We Read Apple's 65 Page Filing Calling Bullshit On The Justice Department, So You Don't Have To

from the and-off-we-go dept

Apple didn't need to reply until tomorrow, but has now released its Motion to Vacate the magistrate judge's order from last week, compelling Apple to create a new operating system that undermines a couple of key security features, so that the FBI could then brute force the passcode on Syed Farook's work iPhone. It's clearly a bit of a rush job as there are a few typos (and things like incorrect page numbers in the table of contents). However, it's not too surprising to see the crux of Apple's argument. In summary it's:

• The 1789 All Writs Act doesn't apply at all to this situation for a whole long list of reasons that most of this filing will explain.
• Even if it does, the order is an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment (freedom of expression) and the Fifth Amendment (due process).

I really do recommend reading the 65 page filing (it goes fast!). But on the assumption that you have more of a life than we do, let's dig in and detail what Apple's argument is. The brief is quite well written (other than the typos) in making the issues pretty clear:

This is not a case about one isolated iPhone. Rather, this case is about the Department of Justice and the FBI seeking through the courts a dangerous power that Congress and the American people have withheld: the ability to force companies like Apple to undermine the basic security and privacy interests of hundreds of millions of individuals around the globe. The government demands that Apple create a back door to defeat the encryption on the iPhone, making its users’ most confidential and personal information vulnerable to hackers, identity thieves, hostile foreign agents, and unwarranted government surveillance. The All Writs Act, first enacted in 1789 and on which the government bases its entire case, “does not give the district court a roving commission” to conscript and commandeer Apple in this manner. Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1979). In fact, no court has ever authorized what the government now seeks, no law supports such unlimited and sweeping use of the judicial process, and the Constitution forbids it.

The motion also notes the importance of strong encryption in keeping people safe and secure:

Since the dawn of the computer age, there have been malicious people dedicated to breaching security and stealing stored personal information. Indeed, the government itself falls victim to hackers, cyber-criminals, and foreign agents on a regular basis, most famously when foreign hackers breached Office of Personnel Management databases and gained access to personnel records, affecting over 22 million current and former federal workers and family members. In the face of this daily siege, Apple is dedicated to enhancing the security of its devices, so that when customers use an iPhone, they can feel confident that their most private personal information—financial records and credit card information, health information, location data, calendars, personal and political beliefs, family photographs, information about their children—will be safe and secure. To this end, Apple uses encryption to protect its customers from cyber-attack and works hard to improve security with every software release because the threats are becoming more frequent and sophisticated. Beginning with iOS 8, Apple added additional security features that incorporate the passcode into the encryption system. It is these protections that the government now seeks to roll back by judicial decree.

And the filing makes it clear that the government is lying in claiming that this is all just about this phone:

The government says: “Just this once” and “Just this phone.” But the government knows those statements are not true; indeed the government has filed multiple other applications for similar orders, some of which are pending in other courts.2 And as news of this Court’s order broke last week, state and local officials publicly declared their intent to use the proposed operating system to open hundreds of other seized devices—in cases having nothing to do with terrorism. If this order is permitted to stand, it will only be a matter of days before some other prosecutor, in some other important case, before some other judge, seeks a similar order using this case as precedent. Once the floodgates open, they cannot be closed, and the device security that Apple has worked so tirelessly to achieve will be unwound without so much as a congressional vote. As Tim Cook, Apple’s CEO, recently noted: “Once created, the technique could be used over and over again, on any number of devices. In the physical world, it would be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks—from restaurants and banks to stores and homes. No reasonable person would find that acceptable.”

There's a footnote in the middle of that which points to Manhattan DA Cyrus Vance already talking about why he supports the FBI, and how he has 155 to 160 phones that he wants to force Apple to help unlock.

Apple also details how accepting the government's interpretation of the All Writs Act here could easily extend in absolutely crazy ways:

Finally, given the government’s boundless interpretation of the All Writs Act, it is hard to conceive of any limits on the orders the government could obtain in the future. For example, if Apple can be forced to write code in this case to bypass security features and create new accessibility, what is to stop the government from demanding that Apple write code to turn on the microphone in aid of government surveillance, activate the video camera, surreptitiously record conversations, or turn on location services to track the phone’s user? Nothing.

