Appeals Court Doesn't Buy Government's National Security Assertions; Says Lawsuit Against FBI Can Continue

from the 'we-can't-explain,'-they-explained dept

A lawsuit against the FBI for pervasive, unconstitutional surveillance of Muslims can continue after receiving a very key determination from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. At the center of the case are three Muslims who claim the FBI's continuous surveillance -- assisted by an FBI informant -- violated a number of Constitutional protections.

The key victory here is the court's overturning of the lower court's ruling on the national security assertions raised by the government in hopes of avoiding having to litigate the alleged violations at all. The lower court granted the government's motion to dismiss, saying the government's secrecy matters far more than an unviolated Constitution. The appeals court reverses that, noting stating that the government can't dodge litigation simply by claiming the subject of the lawsuit is too sensitive to discuss in court. From the decision [PDF]:

Plaintiffs asserted eleven claims, which fell into two categories: claims alleging unconstitutional searches, and claims alleging unlawful religious discrimination. The district court dismissed all but one of plaintiffs’ claims on the basis of the state secrets privilege, and allowed only the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) claim against the FBI Agent Defendants to proceed.

The panel held that some of the claims the district court dismissed on state secret grounds should not have been dismissed outright. The panel further held that the district court should have reviewed any state secrets evidence necessary for a determination of whether the alleged surveillance was unlawful following the secrecy-protective procedure set forth in FISA.

The lower court showed too much deference to the state secrets assertions. It must now reexamine the claims made by the government, as well as their application to the alleged harms. This is very helpful precedent -- one that forces lower courts to pay a lot more attention to the government's natsec hand-waving, rather than simply conclude the government knows best when it comes to state secrets.

There's more good stuff in the panel's opinion. Two FBI agents will have to defend themselves against claims of unlawful surveillance, like the following:

Plaintiffs offer sufficient well-pleaded facts to substantiate their allegation that some of the Agent Defendants—Allen and Armstrong—were responsible for planting devices in AbdelRahim’s house. Specifically, the complaint details one occasion on which Allen and Armstrong asked [FBI informant] Monteilh about something that had happened in AbdelRahim’s house that Monteilh had not yet communicated to them, and explained that they knew about it because they had audio surveillance in the house.

Plaintiffs also allege sufficient facts with regard to those two Agent Defendants in support of their allegation of electronic surveillance of Fazaga’s office in the OCIF mosque in Mission Viejo: Allen and Armstrong told Monteilh that electronic surveillance was “spread indiscriminately” across “at least eight area mosques including ICOI, and mosques in Tustin, Mission Viejo, Culver City, Lomita, West Covina, and Upland,” and that “they could get in a lot of trouble if people found out what surveillance they had in the mosques.”

The defenses raised by the sued agents forms part of the Ninth Circuit's state secrets decision. It was the agents that raised this defense, not the agency they worked for (which was also sued). As the court notes, the agents cannot possibly hope to prevail by raising a defense the government determined didn't apply to the situation.

The Agent Defendants—officials sued in their individual capacities—are not the protectors of the state secrets evidence; the Government is. Accordingly, and because the Agent Defendants have not identified a reason they specifically require dismissal to protect against the harmful disclosure of state secrets where the Government does not, we decline to accept their argument that the Government’s dismissal defense must be expanded beyond the religion claims.

What the government did do is invoke FISA's protections against open discussion of counter-terrorist surveillance programs. The court reminds the government that the law was created in response to abusive surveillance programs deployed by the government -- abuses much like those central to this case. While it did eventually lend its name to more surveillance abuses following the 9/11 attacks, it was actually more of a reform effort in its original state. Since the government appears to have forgotten FISA's original aim, the appeals court delivers this reminder.

The inference drawn from the text of § 1806 is bolstered by § 1810, which specifically creates a private right of action for an individual subjected to electronic surveillance in violation of FISA. FISA prohibits, for example, electronic surveillance of a U.S. person “solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A). Here, Plaintiffs allege they were surveilled solely on account of their religion. If true, such surveillance was necessarily unauthorized by FISA, and § 1810 subjects any persons who intentionally engaged in such surveillance to civil liability. It would make no sense for Congress to pass a comprehensive law concerning foreign intelligence surveillance, expressly enable aggrieved persons to sue for damages when that surveillance is unauthorized, see id. § 1810, and provide procedures deemed adequate for the review of national security-related evidence, see id. § 1806(f), but not intend for those very procedures to be used when an aggrieved person sues for damages under FISA’s civil enforcement mechanism. Permitting a § 1810 claim to be dismissed on the basis of the state secrets privilege because the § 1806(f) procedures are unavailable would dramatically undercut the utility of § 1810 in deterring FISA violations. Such a dismissal also would undermine the overarching goal of FISA more broadly—“curb[ing] the practice by which the Executive Branch may conduct warrantless electronic surveillance on its own unilateral determination that national security justifies it.”

To sum up, the appeals court isn't willing to let the government (or its agents) claim this apparently-illegal surveillance is too sensitive to discuss in open court. The government will still get to submit evidence and arguments to the court in ex parte hearings if it wants to argue certain elements of the case cannot be discussed publicly, but it will not be granted a blanket exception it can use to dodge the litigation in its entirety. The court ends its decision by noting the government can't have this much power if it's not willing to accept the responsibility that comes with it.

