Gene Sequencing Giant Tries To Use Patents To Block Rising Star's Pocket-Sized Unit From US

from the anti-innovation dept

Last year, Techdirt wrote about how one of the most significant breakthroughs in the field of genomics is already embroiled in a nasty patent battle. But it's not just the fundamental techniques in this field that are being held back by selfish attempts to "own" key technologies. An article in the MIT Technology Review reports that the dominant manufacturer of DNA sequencing machines, Illumina, is trying to use patents to throttle an upstart rival:

Illumina said today it would try to block commercial sales of a disruptive new DNA sequencing instrument developed by a high-flying British rival, Oxford Nanopore.

In a patent lawsuit [pdf] and a separate complaint [pdf] with the U.S. International Trade Commission, Illumina said the British company's cutting-edge DNA sequencing devices contain stolen ideas and should be stopped at the docks.

Oxford Nanopore denies that it is infringing on any patent that Illumina controls, but needs to be able to prove that not just once, but twice. As well as suing in the courts, Illumina is trying to use the International Trade Commission (ITC) loophole that Techdirt has been warning about for many years now. The ITC does not award damages, but can impose injunctions that block the import of items it deems infringing. And that's precisely what Illumina wants, in order to stop the British Oxford Nanopore from challenging it in the US with its new technology, which offers important advantages over Illumina's systems:

Illumina's refrigerator-sized instruments are fast and accurate (see "Why Illumina Is Number One"). But because it works differently, Oxford's MinION, as the device is called, is small enough to be portable (it's about the size of a cell phone) and reads out very long stretches of DNA.

Although it's slower and less accurate than Illumina's instruments, nanopore technology threatens to become a competitor as scientists find entirely new applications for it like sequencing Ebola viruses and diagnosing patients from a makeshift lab in Guinea.

According to the MIT Technology Review article, which gives more details on how the nanopore technology works, more than a thousand teams are already using Oxford Nanopore's pocked-sized sequencing unit. It offers capabilities that Illumina not only cannot match but is unlikely to match any time soon:

In asking U.S. trade officials to investigate Oxford and possibly bar imports of the MinION to the U.S., Illumina could anger researchers, since no comparable technology is available. Illumina has never announced plans to sell a nanopore product of its own.

So, rather than competing by launching its own equivalent product, a big, successful company that dominates a market is trying to use legal actions to squash an exciting new technology before it becomes a serious threat. In other words, yet another case of patents being used not to innovate, for the benefit of the public, but to stifle innovation, solely for the benefit of the current market leader.

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Filed Under: dna sequencing, genomics, injunction, itc, itc loophole, patents
Companies: illumnia, oxford nanopore

Colorado Judge Ignores First Amendment, Allows Prior Restraint In Banning Aretha Franklin Film

from the not-how-it-works dept

Late last week, singer Aretha Franklin succeeded in convincing a judge in Colorado to stop the Telluride Film Festival from screening the documentary Amazing Grace -- a concert film shot by Sydney Pollack that was actually filmed back in 1972, but was never shown. Franklin, of course, has no copyright in the film, but argued in her injunction request that she had an agreement with Pollack not to use the film without her authorization. From the complaint:

Ms. Franklin has never given permission for the use of this footage in any commercial context and has not authorized the public release of the footage. The footage was taken with the express understanding that it would not be used commercially without agreement and consent by Ms. Franklin.

Franklin argued that part of the agreement between Warner Bros., which held the rights to the film, and Alan Elliott, who apparently purchased those rights from WB, was that Elliott would then obtain all the necessary "authorizations, consents and releases and pay all re-use fees and other compensation required by applicable collective bargaining or individual contracts or otherwise required by law." While parts of the complaint hint at possible copyright claims, there really is none here, which is why the actual counts in the complaint do not mention copyright. Instead, they lean heavily on the (already troublesome) concept of publicity rights, as well as an anti-bootlegging law, which makes little sense, since the video is far from a bootleg.

As noted above, amazingly, the judge, John Kane, very quickly obliged and issued a short injunction barring the showing of the film. There is basically no discussion of the issues at all. Rather, Judge Kane merely repeats verbatim the arguments made by Franklin and then orders the injunction, blocking the showing of the movie.

This is ridiculous. As Eriq Gardner at the Hollywood Reporter lays out in great detail, it is difficult to see how this is possible under the First Amendment. When we're talking about speech -- even defamatory speech -- courts cannot issue injunctions, because that's prior restraint. There may be other remedies, but it seems dangerous to argue that a publicity rights claim can lead to an entire film being blocked:

In Colorado, a plaintiff can't prevail on a publicity rights claim if a defendant's use of the plaintiff's name and likeness is privileged under the First Amendment. That much is clear by prior cases. The state's Supreme Court has held the analysis turns on two issues — whether the use is primarily commercial or noncommercial and whether such use reasonably relates to a publication concerning a matter that is newsworthy or of legitimate public concern. Feature films are almost always deemed noncommercial (as opposed to, say, an advertisement) while the public concern of Amazing Grace is a toss-up.

Even if Franklin wins this analysis and shows she has a likelihood of prevailing in her lawsuit, under the proper standard of law, she then needs to demonstrate "irreparable harm" to obtain an injunction. In past court cases, judges have refused to enjoin works even when defamation can be shown or even when someone's privacy rights are being violated. Publicity rights should theoretically evoke an even higher bar because what's being protected is commercial use of their identity.

Even worse, the judge relies on that agreement between Warner Bros. and Elliott concerning Elliott's requirement to get permission. But the actual lawsuit here is against neither WB nor Elliott... but against the Telluride Film Festival, which is not a party to that agreement and thus should not be bound by it. So, even if one were to argue that Elliott had somehow waived his First Amendment rights in signing that contract, that says nothing at all about Telluride's.

