FTC CTO: Full Disk Encryption Is Important In Preventing Crime

from the taking-a-stand dept

While the FBI and NSA continue their campaign to fight against allowing encryption for devices, it's clear that not everyone in the government agrees. It does appear that there's a bit of a fight going on within the administration over where to come down (as President Obama himself admitted), and in a recent blog post, it seems pretty clear where the FTC comes down in this debate. The FTC's CTO, Ashkan Soltani, who has long been a strong user-privacy advocate (and before joining the FTC helped in some of the reporting on the Snowden documents), wrote the blog post celebrating the virtues of full disk encryption and other "end user device controls." It starts out by noting that when he recently lost his own laptop, he wasn't that worried, thanks to the fact that it was encrypted.

Strong end-user privacy and security controls, such as device encryption and firmware passwords, not only protect personal information from unwanted access – they can also make it easier to recover lost or stolen devices as well.

Last month, I had the misfortune of having a personal laptop stolen.

Fortunately for me, while I was a bit bummed about losing my two-year-old laptop, I backup regularly and always enable disk encryption which is an important step to protect the information stored on the hard-disk from unwanted access by criminals, employers, or other actors (with the exception of very sophisticated adversaries).

He notes that this actually allowed him to help track down the device, because whoever ended up with the "useless" laptop tried to bring it to an Apple Genius Bar, which resulted in Soltani receiving an email.

Fast forward to a few weeks later, when I received an email to my personal account notifying me of an upcoming Apple Genius Bar visit. I was initially confused by the email but soon realized that it's probably the thief (or the undiscerning buyer) of my laptop trying to take it into Apple for repair – likely because they’re unable to use it without knowing the firmware password I set.

I immediately began calling local law enforcement and the nearby Apple stores notifying them of the theft and this development. After a few phone calls and the help of a fantastic Sergeant in the Local Crimes Unit of the Sacramento Police department, I was able to coordinate an agreement whereby Apple would notify law enforcement if the new user brought the machine in for repair. After an initial disappointment on account of the suspect skipping his Genius Bar reservation, a representative from Apple Customer Relations notified me that the device was brought into another store and they were coordinating with Sacramento Police Department to return it to me. I’m unclear as to whether they were able to track down the original thief.

And thus, the FTC's CTO makes it clear that full disk encryption has benefits beyond even just keeping your own data safe:

In the end, strong end-user controls like device encryption and firmware passwords not only protect sensitive info stored on the device, they also prevent criminals from utilizing stolen property. The more devices feature strong end-user controls, the less likely thieves can profit from their theft on the open market.

Given that the FBI is supposed to be interested in preventing crime, you'd think James Comey would support that kind of thing...

Filed Under: ashkan soltani, encryption, ftc, full disk encryption, going dark, laptops

DOJ Dismisses Case After Court Explains That Feds Can't Just Grab Someone's Laptop At The Border

from the tail-tucked dept

Remember the 4th Amendment? We hear it's making a comeback. Back in May, we had a story about another court explaining to the government that, contrary to popular belief within Homeland Security, the 4th Amendment does still apply at the border, and thus Border Patrol can't just take someone's laptop without a warrant.

The case involved a guy named Jae Shik Kim, who the government suspected was shipping items to China that were then being forwarded to Iran. Because of that, DHS grabbed his laptop as he was leaving the US (on a flight to Korea). The DOJ argued that the laptop was a "container" subject to search at the border. The court disabused the DOJ of this notion:

After considering all of the facts and authorities set forth above, then, the Court finds, under the totality of the unique circumstances of this case, that the imaging and search of the entire contents of Kim’s laptop, aided by specialized forensic software, for a period of unlimited duration and an examination of unlimited scope, for the purpose of gathering evidence in a pre-existing investigation, was supported by so little suspicion of ongoing or imminent criminal activity, and was so invasive of Kim’s privacy and so disconnected from not only the considerations underlying the breadth of the government’s authority to search at the border, but also the border itself, that it was unreasonable.

Given an opportunity to respond, the DOJ has dropped the entire case.

