NSA Leaks Making Law Enforcement Officials More Wary Of Carelessly Deploying Surveillance Technology

from the should-have-been-this-cautious-all-along,-but-we'll-take-what-we-can-get dept

The trickle-down effect of the leaked NSA documents is starting to seep into smaller entities at local levels. The outrage that has greeted these revelations now has law enforcement entities concerned about public reaction to their own surveillance programs. Reuters reports that speakers at the International Association of Chiefs of Police conference are striking a very cautionary tone about the deployment of surveillance technology.

"The scrutiny that the NSA has come under filters down to us," [Georgia Bureau of Investigation Director Vernon] Keenan said at the annual gathering that draws top law enforcement from the United States and elsewhere with workshops, product exhibits and conferences.

For many new technologies, there is no clear legal standard to govern their use, he said.

"If we are not very careful, law enforcement is going to lose the use of technology," he said.

Additional care in the future would be nice, considering many law enforcement entities, from local police departments to the FBI, have deployed surveillance programs and data collection technology with minimal oversight and few, if any, guidelines for use. Periods for public comment seem to be an afterthought, something usually considered only after the public has raised objections to already-deployed programs.

What should have been the approach taken in the past looks to be the route law enforcement will have to take in the future, according to Philadelphia Police Chief Charles Ramsey.

"Imagine instead of driving down the street scanning license tags, driving down the street checking the faces of individuals walking down the street," Ramsey said.

"We have to remind ourselves - just because we can do something doesn't mean we should do it."

Both FBI Director James Comey and US Attorney General Eric Holder are scheduled to speak at the conference. We'll see if this tone changes after these two handle the mic. The FBI's track record on deploying privacy-invading technology with no rules or regulations has been particularly atrocious, with some of its actions skirting legality altogether. The FBI should be leading by example but, like the NSA and its defenders, it seems to be more concerned with finding new and creative justifications for its invasive surveillance programs (like the biometric database it's building) rather than moving forward with more caution and respect for American civil liberties.

As for the law enforcement officials quoted, it's a shame that it takes a consistent barrage of leaked intelligence documents to make them realize that just because you can do something, doesn't mean you should do it.

Filed Under: law enforcement, surveillance

Feds Apparently Didn't Communicate With Each Other About Various Silk Road Investigations

from the left-hand,-right-hand dept

There's been plenty of talk about Silk Road since the site got shut down and Ross Ulbricht was arrested and accused of being Dread Pirate Roberts behind the site. Of course, it struck us as interesting that hours after the arrest and the criminal complaint in NY, there was also an indictment in Maryland. Since then, there have been a bunch of Silk Road related arrests concerning drug dealers who used the site. One of those, as named in our last post on this, was Steven Sadler of Bellevue, Washington.

The folks over at The Smoking Gun have a bunch of details about Sadler, which show that he wasn't discovered as a result of the Ulbricht arrest, but rather had been raided months ago and became an informant for the feds. His arrest and court hearing were rushed into place after the Ulbricht arrest and the site shut down:

The hastily arranged court appearance for Sadler was prompted by the FBI's arrest a day earlier of Ross Ulbricht, who has been charged with being the mastermind behind the Silk Road site, which operated on the "darknet" (or "deep web"). Simultaneous to Ulrich's bust, federal investigators shut down the two-year-old site, which relied on the anonymizing tool Tor to shield both vendors and patrons.

During the October 2 hearing, federal prosecutor Thomas Woods told Tsuchida that "Mr. Sadler has been cooperating, working for the government for the past two months." Referring to "unusual circumstances," Woods noted that "through reasons unrelated to" Sadler, his cooperation "abruptly came to an end this morning." Sadler's lawyer told Tsuchida that her client was in "constant communication with the government."

Of course, this makes you wonder just how (un)coordinated the various efforts against Silk Road really were by the feds. We've got two separate lawsuits filed against Ulbricht in two separate courts, and now we find out that the feds had already been working one of the site's top dealers (Sadler went by the name "Nod" on the site). You'd think the feds would be a bit more communicative with each other over their various attempts to investigate Silk Road, its operators and users.

The details also suggest a few other informants, including one who taught investigators how to use Silk Road:

Investigators also were aided by a confidential informant who agreed to cooperate after agents seized several packages mailed to her by Silk Road heroin dealers. In a TSG interview, the woman--a business owner in her thirties--said she had made several heroin purchases from "Nod" and allowed investigators to take over her Silk Road account to make undercover drug purchases.

A self-described "junkie" who has been clean since May, the informant said she helped a postal inspector navigate Silk Road and explained how to fund an account with Bitcoin, the virtual currency used for purchases. When an undercover drug purchase failed to arrive, a postal inspector--apparently sensing a rip-off--sent the woman an e-mail seeking advice as to how to address the missing Express Mail parcel with the narcotics seller. When the informant referred to the package "going missing," the inspector replied, "I know the package is not missing, I work for the post office…hahaha. They just have not sent it."

Either way, it seems likely that more arrests are coming, but it still seems to suggest a level of dysfunction among the feds with regards to coordinating their investigations.