The expansive reading of the situation by the judge is really dangerous. As Gardner points out, such a reading of publicity rights laws could allow celebrities to block reporters from writing about them by claiming it is violation of their rights. Furthermore, considering the First Amendment questions at play here, it is even more troubling that Judge Kane doesn't even mention the First Amendment at all, nor does he explore the issue of prior restraint. Even more bizarre? Despite the lack of any copyright claim, the judge seems to focus on the lack of "fair use" for why he's shutting the film down:

A film that essentially recreates the entire concert experience is not fair use of this footage.

Again, the complaint doesn't even make a copyright claim, so it makes no sense to do a fair use analysis in the first place, and even if there was such a claim, a fair use analysis requires a lot more than just saying "hey, it's not fair use." You have to at least do a four factors analysis. But, again, that's neither here nor there since there was no copyright claim in the first place.

And, unfortunately, since the Telluride Film Festival is now over, it's not clear if the festival will appeal this ruling, which will keep it busy in court for no clear benefit. But, in the meantime, the ruling has scared off multiple other festivals that had planned to show the film. As Gardner points out, all of this prior restraint was because Judge Kane couldn't even be bothered to realize who the defendant was, nor did he appear to recognize a blatant case of prior restraint when it landed on his desk:

Judge Kane has done a disservice by issuing a hasty ruling on a last-minute injunction bid — telling THR that this one was an easy call because producer Alan Elliott needed Franklin's permission. Except that's not what he was being asked to adjudicate! Elliot wasn't the defendant after all. Instead, film festivals (and distributors and news organizations) now have to worry about prior restraints on use of a celebrity's likeness and name. And sorry, Aretha, but this is hardly good news for artists who often use the names and likenesses of other artists in their creative endeavors. If she had made a deal that gave her the copyright on the footage — meaning the ability to control reproduction and distribution — that would be one thing; Here, she's attempting the ride the same vehicle that Lindsay Lohan attempted to use to stop a Pitbull song.

I agree with Gardner that this is a horrible ruling, from a judge who seemed to be in a rush to agree with Franklin, without even realizing what the issues were or who the parties were in court (and if they were subject to the contract). The only "saving grace" is that this ruling is at the district court level, rather than appeals court where it would become the rule for the circuit -- but it's already leading to prior restraint and scaring off film festivals from showing the film. And, you can bet that this case will be cited by others looking to use publicity rights to censor content in violation of the First Amendment.

Filed Under: alan elliott, amazing grace, aretha franklin, censorship, copyright, documentary, first amendment, free speech, injunction, john kane, movies, prior restraint, publicity rights, telluride
Companies: telluride film festival, warner bros.

After Internet Companies Protest, MPAA Declares Victory And Walks Away From Attempt To Backdoor SOPA

from the nice-try... dept

The MPAA has been working on a number of tricks to find a SOPA through the backdoor in the last few months -- more on some of the many attempts coming soon -- but in one attempt, it's suddenly walking away. A few weeks ago, all of the major movie studios filed a lawsuit over the website MovieTube (actually a series of websites). While it may well be that MovieTube was involved in copyright infringement (and thus a lawsuit may be perfectly appropriate), the concerning part was that, as a part of the lawsuit, the studios were demanding a remedy that is not available by law: that anyone who provides any kind of service to MovieTube be forced to stop via a court injunction. This was the kind of tool that was a part of SOPA, which (you may recall) never became law. Among the requests in the lawsuit:

That the Registries and/or Registrars be required to transfer the domain names associated with Defendants’ MovieTube Websites, or any subset of these domain names specified by Plaintiffs, to a registrar to be appointed by Plaintiffs to re-register the domain names in respective Plaintiffs’ names and under Plaintiffs’ respective ownership.

That content delivery networks and domain name server systems be required to cease providing services to the MovieTube Websites and/or domains identified with the MovieTube Websites and disable any access to caches they maintain for the MovieTube Websites and destroy any caches they maintain for the MovieTube Websites.

That third parties providing services used in connection with any of the MovieTube Websites and/or domain names for MovieTube Websites, including without limitation, web hosting providers, cloud services providers, digital advertising service providers, search-based online advertising services (such as through paid inclusion, paid search results, sponsored search results, sponsored links, and Internet keyword advertising), domain name registration privacy protection services, providers of social media services (e.g., Facebook and Twitter), and user generated and online content services (e.g., YouTube, Flickr and Tumblr) be required to cease or disable providing such services to (i) Defendants in relation to Infringing Copies or infringement of Plaintiffs’ Marks; and/or (ii) any and all of the MovieTube Websites.

A few days later, the good folks at EFF reminded everyone that SOPA did not pass, and this attempt to require a SOPA-level block is not actually what the law allows. Of course, as we noted soon after the SOPA fight, it appeared that some courts were pretending SOPA did pass, mainly in a variety of lawsuits involving counterfeit goods (rather than copyright infringement). And the movie studios rely on that in their more detailed argument in favor of this broad censorship order on third parties who aren't even a part of this case:

Courts have granted similar interim relief directed to third-party service providers in cases with similar facts. The first such case, The North Face Apparel Corp. v. Fujian Sharing Import & Export Ltd. (“Fujian ”), 10-Civ-1630 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y.), was brought against defendants in China selling counterfeit goods through the Internet directly to consumers in the United States. In Fujian, the district court granted an ex parte temporary restraining order, seizure order, asset restraining order, and domain-name transfer order, later continued by a preliminary injunction order.