The United States, by and through its attorney, the Acting United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, respectfully moves this Court to dismiss the Indictment against the defendants. As grounds for this motion, the government states the following: in a Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed on May 8, 2015, the Court granted the defendants’ motion to suppress evidence, and the government has decided not to pursue an appeal of that decision. Accordingly, the government is unable to continue prosecuting this matter, and we therefore move the Court to dismiss the Indictment pending against the defendants.

Yup. Next time, maybe don't violate the 4th Amendment.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, border search, doj, jae shik kim, laptops

Court To Homeland Security: Wait, No, You Can't Just Take Anyone's Laptop At The Border To Bring Somewhere To Search

from the just-like-a-cell-phone-isn't-a-pair-of-pants dept

The government -- via the DHS and CBP -- has long insisted it should be able to search whatever, whenever, within X number of miles of the border for national security reasons. The DOJ has routinely argued on its behalf, delivering non sequiturs like "Not searching your laptop doesn't protect your civil liberties" with a straight face.

The security/liberty tradeoff has routinely suffered from the government's insistence that its Fourth Amendment-skirting efforts are in the public's best interest, even if the public isn't nearly as interested in seeing the drawers of their personal computing equipment emptied onto the floor every time they stray too close to the "Constitution-Free Zone."

The courts have generally upheld the government's arguments, with a few exceptions. The Eastern District of New York basically said that if you don't want your stuff looked through for no reason, don't put so much stuff in your stuff -- especially sensitive stuff. The presiding judge, Edward Korman, went so far as to compare the US to countries with severe civil rights issues, like Syria and Lebanon, and declared the US the "winner," seemingly because citizens enjoy more rights once they move further inland.

The 9th Circuit Court went the other way, upholding the rights of citizens to be "secure in their papers" -- something most laptops contain en masse. A laptop is not a suitcase and cannot be examined simply because it happens to be crossing the border. Electronic devices are not analogous to physical items travelers carry, no matter how much it benefits the government to treat cell phones as "pockets" and laptops as "suitcases."

Now another court has taken on the government's ridiculous assertions that a laptop is a suitcase/box of papers/open pickup bed full of personal information.

In this case, CBP seized a laptop from Jae Shik Kim, whom it suspected was involved with shipping certain items to China, which were then forwarded to Iran. DHS agents grabbed Kim's laptop before he boarded an outbound flight to Korea. It then took this laptop from where it was seized to an office 150 miles away from where it was seized and dug through it for incriminating information. It found some, but this evidence has now been suppressed.

Judge Amy Jackson attacks the government's ridiculous assertions within the first few paragraphs of the ruling:

The government points to its plenary authority to conduct warrantless searches at the border. It posits that a laptop computer is simply a “container” that was examined pursuant to this authority, and it submits that the government’s unfettered right to search cargo at the border to protect the homeland is the beginning and end of the matter.

Jackson deals with both the treatment of personal electronic devices as "cargo" and the government's reliance on a "Constitution-Free Zone" that apparently exists wherever the government says it exists.

But to apply those principles under the facts of this case would mean that the border search doctrine has no borders. The search of the laptop began well after Kim had already departed, and it was conducted approximately 150 miles away from the airport. The government engaged in an extensive examination of the entire contents of Kim’s hard drive after it had already been secured, and it accorded itself unlimited time to do so. There was little or no reason to suspect that criminal activity was afoot at the time Kim was about to cross the border, and there was little about this search – neither its location nor its scope and duration – that resembled a routine search at the border. The fundamental inquiry required under the Fourth Amendment is whether the invasion of the defendant’s right to privacy in his papers and effects was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, and the Court finds that it was not.

Unbelievably, the government actually used the Ninth Circuit Court's decision finding suspicionless searches of electronics a violation of the Fourth Amendment in its defense of its search of Kim's laptop. Adding this to its "container" assertion leads to some cognitive dissonance, which Judge Jackson points out:

The government argues first and foremost that a laptop is nothing more than a sort of container, and that the agents had full authority to scour its contents without the need for a warrant or a showing of any particular level of suspicion simply because the search was initiated at the border. [...] But the government also suggests that a search which took place at LAX, involving a passenger traveling to and from California, should be assessed utilizing the Ninth Circuit precedent set forth in United States v. Cotterman...

In Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit announced that reasonable suspicion was required before investigators could undertake the forensic examination of a computer hard drive as part of a search that began as a cursory review at the border. In this case, the government argues both that no suspicion was necessary since this was an ordinary, reasonable border search that can be distinguished from the forensic examination that took place in Cotterman, and also that the necessary suspicion was present.

After examining and discarding a number of precedential rulings that don't quite fit the situation at hand, Judge Jackson turns to the Supreme Court's recent Riley ruling, dealing with warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest. Since a laptop has more in common with today's smartphones than the address books, leather valises and pocket contents of yesteryear, Jackson applies the standards set by that ruling.

Applying the Riley framework, the national security concerns that underlie the enforcement of export control regulations at the border must be balanced against the degree to which Kim’s privacy was invaded in this instance. And as was set forth above, while the immediate national security concerns were somewhat attenuated, the invasion of privacy was substantial: the agents created an identical image of Kim’s entire computer hard drive and gave themselves unlimited time to search the tens of thousands of documents, images, and emails it contained, using an extensive list of search terms, and with the assistance of two forensic software programs that organized, expedited, and facilitated the task. Based upon the testimony of both Special Agent Hamako and Special Agent Marshall, the Court concludes that wherever the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals eventually draws the precise boundary of a routine border search, or however either Court ultimately defines a forensic – as opposed to a conventional – computer search, this search was qualitatively and quantitatively different from a routine border examination, and therefore, it was unreasonable given the paucity of grounds to suspect that criminal activity was in progress.

Not only that, but the possible exception to the Riley ruling -- the presumed waiving of Constitutional rights simply by entering/exiting the country -- isn't available to the government, thanks to its own actions.

It is true that Kim’s laptop was seized at the border – in this case, LAX – but it was not even opened, much less searched, there. It was transported approximately 150 miles to San Diego, it was retained for a limited period of time, and eventually, the laptop was returned. Meanwhile, there was so little of note found in Kim’s luggage, and he posed so little of an ongoing threat to national security, that he was permitted to board his flight.

If the government allowed Kim to leave the country, it obviously didn't have enough reasonable suspicion to search his laptop. This was a fishing expedition, partly predicated on some solid hunches, but that's not enough to justify the level of intrusion the government subjected Kim to. These actions are also jarring in their dissonance: if Kim was considered "dangerous" enough to have his rights discarded for national security reasons, then it raises questions as to why he was allowed to travel halfway around the world unimpeded. The government again wishes to have it both ways: Kim is a suspected criminal but also free to leave the country -- something most criminal suspects aren't allowed to do.

All of this contradictory reasoning adds up to a suppression of the evidence the government worked so hard to obtain:

After considering all of the facts and authorities set forth above, then, the Court finds, under the totality of the unique circumstances of this case, that the imaging and search of the entire contents of Kim’s laptop, aided by specialized forensic software, for a period of unlimited duration and an examination of unlimited scope, for the purpose of gathering evidence in a pre-existing investigation, was supported by so little suspicion of ongoing or imminent criminal activity, and was so invasive of Kim’s privacy and so disconnected from not only the considerations underlying the breadth of the government’s authority to search at the border, but also the border itself, that it was unreasonable.

This ruling clearly highlights the asinine arguments justifying the government's at-will, warrantless border searches. The DHS/CBP continues to assert electronics, containing thousands of documents and a wealth of personal information that normally wouldn't be transported across borders in a physical fashion, should be treated as nothing more than "containers." It doesn't make this connection because it's obtuse. It makes this connection because it wants as much unfettered access as it can get.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, amy jackson, border search, cbp, computers, dhs, jae shik kim, laptops

2009 DHS Document Says Border Patrol Can Search/Copy The Contents Of Your Device Just Because It Wants To

from the all-about-that-privacy-you-won't-be-allowed dept

FOIA clearinghouse MuckRock has scored another revealing document, this time from Customs and Border Protection. As we're well aware, the US border isn't technically considered to be part of the United States, at least not as far as the Constitution is concerned. All bets are off, 4th (and others) Amendment-wise. If you're traveling with anything -- whether its a vehicle, suitcase or laptop -- expect it to be searched.

