complete digital files to its website, and solicits users to access them for free by signing up for Internet Archive Accounts. The sheer scale of IA’s infringement described in the complaint—and its stated objective to enlarge its illegal trove with abandon—appear to make it one of the largest known book pirate sites in the world. IA publicly reports millions of dollars in revenue each year, including financial schemes that support its infringement design.

In willfully ignoring the Copyright Act, IA conflates the separate markets and business models made possible by the statute’s incentives and protections, robbing authors and publishers of their ability to control the manner and timing of communicating their works to the public. IA not only conflates print books and eBooks, it ignores the well-established channels in which publishers do business with bookstores, e-commerce platforms, and libraries, including for print and eBook lending.

Yeah, but that's kinda the point, isn't it? The publishers have been chipping away at "libraries" for years. Before ebooks, libraries could buy books and lend them out. They didn't need a special license. However, in recent years, publishers have rushed into the opportunity created by ebooks to change that, and to require licenses (crazy, expensive licenses) for ebooks. Just last fall we noted how publishing giant Macmillan (which, somewhat oddly, is the one big publishing house that is not a plaintiff) had gone to war with libraries, using its extreme ebook pricing and licensing terms to basically kill the market for ebook library lending.

It's that very new imbalance that the CDL/Open Library system was designed to fight back against. But, no, the publishers act as if they've always been able to block libraries from lending.

And, of course, filing this lawsuit in the midst of a pandemic (not to mention all the social unrest) in which libraries around the globe remain closed is just... crass.

For what it's worth, in looking down the list of works sued over, and doing a spot sampling, it looks like at least some (though not all) of the works being sued over are no longer available through the National Emergency Library. Since the NEL has always had a simple opt-out system, it does make you wonder why these publishers and authors didn't just make use of that. But also looking over that list, I see a bunch of books that I know are read in schools -- meaning that these publishing houses likely have just screwed over a bunch of teachers and students, many of whom already have physical copies of books, but find them inaccessible for the kids to read while we all still remain under lockdown.

So much for those books being "essential to our society."

But, of course, this is copyright, and the rule of the land tends to be that when big legacy copyright holders file lawsuits, they tend to win. I'd say there's a more than even chance that the Internet Archive loses. Not because it should, but because when big old industries scream copyright infringement, we've seen the courts buy it over and over again, even when the legal arguments are nonsensical. And, in this case, the Internet Archive's legal theories are certainly untested. There isn't real legal precedent to guide this. For its part, the Internet Archive has said that they hope this can be resolved quickly, however, there are very real concerns that this fight could bankrupt the entire Internet Archive.

I do wonder if the authors who spoke out against this really want to shut down such an important institution just so they can sell a couple more books.

Filed Under: controlled digital lending, copyright, covid-19, fair use, libraries, library, national emergency library
Companies: aap, hachette, harper collins, internet archive, john wiley, penguin random house

Supreme Court Makes It (Slightly) Easier To Award Attorneys' Fees For Bogus Copyright Lawsuits

from the a-little-bit dept

You may recall the Kirtsaeng case that we covered a few years back, in which a student, Sudap Kirtsaeng, had been sued for copyright infringement by publishing giant John Wiley for buying English-language textbooks in Thailand (that were cheap) and then reselling them to students in the US. It was a classic arbitrage situation. Wiley insisted that this was infringing, while Kirtsaeng pointed to the First Sale doctrine, allowing people to resell physical products they've legally purchased, even if they include copyright-covered content. Wiley's argument against first sale is that it only applied to content that was "legally made under this title." Thus, since the textbooks were made in Thailand and not under US copyright law, First Sale didn't apply. The Supreme Court, thankfully, rejected that argument 6 to 3, and said that first sale does apply. That was good.

The case then went back to the lower courts where Kirtsaeng sought to have Wiley pay his legal fees. The lower court and the appeals court both rejected this request, arguing that the standard for assigning attorneys' fees in copyright cases was whether or not the plaintiff bringing the case had an "objectively reasonable" argument -- and noting that with 3 of the 9 Justices eventually siding with Wiley, the case was likely "objectively reasonable," even if it failed in the end. This argument also reached the Supreme Court and on Thursday, the Justices decided to tweak the standard.

