NZ Supreme Court Gives A Mixed Bag Extradition Ruling To Kim Dotcom; Extradition Still Alive, But He Can Raise Procedural Issues

from the this-case-will-never-end dept

It's been almost a decade since US and New Zealand forces did a silly made-for-Hollywood (and possibly by Hollywood) raid of Kim Dotcom's home in New Zealand for the crime of running a cloud storage service that some people used for infringing works. Since that time, Dotcom has been fighting extradition charges to the US. The case has taken many crazy twists and turns, including the US government seizing his assets by claiming he's a fugitive, even as he's been going through the standard legal process to determine if extradition is proper (and there's a very strong legal argument it is not even remotely proper).

That said, while Dotcom has won rulings showing illegal activity in how he was surveilled and arrested, he's also lost his attempts to block the extradition.

The latest ruling, from New Zealand's Supreme Court is unfortunately more of the same. The court has found that he can be extradited on 12 of the 13 charges against him, but also noted the procedural problems that have plagued the case mean that he still cannot be extradited. Specifically, the Supreme Court found that Dotcom (and his colleagues who were also arrested) were denied judicial review of the original ruling in the district court in 2015.

Dotcom and his lawyers have (accurately) stated that the ruling "is a mixed bag." But it's mostly mixed with bad news for Dotcom. The good part is just that he doesn't have to get shipped off to the US right away.

But on the whole this is a bad ruling for Dotcom. The key issue at play gets deep into the copyright weeds, about theories regarding criminal inducement of infringement, and whether or not New Zealand and the US have matching crimes. Unfortunately, so far it looks like the New Zealand courts (like too many of the US courts) don't really care to look at the actual specifics of what's in the law and just lump together a bunch of different concepts around "copyright infringement bad," without being willing to understand that building a platform that is used for infringement is not the same thing as infringing yourself. The court didn't seem to understand the difference here -- which is unfortunately not that surprising, but it is disappointing. These kinds of rulings damage the open internet, limit the kinds of services that can be built, and bring us closer to a locked down broadcast-only internet, the kind which Hollywood wants.

Filed Under: cloud storage, copyright, extradition, intermediary liability, kim dotcom, new zealand, procedural issues, us
Companies: megaupload

Kim Dotcom Loses Latest Round In Extradition Fight, Will Try To Appeal Again

from the this-case-will-never-end dept

Kim Dotcom's ongoing legal saga continues. The latest is that the New Zealand Court of Appeal has rejected his appeal of earlier rulings concerning whether or not he can be extradited to the US. Dotcom and his lawyers insist that they will appeal to the Supreme Court, though there seems to be some disagreement about whether or not that will even be possible. The full ruling is worth a read, though much of it is dry and procedural.

And, I know that many people's opinion of this case is focused almost exclusively on whether they think Kim Dotcom and Megaupload were "good" or "bad," but if you can get past all of that, there are some really important legal issues at play here, especially concerning the nature of intermediary liability protections in New Zealand, as well as the long-arm reach of US law enforcement around the globe. Unfortunately, for the most part it's appeared that the courts have been much more focused on the whole "but Dotcom is obviously a bad dude..." and then used that to rationalize a ruling against him, even if it doesn't seem to fit what the law says.

As Dotcom and his lawyers have noted, this has meant that, while there are now three rulings against him on whether or not he can be extradited, they all come to different conclusions as to why. A key issue, as we've discussed before, is the one of "double criminality." For there to be an extraditable offense, the person (or people) in question need to have done something that is a crime in both the US and New Zealand. As Dotcom has argued over and over again, the "crime" that he is charged with is effectively criminal secondary copyright infringement. And that's a big problem, since there is no such thing as secondary criminal copyright infringement under US law. Since Megaupload was a platform, it should not be held liable for the actions of its users. But the US tries to wipe all of that away by playing up that Dotcom is a bad dude, and boy, a lot of people sure infringed copyright using Megaupload. And all of that may be true, but it doesn't change the fact that they should have to show that he actually broke a law in both countries.

Indeed, the lower court basically tossed out the copyright issue in evaluating extradition, but said he could still be extradited over "fraud" claims. Dotcom argued back that without the copyright infringement, there is no fraud, and thus the ruling didn't make any sense.

