NSA-To-English Dictionary: I Don't Think These Words Mean What You Think They Do

from the if-you-can-redefine-the-language dept

For the last few weeks I'd been meaning to write up a "dictionary" of how the NSA translates certain words, completely different from the way any other English speaker does, in order to argue that what it does with its surveillance programs is "legal" under the law. I hadn't gotten around to it because every time I started, it seemed like there was more breaking news. Thankfully Jameel Jaffer and Brett Max Kaufman from the ACLU beat me to it, and put together a fantastic NSA lexicon, which highlights how the NSA has simply changed the meaning of many basic English words in order to argue that their efforts are, in fact, legal and above board. You can and should read the full and detailed explanations that Jaffer and Kaufman have put together for each word, but I'm going to take their same list and simplify it down a little. In bold is the word, and after it is what the NSA thinks it means.

• Surveillance: When we actually access full content of your calls and emails, but not when we access all the data about who you talk to, where you are and what you do.
• Collect: When we run a search on data we collected er... "stored for safe keeping."
• Relevant: Everything. It might become relevant in the future, thus it's relevant today.
• Targeted: As long as we're collecting the info for an investigation that involves a "target" then any info is "targeted" even if that info has nothing to do with the "target."
• Incidental: Everything that we collect... er... store that may become "relevant" at some point but isn't now even though it's "targeted." In short: everything.
• Inadvertent: Stuff we did on purpose on a massive scale that looks bad when exposed publicly.
• Minimize: A term we use to pretend that we delete information on Americans, but which has many exceptions, including if you encrypted your communications or if we have a sneaking suspicion that you're 51% foreign based on a hunch.
• No: When said to Congress in response to questions about whether we collect data on millions of Americans, this means "fuck you."

I would imagine there are a few more words that will need to be added at some point.

Filed Under: collect, definitions, incidental, laws, legality, minimization, nsa surveillance, relevance, surveillance, targeted

Investigation Finds The UK's Spy Agency Did Not Break Any Laws When It Tapped Into PRISM Data

from the of-course-it-didn't...-nothing-ever-does dept

In case anybody thought UK's GCHQ may have broken a law or two by pulling data from the NSA's PRISM surveillance net, they can now set their minds at ease. Like every other surveillance program in the UK and the US, it's totally legal.

Parliament's intelligence and security committee launched an investigation into allegations Britain's GCHQ surveillance agency circumvented British laws protecting the privacy of communications by accessing data from the U.S. program.

"From the evidence we have seen, we have concluded that this is unfounded," said the committee.

That's a relief. For a little while, it looked as though sweeping data collection might be something that ran afoul of laws protecting citizens' privacy or other limitations put in place to prevent domestic intelligence agencies from spying on their countrymen. You know, the sort of restrictions that separated us from our Cold War rivals and current totalitarian regimes.

On the bright side, the GCHQ at least has the decency to show up with a warrant. Classy.

A thorough investigation had shown the reports GCHQ compiled using U.S. intelligence were put together legally, it said. The agency possessed a warrant for interception signed by a government minister each time it asked for information from the United States, it added.

Oh, wait. A "warrant for interception" is remarkably similar to a FISA court order.

All interception warrants are valid for an initial period of three months. Upon renewal, warrants issued on serious crime grounds are valid for a further period of three months. Warrants renewed on national security/economic well-being grounds are valid for a further period of six months. Urgent authorisations are valid for five working days following the date of issue unless renewed by the Secretary of State.

And they go after the same data.

For mobile telephony

the telephone number from which the telephone call was made and the name and address of the subscriber and registered user of that telephone;

the telephone number dialed and, in cases involving supplementary services such as call forwarding or call transfer, any telephone number to which the call is forwarded or transferred;

the date and time of the start and end of the call;

the service used to make the call;

details of the SIM and phone used to make and receive each call;

for pre-paid services the date, time and place of activation; and

the cell ID and location used for each call.

And having one conveniently available "each time" the GCHQ asked sounds familiar, too. More specifically, the report makes this statement:

Further, in each case where GCHQ sought information from the US, a warrant for interception, signed by a Minister, was already in place, in accordance with the legal safeguards contained in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.

