Audits Of Asset Forfeiture Program Uncover Funds Used To Pay Student Loans, Property Used As Rent-Free Housing

from the stealing-our-way-to-justice! dept

Student loan debt is a serious problem here in the US as the price of higher education continues to outpace every standard economic yard stick. Lots of people think the government should step in to do something about it. While the administration makes helpful noises and tries to figure out how it can effectively tell Americans it's alright to rack up debt and walk away from it without actually, you know, encouraging Americans to get deeply in debt and walk away from it, one government employee is taking the bold steps the US government won't to eradicate student loan debt… specifically, his.

In a 2014 audit of the DA’s office representing Washington and Nowata counties [Oklahoma], the State Auditor’s Office found that $5,000 in forfeiture funds had been used to make payments on an assistant district attorney’s student loans.

That's a pretty egregious abuse of seized funds, and that's even if you find the whole asset forfeiture system mostly abuse-free when it comes to seizing property. Unbelievably, the DA's office defended the use of the public's money to pay off personal student loans.

The report said the district attorney maintained the expense was justified because most of the cases the assistant DA prosecuted were drug cases.

Which means what? That he was involved in several drug prosecutions and therefore entitled to a percentage of the take for his own personal use?

But no need to worry about the misspent $5,000. The DA's office has already "repaid" it using money seized a bit more lawfully via taxation.

After the issue came to light, the Oklahoma District Attorneys Council reimbursed the $5,000 using funds from its own student-loan program, the State Auditor’s report states.

So, everything's cool now. Except:

A 2009 audit of the District Attorney’s Office that represents Beaver, Cimarron, Harper and Texas counties found that a Beaver County assistant district attorney began living rent-free in a house obtained in a 2004 forfeiture. A judge had ordered the house sold at an auction, but the prosecutor lived there through 2009.

A bold new opportunity in real estate! Open to law enforcement members only!

There's so much more.

Schroedinger's seized pickup truck -- listed as "sold" at an auction -- remains in a sold/unsold state as neither the pickup, the paperwork nor the cash generated from the sale can be located. One district further perverted the perverse incentives by spending seized money before it had even been processed by the courts. In other instances, the money made its way onto the ledgers as "seized," but forfeiture cases were never filed. (This is particularly evil because without a filing, there's almost no way to challenge the seizure.)

The violations found by these audits are the sort of thing everyone should have expected when they allowed law enforcement to start seizing property without bringing criminal charges. Guns, vehicles and cash go missing. Proceeds from auctions are used to pay court costs and fund retirement parties. The program basically allows officers to steal from people they've already dehumanized as "drug traffickers." So, if someone's property goes missing and ends up as an off-the-books personal use vehicle/gun for some cop, no one's going to spend too much time worrying about the supposed "criminal" whose property has been seized. That's why the accountability is so lax and that's why the laws granting officers these powers need to be -- at minimum -- rewritten, if not taken off the books entirely.

And, as is always the case when asset forfeiture is attacked by legislators and regulators, there's a caricature of law enforcement on hand to offer homespun words of wisdom in defense of the legalized theft:

“I know for a fact we all try to work very hard to rid this devil’s candy (drugs) off of our state. And for someone to try and push us back — sheriff’s departments, police departments — that’s how we continue our fight, is to take that money and go forward,” Stradley said. “That will set us back many, many, many years.”

Will it set you back to 1990? And put you right in the middle of the crack epidemic? Or will it take you back to the 1920's, when marijuana was making jazz music tolerable and turning non-Caucasian males into rapists? How many years exactly will forcing Oklahoma law enforcement to accompany seizures with criminal charges set back these agencies? We all want to know. Even those of us who swore off the devil's candy years ago or never made it past anything harder than devil's food cake.

Filed Under: abuse, asset forfeiture, law enforcement, misuse, police, student loans

Even If You Think Kim Dotcom Is Guilty As Sin, The US Government Stealing His Assets Should Concern You

from the it's-called-due-process dept

Earlier this year, we covered a very troubling situation involving Kim Dotcom and the US government. As you almost certainly already know, Dotcom is fighting extradition from New Zealand to the US to face a bunch of charges concerning criminal copyright infringement. We've written about those charges as well as the extradition fight many times. However, while all of this was going on, the Justice Department filed a separate lawsuit, not against Dotcom himself, but against all of his stuff. We've talked for years about the problems of the "asset forfeiture" program in the US, and Dotcom's case drives all of those points home. And, even if you think that Kim Dotcom is absolutely guilty, a horrible person, responsible for billions of dollars in losses to the film and music industries, you should still be concerned about the asset forfeiture aspects here.

Again, this lawsuit is technically entirely separate from the ongoing case against Dotcom himself. Instead, it's USA v. All Assets Listed In Attachment A, And All Interest, Benefits, And Assets Traceable Thereto -- which is a catchy name if you're trying to hide what you're really doing, which is stealing all the assets of someone in a foreign country. The Attachment A in the title of that lawsuit is basically a listing of all of Kim Dotcom's assets. In asset forfeiture cases, since the government is technically filing the lawsuit against the stuff, arguing that the stuff itself is guilty, it leaves only limited ability of the original owner of that stuff to try to block the government from taking it all. And, that was made much more difficult by Dotcom (who has never even been to the US) fighting extradition in the (entirely separate) lawsuit against him. The DOJ, somewhat perversely, used the extradition fight to argue that Dotcom is a "fugitive," to basically say that he can't try to block the forfeiture, and the judge agreed.

The end result? The court gave the DOJ a huge green light to legally steal millions of dollars worth of assets from Kim Dotcom despite the lack of any court ruling or admission of guilt. That seems like a rather big due process concern. While a New Zealand court has put a temporary stop to the US government taking the New Zealand portion of the assets, back in the US, there is an appeal going on over the initial ruling.