What MuckRock has obtained is the DHS's Privacy Impact Assessment of the CBP's search policies. The only thing seen of this near-mythical document to this point has been a two-page summary of the report's contents, released nearly three years after its border search policy went into effect.The assessment basically says privacy will be severely impacted… and not much else. To do otherwise is to open the borders to terrorists, illegal immigrants, drug runners, child porn traffickers... at least according to the talking points. If you're none of the above, you're not exempt from in-depth warrantless searches of your person and belongings, including laptops and other electronic devices.

Based upon little more than the opinion of a single US Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) officer, any device can be searched and its contents read. With approval from a supervisor, the device can be seized, its contents copied in full, or both.

These opinions, also known as "gut feelings" and "mental coin tosses" (the latter extremely popular with the TSA's Behavioral Detection Officers), are all it takes to initiate a very intrusive search.

Part of this we can blame on the courts and their deference to national security fears.

Under DHS authorities to conduct border searches, travelers' electronic devices are equally subject to search as any other belongings because the information contained in them may be relevant to customs and immigration inspection processes and decisions. While the terms "merchandise" and "baggage" are used, the courts have interpreted border search authorities to extend to all of a traveler's belongings, including electronic devices and the information in such devices.

Beyond the hunches that trigger warrantless searches of electronic devices, the CBP also has the authority to demand travelers translate foreign languages and/or decrypt files.

Demand for Assistance: During a border search, ICE and CBP have specific statutory authority to demand assistance from any person or entity. For searches of electronic devices, CBP or ICE may demand technical assistance, including translation or decryption or specific subject matter expertise that may be necessary to allow CBP or ICE to access or understand the detained information.

In some cases, travelers will be notified that their device has been searched. In others, the CBP and ICE will withhold this information from the person who owns the searched device. This includes cases where the agents image the entire contents of the device in order to perform a search later. In fact, in most cases where this is done, the person is cut out of the informational loop.

Instead of detaining the electronic device, CBP or ICE may instead copy the contents of the electronic device for a more in-depth border search at a later time. For CBP, the decision to copy data contained on an electronic device requires supervisory approval. Copying may take place where CBP or ICE does not want to alert the traveler that he is under investigation; where facilities, lack of training, or other circumstances prevent CBP or ICE from performing the search at secondary inspection; or where the traveler is unwilling or is unable to assist, or it is not prudent to allow the traveler to assist in the search (such as providing a password to log on to a laptop).

And, again, this sort of detainment/search can be triggered by nothing more than an agent's feelings about the person being vetted. And while a CBP officer may have to check with a supervisor before imaging a device, ICE agents are able to self-approve intrusive searches and seizures.

As federal criminal investigators, ICE Special Agents are empowered to make investigative decisions based on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The decision to detain or seize electronic devices or detain, seize, or copy information therefrom is a typical decision a Special Agent makes as part of his or her basic law enforcement duties. However, although no additional permission is required at this stage, Special Agents must comply with precise timeframes and supervisory approvals at further stages throughout each border search.

While there are oversight guidelines in force, they aren't set in motion until after the copying/searching has already been performed.

As the PIA notes later, the DHS's agencies don't care whether it's papers in a briefcase or the entirety of your digital life housed within a smartphone. Either way, it claims to have the right to search, seize and copy data without probable cause. Or so it did until recently.

The 9th Circuit Court's 2013 decision on border searches of electronic devices undercuts a lot of the assertions in this 2009 DHS document. Most importantly, the decision forces the government to stop pretending the contents of a laptop or cellphone are no different than the contents of a briefcase or suitcase. (h/t to Daniel Nazer for pointing out this superseding decision)

The amount of private information carried by international travelers was traditionally circumscribed by the size of the traveler’s luggage or automobile. That is no longer the case. Electronic devices are capable of storing warehouses full of information. The average 400-gigabyte laptop hard drive can store over 200 million pages—the equivalent of five floors of a typical academic library.... Even a car full of packed suitcases with sensitive documents cannot hold a candle to the sheer, and ever-increasing, capacity of digital storage.

