NSA FOIA Response Claims Data On Vendor Contracts 'Unsearchable'

from the it's-easier-to-not-find-something-when-you-don't-bother-looking-for-it dept

Trying to pry information loose from the NSA is nearly impossible. The ODNI has been dropping documents related to the NSA's various surveillance programs, but that's as a result of a lawsuit, something that goes completely unacknowledged at the ODNI's site. People requesting a peek into what the NSA has collected on them PERSONALLY have been universally met with a boilerplate response that "neither confirms nor denies" the existence of this data.

MuckRock has been filing dozens of FOIA requests in hopes of freeing up info on the many contractors employed by the NSA. Unsurprisingly, this has met with little success. While it did manage to secure 16 pages on French security firm Vupen, its other requests have been met with claims that no responsive documents have been found. This is hard to believe considering some of the requests are about known NSA contractors.

But one recent response went past baffling into the realm of the surreal in its assertion that the keywords MuckRock sought info on were just too "wide open" to be useful.

A search for overly broad keywords such as "CNO" and "computer network attack" would be tantamount to conducting a manual search through thousands of folders and then reading each document in order to determine whether the document pertains to a contract.

So, the agency that claims to be able to sift through millions of pieces of communications and data somehow claims it can't wrangle its own data. Of course, the NSA can't even search its own internal email, so asking it to run a keyword search for contract documents is probably out of the question. But this assertion by the NSA is a bit puzzling, as it almost implies a lot of what's being searched for isn't even digitized, as MuckRock points out.

In other words, the NSA is claiming that, for external contractors, large portions of its $10.8 billion budget are tracked primarily through paper indices not searchable even by relatively broad topic.

In addition, the agency's response appears to be saying that they don't even have a designated place to store paper copies of contracts, but place them in folders with other documents.

So, how does the agency track its interactions with its "vendors?" Does it even matter? The agency's own budget is secret (though not so much anymore), so a lack of solid accounting hardly matters. But it's still rather disturbing to see such a deliberately cavalier attitude towards accountability.

How do they keep track of their activities if they don't have an electronic contracts database? How do they, as a complex organization, determine budgetary needs if they cannot easily track their own spending? How do they measure the performance of vendor contracts, if as they claim, the contracts are shuffled to some paper file that may not see the light of day unless someone requests it through a FOIA request?

As MuckRock points out, this obfuscation is likely deliberate. The NSA is a data black hole. Lots of info flows in but it rarely, if ever, leaves. Any questions those charged with approving funding might have can be waved away by citing magic words like "national security," and that's even before its flacks in the halls of Congress start erecting roadblocks.

Almost certainly the NSA has very effective ways of searching its own internal files. After all, its defenders often boast about the number of geniuses it employs. It just has no compelling reason to do so. Even being compelled by courts to kick loose documents has its limits. As we saw just recently, a court order to declassify the government's secret opinion on the Section 215 collections was flat out refused by the DOJ. If the FISA court can't get the government to comply, then average citizens have no chance whatsoever.

MuckRock is continuing to assault the NSA's FOIA defenses. It's hoped that with enough requests, info will be pried loose that will indicate what sorts of keywords generate responsive documents -- and which ones result in ridiculous "this is impossible" statements from the agency.

Filed Under: contractors, foia, nsa, searching

FBI Stops Responding To The Most Prolific FOIA Filer, Because He Might Actually Learn Something

from the he's-so-effective-that-they'd-like-him-to-stop dept

Mother Jones has an interesting profile of Ryan Shapiro, a punk rocker turned animal rights activist turned MIT PhD student, who is officially the "most prolific" filer of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests from the FBI. At a high point, he was filing an average of two per day. In fact, he filed so many FOIA requests so successfully, that the FBI is now refusing to respond and is giving the courts a secret explanation which they won't share.

The FBI claims that it cannot discuss the case in open court "without damaging the very national security law enforcement interests it is seeking to protect." Instead, it has filed a secret declaration outlining its case. "This is an especially circular and Kafkaesque line of argument," Shapiro counters. "The FBI considers it a national security threat to make public its reasoning for considering it a national security threat to use federal law to request information about the FBI's deeply problematic understanding of national security threats."