The Court of Appeal comes to the same conclusion, but for somewhat different reasons. It appears that Dotcom's lawyers focused heavily on what some might consider technical nitpicking in reading of the law. Pulling on a tactic that has been tried (not successfully...) in the US, they argued that reading through the text of the copyright shows that it only applies to "tangible" copies -- i.e., content on a physical media -- rather than on digital only files. In the US, at least, the Copyright Act is written in such a way that a plain reading of the law says that copyright also only applies to physical goods, rather than digital files. But, as has happened here, US courts have not been willing to accept that fairly plain language in the statute because it would mess up the way the world views copyright. It's no surprise that the New Zealand court came to the same end result. While it would be better if the law itself were fixed, the courts seem pretty united in saying that they won't accept this plain reading of the statute, because that would really muck things up. Unfortunately, in focusing on that nitpicking, it may have obscured the larger issues for the court.

Over and over again in the ruling, the court seems to bend over backwards to effectively say, "look, Dotcom's site was used for lots of infringement, so there's enough evidence that he had ill intent, and therefore we can hand him over to the US." That seems like a painfully weak argument -- but, again, par for the course around Dotcom. So, basically, even though it has other reasons than the lower court, this court says there's enough here to extradite:

We have departed from the Judge in our analysis of s 131.260 But the Judge’s conclusions on ss 249 and 228 (the latter of which we will turn to shortly) were not affected by his conclusion on s 131. Each of the ss 249 and 228 pathways depended on dishonesty, as defined, and the other elements of the actus rei of those offences. Inherent in the Judge’s finding was that dishonesty for the purpose of s 249 (and s 228) did not require proof of criminal conduct under s 131. With that conclusion we agree. It is plainly sufficient that for the purposes of s 217 that the relevant acts are done without belief in the existence of consent or authority from the copyright owner. It does not need to amount to criminal conduct independently of s 249. Put another way, “dishonestly” as defined in s 217 is not contingent on having committed another offence, but is instead simply an element of the offence.

That may be a bit confusing, but basically they're saying it doesn't much matter whether or not there was actual criminal copyright infringement or not, because there was enough "dishonesty" to allow Dotcom to be extradited on other issues.

Again, none of this is that surprising, but it does again feel like the courts reacting to how they perceive Dotcom himself, rather than following what the law actually says. That should worry people. At this point, it seems highly likely that Dotcom's attempts to appeal to the Supreme Court will fail and that he will be extradited. Of course, then there would still need to be legal proceedings in the US -- though the judge assigned to his case has already shown little interest in understanding the nuances of copyright and intermediary liability law, so it's likely to be quite a mess here as well.

Whatever you think of Kim Dotcom, many of the legal arguments against him seem almost entirely based on the fact that people want to associate him with the actions of his users, and the fact that he didn't seem to much care about what the legacy entertainment industry thought of him. Maybe he deserves to be locked up -- but it's hard to argue that the process has been fair and based on what the law actually says.

Filed Under: appeals, due process, extradition, intermediary liability, kim dotcom, new zealand
Companies: megaupload

Kim Dotcom Wins Human Rights Tribunal Case Over Kiwi Government Withholding Info

from the another-mistake-by-nz dept

It's really quite incredible how, at nearly every turn, the New Zealand government has managed to mess up the legal case against Kim Dotcom. The raid on his house was later declared to be illegal, using invalid warrants. Evidence that was seized from his home and illegally turned over to the FBI was ordered to be returned. Oh, and then there was the whole bit about conducting illegal surveillance on Dotcom, deleting evidence of that illegal spying, and ordering officials to "bury" information about that illegal surveillance to avoid embarrassing the Kiwi government.

And now we have the latest: A Human Rights Tribunal in New Zealand has declared that the New Zealand government violated Dotcom's rights in withholding information from him. Specifically, in July of 2015, Dotcom had made an information request (in New Zealand it's an "information privacy request" which appears to be a quasi-privacy/data protection-type right in New Zealand) to various officials in the government requesting whatever personal information they held on him. The recipients of the demands sent them to the Attorney General, who refused to comply with the demands, claiming they were "vexatious and included information that was trivial."

The Tribunal disagrees. It goes through, in pretty great detail, the procedural issues at play here, including an attempt to discover this information by way of his extradition case, which was denied by the court. But that still left open the information privacy request. The court then goes through the question of whether or not it was even appropriate for everyone who received the request to hand them over to the Attorney General. This is done in almost excruciating detail, which we'll save you from having to go through yourself (unless you'd like to dig in below). However, the tribunal sums up the issue by basically pointing out that the recipients of the request were not supposed to transfer those requests to the Attorney General in the first place, as they had no legitimate reason to do so under the law (the fact that Dotcom was fighting the government in an extradition case is not enough).