Filed Under: communication, law enforcement, ross ulbricht, silk road, steven sadler
Companies: silk road

Anonymous Cop Claims Anonymity Is Bad, Proposes National Email Registry For Internet Users

from the hope-you-saved-a-receipt-for-that-Irony-Detector dept

Online anonymity is a feature, not a bug, as we've pointed out several times here at Techdirt. True, being faceless and nameless can often bring out the worst in certain people. Anonymity may make a bad things worse, but anonymity, in and of itself, isn't a bad thing.

Ask any website that has battled back by routing comments through third parties like Facebook, Google+ and Disqus. Requiring registration before commenting tends to result in fewer commenters. It also doesn't eliminate the trolling issue as many people are just as willing to troll away post-registration. It does make it easier to ban troublesome commenters, but it rarely raises the level of discourse.

There are nearly as many "solutions" as there are varieties of trolls but until the problem of human nature can be solved, trolls will troll. Editors of websites will continue to fight a battle that's pretty much unwinnable, shedding quality users along with a few trolls with every implemented system.

There's one plan that hasn't been considered yet (and for good reason). Via kenichi tanaka comes this alternative to online anonymity, courtesy of Officer Anonymous, puportedly answering a question that must have been phrased very badly (if it was asked at all) at KSL.com's "Ask A Cop" column.

Here's public enemy #1 as described by Officer Anon.

I am speaking about the spineless bottom feeders who sit at their computer all day bullying other people with inflammatory comments and remarks. A troll's sole purpose in life is to comment about an article, statement, question in a forum or other Internet venue so that comment will upset the target person or persons to the point where they are yelling at their computer and punching the monitor... These arguments tend to be typed in all caps lock. There are professional troll organizations where this becomes a quasi profession. Lame, I know.

Officer Anonymous wants to beat back the troll horde with cliches, it would appear. He (or she) sounds like one of those people who reside just outside the sphere of discussion. Officer Anon's depiction of trolls and their lives is all broad brushstrokes, the kind that appeal to other people like himself (we'll just say it's a "him" to save keystrokes) -- the kind of people who label anyone who can safely browse the web without picking up extra toolbars as losers simply because "the internet isn't real." It's like Andy Rooney reading Dilbert strips and spending his next segment trying to twist laughs out of cubicle farm stereotypes, bypassing any sort of subtlety and just generally banging out easy hits -- slapstick discourse.

Here's more:

Some actually think they are providing a source of entertainment. Unfortunately the people who do find this funny are trolls themselves. I can just imagine two pasty skinned trolls, one hand in a bag of Funyun's, spraying crumbs on their overly used keyboard as they laugh at each other's wit.

I'm sure Ofc. Anon. can "imagine" this scenario. Anyone can. It's the "internet user" archetype, one that has been converted into a horse, killed and beaten nonstop for nearly 20 years straight. Snacks? Check. Crumbs? Check. Pasty? Check.

At this point, Anonymous Cop answers a question no one asked, not even himself. The answer he comes up with is surprising, not because it adds some previously unseen nuance to his argument, but because it's so mindblowingly horrible.

So why should trolls go to jail? They are causing or inciting a riot plain and simple.

At this point I would add some commentary, but I really think it's best that AC keep speaking for himself. Here's the "riot."

The victims of these trolls are upset the rest of the day. They are driving aggressively on the roads, yelling at their co-workers and being consumed with a way to find out who that person on the Internet was.

This is not good for public safety.

If you go through this post and replace the word "victim" with "Officer Anonymous," the picture starts to take focus. (Nothing harder on public safety than an angry, aggressive cop.) This isn't an editorial. This is a police officer attempting to get even with the internet and using the only weapon he has: authority.

Anyone who wants to comment or post anything needs to do this with their official email address registered by the government. This will be verified in person at your local driver's license division. No more anonymity on the Internet. Every time you post anything, your picture and name will pop up.

Wow. Where do we go to sign up? The Dept. of Public Safety? Do we need to wait until we're 15 or 16 and get an adult's permission to acquire a provisional Internet License? Or do we have to wait until we're 18? If you're old enough to vote, you're old enough to have an opinion. Just sign up for the draft and the Internet, all in one stop!

Won't a registry like this just add to the problem? If someone's pissed off enough and knows exactly where their tormentor lives, wouldn't they be more likely to respond with violence or vandalism or some criminal action more serious than trolling?

Officer Anonymous touts the benefits of his Internet-as-police-state plan. No more phishing. (Really?) No more email scams. (Really?) No more catfishing. (Possibly...) Somehow the possibility that those seeking to scam others will be stopped by internet registration escapes this cop, who surely must be aware of things like identity theft, underage drinking and unlicensed gun sales. Making something illegal doesn't stop it from happening. It can deter it, but those truly wishing to break the law will just route around the roadblocks. And while they do, good citizens using government-approved Commenter's Licenses will have their every online action scrutinised, if not by the State then by their fellow Licensed Commenters.