"Already in place." A warrant pre-approval process, not unlike our "not a rubber stamp" FISA court approval process.

The process appears to be: if you'd like to grab some data, please stop by our offices during business hours to pick up a pre-filled out warrant. But don't worry. It's all legal and buttressed by plenty of "safeguards," just the way it is over in the US.

The takeaway is simple: the laws governing these surveillance programs are terrible if this is what they permit. Perhaps there will be some major changes in the future. But all of this would have remained unchallenged without Snowden's leaks. This just shows that, within our two governments, those who had direct knowledge were perfectly content with what was allowed. Even worse, they allowed expansions and reinterpretations of these laws in order to enable and encourage additional surveillance of domestic citizens.

Filed Under: investigation, legality, prism, surveillance, uk

Federal Judge None Too Impressed With Government's Defense Of Its 'No Fly' List

from the we-have-several-reasons;-here-are-none-of-them dept

The top secret "No-Fly" list has been problematic since day one. The DHS and FBI apparently believe over 20,000 people are too dangerous to allow to board a plane but not dangerous enough to arrest.

This is the process the government follows to place would-be travelers on the no-fly list.

1. The government places a person on the no-fly list.

That's all there is to it. The list is too "sensitive" to publish and exposing its methodology would apparently result in airliners raining down around us.

If you're a lucky recipient of the "no-fly" designation, here's how you're informed of your new status.

1. Purchase a ticket and attempt to travel.
2. Be rebuffed by TSA personnel.

This process can sometimes be applied with more flexibility.

1. Purchase a roundtrip ticket and fly to a foreign destination.
2. Attempt to return home.
3. Be rebuffed by local customs/security officials.

You won't know you're on The List until the list is triggered, which could happen when you're a few thousand miles from home. And if you think you're boarding the next boat back to the US, think again. The list is also "no-sail," meaning passenger ships are out of the question.

Now, if you're on the list and wish to be removed or, at the very least, informed of why you've been banned from commercial airline travel, there's no reason to panic. The DHS has a resolution process that relies very heavily on "process" and skips the "resolution" completely.

Their only recourse is to file a request with the Department of Homeland Security's "Traveler Redress Inquiry Program," after which DHS responds with a letter that does not explain why they were denied boarding. The letter does not confirm or deny whether their names remain on the No Fly List, and does not indicate whether they can fly. The only way for a person to find out if his or her name was removed from the No Fly List is to buy a plane ticket, go to the airport, see if he or she can get on the flight – taking the risk of being denied boarding and marked as a suspected terrorist, and losing the cost of the airline ticket.

One wonders what a letter that answers no questions and explains nothing is supposed to "redress."

Dear Sir/Madam No Fly,

Thank you for expressing an interest in our Traveler Redress Inquiry Program. The Department of Homeland Security works in conjunction with all domestic airports, as well as those in 22 other nations worldwide, in order to provide you with a safe traveling experience. We hope that you will continue to make use of our products and services.

Thank you again for your support.

If you have additional comments or questions, please dial (202) 282-8495.

Sincerely,
The Department of Homeland Security

This decade-long lack of specifics or actual redress has led to the ACLU suing the federal government on the behalf of thirteen no-fly list members.

Thirteen people on the no-fly list have sued the U.S. government, arguing that their placement deprives them of due process and smears their reputation by branding them as terrorists. Several of the men who filed suit have been surrounded at airport security areas, detained and interrogated.

The suit seeks to either remove the plaintiffs from the no-fly list or tell them why they are on it.

Government attorney Scott Risner addressed these complaints by arguing that air travel is not a "right" but a "convenience."

Risner said placement on the list doesn't stop people from traveling, and stopping people from using one mode of travel doesn't deprive them of their liberty. That's a key question in determining whether the government must ensure due process and one that's at the heart of the constitutionality of being placed on the list.

"We're not suggesting that there's not a convenience in air travel," Risner said. "(But) there's no right to travel without impediments. That's what's happening here.