Of course, last week, a bunch of internet companies -- Google, Facebook, Tumblr, Twitter and Yahoo -- filed an amicus brief highlighting how ridiculous the widespread demand is:

Plaintiffs are asking the Court to grant a preliminary injunction not just against the named Defendants, but also against a wide array of online service providers—from search engines, to web hosts, to social networking services—and require them to “cease providing services to the MovieTube Websites and Defendants[.]” None of those providers is a party to this case, and Plaintiffs make no claim that any of them have violated the law or play any direct role in the Defendants’ allegedly infringing activities.

Plaintiffs’ effort to bind the entire Internet to a sweeping preliminary injunction is impermissible. It violates basic principles of due process and oversteps the bounds of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, which restricts injunctions to parties, their agents, and those who actively participate in a party’s violations. The proposed order also ignores the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), which specifically limits the injunctive relief that can be imposed on online service providers in copyright cases. Even if Plaintiffs had named those providers as defendants and obtained a final judgment against them, the DMCA would not permit the relief that Plaintiffs are asking for at the outset of their case, where they have not even tried to claim that these nonparties have acted unlawfully.

And... just days later, the movie studios tell the judge that they need not rule on this issue at all, and they're happy to drop the request for the preliminary injunction entirely, because the MovieTube websites have already been shut down (h/t to Eriq Gardner, who first reported on the studio's letter).

We represent Plaintiffs in the above-titled action. We write to inform the Court that after Plaintiffs filed their Complaint (and presumably in response thereto), Defendants shut down their infringing websites, and as of today, such websites remain offline. Plaintiffs are no longer seeking preliminary injunctive relief at this time but will seek permanent relief as soon as possible. Defendants’ time to answer or otherwise respond is August 19, 2015.

Moreover, because Plaintiffs have withdrawn their motion for preliminary injunctive relief, the arguments offered by Amici Curiae... in opposition to that motion are not ripe for consideration and are otherwise inapplicable. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not addressed them here. To the extent Amici are requesting what amounts to an advisory opinion, such a request is improper and should not be entertained.

In short: we had hoped to quietly get a court to pretend SOPA existed so we could point to it as proof that this is perfectly reasonable... but the internet folks spotted it, so we'll just walk away quietly, and hope that next time, those darn internet companies, and those eagle-eyed lawyers at the EFF aren't so quick to spot our plan.

Filed Under: copyright, injunction, site blocking, sopa
Companies: movietube, mpaa

Court Realizes That Maybe It Can't Order Cloudflare To Proactively Block Any New Grooveshark From Ever Appearing

from the that's-not-how-this-works dept

After Grooveshark shut down a few months ago, some individuals set up a site that looked kind of like Grooveshark, but with a totally different backend, and used a variety of URLs that included Grooveshark on different top level domain systems. The RIAA, as it's been known to do, freaked out, and filed a lawsuit. As part of this, it sought a restraining order and injunction, which it got. The RIAA then insisted that the restraining order applied to CDN provider Cloudflare, despite not actually being a part of the case. Cloudflare, as a non-party worried about the impact of such a restraining order, stepped into the case to protest, but the judge still ruled against Cloudflare despite the fact that the ridiculously broad injunction went really far, basically saying that no site with the word "Grooveshark" in the domain could use Cloudflare, even if that was a domain like "GroovesharkSucks-GoBuyMusic.com."

Cloudflare complied, but asked the court to modify the ridiculously overbroad injunction, as it could easily be read to say that Cloudflare itself then had to proactively police every use of its service to make sure no one tried to similarly post a Grooveshark-related site. Instead, it asked the judge to, at the very least, require the RIAA to alert Cloudflare to sites that it believed were violating the injunction. The RIAA, of course, argued that Cloudflare had the full responsibility of proactively making sure no new Groovesharks showed up. The judge has now clarified the original injunction, saying that, yes, the RIAA needs to alert Cloudflare to any future problematic sites, but denying Cloudflare's request for a five day turnaround time.

The initial injunction still seems tremendously problematic in just how broad it is. Here's what it covers, saying that basically anyone is barred from:

1. Using the Grooveshark Marks in any manner in connection with the advertising, offering for sale, or sale of any service or product, not provided by or authorized by Plaintiff UMG.
2. Committing any acts calculated to cause consumers to believe that the Counterfeit Service or any other use of the Grooveshark Marks is offered under the control and supervision of Plaintiff UMG or sponsored or approved by, or connected with, or guaranteed by, or produced under the control and supervision of Plaintiff
3. Infringing any of the Grooveshark Marks and damaging Plaintiff goodwill;
4. Otherwise competing unfairly with Plaintiff UMG in any manner; or
5. Using, linking to, transferring, selling, exercising control over, or otherwise owning the domain names grooveshark.io or groovesharkpw or any other domain name that incorporates, in whole or in part, any of Grooveshark Marks (the "Infringing Domain Names").
6. Directly or secondarily infringing Plaintiffs' copyrighted sound recordings via the Counterfeit Service or any variations thereof.

While I don't care what happens to Grooveshark itself or these copyrights, it seems quite disturbing that a judge can issue such a broad injunction that can impact so many third parties, potentially making them liable should someone do something that "unfairly competes with Universal Music in any manner." Part of the point of SOPA was to add these kinds of injunctions to the law but Congress did not approve SOPA. So why is the court acting like it has this power?

Again, it's easy to say "meh, no big deal, whoever set up these sites were clearly infringing" or even to attack them for setting up a fake Grooveshark. But this goes beyond that, and raises serious questions about the court's powers to order third parties to block all access to websites without full due process.