In holding, for the reasons stated, that the Government’s assertion of the state secrets privilege does not warrant dismissal of this litigation in its entirety, we, too, have recognized the need for balance, but also have heeded the conclusion at the heart of Congress’s enactment of FISA: the fundamental principles of liberty include devising means of forwarding accountability while assuring national security.

Which is exactly how it should be. Unfortunately, too many courts take the district court's path and give the government all the secrecy it asks for.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, 9th circuit, constitution, doj, fbi, fisa, muslims, national security, surveillance

Federal Court Says NSA PRISM Surveillance Good And Legal Because The Gov't Said It Was Good And Legal

from the 'those-DOJ-guys-are-real-straight-shooters' dept

Three years after its inception, a prosecution involving possibly unlawful FISA-authorized surveillance, hints of parallel construction, and a very rare DOJ notification of Section 702 evidence has reached a (temporary) dead end. The defendants challenged the evidence on multiple grounds -- many of which weren't possible before the Snowden leaks exposed the breadth and depth of the NSA's domestic surveillance.

The federal judge presiding over the case -- which involved material support for terrorism charges -- has declared there's nothing wrong with anything the NSA or FISA Court did, so long as the surveillance was authorized and possibly had something to do with national security. (via FourthAmendment.com)

First, the defendants -- all accused of providing material support to Al Qaeda (remember them?) -- asserted the constitutionality of the NSA's upstream collections should be revisited in light of the Snowden leaks. The court [PDF] says these more-recent exposures are no reason to upset the precedential apple cart.

Controlling precedent decides this issue. In 2005, the Sixth Circuit rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to FISA's procedures. The court explained in Damrah that the defendant's Fourth Amendment challenge lacked merit, as "FISA has uniformly been held to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment." Damrah has not been overturned or altered in light of the public disclosures regarding PRISM and upstream collections. And consequently, Damrah forecloses Defendants' constitutional challenge.

So, to add this all up: leaked documents from 2013 onward, exposing routinely-abused programs that massively expanded following the 2008 FISA Amendments Act, mean nothing when stacked up against a 2005 case predating the NSA's admissions of surveillance abuse and the exposure of the FBI's backdoor searches of domestic communications.

Furthermore, the court declares -- based on documents provided by the government directly to the court, but not to the defendants (in ex parte hearings) -- the FISA-authorized surveillance was on the up-and-up because the government provided documents declaring the FISA-authorized surveillance was on the up-and-up.

The court is sympathetic to those on the other side of the deck it helped stack, but only barely.

I recognize the challenge faced by a defendant in making a substantial preliminary showing that a FISA application contains a false statement when the defendant does not have access to the application. But the threshold burden exists nonetheless. [...] And here, Defendants have failed to satisfy that burden.

Oddly, the court then decides, after pulling from a 2005 decision and ignoring every FISA-related development since then, that previous domestic surveillance violations by the FBI have no bearing on this case.

The Government's errors from more than a decade ago [referring to a 2004 IG report about post-9/11 surveillance] do not amount to a substantial preliminary showing that an application for FISA collection relevant to this case contains a false statement which was knowingly or recklessly made and necessary to the finding of probable case.

Yes, this is true. These are not comparable things. But with the defendants unable to review the FISA applications, they're left with the judge's take as guided by government submissions -- submissions the defendants are also unable to review or even argue.

As for the Fourth Amendment challenge to Section 702 surveillance generally, the court says there's really no Fourth Amendment issues as this does not apply to "aliens in foreign territory." The court goes even further, though, suggesting the collection of communications outside of the country does not even require a warrant, even if it "inadvertently" sweeps up Americans' communications during the process.

Since the court has also unilaterally decided it can -- unaided by anyone but the government -- decipher the government's FISA-related submissions, there are no due process violations even if the defendants are prevented from viewing, analyzing, or rebutting the claims made by the government during these ex parte sessions. In the end, there's nothing left for the defendants to do but appeal, which will certainly happen what with the court dismissing out of hand the evidence provided by multiple leaked documents and documents officially released by the Director of National Intelligence. To buy the government's claims of above-board surveillance in secret court sessions and declare those NATSEC Kosher seems like a very close-minded move that grants the government more deference than documents the government released publicly itself shows it has earned.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, fisa, fisa court, fisc, mass surveillance, nsa, prism, privacy, surveillance

Government Says FISA Court Should Stop Wasting Time Considering The ACLU's Request For Greater Transparency

from the and-take-your-worthless-Constitution-with-you! dept

Late last year, the FISA Court did something it had never done before. It performed an en banc review of an earlier decision to determine whether or not the ACLU had standing to petition the court to release decisions pertaining to ongoing surveillance programs. The judges found the ACLU could continue its legal battle -- one it has waged on and off for more than a decade. It pointed out the ACLU had raised enough of a First Amendment allegation to be heard, although it wasn't particularly optimistic about its ability to overturn decades of FISA court secrecy.

The FISA court has posted the opening briefs from both parties. The government's brief [PDF] basically argues that the court has worked in near-total darkness for years and it should go on doing so for years to come. The phrase "national security" is used frequently. It points to two earlier petitions by the ACLU -- filed with different FISA judges -- as having set up a dilemma the government shouldn't even need to address. Judge Saylor's opinion in 2013 opened the door for the ACLU's standing, finding the ACLU was entitled to access at least one opinion dealing with bulk collection authority.