The FBI is basically arguing that because Shapiro is filing so many requests, he might actually be able to pull enough info together from so many different responses, that it would reveal stuff that wouldn't have been revealed if it had been found in a single FOIA request. In other words, Shapiro is better at this game than the FOIA censors, figuring out ways to get a variety of information that, when put together, is actually kind of useful.

Part of the trick, apparently, is getting a ton of people to agree to sign "privacy waivers" so he can request the FBI's info on those people, which the FBI wouldn't reveal otherwise.

When he started using privacy waivers, Shapiro realized he was on to something. Suppose you and I volunteered for the animal rights group PETA. If Shapiro requested all PETA-related FBI documents, he might get something back, but any references to us would be blacked out. If he requested documents related to us, he'd probably get nothing at all. But if he filed his PETA request along with privacy waivers signed by us, the FBI would be compelled to return all PETA documents that mention us—with the relevant details uncensored.

Shapiro began calling up old friends and asking for waivers. Coming of age amid the 1990s punk scene, he'd been drawn to animal rights causes and took part in their actions. He walked into foie gras facilities to film sick and injured ducks, several of which he rescued, and locked himself to the doors of fur salons. And while he no longer does such things, he has kept in touch with people who do.

Armed with signed privacy waivers, he sent out a few experimental requests—he calls them "submarine pings"—and when the FBI returned more than 100 pages on a close friend, he knew he'd struck gold. The response included pages of information that Shapiro had requested previously, but that the FBI had claimed didn't exist. Using case details from those documents and a handful of additional waivers, he filed a new set of requests.

Later in the article, Shapiro admits that as he got more and more responses, it certainly allowed him to fill in many blanks (and also point him to where to file other requests). This, it seems, is exactly what the FBI fears the most: Shapiro has outsmarted them. While, normally, FOIA responses are done in a manner to limit what information is shared and to never, ever suggest a slightly different query that might be useful, it appears Shapiro has more or less figured out a way around that, in part via bulk requests which lead down other paths of inquiry. No wonder the FBI has stopped responding. Shapiro just plays the game better than they do, and they're used to a world where the house always wins.

Filed Under: activists, animal rights, fbi, foia, mosaic theory, privacy waiver, ryan shapiro

Feds Took Reporter's Notes During Unrelated Search, After They Spotted Documents She Had Obtained Via FOIA

from the weak-excuses dept

Remember how the feds said they were going to be more careful about respecting freedom of the press and such? Not that anyone really expected that to happen, but late last week there was a scary report about how DHS officials and Maryland police were sent to do a search of Paul Flanagan's house to make sure he had no guns -- since he's been legally prohibited from owning a gun due to previous legal issues. But, while in the house, the officials apparently searched Flanagan's wife's documents and seized a bunch. That's a problem because his wife, Audrey Hudson, is a journalist and they took a bunch of her private notes, many of which revealed journalistic sources.

Hudson claims that the search concerning her husband was nothing more than a ruse to uncover details of government sources she had quoted in a recent article about Air Marshals. While not definitive, there appear to be an awful lot of coincidences that lead to the seizure of her documents. First, one of the people on the "search" was with the Coast Guard Investigative Services, and the Federal Air Marshals are a part of the Coast Guard. Admittedly, Hudson's husband, Flanagan, works for the Coast Guard. However, the investigator who did the search asked Hudson if she had authored that particular article, so he was well aware of it going in. Furthermore, the search warrant was just about guns, so it seems odd that they'd go searching her computer. On top of that, the "excuse" given by the Coast Guard after all of this is incredibly flimsy:

"In the course of a joint Federal & Maryland State Police investigation, a lawful search warrant was served on August 6, 2013 in Shadyside, MD. The Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS) was asked to participate since the search involved a Coast Guard employee. During the course of the search, the CGIS agent discovered government documents labeled FOUO - For Official Use Only (FOUO) and LES - Law Enforcement Sensitive. The files that contained these documents were cataloged on the search warrant inventory and taken from the premises. The documents were reviewed with the source agency and determined to be obtained properly through the Freedom of Information Act. The CG employee was notified that the documents were cleared and the CG employee picked them up after signing for the documents."