As part of that, three organizations that you wouldn't normally think of as associating themselves with the likes of Dotcom, have stepped up to argue that the whole civil asset forfeiture effort against Dotcom's stuff is a complete farce. The Cato Institute, the Institute for Justice and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers have filed an amicus brief in the appeal arguing forcefully about how ridiculous this whole case is (not the case against Dotcom, but the case against all his stuff). As the Cato Institute notes in its blog post about this:

The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires an opportunity to be heard and an opportunity to defend against government-initiated actions against your property. Unlike an escaped criminal appellant who is scorning the court’s jurisdiction, in civil forfeiture, it’s the government that has dragged Dotcom and the others into court. Moreover, given the amount of abuse in civil-asset forfeiture, the government shouldn’t be allowed both to profit from the forfeiture and suppress defenses by calling residents of other countries “fugitives.” Finally, the reasons for fugitive disentitlement in criminal appeals simply can’t be transferred to civil-asset forfeiture. When an individual is “on the run” from criminal prosecution, courts can’t enforce judgements against them, but a valid forfeiture order would be fully enforceable against Dotcom if the court has jurisdiction over the property. Fugitive disentitlement is also used to deter felons from escaping justice, but there’s no similar concern here, where the property can’t run away and the claimants are merely residing in their home countries. The Fourth Circuit should not only allow the Megaupload defendants to challenge the seizure, it should also consider striking down as unconstitutional all uses of fugitive disentitlement in civil-forfeiture cases.

Frankly, if Dotcom is eventually found guilty of that which he is charged with (which is a separate issue altogether), then it could be perfectly reasonable to argue for asset forfeiture of the proceeds from such illegal acts. But to argue for civil asset forfeiture entirely separately from that process and to abuse the process by arguing he's a "fugitive" in order to get those assets is particularly ridiculous:

Under civil forfeiture laws, the government can take property without an underlying criminal conviction based only on the allegation of a crime. Those whose property has been seized can get it back by proving that their property is “innocent.” The government, however, is preventing the defendants from even making that argument. Using the “fugitive disentitlement” doctrine, the government is blocking the defendants from challenging the forfeiture.

Fugitive disentitlement has historically been applied only to criminals who escaped custody while appealing a conviction, the idea being that a court could decide to dismiss the appeal because any judgment would be unenforceable against an absent defendant. Here, the government has decided that, because the Megaupload defendants aren’t coming to the United States to defend their property, they are “fugitives” who have lost the ability to defend against that seizure — and the district court agreed.

As the filing itself notes:

Stripping the claimants of their due process rights isn’t just unconstitutional, it’s dangerous. There’s a growing literature on the abuse of civil forfeiture—and those abuses are directly tied to the protections given to the claimants here, as well as the ability of government officials to directly benefit from forfeitures. This court should not ratify a doctrine that would make abuses even easier.

Moreover, the reasons for invoking the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in criminal appeals are inapplicable to civil forfeiture actions. First, unlike an order against an absent criminal defendant, a valid forfeiture order where the court has rightful jurisdiction will be fully enforceable. Second, the claimants here haven’t scorned the district court’s authority as a fleeing criminal defendant would. Third, by appearing before the court via counsel, the claimants haven’t disrupted the court’s processes or offended its dignity. Finally, unlike with criminal appellants—who may need to be deterred from flight by the threat of disentitlement—the claimants are merely continuing to lawfully reside in their home countries.

Once again, even if you think Dotcom is the root of all evil in the world, even then you should be concerned about this particular aspect of the case(s) against him. It seems telling to me that, in the comment sections on our previous posts, those who have argued that Dotcom is clearly guilty, seem to have no problem with the asset forfeiture. They don't see it as any sort of due process violation because they've already decided he's guilty in their minds, just as the US government has. But that's not how due process works. You're supposed to be found guilty first. If these people are so sure that Dotcom is guilty, why not wait until that's shown in a court of law, rather than having to go through this separate process to take all of his stuff?

Filed Under: asset forfeiture, doj, due process, fugitive, fugitive disentitlement, kim dotcom
Companies: cato, institute for justice

Judge Orders Lying, Cheating Government To Return $167,000 To The Man They Stole It From

from the nothing-civil-about-this-forfeiture dept

A federal judge has just ordered the government to return $167,000 it took from a man passing through Nevada on his way to visit his girlfriend in California. The officers really wanted that money, too. They used two consecutive stops to jerry-rig some probable cause… even though at that point they thought they were only dealing with $2000. From the original stop forward, the entire situation was deplorable, indisputably showing that everyone involved was more interested in taking (and keeping) a bunch of cash than enforcing laws or pursuing justice.

The order is a jaw-dropping read. It begins with the flimsiest of "reasonable suspicion" and heads downhill after that. Straughn Gorman was driving across Nevada in his RV when he was pulled over for a "left-lane violation" -- driving too slow in the passing lane. (This itself isn't actually a moving violation, but the Supreme Court's Heien decision has ensured that law enforcement needn't be slowed by actual knowledge of the laws they're supposed to be enforcing.)

This lead to some questioning, because reasons:

Upon request, Gorman produced his license and registration and told Monroe that he was traveling to Sacramento, California to visit “his chick.” Id. at 60:9-61:5. Gorman told Monroe that his girlfriend lived in downtown Sacramento, but was not able to produce her exact address, noting that it was entered into his GPS system. Id. at 84:2- 22. Gorman’s use of the word “chick” aroused Monroe’s suspicion that Gorman’s answers were rehearsed because Monroe thought that “chick” was an unusual word for a person Gorman’s age—thirty-one at the time of the stop—to use.

Obsolete vernacular = "reasonable suspicion." That and State Trooper Greg Monroe felt Gorman's claimed employment with a "beach activities and paddle board company" sounded similarly "rehearsed." Monroe went back to his vehicle and tried to rustle up a K9 unit. But there were no units nearby, the records check was coming up clean and Monroe was running out of ideas. First, he told Gorman he was free to leave. Then he started fishing:

Immediately afterward, Monroe asked Gorman if he could ask some additional questions. Monroe first asked how Gorman could afford to drive a motor home cross-country when gas prices were over $3.00 per gallon. Monroe then asked if Gorman still sold paddle boards for a living, and asked about his compensation, to which Gorman responded “I don’t want to talk about how much I make.” At approximately 9:25 a.m., Monroe asked if there was anything illegal in Gorman’s motor home, or if he was carrying large amounts of U.S. currency. Gorman then told Monroe that he was only carrying about $2000 in U.S. currency in the motor home. At 9:25:45 a.m, Monroe asked Gorman “do you mind if we search the vehicle?,” to which Gorman said “I do mind, yes.” At this point, Monroe told Gorman that he was free to leave [for the second time], returned to his vehicle, and said “he’s carrying money” aloud to himself.