Risner went so far as to point out that those stranded by sudden inclusion on the no fly list had made it back to the US via alternate forms of travel, thus "proving" a lack of air travel isn't preventing traveling.

Unfortunately for Risner, Judge Anna J. Brown wasn't buying it.

"To call it 'convenience' is marginalizing their argument," Brown said. [She] said alternatives to flying are significantly more expensive. "It's hugely time-consuming, and who knows what impediments there are between the Port of Portland and other countries."

She also pointed out that sea and land travel options aren't suitable replacements for flying, especially when time is of the essence and that the government's argument "fails to take into account the realities of modern life."

The DHS and FBI would obviously like everything to proceed the way it has for years, which means convincing the judge that flying isn't a fundamental right. This removes the question of constitutionality, as least as far as flight restrictions go.

The ACLU has gone further, though, declaring the entire system to be screwed up.

"We're asking the court to finally put a check on the government's use of a blacklist that denies Americans the ability to fly without giving them the explanation or fair hearing that the Constitution requires. It's a question of basic fairness," said ACLU Staff Attorney Nusrat Choudhury, one of the ACLU attorneys who will argue the case Friday in Portland. "It does not make our country safer to ban people from flying without giving them an after-the-fact redress process that allows them to correct the errors that led to their mistaken inclusion on the list."

It also points out that issuance of notice and due process are required for much less far-reaching actions.

The ACLU argues that this system violates the Fifth Amendment's command that the government cannot deprive a person of liberty "without due process of law." Courts have ruled that the Constitution requires some kind of notice and hearing for far less severe actions, such as losing state assistance for utility bills or being suspended from school for 10 days.

Judge Brown hasn't said when she'll issue a ruling, but so far she seems less than impressed with the government's arguments. In the meantime, 20,000 people, including the 13 US citizens represented here (four of which are military veterans), are still stuck in War on Terror limbo -- unofficially "detained" in the US by secretive travel restrictions.

Filed Under: dhs, due process, homeland security, legality, no fly list, tsa

Why Site Blocking Orders Need To Be Challenged In Court

from the two-sides-to-every-story dept

There is an extremely dangerous trend to remove proper judicial review from cases involving alleged copyright infringement. Sometimes that means "voluntary" actions by ISPs -- the SOPA and ACTA approach. Sometimes, it means appearances before tribunals by members of the public without adequate legal representation, as is happening under New Zealand's "three strikes" law. And sometimes it might involve a judge, but consist of the latter simply agreeing to requests from the copyright industry, without anyone challenging the grounds for doing so.

That was the case for the most recent action by the British Phonographic Industry (BPI), which represents the recording industry in the UK, as reported by Techdirt last week. Now Andres Guadamuz on his TechnoLlama blog has dug a little deeper into the judge's reasoning for granting these orders, and discovered the following remarkable section:

the evidence indicates that blocking orders are reasonably effective. The effect of the order made in Italy with regard to TPB [The Pirate Bay] referred to in 20C Fox v BT at [197] was a 73% reduction in audience accessing TPB in Italy and a 96% reduction in page views. The blocking order made in Italy in relation to KAT has had a similar effect. As for the effect of the orders made in England in relation to TPB, as at 19 December 2011, TPB was ranked by Alexa as number 43 in the UK, while as at 21 November 2012, its UK ranking had dropped to number 293.

As Guadamuz notes:

I had to look for the source of such astounding information, but I was not able to obtain any reliable resources, and I suspect that it is a figure given by the BPI, which may have been pulled out of the nether regions of their institutional anatomy. On the contrary, I found a report from Torrent Freak claiming the opposite, but this claim should be taken with a pinch of salt.

The use of Alexa is also rather surprising, since it is very rarely quoted these days:

Alexa works by measuring the behaviour of users who have installed a toolbar in their browser. This gives a snapshot of a very narrow demographic, that of Alexa toolbar users. Needless to say, people who are more likely to share files online are less likely to have any sort of toolbar installed on their browsers, particularly one that tracks online behaviour. Similarly, there are studies that prove that Alexa's rankings tend to be wrong for both small and big websites, as they tend to produce some serious mismatches with reality.