Basically, for no clear reason, they decided that even though they were looking for guns, they would start rifling through her documents, and then seize them, even though they had been obtained through perfectly legal means. It is entirely possible that this was all coincidental, but it certainly would seem to create some fairly significantly chilling effects, yet again, for reporters.

Filed Under: audrey hudson, coast guard, dhs, foia, leakers, reporters, search, whistleblowers

CIA Also Scolded By Court For 'Twisting The Factual Record' And Withholding Documents

from the guess-they-were-getting-lonely dept

So much of the attention about our abusive intelligence agencies has focused on the NSA. Even the FBI has been seeing some sunlight as its abusive practices have been revealed. But, amazingly, the CIA has been rather unscathed by all of this, even if the revelations of the intelligence black budget showed that the CIA was actually getting more money than the NSA (something most people thought was not true). However, in a story that has received not much attention, McClatchy reporters recently wrote about the CIA getting smacked around by Judge Beryl Howell in a DC district court (yes, that Beryl Howell).

Howell was not impressed by the CIA's attempt to keep certain documents under wraps:

In a recent decision, U.S. District Judge Beryl Howell denounced several of the CIA’s legal arguments. At one point, she accused the CIA of a “shameless twisting of the factual record.” Other assertions by the agency, she called “dead wrong” and “implausible.”

The specific quote on the shameless twisting of the factual record concerned the CIA's attempt to portray a non-profit that had requested documents under a FOIA request as a for profit organization, because it sought funds on its website. This is similar to our recent report of the FBI arguing that FOIA service Muckrock wanted documents for commercial reasons. Basically, it looks like they'll look for any excuse. Of course, given the smackdown Judge Howell gave the CIA over this, the FBI may want to reconsider its letter to Muckrock:

The CIA appears to conclude that NSC is a for-profit entity based on the fact that “its website appears to solicit paying customers.”.... The mere earning of income, however, is not at all an indication that an entity is organized for profit. Even nonprofit organizations must pay their bills. The government, of all entities, should know that the difference between a for-profit corporation and a non-profit organization is not whether the entity earns income (or even whether it earns income at a profit). Rather, “[i]n contrast to a for profit corporation, a non-profit organization must utilize its earnings to finance the continued provision of the goods or services it furnishes, and may not distribute any surplus to the owners.” .... The CIA’s shameless twisting of the factual record in this case to portray their assignment of rights position in a better light falls short of the level of representation that this Court expects of a United States government agency. The CIA should know better than to make such an obviously unfounded argument, particularly in light of the many allegations of bad faith that have been leveled by the plaintiff in these cases, including allegations that prompted a nonfrivolous motion for sanctions.

Yes, we recognize that the intelligence community's default mode is to keep things secret. But that doesn't mean it gets to misrepresent and lie when confronted with a basic FOIA request. You expect a culture of deception to rise up in agencies whose main purpose is to deceive, but that's exactly why we need more transparency and strict oversight of their activities -- and that's something that we've fallen well short of achieving.

Filed Under: beryl howell, cia, foia

FBI Wants More Than $270,000 To Respond To FOIA Request About Booz Allen

from the pocket-change-for-a-defense-contractor,-but-for-the-rest-of-us... dept

Yes, the federal government has something of a reputation for expecting "padded bills" when it deals with defense contractors, but it would appear that the FBI is trying to do the reverse when someone decided to start investigating the FBI's relationship with giant defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton (famous, among other things, for employing Ed Snowden, and for hyping up "cyberwar" for fun and (mostly) for profit).

Looking to explore Booz Allen's work with the government, the government transparency aficionados over at Muckrock asked various federal and state agencies for details of their contracts with Booz Allen (starting well before the Snowden leaks). Back in March, Muckrock asked a whole bunch of agencies for "Copies of contracts with Booz Allen Hamilton over the past 5 years" and "Any final reports generated and delivered by Booz Allen Hamilton to the agency over the past 5 years." Some agencies did respond without question, including the Air Force and the Department of Defense Education Activity.