The nature of the contents of electronic devices differs from that of luggage as well. Laptop computers, iPads and the like are simultaneously offices and personal diaries. They contain the most intimate details of our lives: financial records, confidential business documents, medical records and private emails. This type of material implicates the Fourth Amendment’s specific guarantee of the people’s right to be secure in their “papers.”.... The express listing of papers “reflects the Founders’ deep concern with safeguarding the privacy of thoughts and ideas—what we might call freedom of conscience—from invasion by the government.”... These records are expected to be kept private and this expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”

This decision partially restores the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution-free Zone -- at least the portion covered by the Ninth Circuit. The decision doesn't forbid these searches. It just holds them -- and the CBP/ICE -- to a higher standard than agents' hunches.

So, in all the principles (transparency, minimization, information safeguards) listed in the DHS's 2009 Privacy Impact Assessment of warrantless border searches, there's not a single one devoted to warrants, warrant requirements or establishing reasonable suspicion. It took a court to reach that obvious conclusion and it took a court's explanation as to why a laptop isn't a briefcase to force the CBP to stop behaving like a law unto itself in the Ninth's jurisdiction. A privacy impact assessment that doesn't mention Fourth Amendment implications is a waste of 50 sheets of paper.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, border, dhs, download, laptops, privacy, search

As Expected, Snowden's Four Laptops Were A Diversion; Didn't Contain Leaked Files

from the moving-on dept

One of the oddities of the whole Ed Snowden affair has been all the talk of how some people are absolutely positive that officials in both China and Russia have copies of all the documents he had. One thing that's often brought up is the fact that he traveled with four laptops -- with the assumption being that the documents are somehow stored on those laptops, and it's likely that government officials in those two countries were able to get access to those laptops and thus get the documents. Except, as some pointed out early on, that doesn't make much sense. Why would you need four laptops to carry a bunch of documents? Documents can be quite small and you don't need extra laptops if you run out of room. Furthermore, as reporter Barton Gellman has explained, Snowden's expertise is in keeping stuff like that secret, and it seemed quite unlikely that he had the documents on those laptops -- which is also why he was able to state that there was no actual way for officials in those countries to get the data from him.

There's now more support for this claim, as Ray McGovern, a former CIA analyst, who was among a small group of high profile whistleblowers from the US intelligence community who traveled to Russia to meet with Snowden last week, has explained that the laptops were nothing more than "a diversion."

The four laptop computers that former U.S. spy contractor Edward Snowden carried with him to Hong Kong and Moscow were a "diversion" and contained no secrets, according to an ex-CIA official who met with Snowden in Russia this week.

The classified documents that Snowden had downloaded from the U.S. National Security Agency were stored on smaller devices, such as hard drives and thumb drives, and they have not been turned over to the Russian or Chinese authorities, said Ray McGovern, a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst.

Of course, some will point out that the Russians and the Chinese could also get those hard drives and thumb drives, but from everything that's been stated, it seems fairly clear that Snowden doesn't have them any more himself, either. Either way, it would appear that a lot of people jumped to conclusions that have yet to be supported by any actual evidence.

Filed Under: ed snowden, laptops, leaks, nsa, nsa surveillance

DHS Says Agent 'Hunches' Trump Citizens' Rights In Searching Your Computer At The Border

from the burns-through-a-handful-of-black-toner-cartridges-as-well dept

The Dept. of Homeland Security has finally coughed up its Civil Rights/Civil Liberties Impact Assessment of its suspicionless electronic device searches performed at border crossings by ICE and CBP agents. It's been a long time coming.

The DHS announced it would take a look at this policy's impact on civil liberties "within 120 days." That was back in 2009. The report was released (but not publically) in December of 2011. In February of this year, it finally published a two-page executive summary of its findings for the public's perusal. There wasn't much contained in the release, but what was included was disturbing enough. In its own estimation, the DHS felt it complied with the Fourth Amendment but went on to state that imposing a "reasonable suspicion" requirement for device searches would be "operationally harmful" without any "concomitant civil liberties benefit." In other words, the public wouldn't be appreciably better off if these searches didn't violate anyone's rights, but the DHS felt its agencies would be worse off if forced to respect them.