And Guadamuz goes on to point out:

In the end, the best way to try to ascertain the effect of ISP blocking orders is to ask the people who are engaged in the practice. This is precisely what was done by Dutch researchers Joost Poort and Jorna Leenheer. They conducted a survey of thousands of Dutch residents about their downloading behaviour. While more than 75% of respondents claimed that they never downloaded any illegal content, those who engaged in the practice replied that they were not affected whatsoever by the blocking of TPB in the Netherlands. Only 3.6% claimed that they are downloading less, and only 1.9% admitted that they had stopped downloading entirely. This seems like a huge failure of blocking orders.

But none of this information was presented in court. Instead, the judge used his own -- or maybe the BPI's -- figures to justify his blocking orders. That's why it's regrettable the ISPs involved did not mount any kind of challenge where they could have offered an alternative view on how effective such orders really are, so that the judge could form a more balanced view of the situation. More generally, this episode shows the dangers of moving to systems where the other side of the copyright story is not fully and fairly presented.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca, and on Google+

Filed Under: evidence, legality, site blocking, uk, unchallenged claims

Anti-Piracy Group Already Demanding That Kim Dotcom's New Mega Service Be Shut Down

from the but-of-course dept

This probably isn't a huge surprise, but with the launch of Kim Dotcom's new Mega cloud drive system, many in the entertainment industry have assumed that he must be relaunching Megaupload and a way to infringe. However, it seems pretty clear that Mega is quite different and mostly resembles other well known legitimate services, like Google Drive, Dropbox and Amazon's cloud offerings. Still that hasn't stopped some in the "anti-piracy" community from trying to shut down the site already:

Robert King is the lead figure behind StopFileLockers (SFL), an anti-piracy group dedicated to bringing file-hosting services to their knees by strangling their finances. Last year King claimed his group had a hand in disrupting the cash flow to hundreds of sites and actually shutting down dozens more. Now he has a very big scalp on his mind.

King, an Australian and adult industry player, says that StopFileLockers have just begun a “campaign to have the payment processing of all Mega resellers terminated.”

Apparently waiting for actual evidence of infringement, or even specific liability for Mega, is too much to ask. This is silly. While we may have doubts about how Mega is running, shutting it down without even understanding what it's about seems incredibly short-sighted. Plenty of successful legitimate companies have been built out of those who were earlier sued for "infringement." Isn't it worth at least making sure he's breaking the law before insisting he must have done so?

Filed Under: anti-piracy, cloud storage, copyright, kim dotcom, legality, robert king
Companies: mega, stopfilelockers

Congressional Reps Question Feds Over Botched Domain Seizures

from the will-we-get-answers dept

The government's admission that it had (once again) mistakenly seized and censored a website for over a year when it dropped its case against Rojadirecta/Puerto80 has reminded everyone that Dajaz1 was not an isolate case. It was a part of a wider program where DHS (via ICE) and the DOJ systematically believed whatever the RIAA and MPAA were telling them, leading to the blatant censorship of a variety of websites, without proper due process. Thankfully, some in Congress are paying attention. Bipartisan Congressional Reps. Zoe Lofgren, Jason Chaffetz and Jared Polis have teamed up to send a letter raising a number of questions about Operation in Our Sites, to both Attorney General Holder and Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano.

The letter doesn't even mention the Rojadirecta case, but focuses on what happened with Dajaz1, pointing out their concern with the program, and how it appears to violate free speech rights, ignore due process and destroy legitimate businesses. The letter raises the fact that Dajaz1 is not an isolated case. As we've pointed out in the past, we're aware of at least a few other domains that were seized, and whose owners had challenged the seizures. And yet, well over a year later, there appeared to be no evidence of either a return of those domains or a forfeiture process started. Given how the feds treated Dajaz1, with secret extensions, preventing Dajaz1 from representing itself in court, we've wondered how many other domains the DOJ and ICE had incorrectly and illegally seized -- and which they were now keeping in that kind of holding pattern. It's good to see that this letter directly asks about that issue:

Other complaints have been raised by websites seized under "In Our Sites" that bear similarities to the Dajaz1 case. These complaints center around unnecessary delays in advancing and resolving cases, difficulty in obtaining documents from the government that are fundamental to the underlying cases (such as affidavits), and difficulty even maintaining contact with the U.S. Attorneys prosecuting the cases. The effect of these problems is to severely limit the ability of website owners to challenge the legality and merits of the domain name seizures.