Judge Collyer's decision, released only months later, made no such finding. Instead, Collyer noted the court's secrecy was essential to the nature of the surveillance it approved and the ACLU had no standing to allege a violation of a First Amendment right to access FISA court documents. The government argues Collyer's decision was correct, not the one recently reached by the full panel of FISA judges.

There is similarly no substantial argument that it is logical to open up the FISC's proceedings to public view. The FISC's "entire docket relates to the collection of foreign intelligence by the federal government." In re Motion for Release, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 487. Its operations are governed "by FISA, by Court rule, and by statutorily mandated security procedures issued by the Chief Justice of the United States," which together "represent a comprehensive scheme for the safeguarding and handling of FISC proceedings and records." Id. at 488. The FISC has thus correctly found that ''the detrimental consequences of broad public access to FISC proceedings or records would greatly outweigh any" benefits, and . . that these harms "are real and significant, and, quite frankly, beyond debate."

The government also points out the FISA court has no power to declassify court proceedings. In fact, it argues the court overseeing government surveillance programs doesn't have enough information on hand to make that determination… which is a weird thing to say about people who review surveillance requests.

The Constitution assigns responsibility for classifying and controlling access to national security information to the Executive rather than the judiciary because only the former has the expertise and resources to make the necessary national security determinations.

The ACLU's brief [PDF] argues that FISA court precedent isn't the only precedent the court should consider. It points out that every court that has handled the issue has determined, to some extent, that denial of access to court records is an arguable First Amendment injury.

It then goes on to point out that the few times the FISA court has ordered the release of an opinion, the government has redacted so much that the released documents are useless. On top of its arguments that it should be allowed to proceed with its argument for access, the ACLU also suggests the court take a more active role in moderating the government's redaction efforts. As it points out, prior challenges of government secrecy assertions by the court have shown the government is unable to justify its redaction demands.

Critically, there is no indication in the public record that the FISC had any role in determining which portions of its own opinions should be made public. The government appears to have determined unilaterally which parts of the FISC's orders should be redacted and kept secret. By contrast, in response to a separate access motion brought by the ACLU, the FISC required the government to explain and justify its proposed withholdings in another FISC opinion. That review proved essential to securing public access to the court's opinion. Once required to defend its withholdings, the government abandoned many of them.

It also cautions the court against conflating standing with merit. As the FISA en banc review determined, all that's needed to bring a case is a cognizable injury. The merits of the case will be determined at a later date. The government's brief -- along with the dissenting opinion from the en banc hearing -- wish to substitute merit for standing in order to prevent any further discussion about public access to FISA court documents. All the ACLU wants is a chance to prove its case. The government wants the ACLU to be denied this opportunity altogether.

There's no date set for a ruling so it may be several months before the FISA court hands down a decision. (And several more months after that if the government feels something needs to be redacted.) But this shows the FISA court is at least willing to entertain the ACLU's arguments, even if the end result is a return to the status quo.

Filed Under: first amendment, fisa, secrecy, transparency
Companies: aclu

Devin Nunes Releases Memo That Doesn't Show The Surveillance Abuses He Hypocritically 'Cares' About

from the owning-the-libs-by-pretending-to-do-his-job dept

House intelligence oversight leader Devin Nunes released his supposed bombshell Friday. The Nunes memo was supposed to contain info showing the FBI had engaged in a questionable, politically-motivated investigation of Trump staff. How this news was supposed to be shocking was anyone's guess. Anyone who has followed the FBI's activities since the days of J. Edgar Hoover already knows the FBI engages in questionable, politically-motivated investigations. The only new twist is the FISA court's involvement and the use of secretive surveillance powers to collect domestic communications.

The FBI responded by noting the memo [PDF] contained "material omissions of fact." What's contained in the memo likely provides rhetorical ammo to those who believe Trump and his advisors did nothing wrong during the run-up to the election. But it will only provide limited support. What's contained in the memo are accusations the FBI sought (and obtained) FISA warrants to surveill one-time Trump advisor Carter Page. The FBI -- according to the memo -- used the dubious Christopher Steele dossier to buttress its allegations. It apparently continued to do so even after it knew the Steele dossier had been paid for by the Democratic National Committee.

The memo notes this interception was not performed under Title VII, which covers the recently-renewed Section 702 collection powers. This surveillance was performed under Title I -- a more "traditional" FISA process in which the government seeks probable cause-based warrants from the FISA court, much like law enforcement officers seek warrants from magistrate judges.

The memo suggests the FBI should have dropped the investigation -- or at least given the FISA court heads up -- once it became apparent the Steele dossier was politically compromised. But the FBI continued to ask for renewals and these requests were approved by law enforcement officials Trump and most of the Republican party no longer care for. The list includes James Comey (fired), Andrew McCabe (resigned), Sally Yates (fired), and Rod Rosenstein (who Trump would apparently like to fire).

The memo also points out that Christopher Steele was "terminated" (as a source) by the FBI for disclosing his relationship with the agency to the press. Steele also apparently stated he was very interested in preventing Trump from winning the national election. There's also mention of a conflict of interest: a deputy attorney general who worked with those pursuing an investigation of Carter Page was married to a woman who worked for Fusion GPS, the research group paid by the DNC to dig up dirt on Trump.

This all seems very damning at first blush. The Nunes memo is the party's attempt to derail the FBI's ongoing investigation of the Trump campaign and its involvement with Russian meddling in the presidential election. But there's a lot missing from the memo. The facts are cherry-picked to present a very one-sided view of the situation.