Very similar to the case it decided earlier in the week concerning patent damages (and, in fact, it cites that case in this ruling), the Supreme Court rejects the purely "objectively reasonable" standard test as being too "rigid." It's pretty clear that the court thinks that lower courts should have some leeway in determining the appropriate remedies, rather than sticking to a set of strict guidelines.

All of that said, objective reasonableness can be only an important factor in assessing fee applications—not the controlling one. As we recognized in Fogerty, §505 confers broad discretion on district courts and, in deciding whether to fee-shift, they must take into account a range of considerations beyond the reasonableness of litigating positions.... That means in any given case a court may award fees even though the losing party offered reasonable arguments (or, conversely, deny fees even though the losing party made unreasonable ones). For example, a court may order fee-shifting because of a party’s litigation misconduct, whatever the reasonableness of his claims or defenses.... Or a court may do so to deter repeated instances of copyright infringement or overaggressive assertions of copyright claims, again even if the losing position was reasonable in a particular case. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. WB Music Corp., 520 F. 3d 588, 593–595 (CA6 2008) (awarding fees against a copyright holder who filed hundreds of suits on an over-broad legal theory, including in a subset of cases in which it was objectively reasonable). Although objective reasonableness carries significant weight, courts must view all the circumstances of a case on their own terms, in light of the Copyright Act’s essential goals.

Based on this, the court sent the case back down to the lower court to reconsider, since it originally rejected the request for fees by saying the original claims were "objectively reasonable." So now the court has to consider "other stuff" not clearly laid out by the Supreme Court to see if it could award attorneys' fees for other reasons -- such as the fact that the case was useful in settling an important, but until then, unsettled bit of law: whether or not first sale applied to foreign made goods.

This is probably, mostly, a good thing. Rigid tests can fail in unique circumstances, so granting flexibility is good. But of course, there's also a downside to flexibility, in that it leads to greater uncertainty, and that may scare off certain worthwhile activities. Either way, the court seems to have made the right decision here, and now Kirtsaeng gets another shot at getting attorneys' fees from Wiley.

Filed Under: copyright, fee shifting, fees, sudap kirtsaeng, supreme court
Companies: john wiley

Supreme Court Gets It Right In Kirtsaeng: You Can Resell Things You Bought Abroad Without Infringing

from the phew dept

For a few years now, we've been following the Kirtsaeng case, in which a student was sued by publisher John Wiley & Sons for buying cheap (legal) textbooks abroad, and then reselling them in the US for profit. Wiley claimed this was copyright infringement, while the student, Sudap Kirtsaeng, argued that the first sale doctrine applied. First sale gives you the right to resell, say, a book that you legally bought without having to get permission from the copyright holder. Under copyright law, it says that the first sale doctrine applies to any product "legally made under this title." Wiley argued that goods made abroad were not legally made under US law since they were made abroad (even though, obviously, it wanted the rest of copyright law to apply to it once those works came to the US). We were guardedly optimistic after the oral hearings at the Supreme Court, in which the Justices explored the "parade of horribles" that might happen if Wiley won. And while what happens at oral arguments frequently doesn't seem to have any bearing on the eventual situation, in this case, the Supreme Court has ruled in favor of Kirtsaeng, saying that it is silly to interpret the first sale doctrine the way Wiley does, and that there is no evidence that such "geographical restrictions" make sense, or that Congress intended such a result.

In our view, §109(a)’s language, its context, and the common-law history of the “first sale” doctrine, taken together, favor a non-geographical interpretation. We also doubt that Congress would have intended to create the practical copyright-related harms with which a geographical interpretation would threaten ordinary scholarly, artistic, commercial, and consumer activities.... We consequently conclude that Kirtsaeng’s nongeographical reading is the better reading of the Act.