The letter goes on to ask a series of important questions for both DHS and DOJ, especially regarding the utter failure of both departments in the Dajaz1 situation.

1. What is the process for determining which sites to target? Who is involved in that process? What specific steps do DOJ and ICE take to ensure that affidavits and other material are thoroughly reviewed for accuracy prior to seizing a domain?
2. To what extent are government agents required to evaluate whether the potentially infringing material to which target sites link -- or which they host themselves -- are non-infringing fair uses, impliedly licensed, and/or de minimis uses?
3. Do government agents consider whether a site complies with the DMCA safe harbors? If so, how does this affect the determination to target a site?
4. How many sites have attempted to retrieve their domains, via any process, judicial or informal, and what is the status of those cases?
5. Have you made any changes to your domain seizure policies or their implementation as a result of the issues arising from the Dajaz1 seizure or any other seizure? If so, what were those changes?
6. What specific steps has the DOJ and ICE taken to ensure that domain name seizure cases proceed without unnecessary delays, and that website owners seeking to restore their domain names have swift access to the officials and documents necessary to resolve their cases?
7. How many more seizures do you anticipate occurring in the next six months and year?

It seems to me that questions four and five are the key ones here, which means I fully expect DOJ and ICE to be especially non-responsive in whatever answers they provide.

Filed Under: dhs, doj, domain seizures, forfeiture, ice, jared polis, jason chaffetz, legality, stalling, zoe lofgren

ICANN Confirms That It's Going To Make It Easier For Governments To Seize Domains Around The Globe

from the not-cool,-icann dept

This just gets worse and worse. After pointing out that ICANN was missing a big (and important) opportunity by not speaking out against governments seizing domain names, we were disappointed to see ICANN release a white paper that was more of a how-to manual for governments on seizing domains. Now, Paul Keating points us to the depressing news that ICANN is now publicly saying that it will work more closely with governments around the world to help them seize and censor domains. The writeup is a little vague, but it says that seizing domains for copyright infringement was a "hot topic" at ICANN's recent meeting -- including promises from ICANN that it would work more closely with law enforcement around the globe and the various registrars to help law enforcement be more effective in censoring these websites. This is really unfortunate and once again highlights ICANN's uselessness in protecting the internet. Instead, it appears to be actively working against basic internet principles.

Filed Under: domain names, domain seizures, legality, seizures
Companies: icann

Rather Than Speaking Out Against Domain Seizures, ICANN Provides A 'How To' Manual

from the uh,-bad-decision dept

A couple weeks ago, we noted that with all of these questionable domain seizures going on, it was a shame that ICANN wasn't speaking out against such questionable abuses of the domain system. We thought its silence was a sign of its impotence to actually take a stand. Turns out we may have actually overestimated ICANN's willingness to stand up for the internet. You see, late last week it put out a "Thought Paper on Domain Seizures and Takedowns."

By "thought paper" -- they actually mean an instruction manual.

Seriously. The document is basically a step-by-step guide for government officials on how to seize, takedown and censor websites. It has sections like "guide for preparing domain name orders, seizures & takedowns" and "checklist of information to submit with a legal or regulatory action." This is exactly the opposite of what ICANN should be doing if it believes in preserving the basic structure and principles of the internet. But given ICANN's general incompetence, is it really any surprise that it's ending up on the wrong side of this issue, too?