How refreshing it would be to see who actually posted those racially charged comments. It would be interesting to see if they posted at all. Do you think those same people are making those same remarks in person? I don't think they are. It would take awhile for them to adjust to sunlight, or being around people. I bet it would be nice for their parents to have access to their basements again. They could finally put in that game room they always wanted.

Oh, LOL. Internet users live in Mom's basement. How droll. One last shot at Internet users from Officer Anon before he wraps up his incalculably stupid editorial. Aversion to sunlight? Check. Anti-social? Check. Basement? Check.

These cliched shots at a world that seems weird and scary to Officer Anon could have come from any number of other "authority figures" whose failure to comprehend the internet has lead directly to cheap, hollow mockery. See also: former NSA director Michael Hayden and Sen. Mike Rogers.

You may be reading this, flabbergasted by my own hypocrisy. I am aware that I am writing these articles through the safety of anonymity. But if you guys are willing to come forward, then so am I. Let's break down the barriers of the Internet and come forward showing our true selves with no judgment. I can't wait to see the national email registry!

I'll admit I am flabbergasted, and your anonymity is only part of it, Officer Anonymous. Your offer of shedding your anonymity is contingent on citizens (those without power and authority) shedding theirs first. How convenient.

By the end of this exhausting glimpse into the mind of a cop, one is almost inclined to believe the post itself is guilty of trolling. Certainly it fits the description of trolling (via The Urban Dictionary) Officer No Name quotes earlier:

The art of deliberately, cleverly and secretly angering people, usually via the Internet, using dialogue…

The most essential part of trolling is convincing your victim that ... you truly believe in what you are saying, no matter how outrageous.

Everything about the post, from the casual use of outdated tropes to the notion that anyone (other than the author) would actually consider a national email registry to be a good thing, screams "troll." This gives the cop an easy out should the complaints and comments make him angry enough to "drive aggressively" or "punch his monitor."

"I was just trolling to make a point, etc."

No one should give him this out. Decrying anonymity from behind the two sets of protection -- anonymity and the blue line -- is more than simply disingenuous, it's dangerous.

Filed Under: anonymity, free speech, internet, law enforcement

State AG Says It's OK Ohio Implemented Facial Recognition Program Without Notifying Public Because Everyone Else Is Doing It

from the the-fundamental-disconnect-between-public-and-public-servants dept

Facial recognition software is controversial, to say the least. The privacy implications run deep even when deployed in very public areas, as it basically allows for suspicionless searches of anyone whose face is visible to cameras. The feet-on-the-ground equivalent would be having officers canvass a public area, grabbing IDs from anyone it wishes and running their records. Pretty much unacceptable, even considering the potential upside of the software to catch suspected criminals or stumble upon people with outstanding warrants.

These issues haven't prevented more than half of our nation's states from rolling out some version of facial recognition databases. That doesn't make what Ohio law enforcement did right, although its main defender actually uses that exact justification to answer criticism of the roll out.

Without informing the public and without first reviewing security rules for the system, Ohio law enforcement officers started using facial recognition technology more than two months ago, scanning databases of driver's license photos and police mug shots to identify crime suspects, The Enquirer has learned.

This is fairly common with controversial measures like these: deploy first, ask for permission/set guidelines later. We've seen the same thing happen repeatedly, whether its domestic drone use or the deployment of quasi-legal technology like Stingray devices that mimic cell phone towers. This isn't purely a local phenomenon. National agencies are just as prone to rolling out new methods and devices, and only begin to consider privacy implications or the need to establish guidelines after a public outcry, much as (almost) happened here.

Ohio's new facial recognition system launched June 6, without the knowledge of the attorney general or his chief operating officer. Upon learning about it two weeks later, after it had already been used for 900 facial recognition searches, top officials debated turning it off.

On June 20, during a meeting with DeWine, Chief Operating Officer Kimberly Murnieks sent an urgent e-mail to DeWine's chief information officer and top deputies: "First question: Can we turn this off for now? I am told it has been 'live' for two weeks. Who approved that go live?"

No approval. No period for public comment. No notification to the top cop in the state, or any other top official for that matter. Ohio's law enforcement agencies simply decided to go autonomous, claiming that it was an "almost IT-driven thing." Yep. Completely unstoppable. IT informed the heads of Ohio's Bureau of Criminal Investigation that the system was ready to go live -- and that was all the top Bureau officials needed to hear. The "on" button was pushed and a briefing with the state AG was set up… for two weeks later -- after 900 searches had already been performed.

In the June 20 briefing with DeWine, officials quickly adopted a practice of calling the launch a "test" although some continued to be nervous about whether the system should have been launched before new policies were created.

COO Murnieks suggested the system be taken offline until policies updated, but apparently, the "off" button was nowhere to be found. The system stayed online. While the COO seemed suitably concerned that facial recognition technology was being deployed without public notification or pertinent policies in place, AG DeWine was more blasé about the whole experience, deflecting criticism using the elementary-school-level "well, everyone else is doing it" argument.

Before June 20, "I didn't know it was up live, but I wasn't concerned that it was up live," DeWine said. "Whether you call it a test phase or don't call it a test phase, if we find something (wrong), we would change it, and if we find something alarming, we would shut it down. ...