Other agencies, however, suggested that it would cost quite a bit to get those documents. Leading the list: the FBI. They want over a quarter of a million dollars. Yes. Basically, they want $270,000:

When MuckRock asked the FBI for copies of its contracts with Booz Allen Hamilton and any reports the popular consulting firm may have produced for the bureau in the last five years, a records manager responded with an estimated cost of $267,400. That price is just for the labor of finding and reviewing the documents, and doesn’t include fees for copying or placing the documents on CDs.

That’ll be an extra $9,540 for paper, $2,855 for CD. The total cost, therefore, would be an estimated $277,780 on paper and $271,095 on CD.

If you've got that money to spare, please let Muckrock know. Now, the FOIA process does allow agencies to request money to cover fees, especially if it involves a lot of work/documents. However, it's also quite common, especially for issues of public interest, to do such FOIA searches and delivery for free. As you can see, in this case, there really are a lot of documents. They claim that they found approximately 95,500 -- and rather than considering this a public interest issue, the FBI has classified it as "commercial use" because (the FBI claims, bizarrely) "it seeks information to further the commercial trade, profit interests of the requester." I don't see how that's actually true. That $267,400 is actually the cost of "reviewing" all of those documents (there's another $840 for the search).

Yes, 95,500 documents is a lot. And you could see why they'd want to review the documents before releasing them, but over a quarter of a million dollars just to find out how the FBI spends taxpayer money? That seems a bit crazy.

Filed Under: fbi, foia

NSA Apparently Purchasing Software Exploits From French Security Firm

from the and-everyone's-a-little-less-safe-now dept

The long history of US intelligence agencies' access to software exploits is well-documented. In the interest of "safety," the US government has undermined the safety of millions of users by gathering up exploits and utilizing them for as long as possible before patches and updates close the security holes. Some it acquires directly from companies that report holes in their systems directly to the NSA and other agencies. Others it buys from contractors that specialize in probing software for usable exploits.

Heather Akers-Healy, using Muckrock's FOIA service, recently obtained a document from the NSA (via a FOIA request) detailing its purchase of exploits from Vupen, a French security company specializing in sellable exploits. Unfortunately, the details in this "detailing" are incredibly sparse. Most of what might be interesting is redacted and a majority of the document is standard contractual clauses.

If there's anything of interest here (beyond the purchase of exploits), it's the fact that the transaction takes place on a nondescript form which can be used to handle a variety of products. Due to the standardized wording, it almost appears as though the NSA has the option to purchase exploits by the truckload -- and that said exploits can only be delivered during the normal receiving hours of 7:30 am - 2:30 pm.

That being said, the purchase of exploits is something the NSA has been pretty open about (comparatively). Vupen, or at least its founder and CEO Chaouki Bekrar (who refers to himself as the "Darth Vader of Cybersecurity"), seems rather open about the exploit market itself. As Muckrock points out, Bekrar suggested other FOIA request topics when confronted with this document.

@abbynormative @MuckRockNews You would better ask NSA for contracts with biggest zero-day sellers in US: Northrop, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon

— Chaouki Bekrar (@cBekrar) September 2, 2013

Vupen's looking to open an office in Maryland, which would put it in the same neighborhood as several other government contractors -- and the NSA's headquarters. It certainly wouldn't hurt to be a short drive away from some well-funded government agencies. Bekrar also tweeted a link to story by the Washington Post that noted the NSA had $25 million to throw in the direction of software vulnerabilities.

The "Binary Analysis and Exploits" subscription (pre-paid, yearly) that the NSA purchased is described on Vupen's site as more of a defensive product, but it's highly unlikely intelligence the agency viewed it the same way.

With 15 to 20 binary analysis and private 1-day exploits/PoCs released by VUPEN each month, the VUPEN Binary Analysis and Exploits service allows gov organizations to quickly and easily evaluate risks related the most recent vulnerabilities, and protect national infrastructures against critical vulnerabilities before they are exploited in the wild.

Why the NSA didn't simply go with Vupen's more "proactive" product, "Exclusive and Sophisticated Exploits for Offensive Security", is unknown, unless better exploits were available in the defensive package.

While the NSA's document may lack a lot of details, a brochure obtained by Wikileaks shows what's available in Vupen's offensive package. This service targets law enforcement agencies (LEAs) as well as government agencies. LEAs could certainly be considered a "growth market," especially since so many are "rebranding" themselves as entities lying somewhere between a military force and an unofficial FBI field office.