Apple also doesn't pull any punches on how the FBI itself messed things up:

Unfortunately, the FBI, without consulting Apple or reviewing its public guidance regarding iOS, changed the iCloud password associated with one of the attacker’s accounts, foreclosing the possibility of the phone initiating an automatic iCloud back-up of its data to a known Wi-Fi network... which could have obviated the need to unlock the phone and thus for the extraordinary order the government now seeks.21 Had the FBI consulted Apple first, this litigation may not have been necessary.

Apple's filing also does a good job debunking the DOJ's ridiculous "this is no burden, because it's just software and Apple writes software" argument:

The compromised operating system that the government demands would require significant resources and effort to develop. Although it is difficult to estimate, because it has never been done before, the design, creation, validation, and deployment of the software likely would necessitate six to ten Apple engineers and employees dedicating a very substantial portion of their time for a minimum of two weeks, and likely as many as four weeks.... Members of the team would include engineers from Apple’s core operating system group, a quality assurance engineer, a project manager, and either a document writer or a tool writer.... No operating system currently exists that can accomplish what the government wants, and any effort to create one will require that Apple write new code, not just disable existing code functionality.... Rather, Apple will need to design and implement untested functionality in order to allow the capability to enter passcodes into the device electronically in the manner that the government describes.... In addition, Apple would need to either develop and prepare detailed documentation for the above protocol to enable the FBI to build a brute-force tool that is able to interface with the device to input passcode attempts, or design, develop and prepare documentation for such a tool itself.... Further, if the tool is utilized remotely (rather than at a secure Apple facility), Apple will also have to develop procedures to encrypt, validate, and input into the device communications from the FBI.... This entire development process would need to be logged and recorded in case Apple’s methodology is ever questioned, for example in court by a defense lawyer for anyone charged in relation to the crime....

Once created, the operating system would need to go through Apple’s quality assurance and security testing process.... Apple’s software ecosystem is incredibly complicated, and changing one feature of an operating system often has ancillary or unanticipated consequences.... Thus, quality assurance and security testing would require that the new operating system be tested on multiple devices and validated before being deployed.... Apple would have to undertake additional testing efforts to confirm and validate that running this newly developed operating system to bypass the device’s security features will not inadvertently destroy or alter any user data.... To the extent problems are identified (which is almost always the case), solutions would need to be developed and re-coded, and testing would begin anew.... As with the development process, the entire quality assurance and security testing process would need to be logged, recorded, and preserved.... Once the new custom operating system is created and validated, it would need to be deployed on to the subject device, which would need to be done at an Apple facility.... And if the new operating system has to be destroyed and recreated each time a new order is issued, the burden will multiply.

From there we dig into the meat of the filing: that the All Writs Act doesn't apply.

The All Writs Act (or the “Act”) does not provide the judiciary with the boundless and unbridled power the government asks this Court to exercise. The Act is intended to enable the federal courts to fill in gaps in the law so they can exercise the authority they already possess by virtue of the express powers granted to them by the Constitution and Congress; it does not grant the courts free-wheeling authority to change the substantive law, resolve policy disputes, or exercise new powers that Congress has not afforded them. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has squarely rejected the notion that “the district court has such wide-ranging inherent powers that it can impose a duty on a private party when Congress has failed to impose one. To so rule would be to usurp the legislative function and to improperly extend the limited federal court jurisdiction.”

Congress has never authorized judges to compel innocent third parties to provide decryption services to the FBI. Indeed, Congress has expressly withheld that authority in other contexts, and this issue is currently the subject of a raging national policy debate among members of Congress, the President, the FBI Director, and state and local prosecutors. Moreover, federal courts themselves have never recognized an inherent authority to order non-parties to become de facto government agents in ongoing criminal investigations. Because the Order is not grounded in any duly enacted rule or statute, and goes well beyond the very limited powers afforded by Article III of the Constitution and the All Writs Act, it must be vacated.