In these circumstances it was artificial for the Crown to argue that simply because the Attorney-General, Solicitor-General and Crown Law were the Crown’s legal advisers and conducting litigation against Mr Dotcom the transferring agencies could properly believe the information to which the requests related were more closely connected to the functions or activities of the Attorney-General, Solicitor-General or Crown Law as the providers of legal advice and representation to the Crown. If in the context of that litigation the Crown had wanted to coordinate its responses to the information requests and to the associated requests for urgency, it could have done so by giving advice to the agencies and by communicating any decision made by those agencies. No transfer under s 39 was required by the circumstances or permitted by s 39 itself

And, because of that:

As the transfers were not made in accordance with the Act the Attorney-General was not the lawful transferee under PA, s 39(b)(ii). The Attorney-General accordingly had no authority, as transferee, to refuse to disclose the requested information. In these circumstances Mr Dotcom has established that in terms of PA, s 66(2)(b) there was no proper basis for the refusal.

The next question on the docket was whether or not the requests were "vexatious," as the Attorney General had argued in refusing to release the information. The government's argument here was basically that it was "vexatious" because Dotcom had an "ulterior motive" to accessing the information, with that motive being to help him in his fight against being extradited to the US to face criminal charges. But the tribunal points out that this doesn't appear to be true:

We make the specific finding that Mr Dotcom has amply satisfied us, to the civil standard, that contrary to the assertion by the Crown, he had no ulterior motive in making the information privacy requests. The requests were entirely genuine and not intended to disrupt the extradition hearing.

Indeed, the tribunal actually notes that if anyone seemed to be focused on "disrupting" the extradition hearing, it was the New Zealand government, listing out the various things the government did, including:

• unsuccessfully applying to revoke his bail when his then solicitors and counsel were granted leave to withdraw.
• unsuccessfully opposing the release of restrained funds for living and legal expenses.
• unsuccessfully opposing an adjournment of the eligibility hearing scheduled for 2 June 2015.
• applying to register in New Zealand the USA forfeiture order obtained in that country on the basis of a fugitive disentitlement doctrine, a concept unknown to New Zealand law. If successful, this would have meant that Mr Dotcom would have no funds to live on, let alone to defend the extradition proceeding.
• unsuccessfully opposing, and seeking to strike out, Mr Dotcom’s judicial review of the decision by the Deputy Solicitor-General (Criminal) to authorise the Commissioner of Police to register the USA forfeiture order.
• refusing, until 23 June 2015, to respond to the legitimate concerns as to funding for New Zealand counsel raised by counsel for Mr Dotcom on 29 April 2015.

The tribunal further pointed out:

By making the information privacy requests he was not seeking to be disruptive or vexatious. Rather, based on previous unsuccessful attempts to gain access to information held by various agencies (which had been the subject of judicial review and appeals), he was trying to follow what he understood to be the process identified by the courts as available to him in the circumstances. He was also anxious to avoid the requests being delayed by drawn out litigation as the goal was to obtain the information and to use it in evidence.

The tribunal also laughs off the idea that the government could refuse to hand over the information because it was "irrelevant." As the ruling notes, how could Dotcom know if it was irrelevant until he had seen it?

There is also the point made by Mr Dotcom that without being given access to the information held by the Crown agencies, he cannot know whether the information is relevant to the extradition hearing. To require him to first establish relevance before being given access to the information turns the Privacy Act upside down and renders illusory the legal right of access to personal information held by state agencies.

There are a bunch of smaller claims made by the New Zealand government as part of this that the tribunal dismisses quickly -- often criticizing the silly arguments made by the government. Here's just one example of many:

The Crown’s submission is also difficult to accept given that not knowing what personal information was held by the agencies, Mr Dotcom could not be expected to identify information which was relevant to the stay application. As he said: “you do not know what you do not know”. The suggestion by the Solicitor-General that Mr Dotcom could be more specific was, in the circumstances, not helpful.

Given all this, the Tribunal says that the information requests should never have been passed on to the Attorney General to review, and there was no basis to refuse to disclose the information requested. In terms of remedies, the Tribunal orders the original information requests to be fulfilled, and the Attorney General needs to pay Dotcom $30,000 "for the loss of a benefit Mr Dotcom might reasonably have been expected to obtain but for the interference" and another $60,000 for "loss of dignity and injury to feelings." Dotcom can also petition the Tribunal to have his legal costs paid for by the New Zealand government, which I expect he'll do.