Monroe smelled money and he wasn't about to let $2000 travel across his state without being apprehended. So, he called the Highway Patrol and told dispatch his suspcions, stating that the only way the vehicle could be searched was with the use of a drug dog. Dispatch called Deputy Doug Fisher and informed him that Gorman did not consent to a search and that he "might want to follow up on the information." Here we have two different law enforcement entities basically colluding to perform a search simply because one entity experienced a refusal. The court isn't impressed.

The Court is particularly troubled that the officers’ belief that Gorman would not consent to a search, and his opposition to the canine sniff, appears to have contributed to the officers’ purported reasonable suspicion to extend the stop and continue the investigation. Individuals have a right to refuse consent for a search, and the existence of this right requires that denial of consent not be a basis to prolong a stop.

On top of this, Monroe called Deputy Fisher directly to "relay his suspicions." He also inflated the amount of money Gorman had admitted to be carrying with him -- from $2000 to $5000. Fisher left the Sheriff's Office ostensibly to perform a "roving patrol," but soon decided to park himself on the side of the highway in order to catch Gorman when his RV passed by. Fisher pulled the RV over after it "crossed the fog line" a few times.

Having been stopped for a second time in under an hour, Gorman was understandably annoyed. He told Fisher the same thing he had told Monroe during his twenty-minute stop earlier. Fisher ran the same records checks and received the same lack of anything actionable. Despite this, Fisher pushed for a canine search.

[A]pproximately twelve minutes into the traffic stop, Fisher released his drug-detection canine “Euros” from his vehicle. Fisher and Euros then approached the motor home and began walking around it in the clockwise direction, starting at the rear left-hand side of the vehicle. As Fisher and Euros circled the rear of the motorhome, Euros sat down near the vehicle’s back right compartment, facing the compartment. Fisher described this as a “committed sit and stare,” which he considered to be a positive alert.

Even if you believe -- like the Supreme Court does -- that drug dogs are mostly reliable and unlikely to respond to signals (unconscious or otherwise) from their handlers, Fisher's next statements indicate that bringing a drug dog onto the scene is just an easy way to generate "probable cause" where none exists.

Gorman then referred to the back rear compartment and said “I can open that if you want to look in it. It’s charcoal and stuff like that, do you want to look in it?” Fisher replied “do you want to talk to me now?” Gorman replied “if he alerted somewhere, look in it because there’s no drugs.” Fisher then noted that odor could come out anywhere on the vehicle, and that the rear back compartment was on the “downwind side of the vehicle.”

Armed with the drug dog's affirmation that drugs might be located somewhere in the RV, the deputy acquired a telephonic warrant and immediately began searching the entire interior of the RV. And while the drug dog continued to "alert" on objects inside the vehicle, no drugs were found. The only thing "illegal" in Gorman's motorhome was $167,000 in cash, stashed away in the freezer, microwave and bedroom. Gorman was (for the third time in under two hours) free to go. But his money wasn't.

Gorman fought back. Almost two-and-a-half years from the point the money was taken, it is now ordered to be returned. On top of that, Gorman will also be awarded attorney's fees. Why? Because the government lied every step of the way.

First off, two different law enforcement officers performed consecutive stops, with the second stop being predicated on the "suspicions" generated by the first. This is something law enforcement cannot do.

Here, Gorman was initially stopped for a minor traffic offense at approximately 9:03 a.m. and released at approximately 9:26 a.m. when Monroe concluded that he did not have probable cause to search the motor home. Gorman was stopped the second time, again for a minor traffic offense, at approximately 10:15 a.m., and held for more than nine minutes before Fisher asked if he could conduct a canine sniff. Fisher knew that Monroe had previously ran a records check and lacked probable cause to hold Gorman, but nonetheless two additional records checks were conducted in order to prolong the detention and make time for a canine sniff. The positive alert occurred approximately twelve minutes after the second traffic stop occurred.

All tolled, Gorman was detained for a total of approximately thirty-five minutes without convincing independent reasonable suspicion—before the officers conducted a canine sniff of the motor home and obtained probable cause for the search. Of course, “an individual who has already been seized can still be further seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 772 n.12 (9th Cir. 2009). But a second stop requires additional reasonable suspicion independent of the reasonable suspicion present in the first stop.

On top of that, the government -- when arguing for its "right" to take money just because -- claimed the two stops were entirely unrelated.

In its supplemental briefing, and after it became evident that the two stops were connected, the United States argues that “Monroe’s earlier traffic stop is wholly irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis applicable to Gorman’s motion to suppress.” Specifically, the United States contends that “Fisher’s traffic stop was based on his own observations of traffic violations being committed by Gorman, without regard to any information provided” by Monroe. These statements cannot be reconciled with the testimony by Monroe and Fisher, or an independent review of the evidence before the Court.

Note the phrase "after it became evident." This wasn't evident at first. Deputy Fisher hid this fact from the magistrate judge when requesting a warrant over the phone and lied about what Gorman had actually told him.

[T]he warrant application never mentions Monroe’s original stop, that Monroe called Fisher with information about Gorman and Gorman’s vehicle, or that Fisher was dispatched to investigate Gorman. This omission thereby represented to the magistrate that Fisher pulled Gorman over solely due to his traffic violations, as opposed to having been encouraged to investigate Gorman by NHP and Monroe. Second, Fisher represents in the warrant application that Gorman “indicated he had no job.” This is unambiguously contradicted by the video of Fisher’s questioning of Gorman, in which Gorman states clearly that he works for a Maui paddle board company.

These lies -- kindly called "omissions" by the court -- sadly wouldn't be enough on their own to suppress the evidence obtained by the search. But the application of the Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision (officers can't unnecessarily prolong stops to perform [often dog-assisted] fishing expeditions) does call for suppression.

But Deputy Fisher wasn't the only one lying. The State's Attorney's office also lied to the court.

The Court is disappointed that the United States would aggressively pursue this forfeiture action while all of its moving documents for summary judgment and supporting affidavits contained material omissions concerning the history leading to the traffic stop and canine sniff at issue. The government’s Motion for Summary Judgment, with supporting affidavits from Deputy Fisher and the Assistant United States’ Attorney, made no disclosure of anything which would have suggested that Fisher’s stop was a follow-up on Monroe’s stop and was based upon suspicion of a drug related offense.