In short, Apple is leaning heavily on the idea that CALEA pre-empts the All Writs Act here, and that CALEA explicitly says that companies can't be forced into helping to decrypt encrypted content. Beyond that, Apple is claiming that it's "too far removed" from the case for the All Writs Act to apply and mocks the idea (put forth by the DOJ) that because Apple licenses its software instead of selling it, that makes it okay:

Apple is no more connected to this phone than General Motors is to a company car used by a fraudster on his daily commute. Moreover, that Apple’s software is “licensed, not sold,”..., is “a total red herring,” as Judge Orenstein already concluded.... A licensing agreement no more connects Apple to the underlying events than a sale. The license does not permit Apple to invade or control the private data of its customers. It merely limits customers’ use and redistribution of Apple’s software. Indeed, the government’s position has no limits and, if accepted, would eviscerate the “remoteness” factor entirely, as any company that offers products or services to consumers could be conscripted to assist with an investigation, no matter how attenuated their connection to the criminal activity. This is not, and never has been, the law.

From there, Apple attacks the argument that there is no undue burden on Apple if it's forced to build this system, which Apple calls GovtOS. It starts out by noting that the idea that Apple can just create the software for this one phone and delete it appears nonsensical when put in context:

Moreover, the government’s flawed suggestion to delete the program and erase every trace of the activity would not lessen the burden, it would actually increase it since there are hundreds of demands to create and utilize the software waiting in the wings..... If Apple creates new software to open a back door, other federal and state prosecutors—and other governments and agencies—will repeatedly seek orders compelling Apple to use the software to open the back door for tens of thousands of iPhones. Indeed, Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance, Jr., has made clear that the federal and state governments want access to every phone in a criminal investigation.... [Charlie Rose, Television Interview of Cyrus Vance (Feb. 18, 2016)] (Vance stating “absolutely” that he “want[s] access to all those phones that [he thinks] are crucial in a criminal proceeding”). This enormously intrusive burden—building everything up and tearing it down for each demand by law enforcement—lacks any support in the cases relied on by the government, nor do such cases exist.

The alternative—keeping and maintaining the compromised operating system and everything related to it—imposes a different but no less significant burden, i.e., forcing Apple to take on the task of unfailingly securing against disclosure or misappropriation the development and testing environments, equipment, codebase, documentation, and any other materials relating to the compromised operating system.... Given the millions of iPhones in use and the value of the data on them, criminals, terrorists, and hackers will no doubt view the code as a major prize and can be expected to go to considerable lengths to steal it, risking the security, safety, and privacy of customers whose lives are chronicled on their phones. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he term ‘cell phone’ is itself misleading shorthand; . . . these devices are in fact minicomputers” that “could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.”...By forcing Apple to write code to compromise its encryption defenses, the Order would impose substantial burdens not just on Apple, but on the public at large. And in the meantime, nimble and technologically savvy criminals will continue to use other encryption technologies, while the law-abiding public endures these threats to their security and personal liberties—an especially perverse form of unilateral disarmament in the war on terror and crime.

That last point is key. Criminals will still use other forms of encryption, while forcing Apple to do this harms everyone else by putting them more at risk.

Here Apple goes even deeper in questioning what are the limits to the All Writs Act:

For example, under the same legal theories advocated by the government here, the government could argue that it should be permitted to force citizens to do all manner of things “necessary” to assist it in enforcing the laws, like compelling a pharmaceutical company against its will to produce drugs needed to carry out a lethal injection in furtherance of a lawfully issued death warrant, or requiring a journalist to plant a false story in order to help lure out a fugitive, or forcing a software company to insert malicious code in its autoupdate process that makes it easier for the government to conduct court-ordered surveillance.

Next, Apple calls bullshit on the DOJ's claim that it absolutely needs Apple's help here. First, the FBI messed things up with the whole resetting iCloud password thing, and then what about the NSA? Why can't the NSA just hack in? That's what the following is saying in a more legalistic way:

... the government has failed to demonstrate that the requested order was absolutely necessary to effectuate the search warrant, including that it exhausted all other avenues for recovering information. Indeed, the FBI foreclosed one such avenue when, without consulting Apple or reviewing its public guidance regarding iOS, the government changed the iCloud password associated with an attacker’s account, thereby preventing the phone from initiating an automatic iCloud back-up.... Moreover, the government has not made any showing that it sought or received technical assistance from other federal agencies with expertise in digital forensics, which assistance might obviate the need to conscript Apple to create the back door it now seeks. See... (Judge Orenstein asking the government “to make a representation for purposes of the All Writs Act” as to whether the “entire Government,” including the “intelligence community,” did or did not have the capability to decrypt an iPhone, and the government responding that “federal prosecutors don’t have an obligation to consult the intelligence community in order to investigate crime”).