On Twitter, Kim Dotcom has declared that this means his extradition case is "over," though that seems to be a bit of an exaggeration:

I don't know enough about New Zealand judicial process to know how true the statement is. It will certainly be interesting to see how it does impact that case, though. I can't imagine it's a good thing for the government. In later tweets, Dotcom also suggests that government officials have destroyed the information he is requesting, but we'll see what happens when the request is finally fulfilled.

Either way, the book of examples of just how incredibly the New Zealand government has fucked up everything about this case at every single turn has now added yet another chapter.

Filed Under: human rights tribunal, information privacy request, information request, kim dotcom, new zealand

Supreme Court Won't Review US Government Getting To Steal All Of Kim Dotcom's Stuff

from the that's-unfortunate dept

While the "main event" in the never-ending case of the US Justice Department against Kim Dotcom continues to grind its way ever so slowly through the wheels of justice, one element has basically concluded. And this was the part that should concern you even if you think that Kim Dotcom was completely guilty of criminal copyright infringement. The issue here is that as part of the arrest of Dotcom and his colleagues, the US "seized" many of his assets. Now, when the government seizes assets, it's a temporary thing. They have a certain period of time to hold onto it. Afterwards, they either need to give those assets back or file a separate case to attempt to "forfeit" those items (i.e., keep them forever). Here's where things get a little bizarre. Because Dotcom was fighting extradition in New Zealand, the "deadline" for the US to continue holding the seized assets was approaching -- so they filed the separate case against his stuff. Because it's a civil asset forfeiture case, the case is literally against his stuff, and not against Kim Dotcom (and, yes, this is as weird and nonsensical as it sounds). But there was a twist: because Dotcom was still in New Zealand, the Justice Department said that he was a "fugitive" and thus couldn't even protest the forfeiture of his stuff. Unfortunately, both the district court and the appeals court agreed.

Again, let's be totally clear here -- because sometimes people get so focused on their belief that because Megaupload enabled copyright infringement that this is somehow okay. But here we have a situation where before anyone has been found guilty of anything, the US government was given permission to take and keep all of Kim Dotcom's stuff. This should concern you even if you think Dotcom deserves to rot in prison, because there's a clear absence of due process here. If Dotcom is eventually found to be not guilty -- that won't have any impact on this. The US government still gets to keep his stuff (or, well, whatever it can get its hands on).

So the issue here is not whether or not Kim Dotcom is guilty of copyright infringement. It's whether or not the US government can just take his stuff before that other process has played out. That's a problem.

And, unfortunately, it's a problem that the Supreme Court will not be reviewing at this time. Even as some of the Justices have expressed concerns about civil asset forfeiture, apparently they didn't want to take on this particular case. And, maybe that's okay, because maybe, as with many people, they wouldn't have been able to separate out the copyright question from the civil asset forfeiture question from the fugitive disentitlement question -- all of which are separate but important.

Filed Under: civil asset forfeiture, copyright, fugitive disentitlement, kim dotcom, scotus, supreme court
Companies: megaupload

Once Again, New Zealand's Spying On Megaupload Execs Found To Be Illegal

from the because-of-course dept

Earlier this week, the new documentary by Annie Goldson about Kim Dotcom, Kim Dotcom: Caught In The Web was released. It's available on basically any authorized platform (and, not surprisingly, quickly showed up on a number of unauthorized platforms as well). I should note that I sat for two interviews with the filmmakers, and am very briefly in the film. It's really worth watching. While it doesn't go as deep into the weeds of the specific legal issues at play as I, as a legal geek, might enjoy, that's understandable as a more mass market documentary. And I think it does a really great job of at least getting across the basic issues, of how people in Hollywood, the DOJ and New Zealand law enforcement, intelligence and government were so won over by the image of Kim Dotcom, that they didn't bother much with the legal details.

One aspect of the legal case that is definitely discussed in the documentary is the fact that the New Zealand intelligence service, GCSB, illegally spied on Kim Dotcom on behalf of the US government. That's supposed to be forbidden, as the GCSB is only supposed to spy on foreigners, and not citizens or permanent residents. This came out fairly early on in the case against Dotcom, but there's been an ongoing legal battle (one of many...) into what it means concerning the case against him. GCSB had said that they didn't mean to break the law, so it shouldn't matter. And New Zealand moved to change the law to expand GCSB's surveillance powers over New Zealanders in the future.