"The fact that over half of states use (facial recognition technology), the fact that the FBI has used it, the fact that we have controls in (the online database) that work in the sense that we could prosecute people ... all of those indicate to me that what we have is adequate."

Of all the poor logic contained in these statements, all of it stands out as being particularly idiotic. Every single bit. DeWine may believe two wrongs don't make a right, but apparently a handful of wrongs adds up just fine.

DeWine feels it's perfectly acceptable to make mistakes that could affect seriously members of the public. Not only that, but he seems to feel it's perfectly acceptable to use the public as a testing ground without even providing them a safety net of applicable data policies, safeguards or scope limitations. Pointing to other states, many of whom rolled out their programs more responsibly, is nothing more than verbal sleight-of-hand designed to diffuse outrage. (Notice I didn't say "defuse." What he's doing is spreading the blame, not placating the masses.)

And I have absolutely no idea what this phrase is supposed to mean, other than the prosecution side is always right:

...the fact that we have controls in (the online database) that work in the sense that we could prosecute people..

Because it can be used to catch "bad guys," all else is negligible? Really? If so, when you're done with screwing over your own constituents, there's probably a prime spot in the NYPD for you. They like people who prize crime statistics above all else, even the Constitution.

Plus, he's happy with everything being "adequate." That's a government official for you -- never strive for more than you can obtain via stasis.

DeWine led off the previous statement by saying the program simultaneously is and isn't a "test phase," and followed it up by telling everyone why it really doesn't matter what "phase" the program's currently in.

He said the system is still in a trial phase, but said its scope or use isn't expected to change after the trial period ends.

Great. So the minimal nod towards stress-testing the system meant nothing. Good to know. DeWine caps this all off by throwing a chewed-almost-beyond-recognition bone to the public's concerns.

"Should we have talked about it the day it went live?" DeWine said of the facial recognition system. "You could argue that."

We are arguing that, you dolt. The problem is you, and many others like you (say, the heads of the Ohio's law enforcement agencies), can't be bothered to check with the public until it's thrusting microphones in your face or calling at all hours demanding an explanation. You and many others like you (say, the heads of the state's law enforcement agencies) are public servants. Apparently, the COO of the state is the only one actually looking out for the people she's serving. The rest of you all figure you know better and can roll out controversial programs without so much as obligatory "here's what we're doing: deal with it" press release. Because crime.

Is it any wonder no one trusts the government?

Filed Under: face recognition, facial recognition, law enforcement, mike dewine, ohio, privacy, transparency

Another 'Internet Threat' Results In Six Months In Jail And A Five-Year Ban From Social Media

from the so...-we've-rounded-up-all-the-REAL-criminals,-then? dept

Another person has been arrested for sending out "terroristic threats" via social media. Caleb Clemmons, a (former, obviously) Georgia Southern student, has spent the last six months in jail because of a Tumblr post that said the following:

hello. my name is irenigg and i plan on shooting up georgia southern. pass this around to see the affect it has. to see if i get arrested.

Within three hours, he was. Achievement unlocked: Bull fucked with; horns acquired.

Clemmons attempted to explain his post, calling it "an experimental literary piece and an art project." No sale. The police charged him with "making terroristic threats via a computer," which seems to be on par with doing it over the phone or by mail or in person. Why the delivery system matters, I have no idea.

Now, there's no disputing the utter stupidity of the post and pretty much daring the police to take action only makes it worse. As I've said before, the police should definitely investigate possible threats like these. The problem is that the investigations come and go without turning up any evidence that the person delivering the threat poses a danger. And yet, the arrestee stays locked up.

Although police found no weapons or evidence of an actual plan to attack the school, a judge set Clemmons' bail at $20,000, which was too much for him and his mother to pay. As a result, he spent the full time waiting for his court date in jail.

Not only did the police find nothing, but the administration at Georgia Southern didn't even bother notifying the student body at the time of Clemmons' arrest because it felt "there was no continuous threat." In fact, no statement at all was made until Clemmons' story resurfaced a week ago, over six months since the date of his original post.

At this point, Clemmons is technically free. He's been sentenced to five years probation, along with six months in jail (which he already served). Perhaps more harshly, he's been banned from social media for the entirety of his probation.

Like Justin Carter and Cameron D'Ambrosio, Clemmons said something stupid on the internet and is now paying the price for it -- one that seems to outweigh the "crime" itself. And like the other two, he was investigated (which is good) but still remained imprisoned despite a complete dearth of evidence to support his ability to carry out the threat (which is terrible).

The overreaction of law enforcement to these "threats" is usually justified by pointing to recent school shootings or terrorist attacks. But what's unsaid is that the perpetrators of the Sandy Hook shooting and the Boston Bombing (both cited frequently) didn't deliver threats via social media (or anywhere really) before carrying out their acts of violence. Somehow prosecutors and law enforcement have gotten it into their heads that terrorists and mass murderers will be sending Tweets and lighting up Facebook before carrying out their plans. I think most murderers and terrorists would prefer to carry out their acts of violence unmolested rather than be detained or imprisoned, hence the lack of advance notice.