Filed Under: injunction, restraining order, site blocking
Companies: cloudflare, grooveshark, riaa

Canadian Court: Yes, We Can Order Google To Block Websites Globally

from the that-seems-like-a-problem dept

Almost exactly a year ago we wrote about a troubling lawsuit in British Columbia, where a court ruled that Google needed to block access to a website globally. The case involved one company accusing another of selling counterfeit or copied equipment, and despite Google not even being a party to the case, said that Google needed to make sure no one could find the site in question via Google anywhere in the world. As we noted, this had tremendously problematic consequences. For example, China doesn't think anyone should be able to learn about the protests in Tiananmen Square. Can it now order Google to remove all links to such references globally? That result seems crazy. And, of course, there was a separate issue of how the court even had jurisdiction over Google, seeing as it does not have any operations, staff or servers in British Columbia. Google stepped in to protest the injunction at the appeals court.

Unfortunately, the court has now ruled against Google, using the same sort of logic the lower court did -- basically arguing that because Google is available in British Columbia, the court has jurisdiction, and because it's trying to stop what it deems to be illegal actions from reaching Canada's shores, it has every right to order Google to block things worldwide, lest someone from British Columbia decide to type "google.com" into their browser to avoid the "google.ca." On the question of "doing business" in BC, the appeals court basically accepts the lower court's confused understanding of things:

While Google does not have servers or offices in the Province and does not have resident staff here, I agree with the chambers judge’s conclusion that key parts of Google’s business are carried on here. The judge concentrated on the advertising aspects of Google’s business in making her findings. In my view, it can also be said that the gathering of information through proprietary web crawler software (“Googlebot”) takes place in British Columbia. This active process of obtaining data that resides in the Province or is the property of individuals in British Columbia is a key part of Google’s business.

Google says that even if it is concluded that it carries on business in British Columbia, the injunction was not properly granted, because it did not relate to the specific business activities that Google carries on in the Province. In my view, the business carried on in British Columbia is an integral part of Google’s overall operations. Its success as a search engine depends on collecting data from websites throughout the world (including British Columbia) and providing search results (accompanied by targeted advertising) throughout the world (including British Columbia). The business conducted in British Columbia, in short, is the same business as is targeted by the injunction.

In other words, if you don't want to be subject to the laws of BC (with control over your entire global operations) don't index websites based in BC? That's crazy. While I doubt it will happen, it's got to be tempting for some at Google to just say "okay, no more Google for BC or any website in BC."

Now as for the nutty idea that a court in BC has jurisdiction over all of Google's global operations, again, the court doesn't seem even remotely concerned about that. It's response is basically "yeah, so?"

Google raises the specter of it being subjected to restrictive orders from courts in all parts of the world, each concerned with its own domestic law. I agree with the chambers judge that it is the world-wide nature of Google’s business and not any defect in the law that gives rise to that possibility. As well, however, the threat of multi-jurisdictional control over Google’s operations is, in my opinion, overstated. Courts must, in exercising their powers, consider many factors other than territorial competence and the existence of in personam jurisdiction over the parties. Courts must exercise considerable restraint in granting remedies that have international ramifications.

And it notes that previous cases have said that, sure, BC courts have "worldwide jurisdiction."

At one time the courts of this Province refrained from granting injunctions that enjoined activities outside of British Columbia.... In 1988, however, the English Court of Appeal held that it had jurisdiction to issue a worldwide Mareva injunction.... It is now over 25 years since the Supreme Court of British Columbia first issued a worldwide injunction.... The jurisdiction to do so was re-confirmed .... and is, today, well-established.

Google, quite reasonably, points out that while injunctions make sense against parties that actually break the law, it makes no sense to issue an injunction against a third party that has nothing to do with the party that actually broke the law. The court goes on a long and winding road saying "sure, but... in this case, it's okay."

Finally, the court addresses another concern raised by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, noting that banning access to a website worldwide has serious free speech consequences. Once again, the court says "sure, but, we don't care in this case."

For that reason, courts should be very cautious in making orders that might place limits on expression in another country. Where there is a realistic possibility that an order with extraterritorial effect may offend another state’s core values, the order should not be made.

In the case before us, there is no realistic assertion that the judge’s order will offend the sensibilities of any other nation. It has not been suggested that the order prohibiting the defendants from advertising wares that violate the intellectual property rights of the plaintiffs offends the core values of any nation. The order made against Google is a very limited ancillary order designed to ensure that the plaintiffs’ core rights are respected.

I note, as well, that the order in this case is an interlocutory one, and one that can be varied by the court. In the unlikely event that any jurisdiction finds the order offensive to its core values, an application could be made to the court to modify the order so as to avoid the problem.

In short, sure, banning speech around the globe from one court in British Columbia, Canada could have serious global free speech concerns, but... we really don't like this website, so we're not going to change the ruling. In fact, later in the ruling, the court basically says "hey, the idea that there may be some 'legitimate' speech on this website we're ordering blocked globally is totally speculative":

There has, in the course of argument, been some reference to the possibility that the defendants (or others) might wish to use their websites for legitimate free speech, rather than for unlawfully marketing the GW1000. That possibility, it seems to me, is entirely speculative. There is no evidence that the websites in question have ever been used for lawful purposes, nor is there any reason to believe that the domain names are in any way uniquely suitable for any sort of expression other than the marketing of the illegal product. Of course, if the character of the websites changes, it is always open to the defendants or others to seek a variation of the injunction.

And, thus, British Columbia believes it can order global blocking of any website its courts deem problematic in BC. One wonders if we'll start to see "censorship tourism" migrating to BC courts now that its doors are open for global censorship orders.