This is how the government portrayed Fisher's actions in its provided documents.

On January 23, 2013, ECSO Deputy Doug Fisher was monitoring west-bound traffic on Interstate 80 near Elko, Nevada.

But, as pointed out earlier in the order, Doug Fisher wasn't assigned to traffic patrol and wouldn't have just been "monitoring traffic" if he hadn't received a call from dispatch about Gorman's RV, as well as a direct call from Trooper Monroe himself.

On top of the deceit at all levels, there were problems with the search itself. The drug dog alerted on a rear compartment. But rather than search that area, the deputies searched the entire vehicle.

[E]ven assuming that the officers had probable cause to search the back right compartment where the canine alerted, the Court is not convinced that the dog’s positive alert to the compartment gave the officers probable cause to search the entire motor home. Despite Gorman’s consent to search the compartment, the officers did not even begin their search of the motor home with the compartment, instead beginning with a search of the motor home’s main cabin. “Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982)

The court doesn't weigh this issue specifically (although it does express its skepticism) but it doesn't have to. The prolonged detainment without probable cause is enough to suppress the evidence under Rodriguez.

The court sums it up succinctly while ordering the government to hand over not only Gorman's original $167,000, but attorney's fees as well.

Gorman is undoubtedly the successful party here.

This order shows law enforcement at its ugliest: willing to lie and cheat to maintain control of what it stole.

Filed Under: asset forfeiture, money, nevada, police, seizure, straughn gorman

Nail Salon Owner Sues For Return Of Life Savings Seized By DEA Agents At Airport

from the law-abiding-citizens-don't-carry-cash dept

Here's something you see all too rarely -- not because the government's civil asset forfeiture programs aren't routinely abused -- but because it's a good way to spend lots of money fighting a losing battle.

Vu Do, owner of two nail salons in New York City, is trying to retrieve nearly $44,000 -- his life savings which he had put together over twenty years -- taken from him by the DEA at the JFK airport. The complaint points out that Do has run two legitimate businesses in NYC for several years, and not once has he been arrested or even charged for violations of controlled substances laws.

Nevertheless, the DEA took all of Do's money under the assumption that he's involved in the drug business, despite being more than willing to let him go without even a citation. Do had planned to take his money to California to help his financially-struggling siblings out, but ran into the DEA first.

Then there's this:

The Plaintiff did not know that it was a violation of Federal regulations to carry cash in excess of $5,000 at the time of the seizure.

There's a good reason for not knowing this. There is no federal regulation prohibiting citizens from walking around (or boarding planes) with any amount of cash. Asset forfeiture laws make this practice unwise, but nothing in federal law says Do was forbidden from boarding a plane with his $44,000.

There are reporting requirements for any amount over $10,000 in cash traveling in or out of the country, but nothing says travelers can't go from state-to-state with their own money. They don't even have to report it. They will, obviously, experience more scrutiny from the TSA, but it's not illegal to do what this salon owner did.

So, why is this in here? It could be that Do performed his own research and came to the wrong conclusions. But that doesn't explain why his legal representation didn't point this out to him or remove it from the complaint. My guess is it's either an oversight (by his lawyer) or him just repeating what a TSA/DEA agent told him en route to the seizure of his money.

The DEA can easily bleed Do dry, or at the very least make it a break even scenario. Trying to get the government to return seized property is about as straightforward as engaging in quantum mechanics with a headful of acid. (Or firing a teacher in New York City.) This chart, part of the Heritage Foundation's new PDF discussing the many abuses of civil asset forfeiture, shows exactly how much work -- and how much can go wrong in the process -- it takes to get your stolen property back. (via Reason) [click through for a larger version]


According to this chart, Do has no shot at reclaiming his money. He had a certain amount of time to challenge this seizure (until April 30, according to the DEA's administrative seizure notice) and his June 17 lawsuit falls well outside that time limit. Not being "timely" is pretty much an instant loss.

If so, that's 20 years worth of savings headed towards ensuring the DEA has the funding to keep seizing cash from travelers. Despite its best efforts, an actual drug trafficker will occasionally stumble into the agency's sticky grasp, inadvertently legitimizing the whole crooked program. I can't imagine the DEA looks forward to encounters with actual criminals, seeing as it involves arrests and a whole bunch of additional paperwork. Cash is king. And as long as asset forfeiture programs remain in effect, government agencies will prefer the easy busts of "guilty" money over the more legitimate effort of removing criminals from the streets.

Filed Under: asset forfeiture, dea, jfk, vu do

Because The 4th Amendment Only Kicks In After The Fact, 'Reasonable Suspicion' Will Always Be Anything But

from the mere-existence-deemed-suspicious-by-law-enforcement-officials dept

A few weeks ago, we wrote about a young man who had $16,000 "forfeited" to DEA agents while riding an Amtrak train -- under the legal theory that the money was somehow involved in drug trafficking. (Not the guy carrying it. He was released without being charged -- just his money.) Maybe if the man had been more careful not to appear "suspicious," he and his money might have made it to California intact.

But how can you not look "suspicious" while riding Amtrak?

• Unusual nervousness of traveler
• Unusual calmness or straight ahead stare
• Looking around while making telephone call(s)
• Position among passengers disembarking (ahead of, or lagging behind passengers)
• Carrying little or no luggage
• Purchase of tickets in cash
• Purchase tickets immediately prior to boarding

Too calm is suspicious. Too nervous is likewise suspicious. The straight ahead stare that's too suspicious to be deployed is undercut by looking around while using the phone. You can't win. You may as well turn yourself in (and any cash you're carrying) before boarding, rather than risk setting off law enforcement's "sixth sense" that basically turns anyone not in a law enforcement uniform into a potential suspect.

Law enforcement needs "reasonable suspicion" before it can move forward with patdowns, searches, questioning, etc. If it can't establish that, everything past that point runs the risk of nullifying any evidence obtained or arrests effected. But it's such a low bar, and it varies from officer to officer, not to mention from locality to locality (and even from agency to agency). Suspicion is hard to articulate, but "reasonable suspicion" is tied to the word "reasonable." The above list is clearly far from "reasonable."

Two stories (of many) we've covered illustrate the huge gap between what the public views as "reasonable" in terms of suspicion, and what those outside of that realm -- namely the courts -- find to be "reasonable."