To get technical, the key issue in the dispute was that two different sections of copyright law could be read to conflict. Section 109 defines the First Sale doctrine while Section 602 defines importation of works. Kirtsaeng focused on 109, while Wiley insisted that 602 is more important. The Supreme Court -- by a six to three margin -- side strongly with Kirtsaeng. The majority was written by Justice Breyer, who is consistently good on intellectual property issues, while the dissent was led by Ginsburg, who is consistently bad on copyright issues (Scalia and Kennedy sided with Ginsburg). Thankfully the "good" side won out today.

The language of §109(a) read literally favors Kirtsaeng’s nongeographical interpretation, namely, that “lawfully made under this title” means made “in accordance with” or “in compliance with” the Copyright Act. The language of §109(a) says nothing about geography. The word “under” can mean “[i]n accordance with.” 18 Oxford English Dictionary 950 (2d ed. 1989). See also Black’s Law Dictionary 1525 (6th ed. 1990) (“according to”). And a nongeographical interpretation provides each word of the five-word phrase with a distinct purpose. The first two words of the phrase, “lawfully made,” suggest an effort to distinguish those copies that were made lawfully from those that were not, and the last three words, “under this title,” set forth the standard of “lawful[ness].” Thus, the nongeographical reading is simple, it promotes a traditional copyright objective (combatting piracy), and it makes word-by-word linguistic sense.

The geographical interpretation, however, bristles with linguistic difficulties. It gives the word “lawfully” little, if any, linguistic work to do. (How could a book be unlawfully “made under this title”?) It imports geography into a statutory provision that says nothing explicitly about it. And it is far more complex than may at first appear.

To read the clause geographically, Wiley, like the Second Circuit and the Solicitor General, must first emphasize the word “under.” Indeed, Wiley reads “under this title” to mean “in conformance with the Copyright Act where the Copyright Act is applicable.” Brief for Respondent 15. Wiley must then take a second step, arguing that the Act “is applicable” only in the United States. Ibid. And the Solicitor General must do the same. See Brief for United States 6 (“A copy is ‘lawfully made under this title’ if Title 17 governs the copy’s creation and the copy is made in compliance with Title 17’s requirements”). See also post, at 7 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting) (“under” describes something “governed or regulated by another”).

One difficulty is that neither “under” nor any other word in the phrase means “where.” See, e.g., 18 Oxford English Dictionary, supra, at 947–952 (definition of “under”). It might mean “subject to,” see post, at 6, but as this Court has repeatedly acknowledged, the word evades a uniform, consistent meaning. See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 245 (2010) (“‘under’ is chameleon”); Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129, 135 (1991) (“under” has “many dictionary definitions” and “must draw its meaning from its context”).

A far more serious difficulty arises out of the uncertainty and complexity surrounding the second step’s effort to read the necessary geographical limitation into the word “applicable” (or the equivalent). Where, precisely, is the Copyright Act “applicable”? The Act does not instantly protect an American copyright holder from unauthorized piracy taking place abroad. But that fact does not mean the Act is inapplicable to copies made abroad. As a matter of ordinary English, one can say that a statute imposing, say, a tariff upon “any rhododendron grown in Nepal” applies to all Nepalese rhododendrons. And, similarly, one can say that the American Copyright Act is applicable to all pirated copies, including those printed overseas. Indeed, the Act itself makes clear that (in the Solicitor General’s language) foreign-printed pirated copies are “subject to” the Act.

The ruling goes on to lay out historical and logical reasons why first sale should apply. It's a good read. It looks like Breyer relied, in part, on the American Library Association's concern for how a ruling against First Sale would cause serious harm to libraries, which would have to somehow figure out ways to get permission on any book they had that was printed outside the US. He similarly cites concerns of used book dealers and the tech industry that this would get in the way of all sorts of reasonable transactions.