Filed Under: british columbia, canada, counterfeits, global injunction, injunction, jurisdiction
Companies: equustek solutions, google

Insanity Rules In Ireland: Media Ordered Not To Report On Parliamentary Speech

from the streisand-goes-to-ireland dept

Over in Ireland, it appears that some are not all that familiar with the Streisand Effect. Yesterday, an Irish member of Parliament, Catherine Murphy, gave a speech in which she detailed some charges against an Irish media tycoon, Denis O’Brien, claiming that the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation, was giving him ridiculously favorable terms on bank loans. Here's the main chunk of it:

I have no doubt that the special liquidator is more than capable of carrying out such a review, but his direct involvement in the sale process, his relationship with the eventual purchaser of Siteserv and his current actions in the High Court in supporting Mr. Denis O'Brien against RTE place him in a position where there is, at the very least, a perceived if not an actual conflict of interest. The review is not confined to Siteserv, but that is the transaction that prompted a review in the first instance. I worry about the transactions that have been excluded from the review given what that we now know that in the final months before prom night, the relationship between the Department and IBRC had completely broken down. If deals were being done without the knowledge or input of the Minister, we must know what those were.

We are now aware, for example, that the former CEO of IBRC made verbal agreements with Denis O'Brien to allow him to extend the terms of his already expired loans. We also know that the verbal agreement was never escalated to the credit committee for approval. I am led to believe and would welcome clarification by the Minister that the rates applicable to the extension were extremely favourable. I understand that Mr. O'Brien was enjoying a rate of approximately 1.25% when IBRC could, and arguably should, have been charging 7.5%. Given that we are talking about outstanding sums of upwards of €500 million, the interest rate applied is not an insignificant issue for the public interest. We also know that Denis O'Brien felt confident enough in his dealings with IBRC that he could write to Kieran Wallace, the special liquidator, to demand that the same favourable terms extended to him by way of a verbal agreement be continued. We now have Kieran Wallace, who has been appointed by the Government to conduct the IBRC review, joining with IBRC and Denis O'Brien in the High Court to seek to injunct the information I have outlined from coming into the public domain. Surely, that alone represents a conflict.

In documents released to me under freedom of information, the Minister, his officials, the Central Bank and even the troika acknowledge that IBRC - the former Anglo Irish Bank - is no ordinary bank and that there is a significant public interest as the bank was fully nationalised and was in wind-down mode. They all accept that this is the people's money we are dealing with and that there can be no dispute regarding the public interest in this.

Now, you may notice that Murphy mentions that O'Brien is trying to get an injunction to stop that information from being made public. Apparently, that even extends to what is said in Parliament -- because O'Brien then successfully got an injunction barring the Irish media from reporting on this. He apparently claimed that this was all a "breach of his privacy rights."

The three-day injunction hearing was told Mr O’Brien wanted to restrain publication of the broadcast report because it breached his privacy rights and would cause him incalculable commercial damage.

IBRC, which brought a separate but related application before the court, supported his case.

Apparently a bunch of people in Ireland still haven't heard about the Streisand Effect. Because now the story is blowing up everywhere. Oh, and if you're interested, you can even see the speech here: In other words, this story that ordinarily wouldn't have received much international press coverage at all -- is now getting tons of attention. Now, perhaps O'Brien and his lawyers are taking a calculated risk that the only place this issue really matters is at home in Ireland, and shutting people up about it there will be more important. After all, the accusations probably are big news there. But, it still seems like its backfiring massively. The internet is still a (mostly) global place, and the injunction not only calls that much more attention to the original accusations, but it makes everyone involved in the injunction look really foolish.

And it does seem to be backfiring in Ireland as well. While such injunctions are all too common in Ireland (and nearby in the UK, for that matter), the fact that it's flat out censoring a Parliamentary speech appears to have broken new ground that has a lot of people up in arms:

But the extension of the terms of that injunction to cover a parliamentary speech has shocked the Irish media community, not to mention the public.

It had extraordinary effects. For example, RTÉ reporter Philip Boucher Hayes tweeted yesterday afternoon that the Drivetime show was about to play Murphy’s speech, but the piece was not broadcast and his tweet was later deleted.

RTÉ news bulletins mentioned that Murphy had spoken but didn’t quote what she had said or play clips. Online reports quoting Murphy were removed, stating only that Murphy had spoken about O’Brien. Similarly, the Irish Times’s report was silent on what Murphy said but it did provide a link to her speech on the Oireachtas site. (Evidently - hat tip: Padraig Reidy - the Irish Times did initially report her words).

The report on the matter by Ireland’s best-selling daily newspaper, the Irish Independent, said: “Mr O’Brien successfully stopped RTÉ from broadcasting the details which Ms Murphy raised in the Dá il”.

Whatever short term benefit O'Brien and his lawyers thought they were getting with this injunction, it appears not to have worked very well.

Filed Under: catherine murphy, denis o'brien, free press, free speech, injunction, parliament, streisand effect

Google Files Legal Challenge To Attorney General Jim Hood's Subpoenas

from the well,-well dept

This story sure escalated in a hurry. Following all the news of the MPAA's tight relationship with Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood, Google has made a filing in a Mississippi federal court seeking seeking a temporary restraining order and an injunction against Hood's investigation. As the filing notes:

For the last eighteen months, the Mississippi Attorney General has threatened to prosecute, sue, or investigate Google unless it agrees to block from its search engine, YouTube video-sharing site, and advertising systems, third-party content (i.e., websites, videos, or ads not created by Google) that the Attorney General deems objectionable. When Google did not agree to his demands, the Attorney General retaliated, issuing an enormously burdensome subpoena and asserting that he now has “reasonable grounds to believe” that Google has engaged in “deceptive” or “unfair” trade practice under the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), which allows for both civil and criminal sanctions. The Attorney General did so despite having publicly acknowledged in a letter to Congressional leaders that “federal law prevents State and local law enforcement agencies from prosecuting” Internet platforms. The Attorney General took these actions following a sustained lobbying effort from the Motion Picture Association of America.