Not only would this sort of heads-up be an anomaly, but bombers and mass murders generally have some sort of evidence laying around, like stockpiles of weapons or bomb-making components. When these threats are investigated, one would expect the police to find something that backs up the words. But in all three of these cases, they haven't.

Not only that, but the cases are weak enough that law enforcement and prosecutors have resorted to editorializing the actual "threats" made by these individuals in order to make their cases stick. In Ambrosio's case, the police chief repeatedly dropped the part of his Facebook post where he said "Ima be famous rapping," making it appear as though his fame relied solely on some vague allusions to other violent acts. In Carter's case, prosecutors dropped the first part of his response (provoked by another person) -- "I'm fucked in the head alright" -- and presented the rest of the post ("I think I’ma shoot up a kindergarten and watch the blood of the innocent rain down and eat the beating heart of one of them") as a standalone statement in the indictment.

Unfortunately, this sort of thing looks like it will only get more common, rather than just become a time-dependent anomaly due to the proximity to acts of terrorism. The police need to take these statements seriously, but they also need to let it go when their investigations come up empty. To move forward with prosecution is to punish someone for stupidity, something that still isn't a crime no matter how often we wish it was. There's no terrorism prevention going on here -- it's just abuse of an easily-abused law and the end result makes no one any safer.

Filed Under: caleb clemmons, georgia southern university, jail, law enforcement, terroristic threats

License Plate Data Isn't 'Personally Identifiable' Until The Public Asks Police For Access To It

from the this-rule-is-for-us-and-this-rule-is-for-the-everyone-else dept

Law enforcement agencies display a deliberate cognitive dissonance when it comes to data they claim has no "expectation of privacy." As was recently detailed here, license plate scanners are in operation across the United States, most with little to no oversight over the use of the location information obtained. Even worse, disposal of "non-hit" data seems to be an afterthought -- in some cases, the information is held onto indefinitely. One law enforcement agency was even quoted as saying the use of the data was "limited only by the officers' imagination."

These agencies excuse these efforts by claiming the information they obtain is public. After all, the vehicles are driving on public roads where anybody, even a license plate scanner, can see and record the license plate. They also argue this is no different than an officer writing down a plate number and calling it in. (Although I'd like to see an officer write down 786 plates in one hour, as one plate scanner did in the Motherboard article.)

As Shawn Musgrave points out, this information travels almost exclusively one way.

A report released this week by the ACLU explores the widespread deployment of automatic license plate recognition (ALPR) scanners by law enforcement across the country. As police tout the advantages of ALPR and seek millions in federal funds to the equipment, many departments insist that license plate and vehicle location information don't require special protection or oversight.

When pressed to put special protections on their massive license plate databases, the law enforcement community writ large argues that license plate numbers are not personally identifiable information (PII), and thus not subject to restricted access or probable cause requirements for detectives to paw through it.

One would think that, for the most part, license plate data is personally identifiable. After all, most of us use the same vehicles for day-to-day travel. If it's not you, then it's a close family member. A plate can easily be tied to a small group of individuals, generally located at the same address. But law enforcement members argue that it isn't -- that a license plate is a license plate and nothing more.

In its 2012 guidelines on ALPR, the International Association of Chiefs of Police remind us that a license plate “identifies a particular vehicle, not a particular person.” When the Drug Enforcement Agency wanted to install ALPR along Utah highways in 2012, an official told local legislators, “We're not trying to capture any personal information--all that this captures is the tag, regardless of who the driver is.”

It's a terrible argument, especially considering phone numbers and addresses are considered personal information (according to federal guidelines), even if neither specifically identifies a person. Not only that, but plate numbers seem to be "personally identifiable" enough to allow traffic cam tickets to be sent to the person (and address) linked to the plate number. (It should be noted that a few drivers have turned this weak argument against law enforcement -- most notably, the driver who wore a monkey mask while racking up traffic cam tickets and then argued the city couldn't prove who was driving the vehicle.)

So, if license plates aren't "personally identifiable information," anyone should be able to access these public records, right?

When one citizen requested anonymized ALPR data from the LA County Sheriff earlier this month via a public records request, his request was denied primarily on confidentiality grounds. Again, he wanted anonymous data, but was denied based on confidentiality.

When I asked for data from the Boston police, the department indicated it was only willing to produce redacted records “without images of license plates and license plate numbers.” (I’m still waiting for this data after three months.)

There's the one-way street. It's not "personal" but only authorized law enforcement members are allowed to view the data. It's not "personal" enough to be subject to the same restrictions addresses and phone numbers are but agencies aren't interesting in sharing their databases of "vehicles" with the public. (Of course, they will sell it to private corporations...) It's a shifting definition that serves law enforcement's desire for massive data and little oversight.

And what happens if a member of the public manages to get ahold of the "private" database full of "public" information?

After a Minneapolis open data advocate paid $5.91 last December for a USB drive packed with 2.1 million ALPR scans complete with license plate numbers and photos, including the mayor’s, the city’s police chief successfully petitioned for a change in the public records law. In the same breath, Chief Harteau asserted that an ALPR scanner “does not record personally identifiable information,” but that its scans “should be private data, available to only the subject and not the general public.” The mayor quickly obliged.