Technology companies tell us that “automobiles, microwaves, calculators, mobile phones, tablets, and personal computers” contain copyrightable software programs or packaging. Many of these items are made abroad with the American copyright holder’s permission and then sold and imported (with that permission) to the United States. A geographical interpretation would prevent the resale of, say, a car, without the permission of the holder of each copyright on each piece of copyrighted automobile software. Yet there is no reason to believe that foreign auto manufacturers regularly obtain this kind of permission from their software component suppliers, and Wiley did not indicate to the contrary when asked. Without that permission a foreign car owner could not sell his or her used car.

Breyer dismisses the idea, presented by Wiley, that because this "parade of horribles" hasn't happened yet, it won't happen in the future if the ruling had gone the other way. The ruling notes that this is still somewhat unsettled law, but that large parts of the economy clearly rely on the first sale doctrine, and upsetting that apple cart could have dramatic impact. It also rejects other spurious arguments, including a favorite of copyright maximalists, that the first sale doctrine on such works prevents copyright holders from doing differential pricing. The court rightfully questions what this has to do with copyright:

Wiley and the dissent claim that a nongeographical interpretation will make it difficult, perhaps impossible, for publishers (and other copyright holders) to divide foreign and domestic markets. We concede that is so. A publisher may find it more difficult to charge different prices for the same book in different geographic markets. But we do not see how these facts help Wiley, for we can find no basic principle of copyright law that suggests that publishers are especially entitled to such rights.

[....] the Constitution’s language nowhere suggests that its limited exclusive right should include a right to divide markets or a concomitant right to charge different purchasers different prices for the same book, say to increase or to maximize gain. Neither, to our knowledge, did any Founder make any such suggestion.We have found no precedent suggesting a legal preference for interpretations of copyright statutes that would provide for market divisions.

To the contrary, Congress enacted a copyright law that (through the “first sale” doctrine) limits copyright holders’ability to divide domestic markets. And that limitation is consistent with antitrust laws that ordinarily forbid market divisions.

The dissent obsesses over this issue of differential pricing, despite it having little to do with copyrights and simple serves to reinforce the idea -- as seen in previous copyright rulings, including Eldred -- that Justice Ginsburg seems to have a bit of a blindspot in copyright cases, such that anything that helps copyright maximalists is automatically seen as "good."

But, perhaps more importantly, Justice Ginsburg repeatedly cites various international trade agreements in arguing that her position is the correct one. With this ruling decided as is, copyright maximalists will no doubt seek to have Congress change the law in their favor -- especially now that comprehensive copyright reform is back on the table. But, as a part of that, you can absolutely expect to see this issue pop up in various international trade agreements as well. Copyright maximalists will seek to force Congress' hand in suggesting that first sale rights do not transfer over for goods made in foreign countries. This is something that we're all going to have to pay close attention to in the coming years.

Filed Under: copyright, first sale, foreign goods, international exhaustion, kirtsaeng, resale rights, sudap kirtsaeng, supreme court
Companies: john wiley

Copyright Trolling For Dummies: Wiley Gets Default Judgment

from the books-not-to-buy dept

A little over a year ago, we noted that large publishing house John Wiley (also the plaintiff in the Kirtsaeng case that seeks to wipe out First Sale rights on many goods) was jumping into the copyright trolling game by suing a bunch of people for supposedly sharing digital copies of the company's "For Dummies" books online (though unlike other trolls, at least Wiley tried to target people who were actually in the same jurisdiction: New York). In typical copyright trolling fashion, the company was seeking that people pay up, but a few apparently ignored the whole thing, leading Wiley to score a default judgment against them. Default judgments are generally meaningless in terms of having a wider impact. It's what happens when the defendant ignores the lawsuit, and most courts just give the plaintiff everything they want (though they don't have to) and leave it to the plaintiff to figure out a way to collect.

In this case, the court has issued default judgments against Tammy Roberts and Fred Burgos. It looks like the case went more or along the lines of how copyright trolls would like: the judge allowed the subpoenas, and a few months later, Wiley amended the complaint to name names based on what it learned from the subpoenas issued to ISPs. And... just before anything else was scheduled to happen Wiley magically dismissed most of the defendants (meaning they paid up). The two exceptions were Burgos and Rogers. Wiley insists it properly served both of them, and they both ignored it -- and now the court says they need to pay $7,000 -- split up as $5,000 for copyright infringement and $2,000 for trademark infringement. This is exactly what Wiley asked for. The judge just took what they asked for and accepted it, which is unfortunately common in default judgment cases.