From there, we move onto the Constitutional arguments, which the court might not even address if it decides the All Writs Act doesn't apply. But, here, Apple starts with the First Amendment concerns of "compelled" speech.

Under well-settled law, computer code is treated as speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.... The Supreme Court has made clear that where, as here, the government seeks to compel speech, such action triggers First Amendment protections..... Compelled speech is a content-based restriction subject to exacting scrutiny... and so may only be upheld if it is narrowly tailored to obtain a compelling state interest....

The government cannot meet this standard here. Apple does not question the government’s legitimate and worthy interest in investigating and prosecuting terrorists, but here the government has produced nothing more than speculation that this iPhone might contain potentially relevant information... It is well known that terrorists and other criminals use highly sophisticated encryption techniques and readily available software applications, making it likely that any information on the phone lies behind several other layers of non-Apple encryption....

This argument feels a bit weakly supported. Then there's the Fifth Amendment argument, concerning due process:

In addition to violating the First Amendment, the government’s requested order, by conscripting a private party with an extraordinarily attenuated connection to the crime to do the government’s bidding in a way that is statutorily unauthorized, highly burdensome, and contrary to the party’s core principles, violates Apple’s substantive due process right to be free from “‘arbitrary deprivation of [its] liberty by government.’”

Again, this feels a bit weakly developed, but not surprisingly so. Apple is betting heavily that its main argument, concerning the All Writs Act not applying, will win the day (which seems to have a strong likelihood of being true). The Constitutional arguments are just being thrown in there so that they're in the case at this stage, and can then be raised on appeal, should it get to that level.

I imagine the DOJ will respond to this before long as well, so stay tuned (we certainly will).

Filed Under: all writs act, backdoors, compelled speech, doj, due process, encryption, fbi, fifth amendment, first amendment, iphone, san bernardino, syed farook
Companies: apple

The Way You Ask The Questions Matters: Reuters Poll Says People Support Apple Against FBI, But It's All In The Questions

from the stupid-questions,-stupid-answers dept

Earlier this week, we highlighted a questionable poll done by the Pew Research folks concerning the Apple/FBI fight, and noted that the actual questions it asked were wrong and misleading (and also leading...) and that resulted in fairly meaningless results, which were then spun by reporters into false claims that the public backed the FBI in this fight: And then, just days later, Reuters/Ipsos released a poll of its own, saying... basically the exact opposite, and it's being spun to claim that there is "Solid support for Apple in iPhone encryption fight." And, once again, the poll is basically meaningless when it comes to the actual issues in this case. You can read the details of the questions in the linked document, which shows that, before asking the key question, the pollsters asked a bunch of questions about whether or not people were willing to "give up privacy" to help the US government on a variety of things. And lots of people said no. These questions more or less framed the issue as one about protecting your own privacy -- as compared to the Pew poll that framed it more as being about investigating the San Bernardino attacks. Then after all those questions, the poll asks about the specifics of the Apple case, where they frame the question much more broadly than Pew's. Here's Reuters question:

Apple is opposing a court order to unlock a smart phone that was used by one of the shooters in the San Bernardino attack. Apple is concerned that if it helps the FBI this time, it will be forced to help the government in future cases that may not be linked to national security, opening the door for hackers and potential future data breaches for smartphone users. Do you agree or disagree with Apple’s decision to oppose the court order?

And, to refresh your memory, here's how Pew asked it:

As you may know, RANDOMIZE: [the FBI has said that accessing the iPhone is an important part of their ongoing investigation into the San Bernardino attacks] while [Apple has said that unlocking the iPhone could compromise the security of other users’ information] do you think Apple [READ; RANDOMIZE]?

(1) Should unlock the iPhone (2) Should not unlock the iPhone (3) Don't Know.