But on Friday, New Zealand's High Court officially unveiled a ruling from back in December, saying that the surveillance of two of Dotcom's colleagues was illegal. This goes beyond what was previously revealed a few years back. Of course, it appears that part of the ruling is based on GCSB refusing to provide any details, claiming they are "top secret" and that to respond to the charges would "jeopardise the national security of New Zealand." Yes, or perhaps just jeopardize GCSB.

It's not entirely clear that this will have much of an impact on the case for Dotcom directly, though it once again highlights how the investigation and case against him involved an awful lot of cut corners by officials who totally bought into Hollywood's repeated story about how Dotcom was "Dr. Evil." Dotcom's lawyer, Ira Rothken, is arguing that this is yet another reason why the case should be dropped -- but so far the courts haven't really seemed to care much about all of the errors, law breaking and over reaction in building the case against Dotcom. However, as Rothken notes:

"This case and extradition should now be dismissed in the interests of justice.

"The government's illegal conduct has reached such an extreme level that we believe that no court should entertain an extradition proceeding so tainted with state sponsored abuse and violations of basic human rights."

For years now, I've explained why the case against Dotcom has serious problems -- mainly in that it makes up elements of criminal activity that simply don't exist in the law. The fact that there was also illegal spying on Dotcom and his partners only raises more questions. Yet, so far, the courts don't seem very interested in dealing with any of that, preferring to smooth things over with a simple "but bad stuff happened, therefore he should be punished." It's one of the most extreme examples we've seen of what law professor Eric Goldman has called out concerning lawsuit about infringement online: the courts frequently ignore the actual law if they sense there was "too much infringement." The fact that the government also got some of its information through illegal spying may not be enough to counteract the massive gravitational pull of "but... but... infringement."

Filed Under: gcsb, kim dotcom, new zealand, surveillance
Companies: megaupload

Kim Dotcom Asks US Supreme Court Not To Allow US Government To Steal All His Stuff Without Due Process

from the due-process-matters dept

Over the past few years we've covered what may seem like a side issue in the many legal issues facing Kim Dotcom, but it's an important one: is the US able to legally take all of his money and stuff, despite (1) him not being found guilty of anything and (2) that stuff not being anywhere near the US? As we've said, even if you think Dotcom is guilty of horrible crimes and should rot in jail, how the US is going about taking his assets should concern you massively. The fact that courts have blessed the DOJ's actions doesn't make it any less concerning.

On Friday, Dotcom (along with some powerhouse legal help) asked the Supreme Court to review this issue. The real issue here is one that we've covered a lot in other contexts: civil asset forfeiture, in which the US seizes and sues stuff rather than people. That's why this lawsuit is not actually against Kim Dotcom (there are other such lawsuits), but rather the United States v. All Assets Listed in Attachment A (no, really, that's the case). Of course, "Attachment A" is all of Dotcom's assets, mostly in Hong Kong. But the situation with Dotcom takes the normal questions about asset forfeiture and adds layer upon layer of complexity.

There are three specific issues that Dotcom is asking the Supreme Court to review, and all are important here. The first is whether or not a US court can allow for asset forfeiture for assets that are outside the US and outside of US government control. As the dissent pointed out in the appeals court ruling in this case, a federal court issuing a ruling is supposed to be a binding ruling, not an advisory ruling. And if the assets are held outside the US and not under the jurisdiction of the US courts, the ruling can't be binding.

The second two issues are connected: and it's basically the question of whether the courts were right in saying that the federal government could take Dotcom's stuff and that Dotcom could not protest, because he was "a fugitive." Of course, he's not a "fugitive." He's just fighting extradition to a place he's never been. He isn't running away and is going through the full legal process he's entitled to in New Zealand. That's not someone hiding from the US, it's someone who is following the basic rules of due process, which the US wishes to deny him. The specific questions are at what stage of the process he can be declared a fugitive and the other is whether or not intent needs to be shown.

As we have noted repeatedly, the Supreme Court rejects most requests to hear cases, but the lawyers here (Dotcom's long-term lawyer Ira Rothken along with legal giant Quinn Emanuel) have done a good job demonstrating real circuit splits in appeals courts on each of the three questions, which is often important in convincing the Supreme Court to actually take a case. As the filing notes:

This Court has previously admonished that the “harsh sanction” of fugitive disentitlement in a civil forfeiture action is “most severe and so could disserve the dignitary purposes for which it is invoked,” because it “foreclos[es] consideration of claims on the merits.” ... The Court noted that it “ha[d] held it unconstitutional to use disentitlement similar to this as punishment for rebellion against the United States,” but left open the question of “whether enforcement of a disentitlement rule under proper authority would violate due process.” ... Nonetheless, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed civil forfeiture based on fugitive disentitlement.