Filed Under: domain names, domain seizures, legality, seizures
Companies: icann

Why Isn't ICANN Speaking Out Against ICE/DOJ Domain Seizures?

from the ridiculous dept

Following the feds seizing bodog.com, Mark Jeftovic from EasyDNS wrote a really interesting post pointing out just how insane these domain seizures are. He focused on the fact that Bodog was run outside of the US, hosted outside the US, and the domain registrar was even outside the US. Thus, the feds went straight to Verisign to seize the domain. For what it's worth, while I share his concern about the insanity of this, I don't actually think this is new. As we discussed back in 2010, the government appeared to go direct to Verisign for earlier seizures. As we said at the time:

It appears that Homeland Security contracted out the seizures to a private company, immixGroup IT Solutions, which set up the "seizedservers.com" domain that the seized domains now point to. The other bit of useful info is that the seizures appear to have been done directly by VeriSign at the top level domain level. VeriSign, of course, controls the .com TLD, and so Homeland Security appears to have just asked VeriSign to move the domains (with a court order, of course), and it did so.

However, we agree with Jeftovic that this is crazy, and if it finally gets some more attention now, that would be a good thing. Another point that he raises is that the Bodog seizures seem to be based on a violation of Maryland state law, which raises additional questions about jurisdictional issues. You may recall a few years ago, that the state of Kentucky tried to seize a bunch of gambling related domains, and the world freaked out about a massive overreach by that state against websites that had no presence in the state. Shouldn't there be similar concerns when it comes to a Maryland state law... and the federal government?

But there's a bigger point in all of this, which Jeftovic raises at the end, which deserves a lot more attention: where the hell is ICANN on this and why isn't it speaking out against these domain seizures?

Where the fsck is ICANN in all of this?

They are nowhere. They are collecting their fees, pushing their agenda of as many possible new-top-level domains and despite the fact that SOPA, ACTA, PIPA et aim directly at the interests of their core stakeholders, for whom they are supposed to be advocates and stewards.  ICANN is conspicuous in their absence from the debate, save for a smug and trite abdication of involvement (i.e. "ICANN Doesn't Take Down Websites") – translation: "This isn't our problem".

And therein lies the issue. ICANN needs to make this their problem, because it very much is. If ICANN isn't going to stand up, and vigorously campaign for global stakeholder representation in these matters, than they are not only abdicating any responsibility in the ongoing and escalating crackdown on internet freedom, they are also abdicating their right to govern and oversee it.

They need to be visible, they need to be loud and they need to come down on the right side of these issues or they need to be replaced.

It's a good point that highlights what a joke ICANN has been on this front. It should have come out right when ICE started seizing domains. The longer it's silent, the worse it makes things.

Filed Under: domain seizures, domain system, icann, internet, legality

Retroactive Immunity From The Gov't For Warrantless Wiretapping Deemed Constitutional

from the and-then-what? dept

As you hopefully recall, a few years back, the press revealed that the Bush Administration had begun a rather sweeping wiretapping campaign, working with major telcos to get access to all sorts of phone and internet communications... without a warrant. That revelation resulted in a bunch of lawsuits against both the telcos and the government. In response, Congress quickly passed the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), which included a provision granting retroactive immunity to the telcos who helped the government by passing along private info despite the lack of any warrant. Then Senator Obama originally opposed this provision, but changed his mind at the last minute... and has been an enthusiastic supporter of retroactive immunity since becoming President.

A series of 9th circuit appeals court rulings on various cases related to these issues all came out on Thursday. The big one, Hepting v. AT&T, was on the question of the Constitutionality of the retroactive immunity clause. While the specifics of the ruling focus on some tricky specific legal claims (and you have to wade through 26 pages listing all the parties to the case...), the basic summary: granting retroactive immunity is perfectly Constitutional, in large part because of the big scary bogeyman of "national security." For example, in the discussion of whether or not Congress had an "intelligible principle" in delegating authority concerning retroactive immunity under the Act to the Attorney General, the Court basically "national security" is good enough:

When considering how to respond to lawsuits like this one, the Committee "recogniz[ed] the importance of the private sector in assisting law enforcement and intelligence officials in critical criminal justice and national security activities." ... The Report further states that "electronic surveillance for law enforcement and intelligence purposes depends in great part on the cooperation of the private companies that operate the Nation's telecommunication system." ... The intelligible principle that comes through in the legislative history is one of protecting intelligence gathering and national security information.