The actual report has finally been pried loose, thanks to a FOIA request by the ACLU. There's a lot of information available in the report, including an explanation as to why the agency feels a "reasonable suspicion" threshold is "inadvisable." This is significant, the ACLU points out, as it's the first time the government has explained why it believes suspicionless searches "enhance" security. It begins with some familiar language and expands on that thought process a bit

[A]dding a heightened [suspicion-based] threshold requirement could be operationally harmful without concomitant civil rights/civil liberties benefit. First, commonplace decisions to search electronic devices might be opened to litigation challenging the reasons for the search. In addition to interfering with a carefully constructed border security system, the litigation could directly undermine national security by requiring the government to produce sensitive investigative and national security information to justify some of the most critical searches. Even a policy change entirely unenforceable by courts might be problematic; we have been presented with some noteworthy CBP and ICE success stories based on hard-to-articulate intuitions or hunches based on officer experience and judgment. Under a reasonable suspicion requirement, officers might hesitate to search an individual's device without the presence of articulable factors capable of being formally defended, despite having an intuition or hunch based on experience that justified a search.

So, a CBP/ICE agent's hunch trumps a US citizen's rights. Rather than take the chance that someone dangerous might pass through its net, the agencies would prefer to be allowed to use "I've got a bad feeling about this" as justification for digging through not just someone's laptop, but anyone's laptop. The report supports the agencies' hunch-based investigative processes with anecdotal evidence but no real data.

Any data actually produced comes from outside parties concerned about the First and Fourth Amendment rights of American citizens. The Constitution Project's recommendations for border policy reform are included with the freed documents and it concludes that suspicionless searches not only have a very low "hit rate," but that the policy itself, as it stands now without limitations, actually creates a burden for the CBP and ICE.

Moreover, requiring reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of electronic devices would focus limited law enforcement resources where they can be most effective. Suspicionless searches are not well-suited to identifying and locating contraband or illegal material, as the CBP's own data show. In 2009, for example, only about 5% of the electronic devices searched at the border were seized as a result of the search. Put differently, in the vast majority of instances involving border searches of electronic devices, the traveler has had to needlessly withstand a significant intrusion into his or her privacy for no legitimate law enforcement purpose.

This hit rate puts it right in the neighborhood of another rights-violating law enforcement tactic -- NYC's stop-and-frisk program. Lots of busywork but very little in the way of results.

But this report is almost more about what it doesn't include than what it does. If you're looking for some in-depth discussion of the DHS' views on various civil liberties, you're going to be disappointed. Here's what greets readers when they reach the "Fourth Amendment" section.


This continues for four straight pages. First Amendment? A page and a half of redacted text before this concluding sentence:

The laptop border searches in the ICE and CBP policies do not violate travelers' First Amendment rights as defined by the courts.

Interesting. Of course, the involved agencies don't really seem too concerned about any definitions provided by any court. If they did, they might have paid a bit more attention to a Supreme Court decision dealing directly with the Fourth Amendment.

Even more problematic is the government's claim that the "hard-to-articulate" hunch of a border agent is enough for the government to scrounge around through our personal photos, medical and financial records, email, and whatever other sensitive information may be stored on our laptops and phones... As the Supreme Court explained in Terry v. Ohio, if law enforcement agents are allowed to intrude upon people's rights "based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches," then "the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,' only in the discretion of the [government]."

This evaporation process seems to be nearly complete in the so-called "Constitution-free zone" and things continue to get noticeably drier elsewhere. The DHS clearly believes that citizens' Constitutional rights end where its jurisdiction begins -- and unfortunately at this point in time, that's pretty much everywhere.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, 4th amendment, border searches, homeland security, hunches, ice, laptops

US Government Settles Lawsuit Over Seizure Of Laptop Of Bradley Manning's Friend

from the a-bit-late... dept

The US government's intimidation of anyone even remotely connected to Wikileaks is somewhat insane. The difficulty that former Wikileaks volunteer Jacob Appelbaum has every time he crosses the border is well documented. Two years ago, we noted that Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had seized David House's laptop as he re-entered the country from a vacation. House has been a friend and supporter of Bradley Manning, and the feds kept his laptop for 49 days, and only returned it after the ACLU sent a sternly worded letter. House then sued the government. The government's defense was basically "we're the US fucking government and we can do what we want with your laptops at the border" (slight paraphrase). The court, however, didn't quite see it that way, and noted that politically motivated searches and seizures may be unconstitutional, under the First Amendment. This is important, because courts have let DHS/ICE ignore the 4th Amendment at the border, but here the court said that intimidating House and others could violate their 1st Amendment rights to freedom of association.