The trademark claim here seems especially bizarre and it's unfortunate that the judge just granted the default judgment. For it to be a trademark infringement, there needs to be a "use in commerce," and it's unclear how posting something online could be seen as a use in commerce if there was no commercial aspect to it. In the grand scheme of things, these rulings mean very little, since they're default judgments, but they'll likely be used by copyright trolls to try to justify their own actions going forward.

Filed Under: copyright, copyright trolling, default judgment, for dummies, trademark
Companies: john wiley

IP Throwdown: Patent Lawyers Sued For... Copyright Infringement

from the fight-fight-fight dept

Last month, we wrote about how the USPTO had stepped in to a brewing fight between copyright lawyers and patent lawyers, saying that it believed that submitting journal articles as part of the patenting process was fair use. Apparently, the copyright lawyers working for the scientific journals disagreed... and the fight is on: the journals have sued a bunch of patent lawyers for making use of articles from the journals in preparing their patent applications. The journals, in their desperate desire to squeeze more cash out of everything, were demanding that patent lawyers get an additional license if they wanted to submit copies of journal articles along with patent applications.

While it's rare that you'll find me agreeing with the patent bar on very much, on this one, I'm on their side. The lawsuit, lead by publisher John Wiley, is kind of crazy. We're not talking about people who are getting copies of the journal for free. These are generally people who have a legitimate subscription to the journals, and are submitting copies of the information as part of the patent process -- as they're required to do by law. This is just yet another attempt by the publishers to get paid for every single possible use, even for those who already have legitimate access. And, of course, these journals don't have the best reputation these days, with their attempts to block open access requirements. While there may be some appeal in making it more difficult to get a patent (something where I believe the bar needs to be much, much, much higher), I don't think this is as reasonable way to do so.

In nearly every way, it seems like submitting such a journal article as part of a patent application process should be seen as fair use. It really does fit the kind of key "spirit" of the fair use rule.

Filed Under: copyright, fair use, lawsuit, patent applications, patents
Companies: john wiley

Why Adversarial Hearings Are Important: Rulings Change When The Other Side Is Heard

from the let-them-be-heard dept

We already wrote about the judge's ruling saying that Chitika was not liable for running ads on a site that linked to some allegedly infringing material, but there was a separate point brought out by the case -- and by Eric Goldman's analysis, that I wanted to highlight. As we noted, in that case, a court said that Chitika shouldn't be liable, because it was unaware of the infringement. But, the thing is, this is the second ruling in this case. The original ruling, back in January was different. It ordered the ad networks Chitika and Clicksor to freeze all money for the site and stop serving ads. But all of that was done without Chitika's participation in the case. In other words, no adversarial hearing.

Once Chitika got involved, the ruling flipped almost entirely. Or, as Goldman summarizes:

But hold on a second. The court's January order was based on ex parte proceedings. Chitika subsequently showed up to contest the case, and surprise! The court reaches a different result after adversarial proceedings. Let's hear it for due process!!! YEAH!

We hear all the time from defenders of ICE domain seizures and SOPA/PIPA that there is due process "because there's a judge involved." But that's not due process. If one of the key parties impacted by the lawsuit is not heard from it's not due process at all. True due process means you hear from those actually impacted. And, as we see in this case, it can make a pretty big difference.