The rebuttal letter [PDF] from Democratic legislators is similarly one-sided. But adding both together, you can almost assemble a complete picture of the FBI's actions. The rebuttal points out Christopher Steele had no idea who was funding his research beyond Fusion GPS. It also points out the dirt-digging mission was originally commissioned by the Washington Free Beacon, a right-leaning DC press entity.

It also points out something about the paperwork needed to request a FISA warrant. To secure a renewal, the FBI would have to show it had obtained evidence of value with the previous warrant. If it can't, it's unlikely the renewal request would be approved by FBI directors and/or US attorneys general. The multiple renewals suggest the FBI had actually obtained enough evidence of Carter Page's illicit dealings with the Russians to sustain an ongoing investigation.

Beyond that, there's the fact that Devin Nunes -- despite spending days threatening to release this "damning" memo -- never bothered to view the original documents underlying his assertions of FBI bias. In an interview with Fox News after the memo's release, Nunes admitted he had not read the FBI's warrant applications. So, the assertions are being made with very limited info. Nunes apparently heard the Steele dossier was involved and that was all he needed to compile a list of reasons to fire current Trump nemesis Robert Mueller... disguised as a complaint about improper surveillance.

It's this complaint about abuse of surveillance powers that really chafes. Nunes throttled attempts at Section 702 reform last month and now wants to express his concerns that the FBI and FISA court may not be protecting Americans quite as well as they should. Marcy Wheeler has a long, righteously angry piece at Huffington Post detailing the rank hypocrisy of Nunes' self-serving memo.

Because Nunes and others ― up to and including House Speaker Paul Ryan ― claimed to be motivated by a concern about civil liberties, it was generally assumed the privacy community would join the clamor. But those of us who’ve been through several surveillance fights with these posers know the reality is far more complex. Ultimately, two principles are at issue: the rule of law and privacy. In both instances, Nunes and Ryan are on the wrong side of the issue.

[...]

A mere three weeks ago, Nunes and Ryan were happy to have Americans surveilled with no evidence whatsoever of wrongdoing. Back then, Ryan backed suspicionless, warrantless searches of Americans as a necessary trade off. “This [bill] strikes the balance that we must have between honoring and protecting privacy rights of U.S. citizens, honoring civil liberties, and making sure that we have the tools we need in this day and age of 21st century terrorism to keep our people safe.”

Today, however, when a former Trump campaign adviser is at issue, Nunes and Ryan have discovered the due process they personally refused for so many Americans.

This isn't Devin Nunes' first ride on the surveillance hypocrisy merry-go-round. Just like Dianne Feinstein on the other side of the political aisle, Nunes doesn't give two shits about domestic surveillance unless it's being used against him and his. Somehow, Nunes believes libertarians and anti-surveillance progressives will join him in his excoriation of the FBI and its alleged abuse of domestic surveillance powers. But he's not going to win any converts. The hill Nunes has chosen to die on with this memo is this: the law should protect the powerful from questionable snooping. It has nothing to say about the marginalized groups targeted most frequently by security agencies and law enforcement.

Every single privacy activist I know cares about privacy in significant part to ensure the rule of law and to prevent the arbitrary exercise of justice to focus just on select groups like Muslims or Chinese-Americans, rather than those who pose the greatest risk to society, like people allegedly doing Russia’s secret bidding. Yet the actions of Ryan and Nunes reverse that, using a sham concern for civil liberties as a way to prevent themselves, their associates, and the president from being subject to the rule of law like the rest of us would be.

Moving beyond that, there's the damage done to the FBI by the president and the party that follows him. Trump proclaimed himself a "law and order" president and stated he would always have law enforcement's back. But he's spent most of his time in the White House battling the FBI and DOJ, hoping to make investigations into his campaign's questionable relationship with Russia vanish. He wasted no time alienating the FBI simply because its former director wouldn't give him a pledge of loyalty.

Now, with Nunes releasing a completely unredacted memo, the FBI will suffer even more harm. The agency now knows its sources might be exposed for purely political reasons. Very few people will work with the FBI knowing their names might be splashed all over documents released voluntarily by intelligence oversight committee members. This administration has made it clear no one is safe from public disclosure, even as it does everything it can to shut down unauthorized leaks. Again, the hypocrisy is undeniable. While every administration desires to control the narrative, few have been this transparent about their motives.

There should be no rush to lionize the FBI and the officials Trump has discarded because of perceived lack of loyalty. The FBI is no better than it was before Trump took office. It's no champion of civil liberties and it is in the wrong position to pretend to speak truth to power simply by continuing to exist. Abuse of surveillance powers is a very real thing and the FBI remains one of the worst offenders. The memo is Nunes photoshopping a bunch of smoke over a small, ordinary flame and claiming it's photographic evidence of the FBI's antipathy towards Trump. If abuse occurred under Nunes' watch, then it should be called out. But laying bare the details of an ongoing investigation just to score political points is a terrible abuse of Nunes' oversight powers.

Filed Under: devin nunes, fisa, fisa court, fisa warrant, russia, russia investigation, surveillance

A Bunch Of Politicians Who Complain About Trump's Authoritarian Tendencies Just Gave Him 6 Years To Warrantlessly Spy On Americans

from the because-reasons dept

As was widely expected after Tuesday's close vote on cloture, the Senate officially voted to renew (in a somewhat expanded way) Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act by a vote of 65 to 34. That also means a few of those who voted against cloture switched over and voted for the program, including Senators Ted Cruz and Chuck Schumer. President Trump will almost certainly sign the bill shortly, despite confusing basically everyone last week by tweeting out complaints about the program, despite his White House vehemently supporting it.