What this program does is turn your subscription fee into credits and allow you (the LEA/government) to buy exploits with these credits (based on how valuable Vupen feels they are). It's like a Wii store for vulnerabilities. The ultimate aim?

VUPEN Exploits for Law Enforcement Agencies aim to deliver exclusive exploit codes for undisclosed vulnerabilities discovered in-house by VUPEN security researchers. This is a reliable and secure approach to help LEAs and investigators in covertly attacking and gaining access to remote computer systems.

Now, Vupen states on its site and in its brochures that it will only sell to "trusted countries and government agencies." Even if that is entirely true, the underlying issue doesn't go away. Instead of identifying holes and working with software companies to get them patched (or at least informing the general public), it's selling these off to various intelligence/law enforcement agencies.

If Vupen can find these exploitable holes, so can other untrustworthy actors, whether they're governments that don't quite make the "trusted" list or simply individuals looking to profit on the misery of others. Vupen can't corner this market. A security hole is a security hole and no one owns it or can prevent others from exploiting it (other than by closing the hole). What it's selling isn't necessarily scarce and what it's doing is allowing the public (including paying customers) to assume the risk while it profits.

Filed Under: foia, nsa, nsa surveillance, purchases, security, software exploits
Companies: vupen

Defense Department Can't Afford To Buy A Fax Machine To Receive FOIA Requests

from the priorities dept

Apparently the Sequester is hitting the Defense Department so hard that it can't even afford a new fax machine to handle Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. Now, you might wonder why a fax machine is needed, but since the US government has generally made it as difficult as possible to file FOIA requests, faxing is often the best way. MuckRock, a service that helps others (including us!) file FOIA requests, has noted that the Defense Department (which it also notes has a $31.8 billion -- with a b -- budget for "maintenance and operations") has a broken fax machine, and can't promise a new one will be set up "until the start of the new fiscal year." That's not particularly comforting. Basically, the DOD is telling MuckRock to stop sending it faxes for a few months (at least). Remember that, by (often ignored) law, the DOD is required to respond to FOIA requests within 20 business days. Yet, here, the DOD is saying sit tight and wait for a few months because it can't buy a new fax machine. MuckRock even points out that, these days, you can just get an online faxing service which would probably be a lot more efficient in the first place. But, of course, that's not how the government works.

Filed Under: defense department, dod, fax machine, foia

AP Journalists: The NYPD 'Less Transparent' Than CIA, FBI And NSA When It Comes To FOI Requests

from the ray-kelly-states-info-needs-to-be-pried-from-his-cold,-live-fingers dept

According to the investigative journalists Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, the entity most reluctant to part ways with information isn't any of the expected national intelligence agencies. No, the entity least likely to kick loose a response to a FOI request is none other than the NYPD.

“For the most part, they don’t respond,” Apuzzo, 34, said in an interview with The Huffington Post. “I don’t think people are well-served by that. Even the NSA responds.”

“Even the CIA responds,” Goldman, 42, jumped in. “Even the FBI responds.”

Incredibly, this is an improvement over the Giuliani years.

Bob Liff, a former reporter and Democratic political consultant, said the public’s right to know may not be perfectly served under Bloomberg, but it has vastly improved from his predecessor’s time.

“I don’t doubt that there’s always a battle over controversial information,” Liff said. “But under Rudy, the battle was over basic information. That’s a significant distinction.”

Thanks to the oft-thwarted efforts of Apuzzo and Goldman, we now have an answer as to why New York is referred to as the "city that never sleeps." It's because it's up all night crafting narratives.

The "public is not well-served by a police department that doesn’t allow you access to 911 calls or public records, police reports" and then "produces their own summaries of cases for you to look at, but doesn’t let you get access to the underlying documents,” Apuzzo added later.

“The NYPD is deciding what’s news,” Goldman said.

Apuzzo and Goldman have had plenty of experience with the NYPD, having exposed the department's highly questionable surveillance tactics deployed after the 9/11 attacks, along with breaking the news that a former high-ranking CIA officer was running the so-called Demographics Unit. This unit has designated entire mosques as "terrorist operations" and operates under a loophole in the laws governing police investigations -- a generous loophole manufactured by the former CIA agent himself.