Asserting your rights isn't inherently suspicious, but law enforcement has attempted to paint it as such when trying to hold onto a drug possession bust. The government has also tried to make the assertion that password-protected files on a laptop were suspicious enough to prompt further searches, but this reasoning was shot down by the court.

A 2006 National Institute for Justice report detailed some behavior officers find suspicious -- as noted during 132 hours of ride-alongs with 182 police officers.

• All black clothing, regardless of race of person wearing them.
• Nervousness, refusal to look directly at officers, "fidgeting"
• Mismatch of ethnicity (whites in a black neighborhood and vice versa)

The vague notions of "reasonable suspicion" have evolved over the past decade as law enforcement agencies increasingly view themselves as integral parts of the War on Terror. Asset forfeiture laws haven't helped, especially considering assets can be seized based on nothing more than an officer's "suspicion" the assets may be tied to illegal enterprises. (And, it must be noted, the Fourth Amendment -- despite its language about "seizures" has almost no bearing on most asset forfeiture proceedings. And due process -- the Sixth Amendment -- is often ignored as well.) Hence, this sort of thing, as detailed by the Denver Police Dept.:

Business patrons or individuals who carry large amounts of cash.

That alone is supposed to be "suspicious activity" -- something that nicely dovetails into the perverse incentives of asset forfeiture laws. Cash is suspicious and must be seized before it can do further harm, whether or not the person carrying it is ever determined to be involved in criminal activity.

Even worse -- following a list of terrorist-related activities to look out for (chemical purchases, questions about building security, etc.) -- is the assertion that looking slightly out of place is inherently suspicious.

Anyone attempting to appear ‘normal’ in their behavior, such as portraying themselves as a student or tourist.

Some alleged "terrorists" are nothing more than people who aren't entirely comfortable in their new environments.

The list of "reasonable" suspicions is neverending. The following are from cases where courts actually stepped up to call officers out on their "reasonable suspicion" claims.

(US vs. Davis, 2013)
There was no reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop for allegedly being nervous and only allegedly walking away from the officers after making eye contact with one and saying “shit.”

(State vs. Fontaine, Ohio, 2013)
We agree with the trial court that “overly polite” and “heavy breathing” are not sufficient indicators that give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

(State vs. Richardson, 2010)
While Officer Eastwood did observe an “unusual bulge,” this fact standing alone did not provide the independent basis of reasonable suspicion that Baldwin requires, especially in light of Richardson’s immediate compliance and Officer Eastwood’s prior peaceful exchanges with Richardson.

(Schneider vs. State, 2015)
Here, although Officer Wiens testified that he would conduct a stop in the event of a color discrepancy to determine whether the vehicle was stolen, he did not testify that, in his experience, car thieves would change the color of a vehicle after it had been stolen or that a discrepancy in color was indicative of any type of criminal conduct. There was, therefore, no evidence before the circuit court that a color discrepancy was indicative of any criminal activity that would possibly allow otherwise innocent behavior to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

It is clear, based on the testimony at the suppression hearing, that Officer Wiens was acting on a purely conjectural suspicion that appellant was engaged in illegal activity at the time he initiated the traffic stop.

(Parker vs. Town of Woodworth, 2015)
The issue is simple: Can a police officer conduct an investigatory stop and detain citizens otherwise legally operating motor vehicles on the public highways or private roads in this State solely because past crimes or suspicious activities have occurred in the area where motorists are traveling? The answer is not even close: “No.” There simply is no “check-em-out” exception to this Constitutional prohibition. [...] Officer Godwin could articulate nothing to establish a particularized and objective basis for suspecting Parker of criminal activity.

(US v. Thompson , 2015)
The combination of air fresheners, two phones, only one visible bag, referring to military friends to a stranger by rank and last name, clean construction gear, and no hotel reservation do not rise to more “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.”

This is a very small sampling. Dozens more can be found here.

Police may find the courts to be too narrow in their definition of "reasonable suspicion." It's not that every case where a search is thrown out is linked to a bad cop abusing his or her power. It's that the courts don't see the situation the way cops do. This doesn't make the courts wrong, but it does explain why it's so pervasive, despite dozens of rulings finding in favor of those illegally searched.

In a case where "reasonable suspicion" was nothing more than a person being in what was termed a "high-crime area" by the police officer, the court had this to say about the law enforcement mindset:

But here, an officer’s confident body language and tone of voice are not enough to prove a high-crime claim. Allowing such a finding solely through unsubstantiated testimony (no matter how confidently stated) would give police the power to transform “any area into a high crime area based on their unadorned personal experiences.” United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., concurring). Yet those experiences can exaggerate the criminality of an area because “[j]ust as a man with a hammer sees every problem as a nail, so a man with a badge may see every corner of his beat as a high crime area.” Id. This is natural--even expected--because police “are trained to detect criminal activity”; they view “the world with suspicious eyes.” Id. But seeing some crime does not automatically make a place a high-crime area.

That's the disconnect. People who aren't committing crimes wonder why they're being hassled by police officers. This is why. "Reasonable suspicion" is subjective and that determination is placed completely in the hands of those who can easily abuse it, and who are in the business of finding and detaining suspicious people. The remedy is the courts, which isn't much of a remedy at all, when you have to be arrested, held and possibly charged before you can avail yourself of your Fourth Amendment rights.

In a recent Ohio Supreme Court case, this unfortunate limitation is called out. The "reasonable suspicion" prompting the illegal search and arrest was based on little more than the "suspect" not making eye contact with a police officer.

The officer in this case was cruising a Kroger parking lot using the license plate scanner. She approached defendant because he was suspicious, but, on cross, could not identify any potential crime at all. The stop was without reasonable suspicion, and the trial court correctly suppressed the evidence. [Not looking at a police officer was considered suspicious. ¶10. How many cases have said that staring at a police officer is suspicious? Apparently some form of acknowledgment is required in this city.]

The footing for reasonable suspicion constantly shifts. The assertions made in defense of bogus searches and busts are similarly ethereal. The "hunch" always remains, but when pressed for something factual and tangible, there's nothing there.

The decision quotes a 1948 ruling that clearly defines the Fourth Amendment's purpose in relation to searches.

"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."

Which is why the courts must sort this out. We've already seen what the Fourth Amendment looks like in the hands of police officers. It's an obstacle, at best, and it's more commonly viewed as an enemy of police work rather than a necessary check against abuses of power.