Trump's confusion isn't all that surprising. What is surprising is just how many people who have been complaining and warning about Trump made this possible. In the House, vocal Trump critics including Nancy Pelosi, Adam Schiff and Eric Swalwell were among those who voted for this bill which, again, gives the FBI the power to spy on Americans without warrants via the collection of content (not metadata) swept up by the NSA. While defenders of the program keep insisting the program cannot be used to "target" Americans, they leave out that a ridiculous amount of American content is swept up into this collection, which can then be sifted through without a warrant, including a huge amount of communications of Americans.

Over on the Senate side, things were even more ridiculous. Senator Jeff Flake voted for cloture, helping to end (the already non-existing) debate on such surveillance, and blocking any amendments. And then, the very next morning, went on the Senate floor to slam the President, compare him to Stalin, and warn that our democracy may not survive. Again, this was mere hours after Senator Flake voted to give more surveillance powers to the President he was about to compare to Stalin.

Or how about Dianne Feinstein? It may be no surprise that Feinstein voted to continue and expand surveillance -- she has a long history of doing exactly that. But just about an hour before voting for cloture, Feinstein herself introduced an amendment that would have required a warrant to search the corpus of data collected under 702. And then she voted to block that amendment from even being voted on. Let me repeat that, because it's just that insane: Feinstein introduced an amendment to the 702 renewal, that would have required a warrant to sniff through the data... and then voted against allowing that amendment to be heard and voted on. Within an hour or so. And, since cloture needed 60 votes and just squeezed through with those 60 votes... Feinstein could have changed the debate herself. But chose not to.

Or how about Senator Claire McCaskill. She was the final vote for cloture and took over an hour after the vote was called to actually reach the floor. She was the actual deciding vote, as, if she voted against it, the cloture vote would have had only 59 yaes, and the debate would have continued, and amendments proposed. Trump has been loudly denouncing McCaskill for months as she's facing a tough reelection campaign. And her response was to deny any further debate or amendments and to vote to give Trump more surveillance powers.

These are not the only ones. Many vocal critics of the President just handed him much greater power to warrantlessly spy on Americans -- something the President (in a confused way) complained about concerning what he believed (incorrectly) was illegal spying on his own campaign.

Zack Whittaker at ZDnet has also compiled a list of elected officials who had put out earlier statements promising to reform surveillance... only to then vote for this program. It includes both Swalwell and Feinstein mentioned above, but many others as well.

Over at Lawfare, a site that has long defended basically every aspect of the surveillance state, reliable surveillance defenders Jack Goldsmith and Susan Hennessey tried to defend the paradox of not trusting Trump, but giving him the ability to warrantlessly spy on Americans. The crux of it is basically... "we don't trust Trump, but there are good people in the intelligence and law enforcement communities and they'd never abuse these powers."

More broadly, one of the underappreciated developments in the post-Snowden-revelations era is the absence of credible allegations of political or venal use of 702 authorities. In essence, the public evidence confirms that the problems that used to bedevil secret electronic surveillance through the Hoover/Nixon era—namely, senior political figures deploying intelligence agencies and tools for inappropriate, abusive political purposes—have been resolved by a robust legal regime of oversight and reporting. When Sen. Elizabeth Warren points to the surveillance abuses directed at Martin Luther King Jr. to argue against 702, she actually highlights the opposite point: the massive transparency, both voluntary and involuntary, over the past few years about how Section 702 operates shows that it has not been abused for domestic political spying and implies that the 40 years of post-Hoover legal reforms are largely a success (though not without hiccups). The fact that President Trump has not focused his abusive energies on intelligence collection is a testament to the efficacy of the legal and cultural constraints on electronic surveillance.

Not surprisingly, Marcy Wheeler rips these claims to shreds in a response on her own blog, noting that beyond factual errors in the piece, it more or less ignores the FBI's role in all of this. Even if we grant the (incorrect) claim that the NSA doesn't abuse this data, that's not at all clear on the FBI side -- especially when the FBI refuses to provide any details at all:

You can’t pass a bill that effectively blesses FBI’s use of back door searches on Americans about whom it has no evidence of any wrongdoing, while admitting you don’t know how FBI conducts those back door searches, and make any claim to conduct adequate oversight. Rather, the bill permits FBI to continue practices it has stubbornly refused to brief Congress on, rather than demanding that FBI brief Congress first, so Congress can impose any restrictions that might be necessary to adequately protect Americans.

Furthermore, Wheeler notes that Hennessey and Goldsmith completely ignore how this gives Attorney General Jeff Sessions incredible unreviewable power to make use of this warrantless data for criminal prosecutions, hiding where he got the information from.

But it’s the unreviewable authority for Jeff Sessions bit that is the real problem.

We know, for example, that painting Black Lives Matter as a national security threat is key to the Trump-Sessions effort to criminalize race. We also know that Trump has accused his opponents of treason, all for making critical comments about Trump.