The fact that § 802 arises within the realm of national security--a concern traditionally designated to the Executive as part of his Commander-in-Chief power--further suggests that the intelligible principle standard need not be overly rigid.

This strikes me as somewhat bizarre reasoning. Even if we recognize that the government has to rely on the private sector in intelligence gathering, that should never create immunity for illegal activities. The concerns that telcos would be afraid to help the government without immunity seems ridiculous. If the actions were legal then it would already have effective immunity, in that suits would be quickly dismissed. It's only if the actions are illegal that they would need immunity.

There are a number of other specific points in the ruling, but the other one that strikes me as ridiculous is the court's response to Hepting's claim that another problem with the Act is that it puts a biased party in charge of determining who gets immunity, and that's a due process violation. To put it simply, if it's the government's own Attorney General deciding to grant telcos immunity to coverup the government's own illegal wiretapping... then that's a due process violation in that the plaintiff has no way to get a fair hearing from a neutral or unbiased judge. Amazingly, the court rejects this in two ways. First, by saying that the Attorney General "certifying" the actions of telcos to qualify them for immunity does not count as "adjudicating," but is merely "factfinding." But if that "factfinding" blocks any chance of the case being heard, isn't that effectively the same as "adjudicating."

The second reason for rejecting this argument is that we just have to assume the Attorney General is unbiased, according to the court:

Hepting views Attorney General Mukasey as operating under "a structural, institutional bias" because he served during the Bush Administration, which advocated for the legislation, and was counsel to the United States in these lawsuits. He follows with the claim that Mukasey "had an actual bias in this matter," because he stated publicly that the immunity provision was "important" and that immunity represented "a fair and just result," and also conveyed this opinion to members of Congress.

Hepting ignores that the Attorney General has a legitimate policy role. It is well established that "[a]dministrators . . . may hold policy views on questions of law prior to participating in a proceeding." .... Public officials are presumed not to be biased; expressing an opinion, even a strong one, on legislation, does not disqualify an official from later responding to a congressional mandate incorporating that opinion.

Yeah, but that's not the issue. No one's saying that public officials can't make use of legislation they supported in general. But in this specific situation, the law allows the AG to very easily cover up illegal activities performed by companies to help his own investigations. That's the bias concern. No one cares that he supported the law. They're concerned that his bias is in covering up illegal actions that helped his own efforts.

The courts also rejected Hepting's argument that retroactive immunity precludes any legal action against the wiretapping, by noting that retroactive immunity only applies to the telcos -- but the government itself can still be liable. And that's where the second important ruling on this issue comes in. The ruling in Jewel v. NSA is at least slightly more encouraging, in that it sends a separate, but related case against the government for warrantless wiretapping back to the district court, rejecting many of its arguments that led it to dump that case earlier.

In that case, the district court dismissed the case, claiming that Jewel lacked the standing to sue the government. However, the appeals court disagrees and says that Jewel does have standing. It finds that Jewel showed "concrete and particularized injury." Of course, the district court may still turn around and dump the case, agreeing with the government's other key assertion that the "state secrets privilege" kills off the case. Of course, if that's what happens it kind of undermines the claim in the Hepting ruling that telco immunity is fine because you can still sue the government. Furthermore, even if the government loses here, it's not clear that it matters. As in the similar Al-Haramain case, if the government is found to have illegally wiretapped someone, so what? In Al-Haramin, the government just had to fork over about $40,000. That's hardly going to make the government stop...

There was a third ruling related to all of this as well, in McMurray v. Verizon, which more or less was the same thing as the Hepting case, but also added one separate argument: that the FISA Amendments Act represented a violation of the Takings Clause. The court keeps this one short, and says that while the idea is a "novel approach," it really just doesn't apply here, in large part because McMurray "failed to seek just compensation from the Court of Federal Claims," as required for a Takings Clause claim to be valid.

In the end, the Jewel ruling is nice, but may not get much further, and the acceptance of the Constitutionality of retroactive immunity is pretty horrifying. Obviously, this seems not just ripe for abuse, but pretty clearly a sign that there was past abuse that the government is happy to keep covering up.

Filed Under: constitution, immunity, legality, us government, warrantless wiretapping