Filed Under: adversarial hearings, due process, pipa, protect ip, sopa
Companies: chitika, clicksor, elsevier, john wiley

Publishers Can't Just Blame Ad Network For Having Ads On A Site That Links To Infringing Content

from the properly-applying-liability dept

As we've seen in some cases, there is a belief among some that many of the worst provisions in SOPA already exist under US copyright law. The latest story involves publishers Elsevier and John Wiley going after ad networks Chitika and Clicksor, because their ads showed up on a site that linked to (but did not host) some content that allegedly infringed. We mentioned this case earlier in the year, but the latest ruling is at least a slight limit on this attempt at what appears to be fourth party liability, rather than third party liability. Note the distance. Someone puts up a website with some infringing content. Someone else links to that content. Someone else provides advertising on that site that links... and the copyright holder claims the advertiser is liable? Huh?

The ruling does go against the publishers here, but only because they failed to first send a notice alerting Chitika, so the court said that Chitika didn't know that the content was infringing:

Plaintiffs do not allege facts showing that Chitika was familiar with the content of the Pharmatext website, or knew (or had reason to know) that such content was infringing. Thus, plaintiffs fail to support with plausible facts their conclusory allegations that Chitika �must have had knowledge� of the alleged infringement of plaintiffs� books...and that Chitika �plac[ed] ads on the Pharmatext site because [it] believe[d] that Pharmatext users � in other words, people seeking to obtain pirated copies of copyrighted books � are a target audience for particular advertisers.�

Of course, as Eric Goldman notes in his analysis (linked above), this suggests that if Elsevier had sent notice, then it might have a claim... and suddenly we're back in SOPA territory, since that has a notice provision for advertisers.

There is also some discussion in the case of whether or not US jurisdiction is proper, seeing as the site was directed at users in India. Elsevier claimed that because its investigators downloaded the content in the US, that means it's proper to apply US laws, but the court isn't entirely sure of that:

While it appears that Chitika may eventually be entitled to judgment on this ground (that is, plaintiffs� failure to allege any act of direct infringement occurring entirely within the United States), factual issues involving the structure of the Internet and the locus of the infringing activity remain (Where did the copying take place? Where are the third-party websites and servers, from which unauthorized copies of plaintiffs� books were downloaded?). These issues preclude the granting of the motion on this ground.

Of course, even pre-SOPA, the Justice Department and ICE like to claim that any .com or .org is automatically subject to US jurisdiction. Either way, it's a reminder that even without SOPA or PIPA in place, the courts may be creating very similar caselaw anyway. That's pretty scary.

Especially when it comes to such fourth party, or tertiary liability, since it seems positively crazy to think that someone so disconnected from any law breaking might be legally liable for it. Again, as Goldman notes:

Notice that this court totally sidestepped (or missed?) the tertiary liability aspect of this case--that Chitika was a support provider to a site that only provided links to allegedly infringing files. To me, it would be entirely appropriate for the court to say that any tertiary player categorically lacks the ability to materially contribute to infringing activity. Otherwise, once we start doing a dragnet for service providers to service providers to infringers, the universe of potential defendants grows to a ridiculous size.

If anything this is why we should be creating further safe harbors for parties, not decimating them with things like SOPA and PIPA.

Filed Under: ad networks, fourth party liability, secondary liability, sopa, tertiary liability, third party liability
Companies: chitika, clicksor, elsevier, john wiley

Copyright Trolling For Dummies; Publisher John Wiley Sues 27 For Sharing 'For Dummies' Books

from the getting-desperate dept

It looks like more and more "mainstream" companies are jumping on the copyright trolling/mass litigation bandwagon. The latest example is publishing giant John Wiley, suing 27 John Does for sharing various Dummies books via BitTorrent. Wiley insists that its book on Photoshop alone has been downloaded over 74,000 times. For what it's worth, Wiley's lawyers appear to have carefully tried to limit the IP addresses sued to just those in New York, where the case was filed. It's not clear if Wiley will follow the path of many other trolls to follow the lawsuit and subpoenas with shakedown threat letters. That would be unfortunate. Either way, this guarantees that I won't be buying any "Dummies" books going forward (and will try to avoid other Wiley books, if possible, as well). There's just no good reason to give support to companies who sue people like this, rather than learn to adapt.

Filed Under: books, copyright, copyright trolling, dummies, mass lawsuits
Companies: john wiley