The powers granted to this unit are so audacious that national intelligence agencies are unable to utilize the information collected without breaking national civil liberties laws.

The NYPD's protection of its own info seems almost antagonistic. As we've covered earlier, the NYPD has rejected FOI requests for everything from weapons discharge reports to Ray Kelly's official calendar. The city of New York isn't much better, as Mike Masnick can personally attest.

There's an insularity to New York that outsiders have trouble permeating. The city is unlike any other in the US, and the residents and ingrained institutions know it. Most people don't have what it takes to get past its callous exterior and those who try are often rebuffed simply on principle. The mayor's office and police department have had each other's back throughout Bloomberg's tenure, which isn't too surprising considering the NYPD has been very instrumental in the mayor's micromanagement of the city and its inhabitants.

But this "we protect our own" attitude extends into the journalistic ranks as well, which is extremely problematic when the police department is already doing everything it can to prevent the release of unflattering information. Apuzzo and Goldman's investigative work was greeted with reactions ranging from harsh criticism to complete indifference by New York papers.

The city’s top tabloid newspapers, the New York Post and Daily News, editorialized against the AP's NYPD series in 2011, and The New York Times did little follow-up reporting on the revelations and newly published documents.

"It was extremely surprising to us that putting a former CIA officer in charge of the NYPD intelligence division and creating what’s been created generated so little attention at the time," Apuzzo said.

That should have been a big deal and New York journalist should have been the ones informing their local readers about the abuses occurring in the name of "security" -- and at the behest of a former CIA officer. But they didn't, instead entertaining the mayor's assertions that everything the department did was legal, above board and not a violation of anyone's rights.

Bloomberg, like President Obama, promised greater transparency. And like the president, he's failed to follow through. Worse, this isn't simply a case of neglect -- both have taken great strides in the direction of opacity. And as for those New York journalists who criticized the pair's work, they need to take a good, long look at their own complicity in the NYPD's overreach.

Filed Under: adam goldman, foia, matt apuzzo, nypd, transparency

Court Says TSA Can Lie About Whether Or Not It Has The Information You're Requesting

from the clearly-spelled-out-on-the-brand-new-FUIA-request-forms dept

In theory, the Freedom of Information Act is great. It allows citizens to pursue disclosure from government entities in order to better understand processes or look for malfeasance. In reality, however, it's often incredibly difficult to convince these agencies to actually free up any information.

Whatever isn't delayed indefinitely is redacted heavily. Everything else that doesn't hit these two extremes tends to run into various bureaucratic walls. FOIA request fulfillment is often handed off to whatever part of the agency seems least likely to want the job, either because of its natural antipathy towards the public or because it's chronically understaffed.

It's gotten to the point where people are regularly suing the government to get documents released. No one needs to point out the sheer insanity of a system that expends public money to keep public documents from the public, especially one that is governed by an act meant to make the wall between the public and its servants so thin as to be nearly transparent.

Now, take that insanity and add to it a court decision that basically says it's perfectly fine for government agencies to lie to the public about the availability of requested information. The blogger who runs TSA Out of Our Pants! recently had his FOIA lawsuit against the agency dismissed by a district court. In her decision, Judge Joan A. Lenard came to a conclusion that agreed with the TSA's assertion that it didn't have the records the blogger requested, despite evidence to the contrary.

U.S. District Judge Joan A. Lenard granted the TSA the special privilege of not needing to go that route, rubber-stamping the decision of the TSA and the airport authority to write to me that no CCTV footage of the incident existed when, in fact, it did. This footage is non-classified and its existence is admitted by over a dozen visible camera domes and even signage that the area is being recorded. Beyond that, the TSA regularly releases checkpoint video when it doesn’t show them doing something wrong (for example, here’s CCTV of me beating their body scanners). But if it shows evidence of misconduct? Just go ahead and lie.

Attached below, you'll see his photos of the security cameras. While there may be some periodic dumps of stored footage, the likelihood of just the footage he requested not being available is pretty slim, especially since (as he points out) the TSA has no trouble locating flattering footage of its employees hard at work.