There's your doublethink. Non-private information given privacy protection by a change in law that only benefits certain (supposedly) public servants. Seems rather possessive for data that anybody with pen and paper could acquire.

Maybe the time has come for the technology to be opened to the public, which can then drive around capturing plate and location data on law enforcement vehicles. Technology has been turned against those deploying it before. After all, if it's perfectly acceptable to grab location data on the public, law enforcement should be willing to submit to the same sort of data collection.

Filed Under: law enforcement, license plate data, license plates, personally identifiable information, public access

Court's 'Temporary' Rule Changes Protect Bad NYPD Cops And Stack Deck Against Plaintiffs

from the where-lady-justice-is-not-only-blindfolded,-but-gagged-as-well dept

The New York Police Department doesn't have a great track record when it comes to civil rights. As Reason points out, claims against the department leapt 71% over the past decade, with $135.8 million in settlements paid out in 2010 alone. While any number of internal investigations and policy changes may be taking place at the NYPD in an attempt to lower the number of rights violations, the Southern District Court of New York made its own proactive, and actively terrible, efforts.

Concerned about the number of federal civil rights lawsuits filed against New York City police officers, a subcommittee of judges in the Southern District of New York adopted a temporary set of rules two years ago "designed to promote the just, speedy and inexpensive resolution" of many of those lawsuits.

That's a nice thought, but at least two of those terms deployed are incorrect. The rules enacted by the court have little to do with "justice" or "speed." But it may have nailed the last term. Stacking the deck against plaintiffs may ultimately be more "inexpensive."

Among other things, the rules increased the amount of time defendants have to respond to lawsuits in Manhattan and the Bronx that accuse police officers of excessive force, false arrest or malicious prosecution, and provided for what its authors called "limited discovery" while establishing a strict timetable for settlement demands and mediation.

How this subcommittee arrived at the conclusion that extending the mandatory response time to filed suits from 21 days to 80 days serves either "justice" or "speed" is beyond me. In the real world, if you give a student the choice of three weeks or three months to finish writing a paper, chances are it will be completed the night before its due. The only thing that's changed is the amount of dead time. Same thing here. Giving the NYPD four times the grace period before response means most (if not all) responses will take four times as long to be filed.

And the discovery process is a nightmarish train wreck of travesty traveling down a one-way street (to pile on excessive metaphors) if you're the plaintiff. These "relaxed" rules heavily favor law enforcement.

While the city is required to produce some evidence quickly, most of it is postponed, and all discovery can be halted if a defendant moves to dismiss the suit.

The NYPD can apply the brakes on discovery at any time, something that will at least speed up responses in some cases. On the other hand, the plaintiff is expected to provide an open book for the defendant to page through.

Plaintiffs are required to authorize the release of medical records and sealed arrest records related to the lawsuit. They must also provide a list of all previous arrests, sealed or unsealed, although the city is only obliged to turn over indexes of previous complaints about officers that are similar to those in the lawsuit or that could raise questions about the officer's credibility.

The city is allowed to know everything about the plaintiff, whether it's relevant to the lawsuit or not. Plaintiffs are only allowed to access what the city deems "similar" to the subject matter of the complaint. With these rules in place, an officer's disciplinary file can be cherry-picked by the defense to present the court with the case of Scumbag Citizen With Priors vs. Officer Good Guy With A Couple Of Judgement Errors On His Record.

And if the officer's misdeeds are altogether too awful/too similar to be withheld? No problem. The court allows for the automatic adoption of protective orders to designate certain evidence as confidential. Either side can take advantage of these orders and either side can attempt to exempt the case from the automatic protection, but a judge can overrule any of these requests. A brief glance at the stacked deck gives a pretty good indication as to which side will receive more favorable rulings.

Here's where the court attempts to obtain the "speedy" resolutions it claims the rule changes enable.

If a case is not settled within three months of the city's initial response, both sides are required to attend a mediation session. And if there has been no resolution at the end of the plan's process, which lawyers said can take about six months, cases proceed with full discovery.

"Speedy" means settlements, but settlements rule out "inexpensive," and nothing in the process indicates "justice" is the intent. The plaintiff's bar has opposed the recommendation to make this temporary rule set permanent, stating that that "months of limited discovery pressures plaintiffs to settle without seeing all relevant evidence." That's one way to keep settlement costs lower -- keep the plaintiff and the evidence separated, as happened to a woman who brought a suit against the NYPD after being shoved to the ground by police officers and detained for hours before being released without charges.

By February 2012, Ms. Weber (attorney for the woman filing the suit) said would generally emerge during the discovery process.

But because of the limited discovery, lawyers for the city were not obliged to quickly identify the unnamed officers.

"If this case remains within the ambit of the plan, it is quite likely that the statute will expire before plaintiff can identify all possible defendants," Ms. Weber wrote to a judge, calling that possibility "utterly unfair" and asking that her case be exempted from the plan and handled under standard rules.