The court also examines the nexus of the Fourth Amendment and the oft-applied "good faith exception." In this too, the officer is found wanting.

The exclusionary rule has existed for a century to broadly protect our rights to be free from unlawful search and seizure. We find no basis for applying a good-faith exception under these admittedly subjective circumstances. '[G]ood faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough.' If subjective good faith created an exception to the exclusionary rule, enforcement of the Fourth Amendment for people to be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," would be at the discretion of the police.

Furthermore, quoting Justice Robert H. Jackson (who presided over the Nuremberg Trials), the court notes that it is there to provide relief in the case of law enforcement overreach, but its offerings are purely defensive, far from comprehensive and well after the fact :

Only occasional and more flagrant abuses come to the attention of the courts, and then only those where the search and seizure yields incriminating evidence and the defendant is at least sufficiently compromised to be indicted. If the officers raid a home, an office, or stop and search an automobile but find nothing incriminating, this invasion of the personal liberty of the innocent too often finds no practical redress. There may be, and I am convinced that there are, many unlawful searches of homes and automobiles of innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is made, about which courts do nothing, and about which we courts do nothing, and about which we never hear.

In short: the remedy exists, but it can't prevent bogus arrests and illegal searches. On one hand, you have inherently suspicious cops far too often finding the Fourth Amendment's protections inferior to their well-honed sixth senses. On the other, you have the victims of these violations attempting to avail themselves of rights that have already been violated. In the middle, you have the courts, which can provide a much more reasonable look at "reasonable suspicion," but are also prone to extending the protections of immunity and "good faith" exceptions to far too many officers.

Unlike other rights, the government is only too happy to violate first and deal with the fallout later. Government agencies are generally wary of stifling free speech and legislators often hesitant to propose or back gun control laws, but the Fourth Amendment is one the government seldom seems worried about violating. Whatever consequences it faces for these violations are often months removed from the incident and far from guaranteed. Because of that -- and the general law enforcement mindset brought on by the realities of the job -- "reasonable suspicion" will always be anything but "reasonable."

Filed Under: 4th amendment, asset forfeiture, dea, police, reasonable suspicion, seizure

New Zealand Steps In To Block US Gov't From Stealing All Of Kim Dotcom's Stuff

from the that's-not-how-the-law-works-there dept

Back in March, we explained the ridiculous process by which the US government was able to steal millions of dollars from Kim Dotcom. If you want the details, go read that post, but the shorter version is that entirely separate from the various lawsuits involving Dotcom, the US government filed a separate lawsuit against all of Kim Dotcom's stuff (literally). Using the highly questionable process of civil asset forfeiture, the government is able to declare the stuff guilty of a crime, and thus making it ripe for the government to just take and keep. There are, of course, all sorts of questionable things about civil asset forfeiture, but it got even more bizarre in this case. That's because, after Dotcom's lawyers sought to intervene (which is how you block this kind of theft), the government had Dotcom declared a "fugitive" even though they know exactly where he is and he hasn't "run" from anything. Then, as a "fugitive," it was deemed that he did not actually intervene, and thus, the government was granted a "default judgment" (what you usually get when someone doesn't respond at all to a case).

Any judicial system that actually believed in due process would at least wait until the rest of the legal issues played out, including Dotcom's extradition and, if he is extradited, his trial over the criminal charges against him. If he loses all of that, then it seems reasonable to seek to forfeit his assets. But without a trial and conviction, it seems ridiculous to even go through the forfeiture process. And to basically force him to lose by declaring him a "fugitive" is just spitting in the face of due process.

At the end of that last post, however, we noted that the situation wasn't final. Since most of the assets were in New Zealand and Hong Kong, it was possible that he could get those countries to block the US from just taking those assets. And, that's exactly what's happened. A New Zealand court has ruled in Dotcom's favor [pdf], blocking the US from taking his stuff. The key issue: New Zealand takes a very different approach to these issues and (quite reasonably) finds the US process absurd. It starts out by pointing out that the whole "fugitive" designation is ridiculous, and that under New Zealand law, someone in the same situation would not be declared a fugitive:

While I accept that s 57 would permit the court to make a forfeiture order in the absence of a respondent, it does not expressly authorise the court to proceed on an ex parte basis or to decline to receive submissions made on behalf of an absent respondent who wished to be heard

The court also notes that just because Dotcom is fighting extradition in a New Zealand court it does not mean that he is "not amenable to justice" as is required for such a forfeiture of assets.

Further, the court recognizes the due process issue inherent in taking away all of the money from a defendant seeking to defend himself in court:

The application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to a person who is exercising a bi-laterally recognised right to defend an eligibility hearing, with the result that he is deprived of the financial means to mount that defence, is to put that person on the horns of a most uncomfortable and (the plaintiffs would say) unconstitutional dilemma.

And thus, after a lengthy discussion delving into many of the details about this, the judge concludes that she will not, in fact, allow the US government to take Dotcom's stuff, because doing so would be a huge burden on someone trying to defend themselves:

It is, I think, self evident from the above discussion that the plaintiffs have a substantial position to preserve and there will be very real consequences if it is not protected, pending final determination of the claim for review. If the provisional view I have formed about the unavailability of post-registration relief is correct, authorising the registration application to proceed now might deprive the plaintiffs of any ability to defend the extradition or to pursue their appeals against the forfeiture order in the United States.

I have little hesitation in concluding that interim relief should therefore be granted. Accordingly there will be a declaration that the Commissioner of Police is to take no further action that is consequent upon the decision by the Deputy Solicitor-General (Criminal) to authorise him to apply to register the foreign forfeiture orders made by Judge O’Grady in the District Court in Virginia on 27 March 2015 until further order of this Court.

This is far from over, as the New Zealand government is likely to appeal as well, but this whole process continues to be a fascinating power play by the US government -- with it repeatedly assuming that everyone will just follow what it wants. And, so far, the New Zealand courts have been ready to push back on the more extreme requests like this one.

Filed Under: asset forfeiture, default judgment, doj, fugitive, kim dotcom, new zealand, us

IRS Drops Forfeiture Case, Returns $107,000 Taken In Bogus 'Structuring' Prosecution

from the teaching-old-thieves-new-tricks dept

The streak continues. A highly-dubious IRS asset forfeiture case receives some media attention, closely followed by the agency dropping the case.