This bill gives Sessions unreviewable authority to decide that a BLM protest organized using or whistleblowing relying on Tor, discovered by collection done in the name of hunting Russian spies, can be referred for prosecution. The fact that the underlying data predicating any prosecution was obtained without a warrant under 702 would — in part because this bill doesn’t add teeth to FISA notice — ensure that courts would never learn the genesis of the prosecution. Even if a court somehow managed to do so, however, it could never deem the domestic surveillance unlawful because the bill gives Jeff Sessions the unreviewable authority to treat dissent as a national security threat.

This is such an obviously bad idea, and it is being supported by people who talk incessantly about the threat that Trump and Sessions present. Yet, rather than addressing the issue head on (which I doubt Hennessey could legally do in any case), they simply remain silent about what is the biggest complaint from privacy activists, that this gives a racist, vindictive Attorney General far more authority than he should have, and does so without fixing the inadequate protections for criminal defendants along the way.

And, now, it appears that (unless Fox News somehow intervenes again) the President will sign this bill. EFF has put out an open letter about how awful this is, and how it intends to fight this in court. But, this was a major missed opportunity, and what's most incredible and disappointing is how many people who complain about Trump's authoritarian tendencies were central to making it possible.

Filed Under: adam schiff, backdoor searches, dianne feinstein, eric swalwell, fbi, fisa, jeff sessions, nancy pelosi, nsa, section 702, surveillance

Trump Doesn't Understand Surveillance Powers; House Votes To Give Him More Of It

from the surveillance-madness dept

As discussed this morning, the House voted a few hours ago on a bill to reauthorize Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act that did not reform the widely abused surveillance rules -- other than to codify some of the power allowing them to continue to abuse it for warrantless surveillance on Americans. There was a vote on an important Amendment from Reps. Justin Amash and Zoe Lofgren that would have allowed the reauthorization of the underlying program, but (importantly) required a warrant (as per the 4th Amendment) for spying on Americans. And, unfortunately, the amendment was voted down (183-233) and the awful reauthorization passed, 256 to 164.

The fight over this bill was... weird in so many ways. There was the expected bullshit: politicians outright lying to the public, arguing that the Amash/Lofgren amendment (which again, just said that the program had to be conducted in accordance with the 4th Amendment) would somehow stop the intelligence and law enforcement community from finding terrorists (it wouldn't). Again: everyone expected that. What was weird was (1) having some of Donald Trump's loudest detractors in Congress... then argue against the Amash amendment and in favor of giving the Trump administration more power to warrantlessly spy on Americans and share that data widely among law enforcement. And (2) having President Trump tweet a series of confused tweets this morning that demonstrated that he clearly didn't know what the debate is actually about... and suggesting he was against the reauthorization, despite the fact that the White House (his White House) had issued a statement strongly supporting the reauthorization.

So despite the White House (which, last I checked is supposed to represent the views of the President) tweeted in support of Section 702, here's what the President himself tweeted early this morning:

Not surprisingly, this came just minutes after Trump's besties at Fox & Friends had complained about Section 702, and even directly said "Mr. President, this is not the way to go."

That resulted in Trump's tweet which freaked out supporters of the bill, and even had a few members of Congress suggesting delaying the vote. Of course, while Trump later when on to tweet about some other topic, hours later, he added another tweet to the original tweet above, suggesting that he was now in favor of the reauthorization:

You will be unsurprised, of course, to learn that in the hours between those tweets, Rep. Paul Ryan (who was soon to go on the floor and completely misrepresent the bill) had spoken to the President.

It's worth pointing out, of course, that both of Trump's tweets totally misrepresent the 702 program and the vote today. While there are many, many examples of abuse of Section 702 surveillance powers, there has yet to be any evidence that it was abused to do surveillance on the Trump campaign. But the second tweet is also wrong. The issue was not "foreign bad guys on foreign land" but the fact that the new bill authorizes surveillance of totally innocent people -- including American citizens at home in America -- without a warrant.

As for the other oddity: some of Trump's biggest critics in Congress -- Adam Schiff and Nancy Pelosi -- just helped to give Trump much greater surveillance powers on Americans without a warrant... despite regularly complaining that he has abused his powers.

...the most powerful member of the Democratic Caucus, House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi, was notably silent on the bill. If Pelosi had whipped Democrats to vote against the bill and supported the USA RIGHTS Act instead, there’s a good chance that Trump and Ryan would have failed to get their full extension. Yet, just before the floor vote today she said she would not support the USA Rights Act and shamefully voted to hand Trump exactly what he wanted.

Almost worse than Pelosi's willingness to go along with the NSA was Rep. Adam Schiff's, D-Calif., who has seen his star rise over the last year being the Democrat’s go-to voice on the Russia investigation. On CNN with Jake Tapper this weekend, Schiff talked at length how he thought Trump was abusing his power and misusing the Justice Department to go after his political enemies.

Nonetheless, Schiff was a leading driver in the House to extend the NSA's surveillance powers, and has been undercutting the more robust reforms proposed by other Democrats, like longtime Senate Intelligence Committee member Sen. Ron Wyden, for months.

So, in summary: this bill that effectively expands the power of US intelligence and law enforcement communities to spy on Americans without warrants... was supported, then opposed, then supported again by the President while demonstrating he had no idea what was in the bill... then supported by Democrats who keep warning that the President will abuse the wider surveillance powers that they are voting to give him... and then the bill passed just as expected.

This is all kinds of fucked up.