As Google explains, there is no legal basis for this investigation:

First, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) precludes state regulation of Google based upon the third-party content available on its services or the manner in which Google moderates that content. “Congress provided broad immunity under the CDA to Web-based service providers for all claims stemming from their publication of information created by third parties.” Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008).

Second, the First Amendment protects Google’s organization and display of third-party information (e.g., search results), prohibits retaliation for how it organizes and displays such content, and bars state action that limits public access to constitutionally-protected speech. As multiple courts have found, the state can no more tell a search engine what results to publish than it can tell a newspaper what editorials to run. See, e.g., Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 436, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Nor can the state “encourag[e] the suppression of speech in a manner which can reasonably be interpreted as intimating that some form of punishment or adverse regulatory action will follow the failure to accede to the official’s request.” Zieper v. Metzinger, 474 F.3d 60, 65-66 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Third, the subpoena violates the Fourth Amendment by demanding information about conduct that is plainly lawful. “[I]nvestigations premised solely upon legal activity are the very type of ‘fishing expeditions’ that” the Supreme Court has held violate the Fourth Amendment and “do[] not pass muster under any standard.” Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177, 1187-88 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

Fourth, much of the Attorney General’s subpoena is preempted by the Copyright Act or the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (“FDCA”). Many of the Attorney General’s inquiries concern copyright infringement—but copyright is exclusively a matter of federal law, which the Attorney General may not enforce and with which Google fully complies. See GlobeRanger Corp. v. Software AG, 691 F.3d 702, 705-06 (5th Cir. 2012). Similarly, the Subpoena seeks information about Google’s practices ten years ago with regard to advertisements relating to the importation of prescription drugs. But the FDCA regulates importation of prescription drugs and preempts enforcement actions not brought “by and in the name of the United States.” 21 U.S.C. § 337. omitted).

In short, Jim Hood is on a massive fishing expedition over things he doesn't understand, over which he has no jurisdiction, for issues where Google fully complies with the law. The filing further notes that, yes, there is bad content on the internet, but that Google actually is extraordinarily active in pushing it down in its search results and seeking to stop people from accessing that content. But, its voluntary efforts are very different from being required to change its search results via an order from a government official:

But if a state Attorney General can punish, irrespective of well-established federal law, any search engine or video-sharing platform whenever he finds third-party content he deems objectionable, search engines and video-sharing platforms cannot operate in their current form. They would instead have to pre-screen the trillions of websites and millions of videos on the Internet, blocking anything they had not yet reviewed from being publicly accessible so as to avoid the ire of even a single state or local regulator. This would “severely restrict the information available on the Internet,” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2003), precisely the opposite of the “unfettered” Internet the CDA and the First Amendment protect. The Attorney General may prefer a pre-filtered Internet—but the Constitution and Congress have denied him the authority to mandate it.

Google further lists out the various threats and statements Hood has made:

In several letters to Google, the Attorney General has falsely accused it of, among other things, “aiding and abetting” and even “encourag[ing] . . . illegal activity.” Id. Ex. 5 at 3. He has characterized Google as an “accessory before the fact” in criminal conduct, id. Ex. 2 at 1, asserted it has “no corporate conscience for the safety of its customers,” id. Ex. 17 at 1, and claimed that Google “facilitates and profits from numerous illegal online activities,” id. Ex. 17 at 2. See also id. Ex. 15 at 3 (page 1 of the draft letter). He has threatened to “take legal action to change [Google’s] behavior,” id. Ex. 2 at 3, outlining “[p]ossible [c]auses of [a]ction” against Google in a presentation to the National Association of Attorneys General (“NAAG”), id. Ex. 10 at 53-57, sending numerous requests for information, see, e.g., id. Exs. 1, 5, & 22, and a broad litigation hold notice, id. Ex. 8. The Attorney General has demanded in several meetings that Google pre-screen or block third-party content and search results that merely may involve illegal activity, even at the cost of burdening lawful, protected speech. See, e.g., id. Ex. 2 at 2; id. Ex. 22 at 2; id. Ex. 27 at 5:13-6:24, 7:16-8:14. He has even sought a “24-hour link through which attorneys general[]” can request that links to particular websites be removed from search results “within hours,” presumably without judicial review or an opportunity for operators of the target websites to be heard. Id. Ex. 5 at 3.

That last one is crazy. Hood is flat out demanding a tool for government officials to censor the internet, based solely on those officials' requests.

The Attorney General has cited no evidence at all of misconduct by Google to back up these inflammatory allegations. He has instead identified a handful of web pages among the trillions reflected in Google’s index, and a smattering of videos amongst the millions of hours watched every month on YouTube, and asserted that some of the content of those websites and videos (all created by third parties) is unlawful.... He has noted that advertising occasionally appears alongside the videos about which he complains.... And he has criticized some of Autocomplete’s algorithmically-generated predictions.

Whatever that says about the actions of those who created and developed the content about which the Attorney General complains, it in no way implies that Google has violated the law. Given the vast quantity of third-party content available on the Internet, it is no surprise that some small percentage of the information found via Search or posted on YouTube is inappropriate or unlawful. Statutes such as the CDA and DMCA accept the inevitability of problematic content online as the cost of a free and open Internet, and squarely immunize Google and other interactive service providers from liability arising from such third-party content.