Federal prosecutors have dropped an attempt to seize $107,000 from a North Carolina small business owner using asset forfeiture laws following several weeks of media scrutiny.

According to the Institute for Justice, a public interest law firm, the Internal Revenue Service and Justice Department moved Wednesday to voluntarily dismiss their case against Lyndon McLellan.

McLellan's case was raised (as a "hypothetical") by Rep. George Holding during IRS testimony in front of the House Ways and Means Committee. Holding asked IRS Commissioner John Koskinen why the agency was continuing to pursue a questionable "structuring" case against McLellan, considering both the IRS and the DOJ had issued policy revisions stating the government would not do this unless there was evidence the deposited money originated from criminal activity.

Koskinen agreed that McLellan's case should be dropped and promised to look into it. Meanwhile, the prosecutor overseeing McLellan's case contacted the Institute for Justice, claiming that its release of case details to House members would not only not help McLellan's case but could actually make it worse for him -- citing the vaguely-threatening "ratcheting" of "feelings" within the IRS by this public disclosure. He then offered McLellan a "final offer" of half his money back.

McLellan didn't take the offer. Now, he's getting all of his money back -- which he'll need, considering he's already racked up plenty of expenses fighting the IRS and DOJ.

McLellan still had to pay for a lawyer, not to mention $19,000 to have his business audited. The government also refuses to pay for interest earned on money after it has been seized.

While the IRS may be curbing its dubious forfeitures, there are still problems that need to be addressed within the DOJ itself.

Last week, the Justice Department said it would investigate two other prosecutors after one business owner whose assets were seized said he had been punished more harshly after publicizing his case and another said he had been threatened with a felony charge if he did not agree to give up some of his money.

Kind of dispels the notion that asset forfeiture has anything to do with "justice." As these programs continue to suffer from mainstream exposure, those heading up prosecutions seem unwilling to scale back their efforts accordingly. They can see the revenue stream drying up and they're getting desperate. There will be more than a few forfeiture victims whose cases will stay off the radar. Unfortunately for them, these "zealous" prosecutors appear willing to do whatever they can to ensure funds seized with no evidence of criminal intent or origin remain inaccessible to those who actually earned them.

Filed Under: asset forfeiture, irs, lyndon mclellan, publicity, stealing

IRS Continuing To Pursue An Asset Forfeiture Case That Contradicts Its Own Policy On 'Structuring' Prosecutions

from the the-pettiest-of-discounts dept

Late last year, the IRS began dropping some of its more questionable asset forfeiture cases, most likely in response to reams of bad press about its sketchy enforcement of structuring laws. Many of these cases were built on nothing more than a series of deposits that came close to -- but never exceeded -- the $10,000 needed to trigger federal reporting. While the IRS may say it's looking for tax cheats, fraudsters and money launderers, its targets were often small, cash-based businesses like restaurants and vending suppliers.

The IRS also announced that, going forward, it would only pursue asset forfeiture cases that showed the money came from an illegal source. The DOJ followed this up with its own policy shift that roughly matched the IRS's.

Despite this change of heart, the IRS and DOJ are still pursuing a case against Lyndon McLellan -- a convenience store owner who had $107,000 taken from him by the feds late last year. McLellan -- on the advice of his banker -- began inadvertently "structuring" his deposits, again to "save" his bank from the burden of extra paperwork. There was seemingly no doubt his business generated the cash he deposited, but the IRS went after him anyway.

McLellan's legal representatives (from the Institute of Justice) forwarded details of his case to legislators ahead of IRS testimony in front of the House Ways and Means Committee. One legislator took this time to confront IRS Commissioner John Koskinen about his agency's contradictory prosecution of McLellan.

Without naming McLellan, Rep. George Holding (R-N.C.), a former U.S. attorney, asked Koskinen about the seizure:

Holding: Are you saying that under the new policy, you have to aver that we have probable cause to believe an illegal act is taking place other than the act of structuring?

Koskinen: Yes.

Holding: You sure about that?

Koskinen: That's what I'm advised by the people who run the Criminal Investigation Division.

Holding: The staff pulled for me a case from North Carolina, from my former prosecutorial district, after your policy change. And I've read through the affidavit and the associated documents. There's no allegation of illegal activity, other than the act of structuring...

Koskiken: If that case exists, it's not following the policy.

This should have resulted in the IRS dropping the case, or at least providing something in terms of evidence justifying its continued pursuit of McLellan. If nothing else, the agency could have played this off as an unfortunate oversight by its prosecutorial arm. Instead of any logical outcome, this questioning resulted in the federal prosecutor handling McLellan's case claiming the real problem wasn't the pursuit of a bogus prosecution. No, the real problem here was people disrespecting the power of a gag order.

Prosecutor Steve West emailed this to the Institute of Justice.

I'm a bit concerned. At your request, I provided you a copy of the application for seizure warrant, which remains under seal with the Court, and now it appears it has been made available to a congressional committee? I do not know who did that, and I am accusing no one, but it was not from our office and could only have come from your clients. That was certainly not my intent in making this available. Whoever made [the document] public may serve their own interest but will not help this particular case.

Oh, and that the public exploration of this contradictory prosecution hurt the feelings of West's office, if not the IRS itself.

Your client needs to resolve this or litigate it. But publicity about it doesn't help. It just ratchets up feelings in the agency.

And, finally, a half-off sale on sour grapes.

My offer is to return 50% of the money. The offer is good until March 30th COB.

As Reason's Jacob Sullum points out, there are valid reasons for filing these affidavits under seal. Notifying a structuring suspect of the IRS's intent to seize funds would probably result in a swift draining of targeted accounts. Whether the seizure is justified or not, there's at least a solid reason for the gag order. But in this case, the IRS had already seized the funds and moved forward with its prosecution. There was no "fear of flight," at least not in terms of the money in McLellan's accounts. West's nod to the power of sealed affidavits isn't due to fear of a compromised investigation, but rather due to his irritation at having one of his prosecutions publicly outed as running contrary to both the IRS's and DOJ's policies on structuring seizures.