It's taken some time since then, but the feds have now agreed to settle the case, and more or less given in to all of the demands from House and the ACLU:

In a settlement reached with human rights activist David House, the government has agreed to destroy all data it obtained from his laptop and other electronics when he entered the U.S. after a vacation, the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Massachusetts announced today. House, who was then working with the Bradley Manning Support Network, an organization created to raise funds for the legal defense of the soldier who has admitted to leaking material to WikiLeaks, charged in a lawsuit that the seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights by subjecting him to unreasonable search and seizure, and violated his First Amendment right to freedom of association.

More specifically:

Under the terms of the settlement, the government agreed to destroy all remaining data copied from House’s devices. The government will also hand over numerous documents, including reports describing Army CID’s inspection of House’s data as well as the DHS “Lookout” telling agents to stop House as he entered the country. The government further agreed to release reports on DHS agents’ questioning of House, which included inquiries about whether he knew anything about Manning giving classified information to WikiLeaks.

Some will argue that this is all way too late -- after all, the feds had that data for years, and the basic intimidation impact is still in place. However, hopefully this stops Homeland Security and ICE from continuing these kinds of politically motivated attacks.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, 4th amendment, bradley manning, constitution, david house, dhs, ice, laptops, seizing laptops

Early-Morning Raid Sent To Confiscate 9-Year-Old's Winnie The Pooh Laptop For Downloading Music

from the a-question-of-priorities dept

One of the biggest problems with the current approach to dealing with alleged copyright infringement is the totally disproportionate nature of the action undertaken in response to it. The "three strikes" collective punishment of households that is available in France, New Zealand and South Korea is one example of this. From Finland, we learn about another completely over-the-top action:

CIAPC, the company that had The Pirate Bay blocked by ISPs in Finland, tracked an alleged file-sharer and demanded a cash settlement. However, the Internet account holder refused to pay which escalated things to an unprecedented level. In response, this week police raided the home of the 9-year-old suspect and confiscated her Winnie the Pooh laptop.

The specific details are worrying:

Tuesday morning the doorbell of the family home rang around 8am and the man, who works in the hospitality sector, had quite a shock. Police were at his door with a search warrant authorizing the hunt for evidence connected to illicit file-sharing.

This kind of early-morning raid would be more appropriate for dealing with serious and dangerous criminals than 9-year-old girls (barely even mentioning that the girl's father claims her attempts at downloading failed, leading them to go purchase the music legally anyway). Similarly, the fact that for such a trivial case the account-holder's name and address were obtained from the ISP, and a search warrant issued, shows how out of control the law has become in this area.

Under the malign influence of the copyright companies, it would seem that the police force is now little more than a bunch of heavies sent around at ridiculous hours of the day to frighten people who refuse to pay the arbitrary sums demanded. It's hard to square this colossal waste of police time and public money with the deadly threat of terrorism that we supposedly live under: is intimidating members of the public in this way really such a priority for the Finnish state? It's also disappointing to see the legal system in Finland and elsewhere acquiescing in this terrible perversion by powerful lobbies of what is supposed to be even-handed, proportionate justice for all.

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Filed Under: excessive, file sharing, finland, kids, laptops

Toshiba: You Can't Have Repair Manuals Because They're Copyrighted And You're Too Dumb To Fix A Computer

from the buy-elsewhere dept

Many years ago, one of the absolute worst customer experiences I ever had concerned a Toshiba laptop that never worked properly -- which was followed by ridiculous and rude service. Eventually, using the famous Consumerist Executive Email Carpet Bomb process, I was able to get things sorted out (and, despite them asking me to sign an NDA, when I sent it back crossed out the exec called me and said it was fine and that I was allowed to talk about the situation). Since then, however, I've stayed away from Toshiba laptops entirely. But having had that experience, somehow it doesn't surprise me that, among the major laptop makers, Toshiba would be the one using copyright law to try to hide its service repair manuals (story found via Slashdot).