Furthermore, Google debunks the notion that it has done nothing to deal with such sites:

Nevertheless, Google has worked to address the Attorney General’s concerns.... In response to his questions, Google provided over one-hundred pages of written answers detailing its policies and practices for voluntarily combating abuse across its services, and voluntary shared nearly 100,000 pages of supporting documents. YouTube engineers even created a custom reporting tool and trained the Attorney General’s office on how to use it so that they could report for expedited review and possible removal videos they deemed objectionable.... To date, over half a year later, the Attorney General has used this tool to report only seven videos.... Nor, to the best of Google’s knowledge, has the Attorney General filed any legal action against any of the actual creators of the specific underlying content to which he has objected. Google has also explained the applicability of CDA immunity and the DMCA safe-harbor provisions to services like Google, as well as the constitutional concerns raised by his demands

That part I bolded is the key. It shows the reality of the situation, which is that Hood isn't really trying to stop bad content online, no matter how many times he argues otherwise -- he's just attacking Google.

There's much more in the filing, including arguing that Hood is violating the First Amendment directly in his most recent subpoena to Google:

The Attorney General has made clear that he disagrees with how Google exercises editorial judgment in the composition of its search results and YouTube content, and wishes to force Google to adopt editorial judgments that he would prefer. For content he disfavors, he asks that Google censor from search results links to websites that are readily available on the Internet, regardless of whether any court has found them unlawful, and has even gone so far as to demand that certain search terms themselves be banned.... The Attorney General has also demanded that links to disfavored content be demoted in search rankings and marked with a warning to users.... Conversely, he has asked Google to promote favored content (e.g., Hollywoodapproved websites) by raising its standing in search results and indicating its favored status with an icon.... Such demands by a government official to displace a private party’s editorial judgment in order to favor certain speech or speakers over others strike at the heart of the First Amendment.

And, of course, just because some of the content targeted may not be protected, that doesn't relieve the First Amendment problems:

State enforcement actions targeting unprotected speech can violate the First Amendment by limiting the “public’s access to constitutionally protected matter.” Smith v. People of California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959). A state may not penalize a bookseller for unknowingly offering obscene material because he would then “tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected,” and the limits on his ability to inspect content would “tend to restrict the public’s access to [content] which the State could not constitutionally suppress directly.” .... Similarly, a state may not sanction a magazine for unknowingly publishing unlawful advertisements because “publishers cannot practicably be expected to investigate each of their advertisers,” and the risk of sanction could lead a publisher to reject advertisements that “could conceivably be deemed objectionable by the [government],” which would deprive the public of access to protected speech, and the potential advertisers an “avenue of access to the public.” MANual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 493 (1962).

There's a lot more in there, but those are some of the high points. Hood has been provoking Google (at the behest of the MPAA and others) for a long time. It appears that Google has hit back.

Filed Under: copyright, dmca, first amendment, fourth amendment, free speech, injunction, jim hood, secondary liability, section 230, subpoena, temporary restraining order
Companies: google, mpaa

UK Court Blocks Author From Publishing A Book About His Own Sexual Abuse, At Ex-Wife's Request

from the bwah!?!? dept

There's no doubt that even closely related or allied countries treat the issue of free speech quite differently. Perhaps our most natural European cultural equivalent, Britain, has laws that I often find either confusing or silly, with a particular eye towards their long-panned libel laws. But even correcting for cultural differences, I'm having a real hard time figuring out how a UK court can issue an injunction barring the publishing of an author's recounting of his own personal history with sexual abuse at his ex-wife's request. You'll have to forgive the vagueness here, because there are simply no names being discussed on the matter due to the ongoing litigation.

A British performing artist has been forced to shelve a book based on his experiences of childhood sexual abuse after his ex-wife obtained an injunction to prevent their young son from reading it. In a case that is alarming freedom of speech campaigners and which publishers say is deeply disturbing, the court of appeal has ordered that the artist cannot publish key sections of the book until the issue has been decided at trial.

However, his ex-wife’s lawyers dispute claims that the case could set a precedent undermining the rights of other authors, arguing that it is concerned only with the rights of one child, who has a number of health problems, who they say would suffer catastrophic psychological distress were he to read parts of his father’s work.

Let me flesh this out for you a bit. A well-known artist in the UK is publishing a memoir, including sections that deal with the sexual abuse he suffered as a child. His ex-wife obtained the injunction on publishing that factual account of his life because she believes it will harm, by her lawyer's own admission, a single child the two had together. That child is suffering a wide range of health problems, including Asperger's Syndrome, and the ex-wife is suggesting that reading the father's account would cause further harm. All of this, by the way, relies on a Victorian-era case the dealt with the intentional psychological harm some guy perpetrated on a woman in a bar by playing a practical joke on her. Seriously, I'm not making that crap up.

To be clear, the injunction is temporary, but the alarming part is that the court seems to be staying the publication in order to ask an incomplete question.

While accepting that there was a public interest in the book being published, the court granted a temporary injunction and ruled that the question of whether the boy’s rights should take priority over those of his father should be decided at a full trial.

The problem here is that the court shouldn't be tossing that public interest out so easily. Imagine, if you will, a court system that disallows factual information to be revealed simply because someone may find it unpleasant. In this particular case, we have a child with medical issues to consider, a potentially sympathetic "victim", but it need not be so, based on the law if this case sets the wrong precedent. You might simply see young children used as excuses to keep controversial information from ever seeing the light of day.

Add on top of that the concept of keeping a victim of sexual abuse from being able to do as he pleases with that information and we're suddenly diving into the arena in which the government is abusing him all over again. Not overtly, of course, but if intimidating homosexuals into staying in the closet is abuse, and it is, the same should be said of abuse-victims being prevented from telling their factual stories. Above and beyond all that, the parents could have tried to reach an agreement to simply not allow their child to read the book until a certain age.

Instead, the mysterious ex-wife is robbing the public of a piece of literature in order to protect her son from being parented. Hey, my UK peeps: either you have free speech or you don't. I know you don't have our Constitution, but if the status of speech is such that you can't write about your own lives, you may have a problem.