Either way, this now moves on to the Senate. And while there are some Senators who are speaking out against the reautorhization -- mainly Senators Ron Wyden, Rand Paul and Mike Lee -- it's widely believed that there's not enough 4th Amendment supporters in the Senate to stop the bad bill from getting passed as well. And, at that point, it's quite likely that the President will sign the bill, despite his own tweet complaining about the program this morning.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, adam schiff, domestic surveillance, donald trump, fisa, fisa amendments act, nancy pelosi, section 702, warrants

Congressional Discussion On Section 702 Renewal Postponed Until 2018

from the good-news[?] dept

It appears we won't be seeing any action on Section 702 until next year. The authority was supposed to sunset at the end of 2017, but legislators have yet to reach an agreement on any modifications or reforms.

As 2017 comes to a close, Congress, still divided over how (or whether) to limit federal surveillance authorities, has kicked the can down the road to at least January 19.

As part of a continuing resolution to keep the federal government running for a few more weeks, Congress extended the deadline to decide what to do about Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments.

This is probably the best solution for now. While there have been some serious efforts made to reform Section 702, none of those efforts have been allowed to reach the floor for a vote. Instead, both the House and Senate Oversight Committees have offered up horrible zero-reform bills as "official" 702 remixes -- both of which expand government agency access to NSA data stores and push the next sunset as far away as 2025.

Going into the final days of the year with no reform package, the suspicion was legislators would append one of the two terrible bills as a rider to the annual must-pass budget bill, thus circumventing any real debate about the NSA's controversial collections.

With the pressure off (temporarily) -- thanks to the passed resolution -- there may be a chance for actual legislative discussion about the oft-abused programs. If talks are productive enough, we may see these powers pruned a bit before being reauthorized. (There is zero chance of a total sunset, even though sunset provisions are put in place to provide for eventual retirement of collection authorities.) Given the new administration's obvious approval of anything remotely connected to the War on Terror, it's going to be difficult to enact significant reforms, no matter when they're finally discussed. No matter what happens in 2018, we can at least be grateful Congress didn't auction off the general public's interests in favor of ensuring government agencies continue to get paid.

It's important to remember none of this would be happening without Edward Snowden. The documents he leaked pushed the Intelligence Community towards more transparency, resulting in the release of FISA court opinions and Inspector General's reports showing widespread abuse/misuse of Section 702 collections by the NSA. Without the leaks, it's unlikely the NSA would be any more transparent than it was back when it was referred to as No Such Agency. Our government's dragnet surveillance operations would still be cloaked in impenetrable darkness and its abuses of power its own dirty little secret.

Filed Under: congress, fisa, fisc, postponed, privacy, section 702, surveillance

First Ever En Banc FISA Court Review Gives Plaintiffs Standing To Challenge Surveillance Program Secrecy

from the How-I-Learned-To-Stop-Worrying-And-Love-The-Adversarial-Process dept

One more thing we can give Ed Snowden credit for: the possibility we may be seeing even more public access to FISA court opinions and other FISA docs in the future. [h/t Mike Scarcella]

There's still a long way to go procedurally, but this latest ruling from the FISA court will allow a First Amendment lawsuit by the ACLU and the Yale Law School Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic to move forward. Being granted the standing to actually challenge government surveillance is a rarity. The cover of national security darkness has prevented many plaintiffs from being able to allege harm, but the Snowden leaks have provided many public entities the information they need to shore up these allegations.

The FISA court review process behind this opinion is itself a unicorn: it's an en banc review of the plaintiffs' challenge -- the first time this has ever happened in the history of the court. The opinion [PDF] notes the rarity of the occasion as well as acknowledges the significant "standing" hurdle the plaintiffs were facing.

Figuring out whether a plaintiff has standing to bring a novel legal claim can feel a bit like trying to distinguish a black cat in a coal cellar. "Although the two concepts unfortunately are blurred at times, standing and entitlement to relief are not the same thing. Standing is a prerequisite to filing suit, while the underlying merits of a claim ... determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief." Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 794-95 (7th Cir. 2008). The Initial Opinion in this action decided that Movants -- the American Civil Liberties Union and Yale Law School's Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic -- had suffered no injury-in-fact and thus lacked standing to bring their First Amendment claim for access to redacted portions of certain of this Court's opinions. Sitting en banc for the first time in our history, we now vacate that decision. Whatever the merits of Movants' suit, we conclude that they have asserted a sufficient injury-in-fact to pursue it.

Shortly thereafter, the judges tip their hats to Snowden.

By necessity, this Court conducts much of its work in secrecy. But it does so within a judicial system wedded to transparency and deeply rooted in the ideal that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960). It comes as no surprise, then, that members of the public may at times seek to challenge whether certain controversies merit our continued secrecy or, instead, require some degree of transparency. The matter before us was born from two such challenges. On June 6, 2013, two newspapers released certain classified information about a surveillance program run by the Government since 2006. Within a day, the Director of National Intelligence declassified further details about this bulk-data-collection program, acknowledging for the first time that this Court had approved much of it under Section 215 -- the "business records" provision -- of the Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861.

From there sprung the First Amendment challenge: the plaintiffs argued the Snowden leaks stripped away the justification for continued secrecy by the government. They argued the ongoing refusal to hand over the government's legal justification of the program -- as approved by the FISA court -- violated the First Amendment "right of access" to courtroom proceedings and documents.

As more documents were leaked, the right to access argument grew stronger -- especially when the leaks were followed by official government acknowledgement of each program's existence and, in some cases, the official release of other documents by the government itself.