I imagine that the federal government will insist there's no reason for the Supreme Court to weigh in here, but hopefully the court decides to review the case. Again, even if you dislike Dotcom or think he's guilty of a "megaconspiracy" to infringe on copyrights, the due process questions around civil asset forfeiture should concern you -- and hopefully they concern the Supreme Court.

Filed Under: doj, kim dotcom, scotus
Companies: megaupload

New Zealand Court Says Kim Dotcom Still Eligible For Extradition... But Not Over Copyright

from the wait,-what? dept

After quite some time, a New Zealand court has said that Kim Dotcom is eligible for extradition to the US -- something he's been fighting for over five years. But there's a weird twist to the story. A key part of the argument that Dotcom's lawyers have been making is that for extradition to the US, there needs to be "dual criminality" (you can hear Dotcom's lawyer, Ira Rothken, discuss this on our podcast a few months back). And, the key "crime" that Dotcom is charged with involves secondary copyright infringement (i.e., creating a platform that others use to infringe). But, that's a problem, as there's no criminal secondary copyright infringement under New Zealand law (nor US law, but that's a separate issue). So, here's the twist. The court actually agreed that there's no such thing under New Zealand law -- and said that Dotcom can't be extradited for copyright infringement. However, the court said that he can be extradited for "fraud" because there's dual criminality there.

As Dotcom's lawyers point out, that means this is no longer, as was claimed by the US, the "largest criminal copyright case" because copyright is officially no longer a part of it. But, if the copyright part is taken out... where's the "fraud"? The whole claim of "fraud" is based entirely on the fact that Megaupload users infringed on copyrights. So if that's not a crime, then, um... where's the fraud?

I know that some will argue that it doesn't really matter, and they'll insist that what Dotcom and Megaupload did was "bad" -- end of story. But we're still supposed to live under the rule of law, and you don't just get to throw people in jail because they're "bad." You have to prove they actually broke the law. But that's a big problem here, because Megaupload didn't violate copyright law. And if it didn't do that... where's the "fraud"? Dotcom's lawyers will now try to appeal this part of the ruling, extending this legal fight even further. But it's a bigger issue than that. If courts can wipe away safe harbor protections by service providers by hiding behind a "fraud" claim, there are no longer safe harbor protections:

The High Court has accepted that Parliament made a clear and deliberate decision not to criminalise this type of alleged conduct by internet service providers, 5 making them not responsible for the acts of their users. For the Court to then permit the same conduct to be categorised as a type of fraud in our view disrupts Parliament’s clear intent. The High Court decision means that Parliament’s intended protection for internet service providers is now illusory. That will be a concern for internet service providers and impact on everyone’s access to the internet.

That's dangerous for free speech, it's dangerous for innovation, and it's dangerous for basic respect for the law.

Filed Under: copyright, criminal copyright, doj, extradition, fraud, intermediary liability, kim dotcom, new zealand
Companies: megaupload

New Zealand Court Grants Kim Dotcom's Request To Have Extradition Hearing Livestreamed On YouTube, Despite DOJ Protests

from the sorry-doj dept

The Kim Dotcom extradition appeal is now under way, with the first question being whether or not the courtroom drama could be livestreamed on the internet for a global public to watch. The request was originally made by Kim Dotcom and his lawyers, but the lawyers for the US government opposed... because... well, just because.

"US defends mass surveillance programs with 'If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear' but opposes live streaming of my hearing," Dotcom, who attended some of the hearing, said on Twitter.

Honestly, it's not at all clear why the government lawyers are opposing this other than to just oppose stuff and be generally obstructionist. However, it doesn't appear to have worked. A little while ago, Dotcom's lawyer Ira Rothken announced that the court had agreed to allow live streaming: And Kim Dotcom himself tweeted that it would begin tomorrow, once a cameraman was set up: This should be an interesting hearing to watch no matter what. If you want a preview of some of the points, check out our podcast interview with Dotcom's lawyer, Ira Rothken from last week.

Filed Under: extradition, hearing, ira rothken, kim dotcom, live stream, livestream, new zealand