Filed Under: book, free speech, injunction, publishing, uk

Italy's First Attempt To Block Websites With No Judicial Review Reveals How Dangerous The System Is

from the this-is-a-problem dept

Late last year, we wrote about how Italy was about to change some of its copyright enforcement setup to give enforcement powers to regulators instead of the courts. That is, regulator AGCOM could now simply declare -- with no judicial review or due process -- that certain sites were infringing and then order ISPs to block access to those sites. While other Italian prosecutors have sought to do the same thing, AGCOM now has the official power to delete websites off the Italian internet if they so much claim they're somehow infringing.

Recently, AGCOM decided to exercise its new power, issuing its first administrative blocking injunction against a site called Cineblog01 -- meaning that ISPs in Italy need to block users from accessing the site. Now, it does appear that the site was linking and/or embedding certain films that may have been infringing. But there are still serious problems with the injunction. IPKat, who wrote about this, details three fairly serious problems with the way that AGCOM handled this.

1. AGCOM declared the site guilty of "massive infringement" based on having just eleven movies. That seems like a ridiculously low threshold. Under such a threshold nearly any user-generated content site might be declared as engaging in "massive infringement."
2. Much is made of the claim that AGCOM tried to reach the operator of the site. They are required to try to communicate with the "website manager." Since the operators of the site used a privacy guard feature from their Panamanian registrar for their Whois entry, AGCOM basically just reached out to that Panamanian registrar, and when there was no response, concluded that the site's operators were ignoring the requests. While we can argue over whether or not the site should have provided a better means to communicate, it still seems fairly weak to argue that sending an email to a third party like that constitutes true notification of the complaint.
3. Third, and most importantly, IPKat checked out the site and the eleven movies in question... and found that they all had been removed already. In other words, it seems fairly clear the site was perfectly amenable to a standard notice-and-takedown type of system, but AGCOM went all in and ordered the entire site blocked.

It's entirely possible that the site had bad actors who were violating the law, but it certainly doesn't look like AGCOM is being all that careful to make sure that's the case, and that's almost certainly going to lead to problematic results.

Filed Under: administrative review, agcom, censorship, copyright, injunction, italy, takedown

Innocence Of Muslims Actress Says Court Should Ignore Copyright Office Rejecting Her Copyright Claim

from the well,-duh dept

This will hardly come as a surprise, but Cindy Lee Garcia -- the actress who appeared in 5 seconds of the 13-minute "trailer" known as "Innocence of Muslims" and somehow convinced the 9th Circuit Appeals court to say she had a copyright interest in the film, allowing her to demand a widespread and highly questionable order to force Google to take down all copies of the video on its platforms -- doesn't think there's anything wrong with the ruling or with the 9th Circuit's denial of Google's request to stay the order until the case could be reconsidered. As we noted earlier, the court has asked for briefs on whether or not it should reconsider the request for the stay (prior to even deciding if it should reconsider the entire ruling). Garcia's lawyer, Cris Armenta has filed their brief on this issue, and as with many earlier filings, it is problematic on many levels.

In short, though, she of course argues that the original ruling was correct, that her "copyright" has been infringed and that any ruling to the contrary leaves her in great danger. Despite plenty of copyright lawyers and experts reacting in horror to the original ruling, she insists it's obvious that every actor in a film gets a copyright in their own performance. As for the fact that the Copyright Office itself rejected her copyright claim saying that "longstanding practices do not allow a copyright claim by an individual actor or actress in his or her performance contained within a motion picture," Garcia says that the court should just ignore all that bluster. I mean, really, who does the Copyright Office think it is, anyway? Actually, she first challenges the "questionable provenance" of the Copyright Office's rejection of her copyright, since she says Google got a copy before she did, and then that it apparently doesn't include a statement from the Copyright Office that it "is a true and correct copy of the record in question." Even then, she begs the court to ignore the Copyright Office.

Further, this court should not defer to the letter because it is inconsistent with the Copyright Office's previous interpretation of the Copyright Act.... Previously, the Copyright Office interpreted the Copyright Act much differently than it does now. As recently as 2010, the Office explicitly stated that performances consisting of "the art of imitating or acting out situations, characters, or other events" are copyrightable as pantomime.

Of course, that's a totally different issue. Yes, the Copyright Office says that pantomimes are copyrightable (a different issue that has its own problems), but that's unrelated to the question of whether an actor in a motion picture retains the copyright in their performance. Instead, Garcia tries to reverse this question, by saying that nowhere has the Copyright Office ever said that actors do not get a copyright in their performance. Because anything the Copyright Office doesn't say is clearly what they allow.

With respect to the issue of motion pictures, nowhere does the Compendium state that actors who are not employees and who have not transferred the rights in their work are not entitled to copyright protection.... Indeed, the Compendium only states that a film's producer is the "author" for purposes of copyright in situations where the participants are employees or have entered into work-for-hire agreements. If the Office's "longstanding practices" truly forbade an actor who never assigned the rights in her performance from asserting copyright, the Office would have mentioned those practices before now.

Of course, the other problem with Garcia's filing is that it doesn't actually focus on the issue at hand. The Court specifically asked that the filings focus on the question of whether or not an en banc panel should rehear the question of a stay for the injunction. Garcia's filing focuses on the overall ruling, not the specifics of the stay, and why the initial injunction can't be stayed until further proceedings occur. That said, given the way Kozinski has handled this so far, who knows what will happen.

Filed Under: 9th circuit, alex kozinski, cindy garcia, cindy lee garcia, copyright, copyright office, injunction, innocence of muslims
Companies: google, youtube