The judge, Denise L. Cote, refused the request. A month later, the case settled without the names of the unidentified officers being revealed.

There's nothing speedy or just about "resolutions" like this. The temporary rule changes that were enacted with the stated intent of streamlining the process and serving justice do nothing of the sort. Now, with the court planning on making these changes permanent, police who violate citizens' rights will have an ally within the justice system, one that allows them to duck their accountability to the public.

Filed Under: bad copys, law enforcement, nyc, nypd

The Latest Leaks Contradict Claims Made In Microsoft's Own 'Law Enforcement Requests Report'

from the protecting-your-privacy-except-for-these-large-exceptions dept

The Guardian's recent revelations of Microsoft's very cozy "teamwork" with the NSA and FBI rendered many of the software giant's statements on privacy completely hollow. Among the details leaked was the surprising amount of access to Skype Microsoft provided to these agencies.

One document boasts that Prism monitoring of Skype video production has roughly tripled since a new capability was added on 14 July 2012. "The audio portions of these sessions have been processed correctly all along, but without the accompanying video. Now, analysts will have the complete 'picture'," it says.

Eight months before being bought by Microsoft, Skype joined the Prism program in February 2011.

According to the NSA documents, work had begun on smoothly integrating Skype into Prism in November 2010, but it was not until 4 February 2011 that the company was served with a directive to comply signed by the attorney general.

The NSA was able to start tasking Skype communications the following day, and collection began on 6 February. "Feedback indicated that a collected Skype call was very clear and the metadata looked complete," the document stated, praising the co-operation between NSA teams and the FBI. "Collaborative teamwork was the key to the successful addition of another provider to the Prism system."

This document seems to contradict Microsoft's statement on Skype in March of this year in its 2012 Law Enforcement Requests Report.

Skype received 4,713 requests from law enforcement. Those requests impacted 15,409 accounts or other identifiers, such as a PSTN number. Skype produced no content in response to these requests, but did provide non-content data, such as a SkypeID, name, email account, billing information and call detail records if a user subscribed to the Skype In/Online service, which connects to a telephone number.

[All emphasis in the original.]

Perhaps "producing content" means something different to Microsoft than it does the NSA, or the general public for that matter. The leaked documents state "Skype video production has roughly tripled since July 2012" with the agent noting they've been collecting audio all along.

No doubt this discrepancy will be greeted with a semantic discussion, involving different ways of interpreting words like "producing" or "content." Perhaps Microsoft feels providing direct access isn't the same as "producing content." Or maybe Microsoft means it just hasn't produced content for law enforcement, and anything given to the FBI falls outside of its definition of that term. But if the FBI's requests are considered to be outside the definition of "law enforcement," Microsoft confuses the issue early in its report by referring to content disclosed to governments.

It’s insightful, I believe, to look at the governments to whom customer content was disclosed. Of the 1,558 disclosures of customer content, more than 99 percent were in response to lawful warrants from courts in the United States. In fact, there were only 14 disclosures of customer content to governments outside the United States. These were to governments in Brazil, Ireland, Canada and New Zealand.

Obviously, Microsoft isn't allowed to discuss much of its work with the NSA and the FBI, but the disclosure here makes it sound as if it's safeguarding the privacy of Skype users, when in reality it's simply holding the door open for the feds.

Filed Under: law enforcement, nsa surveillance, skype, surveillance
Companies: microsoft, skype

Teen's Joke 'Threat' Lands Him In Solitary; While Cop Saying He Wants To 'Kill' The First Lady Walks Free

from the just-because-you-enforce-the-laws-doesn't-mean-they-don't-apply-to-you dept

In life, there are often (at minimum) two sets of rules -- one that applies to average people, and one that applies to those on a more rarefied plane. Our legislators do it all the time, enacting laws that they have little intention of following or carving out exceptions in those that already exist.

The law enforcement community is one of the worst offenders of the double standard. Unwritten rules protect bad cops and a nearly universal "hands off" policy ensures everything from minor traffic violations to drunk driving will be neatly swept under the rug.

Mike Riggs at Reason points out a particularly egregious application of the double standard. In recent months, a pair of teens have been arrested and arraigned on terrorism charges stemming from some ill-advised postings. Cameron D'Ambrosio, whose charges were ultimately dropped, was held without bail for two months as prosecutors pursued "communicating terrorist threat" charges. Justin Carter, a teen who made some unfortunate remarks during the course of some perfectly normal video game smack-talking, was arrested on March 27th and is still in jail.

For this transgression, Carter was not just investigated, but arrested. He's been in jail for months now, held on $500,000 bail. His attorney says he's been beaten several times and placed on suicide watch; suicide watch, in case you didn't know, translates to "placed naked in solitary confinement."

D'Ambrosio's "threat" was non-specific and more centered on bragging about his impending rap fame. The inclusion of the Boston Bombing and the White House into his boasting caught the attention of local law enforcement. Carter's smack talking mentioned shooting up a kindergarten, ending with indications he was joking. In both cases, there was context surrounding the comments and neither "threat" was targeted at any specific person or group of people.