The situation involves an Australian site called Tim's Laptop Service Manuals, which provides exactly what it says it does. Well, until Toshiba's clueless lawyers got involved. Toshiba gave Tim a list of excuses for why he needed to take their service manuals down -- most of which made little sense. At the end of the list was basically "we hold the copyright and thus you need to take them down." Legally, they're probably right. But, this is just one of those cases where it's stupid to apply copyright law. It's not as though Toshiba needed copyright as the incentive to produce these manuals. No, the only reason to assert copyright here is to try to limit repairs to authorized dealers, which limits the usefulness of their products to the public. In a sane world, this would be a case of copyright misuse. But, when it comes to copyright, we don't live in a sane world.

The other excuses Toshiba gave are pretty silly and seem to revolve around the idea that ordinary Toshiba customers are complete morons who should never try to repair their own computer because it might blow up in their face or something. Tim's response is a good one, noting that none of the other major laptop makers seem to have this problem. So, either Toshiba makes crazy-dangerous laptops... or, they're just trying to protect dealer/repair shop revenue. It's likely the latter.

My place of employment puts a massive emphasis on health and safety in the workplace, a policy I am 100% in support of. Safety is an incredibly important issue, and I applaud Toshiba for taking it into consideration, but I think they are a little misguided. I have personally never been injured or visibly endangered by working on any kind of computer system, much less a consumer notebook computer. I have also never heard of anybody else being injured by working on one. While I do understand the drive behind any concern for safety, the reality is that there appears to be no risk to the well-being of myself or any of my readers by providing repair manuals free to download, and so I do not understand Toshiba’s cause for concern here.

It is worth noting that Dell, HP and Lenovo provide service manuals for all of their laptop computers for download, free of charge or registration or membership of any kind, on their various support websites, which would indicate that none of these companies share Toshiba’s concern in this regard. I would not seriously take this to mean that Toshiba laptops are inherently more dangerous to service than laptops of other brands, thus causing them to discourage unqualified persons from doing so, but drawing on my own knowledge and experience I cannot see what risk they are attempting to mitigate here.

In the end, it seems like this is the kind of thing some lawyer thought was a good idea... "because copyright." You get this with copyright maximalists sometimes, where they think that because a copyright exists, you must exclude people -- even if it makes little economic sense. While I'm already not interested in buying a Toshiba computer, it would seem that this little stunt should scare many others away from purchasing their laptops.

Filed Under: australia, copyright, laptops, repair manual
Companies: toshiba

Courts: Search A Cell Phone? No Problem. Touch A Mouse? Violate 4th Amendment.

from the 4th-amendment-law-is-confusing dept

Julian Sanchez points us to a bizarre 4th Amendment ruling. While we've seen courts regularly pick away at the 4th Amendment, and allow things like warrantless wiretapping and tracking individuals via their phones without a warrant. In this case, the court ruled that touching a mousepad, thereby taking a laptop out of screensaver mode, constituted a "search" and was subject to the 4th Amendment. While I'm happy to see courts actually recognizing the importance of the 4th Amendment, and the need for law enforcement to obtain warrants, I'm having trouble understanding how this is a 4th Amendment search when those other -- much more invasive -- actions are not.

The details of the case involve someone who posted a threat to Craigslist about bringing a gun to a mall. Police tracked the guy down at his house, and while there, one of them touched his mousepad, changing the screen from the blank screensaver mode to fully on, displaying some information that was used to arrest the guy. Since stuff seen in plain sight is not considered a search, the question is whether or not this uncovered things that were not in plain sight, and thus constituted a search. I can understand why the court ruled the way it did in this case (though I'm a bit surprised). I'm just struggling to understand how that's not a legal search, but something like scanning the entire contents of a mobile phone during a traffic stop is a legal search.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, laptops, mobile phones, privacy, search