The court now agrees -- after en banc review -- that the alleged harm is sufficient enough to move forward with its lawsuit against the government. It also notes that the granting of standing doesn't pass any judgment on the merits of the arguments, other than to acknowledge the plaintiffs have the right to pursue them. (In other words, courts will entertain arguments destined for doom, but denying doomed arguments upfront would violate other rights.)

A plaintiff, for instance, might lack standing "to complain about his inability to commit crimes because no one has a right to a commit a crime," and no Court could recognize such an interest. Citizen Ctr. v. Gessler, 770 F.3d 900, 910 (10th Cir. 2014). On the other hand, he would have standing to bring colorable First Amendment claims, even if he would ultimately lose on the merits.

[...]

Indeed, were we to define rights with any greater level of specificity, no plaintiff would have standing to challenge established First Amendment precedent. This is certainly not the case.

[...]

At bottom, the legally-protected-interest test is not concerned with determining the proper scope of the First Amendment right or whether a plaintiff is correct that such right has in fact been invaded; that is a merits inquiry. Waukesha, 320 F.3d at 235. The test instead seeks only to assess whether the interest asserted by the plaintiff is of the type that "deserve[s] protection against injury."

[...]

Against this backdrop, the sufficiency of Movants' allegation of such a legally protected interest appears clear. They identify the invasion of an interest - the First Amendment right to access judicial proceedings - that courts have repeatedly held is capable of "being known or recognized."

[...]

No more than this is necessary for standing purposes, even if Movants ultimately fail to prove that the precise scope of the First Amendment right extends to redacted portions of our judicial opinions under the Richmond Newspapers test.

So, it's a win of sorts, even though it's very limited. As Mike Scarcella noted, it's a "foot in the door," rather than a victory. But it stems from a historic first -- an en banc review by the FISA court -- and indicates the nation's most secretive court is willing to address issues in a more adversarial setting than it's used to.

There's a lengthy dissent attached that appears to believe there's no right to access to classified documents and this decision will set up the government for endless redaction challenges, but that's kind of the point. Even the nation's most secret court shouldn't be completely beyond the reach of the citizens it ultimately serves.

Filed Under: fisa, fisa court, fisc, secrecy, standing, transparency

Senator Burr Pitches 702 'Reform' That Would Give NSA Back Its Most Abused Collection Program

from the word-is-pretty-much-meaningless dept

The Senate Intelligence Committee has released its Section 702 reauthorization bill [PDF]. Rather than fix anything, it makes pretty much everything worse. This is largely due to Sen. Burr's influence, who probably felt he had to bring something to the debate, but couldn't bear to part completely with his "clean, forever reauthorization" dreams.

Senator Burr is somehow claiming this is a "reform" bill. Marcy Wheeler has written an excellent post describing all the ways in which it isn't, especially the tail end of the bill which pretends to limit US law enforcement access to NSA collections.

It does so in Section 5, in what is cynically called “End Use Restriction,” but which is in reality a vast expansion of the uses to which Section 702 data may be used (affirmatively codifying, effectively, a move the IC made in 2015). It permits the use of 702 data in a criminal proceeding for any criminal proceeding that “Affects, involves, or is related to” the national security of the United States (which will include proceedings used to flip informants on top of whatever terrorism, proliferation, or espionage and hacking crimes that would more directly fall under national security) or involves,

Death

Kidnapping

Serious bodily injury

Specified offense against a minor

Incapacitation or destruction of critical infrastructure (critical infrastructure can include even campgrounds!)

Cybersecurity, including violations of CFAA

Transnational crime, including transnational narcotics trafficking

Human trafficking (which, especially dissociated from transnational crime, is often used as a ploy to prosecute prostitution; the government also includes assisting undocumented migration to be human trafficking)

So, just the "serious" crimes. This is how agencies like the FBI are using 702 collections already. All Burr's bill would do is codify the use of foreign-facing national security agency to collect and retain communications related to domestic criminal activity -- some of it potentially rather minor.

Beyond that, the bill looks to give the NSA back its "about" program. This is the program the NSA abandoned after pushback from the FISA court and (perhaps) as a way to dodge uncomfortable questions about the continued collection of domestic communications. This was a voluntary move by the NSA and it was already asking to have its collection back a couple of months later.

Burr's 702 bill would hand the NSA back its program with a 30-day waiting period during which the House or Senate could introduce a bill forbidding the reinstatement of the program. Should no bill be introduced within the notice period, the NSA could pick up where it left off and go back to abusing a collection program it has never not abused since its inception.

It also allows the NSA to make "emergency" claims about its "about" program to bypass legislative attempts to block it. This wouldn't automatically nullify legislative efforts to end the about collection permanently, but it would allow the NSA to continue collecting while the issue is being debated.

So, it's basically what one would expect from one of top hardline supporters of the NSA. Good thing Burr is one of the top men in the "oversight" committee. He's willing to give the NSA what it wants -- along with the stuff it gave up -- and for more years than the House Judiciary Committee's tepid reform option. Burr's bill would push the next renewal fight off until 2025, two years more than the 2023 sunset in the House bill. Fortunately, there may be a third option in play soon. Ron Wyden has announced he's preparing a 702 bill and is pushing the Senate Intelligence Committee to make renewal hearings public.

Filed Under: about collection, fisa, fisa amendments act, mass surveillance, nsa, richard burr, section 702, senate intelligence committee, surveillance