Contrast these two cases with one involving a District of Columbia police officer.

D.C. Police Officer Christopher Picciano, "a 17-year veteran who was a member of the elite presidential motorcade detail," will be suspended without pay for a little over a month after joking about killing the first lady, threatening to go on a shooting spree, and calling Pres. Obama a communist.

No jail time. No terrorism charges. No trip to solitary confinement. No being held without bail. Here's a cop, who lives and works in DC, including working in close proximity with the president, who stated specifically he'd "wanted to kill" Michelle Obama, and yet, he walks away almost unscathed.

The lack of overzealous prosecutors is also conspicuous in its absence.

According to the Washington Post, the U.S. attorney's office declined to press charges against Picciano because it "agree[d] with the Secret Service that Picciano was not serious with his comment about Michelle Obama." Picciano also "wrote on Facebook about taking a rifle to a tall building," after the D.C. Council voted to trim pension benefits for the MPD. That wasn't serious either, apparently.

The prosecutors "agreed with the Secret Service." That's rather cozy. Too bad no prosecutors went looking for anything other than having their biases confirmed when dealing with Carter and D'Ambrosio. In both teens' cases, their homes, belongings and computers were searched but investigators were unable to find anything more damning than the posts in questions. No weapons. No evidence of any intent to carry out these "threats." No background suggesting these threats should be taken seriously. And yet, both teens were incarcerated. Justin Carter is still in jail.

That's the process for everyday Americans, especially injudicious teens. Here's the flip side of the double standard.

Picciano joked about killing the first lady and going on a Charles Whitman-esque shooting spree, yet remains free and employed in a job that allows him to carry a gun; Carter, a 19-year-old who doesn't own a gun, joked about shooting up a school, and is being kept naked in solitary confinement as a result.

As Riggs points out, law enforcement members are given a benefit of doubt that's rarely extended to the general public. This low level cronyism further drives a wedge between citizens and so-called "public servants" who shield each other from the repercussions of their words and actions. Law enforcement members have defended themselves by stating they need to "take every threat seriously." Obviously, that's nothing more than self-serving bullshit used to justify the overzealous prosecution of a few mouthy teens.

Filed Under: cameron d'ambrosio, christopher picciano, justin carter, law enforcement, overcriminalization, terroristic threats

UK Announces New Crime Unit Focusing Solely On IP Crimes

from the here-we-go dept

Just a few weeks ago, we noted that the UK government appeared to be working uncomfortably closely with the entertainment industry, going so far as to have lobbying groups do a kind of real-action ride-a-long for arrests of UK citizens. This, after the UK entertainment industry made it their reprehensible goal to censor websites it doesn't like without even the appearance of due process. There seemed to be something of storm cloud brewing over the UK internet, leaving many to wonder exactly how torrential (get it?) the downpour would be.

Well, if the first few raindrops are any indication, it'll be as misguided as it is costly. You see, the UK thinks the next great step for their nation's police force is an Intellectual Property Crimes unit.

"Intellectual property crime has long been a problem in the world of physical goods, but with the growing use of the internet, online intellectual property crime is now an increasing threat to our creative industries. These industries are worth more than £36 billion a year and employ more than 1.5 million people," Lord Younger said.

"Government and our law enforcement agencies must do all they can to protect our creative industries and the integrity of consumer goods. By working with the City of London Police, who have recognised expertise in tackling economic crime, we are showing how committed this government is to supporting business and delivering economic growth."

And hey, why not? After all, it's only costing the British taxpayer roughly $4 million to have their police force act as the American entertainment industry's Stasi. Four-mil-do may not sound like a big number, but when you're $1.5 trillion in debt, every bit counts. And if they just peered over at their long-time-friends and habitual wine-drinking neighbors in France, particularly with how monumentally futile the Hadopi experiment was, maybe they'd decide they could use that money for something more productive. You know, like burning it for a couple moments of warmth.

But no, they say. This is all about jobs and protecting the innocent computers of the citizens.

[Commissioner of the City of London Police, Adrian] Leppard said the new unit would not only safeguard jobs, but would also ensure citizens’ “computer safety” by ensuring they were not exposed to unauthorized copyrighted content.

“Creative industries such as music are a vital part of our economy, providing jobs and investment. Copyright is the engine that makes these industries tick and that is what makes the work of this new Intellectual Property Crime Unit so valuable and important.”

See, the problem is that we've heard the dramatic death-moans of the UK entertainment industry in the past, and they've been shown to be bullshit. You don't create jobs through protectionism, you create them through innovation. And keeping people from being "exposed to unauthorized copyright content?" I can't tell if that is supposed to indicate that UK citizens are being actively sought out by movie files, or if the Commissioner is simply acknowledging that he's going to deny the citizens he serves what a large number of them want, which is access to filesharing sites.

It would be entertaining to watch how this all fails miserably if it weren't being propped up on the backs of tax money paid by my English comrades. But fail it will, not because there isn't great content in the UK, but because the industries concerned would rather play blackshirt than just compete.

Filed Under: copyright, crime, intellectual property, law enforcement, uk