The court does seem to have a point about his second argument -- that releasing unredacted info about the TSA employees involved doesn't really serve the public interest. The TSA argued that releasing the names and faces could "expose them to unnecessary unofficial questioning, harassment, and stigmatization." This argument is a bit of a non-starter, as any public position has a good chance of exposing employees to all of the above. The TSA's second argument, the one the judge agreed with, is a bit more on point.

The TSA also determined that "none of the individuals' personal information would shed light on how TSA performs its statutory duties generally or in the particular instance at issue..." The TSA concluded that "the public interest in having that information disclosed was insufficient to merit disclosure."

This makes more sense even if it does seem a little illogical to pretend the TSA's employees, who work in public areas and interact with many members of the public, should somehow expect this level of privacy to be retroactively applied. However, the overall point is solid: naming names doesn't "shed light" on the issue. The TSA-opposing blogger does make a very good point, however: for all the concern the TSA has for its own members' privacy, it's rather careless with the privacy of others. Earlier this year, the TSA published an unredacted copy of his driver's license in a public court filing. Presumably this was an accident and not some petty form of intimidation.]

Unfortunately for this blogger, along with anyone else filing FOIA requests with government agencies, the judge not only took the TSA's claim that it didn't have the footage at face value in order to dismiss one of the claims, it also gave it tacit permission to permanently lock away any other info it wished to keep undisclosed.

Judge Lenard ruled that once a document is labeled “Sensitive Security Information” (which the TSA does by merely waiving [sic] a magic wand and writing “SSI” on the cover of a document) the U.S. District Court loses its power to review that determination, and the U.S. Court of Appeals is the proper forum. But wait, the Court of Appeals doesn’t evaluate FOIA claims, so now, in order to get a document you want, you must petition 2 courts and pay over $800 in filing fees alone.

And that's how the FOIA works in reality. Limitations, delays, redactions and over-classification. That alone would be enough of an uphill battle without courts pitching in with decisions that further distance requested information from the public.

Filed Under: foia, lying, tsa

Blaming Sequestration, CIA Closes Historical Document Declassification Office

from the nice-going,-everyone-involved-[finger-pointed-at-Congress] dept

The forced cuts of the sequester are hitting everywhere, apparently even at agencies with black budgets. With the budgets not open for public inspection, whatever's cut by those agencies will take on the appearance of being "discretionary." The latest cut by the CIA certainly looks to be a cut of convenience, rather than one of necessity.

The budget ax has fallen on a CIA office that focused on declassifying historical materials, a move scholars say will mean fewer public disclosures about long-buried intelligence secrets and scandals.

The Historical Collections Division, which has declassified documents on top Soviet spies, a secret CIA airline in the Vietnam War, the Cuban missile crisis and other major operations, has been disbanded. The office that handles Freedom of Information Act requests will take over the work.

While most of the documents are mainly of historical interest, the fact is that there's a lot in the CIA's past that should be opened up to the public. It's not as if the agency has run a tight, clean program for the past several decades. Even if its past misdeeds (and that term really understates some of its actions) have little bearing on its current work, they still provide some insight into the mindset of the agency.

Dumping this onto the FOIA department just adds more work to a part of the agency that already uses every excuse it can to avoid complying with requests.

"This move is a true loss to the public," said Mark Zaid, a Washington lawyer who frequently litigates against the CIA. He said the CIA office that handles Freedom of Information Act requests "is the most obstructionist and unfriendly of those I have dealt with during the last two decades."

The agency's spokesman says this move will "create efficiencies," which is both untrue and a buzzword-ish mistreatment of English. All it does is push a likely unwanted task (does the CIA really care whether or not the public's interest is served?) to a part of the agency that wants it even less. With this move, the CIA's history is allowed to slink back into the shadows while its present continues to be kept out of the sunlight by an antagonist FOIA department.

The off-the-record budget keeps anyone from stating definitively whether this cut was mandatory or simply convenient, but considering its lack of direct benefit to the agency (and its agenda), it's not a surprise to see it swiftly placed on the chopping block.

Filed Under: cia, foia, historical documents, sequestration