As for the 50% offer, that's similarly disingenuous. At this point, the IRS commissioner has publicly acknowledged that such a case would be in violation of IRS policy. It's already likely on its way to being dropped, despite the prosecutor's suggestion that publicly embarrassing his office and the IRS's forfeiture team might result in the case being pursued out of spite, rather than based on any evidence of criminal activity.

Filed Under: asset forfeiture, convenience store, doj, irs, lyndon mclellan

DEA Takes $16,000 From Train Passenger Because It Can

from the no-due-process-for-dead-presidents dept

There were no drugs and nothing to enforce, but that didn't stop the Drug Enforcement Agency from taking $16,000 from a passenger on a train headed to California.

After scraping together enough money to produce a music video in Hollywood, 22-year-old Joseph Rivers set out last month on a train trip from Michigan to Los Angeles, hoping it was the start of something big.

Rivers changed trains at the Amtrak station in Albuquerque, New Mexico, on April 15, with bags containing his clothes, other possessions and an envelope filled with the $16,000 in cash he had raised with the help of his family, the Albuquerque Journal reports. Agents with the Drug Enforcement Administration got on after him and began looking for people who might be trafficking drugs.

Rivers said the agents questioned passengers at random, asking for their destination and reason for travel. When one of the agents got to Rivers, who was the only black person in his car, according to witnesses, the agent took the interrogation further, asking to search his bags. Rivers complied. The agent found the cash -- still in a bank envelope -- and decided to seize it on suspicion that it may be tied to narcotics. River pleaded with the agents, explaining his situation and even putting his mother on the phone to verify the story.

No luck.

Leaving aside the unsavory hint of racial profiling, there's the fact that the DEA helped itself to cash simply because it was cash. It had no reason to suspect Rivers of anything, but the money was apparently too much to pass up. Even having his story corroborated was useless. And, sure, the DEA agents had no reason to believe anyone Rivers put them in touch with was a trustworthy source of information. (After all, he's some sort of drug dealer, right?) But to grant the DEA the benefit of the doubt for its refusal to believe Rivers' mother's statements is to cut the agents an absurd amount of slack for everything preceding that.

Because what did the DEA actually have here? A young guy and $16,000 in cash. According to the DEA's own statements, it doesn't need anything more than that to effect an asset seizure. And, according to the DEA's own statements, it has no reason to bother with anything more than a cursory look that "confirms" what it wants it to confirm.

[Sean] Waite [DEA - Albuquerque] said that in general DEA agents look for “indicators” such as whether the person bought an expensive one-way ticket with cash, if the person is traveling from or to a city known as a hot spot for drug activity, if the person’s story has inconsistencies or if the large sums of money found could have been transported by more conventional means.

If we leave it to the DEA to define drug activity "hot spots," it becomes any destination any traveler is headed to, especially if there's seizable cash involved. As for story inconsistencies, we're back to "eye of the beholder" territory. If agents are motivated to perform asset seizures, any story can be found to have enough flaws to justify the forfeiture. Waite's statement is very unhelpful, other than to show how completely screwed up asset forfeiture programs are.

As if on cue -- and as if the DEA's Sean Waite is completely unaware of the level of scrutiny and negative public opinion centered on asset forfeiture programs -- he delivers the most tone-deaf of talking points:

“We don’t have to prove that the person is guilty,” Waite said. “It’s that the money is presumed to be guilty.”

Boom. There's your problem. Or rather, Rivers' problem. And the problem of far too many Americans who made the mistake of leaving home with cash on their person. The government doesn't need to prove shit. It can just take and take and take and force those wronged by its "presumptions" to jump through multiple expensive and mostly futile hoops if they hope to recover their "guilty" belongings.

So, what do you tell people like Rivers? "Don't carry cash?" Cash is universal and accepted everywhere. But it's also apparently inherently guilty. Just don't carry large amounts of cash? From Virginia's asset forfeiture stats:

Contrary to the oft-stated defense that these programs are necessary to cripple powerful drug lords and multimillion dollar fraudsters, more than half the cash seized from 2001-2006 fell in the $614-1,288 range and the average worth of vehicles seized has hovered at about $6,000.

And Philadelphia, PA's:

A City Paper review of 100 cases from 2011 and 2012 found the median amount of cash seized by the District Attorney was only $178.

Any cash is inherently suspicious and can be deemed "guilty" by the seizing agency with no corroborating evidence. $16,000 has just made its way into the DEA's funds and if Rivers wants it back, he's likely going to lose a great deal of it to legal fees. He's currently trying to raise the money the DEA took from him via crowdfunding site GoFundMe. Hopefully, he'll get another chance to make his music video without being sidelined by government agents looking to bust some "guilty" cash.

Filed Under: asset forfeiture, civil asset forfeiture, dea, in rem, joseph rivers, legalized theft, money, stealing

New Mexico Passes Law Saying Law Enforcement Can't Steal Your Property Without A Criminal Conviction

from the good-news dept

We've been talking for a while about the ridiculousness of the civil asset forfeiture system in the US, whereby law enforcement can basically steal what they want (and some cops will even admit that, to them, it's shopping for stuff they want). If you don't remember, it basically just involves police taking stuff and then insisting that it was ill-gotten goods from some sort of law breaking activity -- which would be kept by filing a civil lawsuit against the stuff itself rather than the person. There didn't need to be any criminal conviction at all. Earlier this year, Eric Holder tried to limit the DOJ's assistance of such shopping sprees by law enforcement, but police were still open to using the process to take stuff.

And, now, some states are trying to take action. Virginia lawmakers started pushing for a requirement of a criminal conviction. A similar bill in Wyoming passed out of the legislature overwhelmingly, but was vetoed by the governor who seemed to argue that all civil asset forfeiture "is right" despite plenty of evidence of abuse.

However, in New Mexico, not only did the legislature agree on a bill requiring a conviction, but now Governor Susana Martinez has signed the bill:

House Bill 560 (HB 560) makes numerous changes to the asset forfeiture process used by law enforcement agencies in New Mexico. As an attorney and career prosecutor, I understand how important it is that we ensure safeguards are in place to protect our constitutional rights. On balance, the changes made by this legislation improve the transparency and accountability of the forfeiture process and provide further protections to innocent property owners.

This is great to see and hopefully other states will follow suit -- or we can get a federal law stating that police can't just take stuff without a criminal conviction.

Filed Under: asset forfeiture, civil asset forfeiture, criminal conviction, new mexico, police, stealing