Notice that the Reuters/Ipsos version focuses solely on the downsides laid out by Apple, and not the supposed intent of the FBI. The Pew poll tries to "balance" the two. Meanwhile both polls get the basic facts wrong, because the request is not to "unlock a smart phone" because Apple cannot "unlock it." The actual ask is that it build a new operating system (which has some big challenges) that has purposely undermined two key security features on the iPhone, so that the FBI can then hack the passcode and access the phone. The specifics here matter and neither poll gets them right.

So while I, personally, think Apple is the one to support in this fight, I don't think either poll really says much about anything, other than that depending on how you word a poll, you can get very, very different results. That's really not particularly interesting as it pertains to the actual debate here. Stupid polls get stupid answers.

Filed Under: doj, fbi, iphone, polling, privacy, questions, security
Companies: apple, ipsos, pew research, reuters

How Existing Wiretapping Laws Could Save Apple From FBI's Broad Demands

from the calea-to-the-rescue? dept

There are all sorts of interesting (and frustrating and challenging) legal questions raised by the FBI's use of the All Writs Act to try to force Apple to build a system to allow the FBI to hack Apple's customers. But there's one interesting one raised by Albert Gidari that may cut through a lot of the "bigger" questions (especially the Constitutional ones that everyone leaps to) and just makes a pretty simple point: the DOJ is simply wrong that the All Writs Act applies here, rather than the existing wiretapping statute, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, or 47 USC 1002, better known by basically everyone as CALEA. CALEA is the law that some (including the DOJ) have wanted "updated" in ways that might force internet companies and mobile phone companies to make their devices more wiretap-ready. But that hasn't happened.

And, as Gidari points out, it seems clear that CALEA preempts the All Writs Act and explicitly forbids what the FBI is requesting here. The DOJ is claiming that CALEA doesn't apply to Apple:

Put simply, CALEA is entirely inapplicable to the present dispute [because] Apple is not acting as a telecommunications carrier, and the Order concerns access to stored data rather than real time interceptions and call-identifying information

But Gidari notes that's misrepresenting CALEA, which also does apply to "manufacturers and providers of telecommunications support services" and Apple could be seen as qualifying, since it's providing the "equipment" here. And then if CALEA, rather than the All Writs Act applies, the DOJ's argument is basically dead on arrival. As many have noted, CALEA already says that you can't force a provider to decrypt encrypted communications:

A telecommunications carrier shall not be responsible for decrypting, or ensuring the government’s ability to decrypt, any communication encrypted by a subscriber or customer, unless the encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses the information necessary to decrypt the communication.

Now, some may argue that in this case Apple "possesses the information necessary," but that's not actually the case. Apple doesn't possess the information necessary to decrypt. It's being asked to build a system that would let the FBI then hack the system to decrypt. And that's different. And on that point, there's this in CALEA as well:

(1) Design of features and systems configurations. This subchapter does not authorize any law enforcement agency or office

(a) to require any specific design of equipment, facilities, services, features, or system configurations to be adopted by any provider of a wire or electronic communication service, any manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, or any provider of telecommunications support services;

(b) to prohibit the adoption of any equipment, facility, service, or feature by any provider of a wire or electronic communication service, any manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, or any provider of telecommunications support services.

In a follow up post, Gidari looks at the legislative history of CALEA as well, and notes that it was a compromise between law enforcement (who wanted access to everything) and telcos (who didn't want to give that much access). And the end result was that CALEA was designed to be clear that, no, law enforcement can't always get anything, and certainly can't force companies to build new tools:

Indeed, Congress outright rejected the government’s initial CALEA proposal to actually prevent deployment of new technologies that didn’t have a wiretap back door. As Congress noted, “[t]his is the exact opposite of the original versions of the legislation, which would have barred introduction of services or features that could not be tapped.” In other words, Congress accepted the fact that some new technologies would put some evidence that law enforcement wanted, needed, and may have had access to in the past, beyond its reach in some cases.

Congress also determined that carriers would have no responsibility to decrypt encrypted communications unless the carrier provided the encryption and could in fact decrypt it. CALEA did not prohibit a carrier from deploying an encryption service for which it did not retain the ability to decrypt communications for law enforcement access, period. Here again, CALEA recognized that some evidence that may be necessary to an investigation will not be available to the government because it is encrypted and the provider lacks the key to access it.

So while CALEA provided law enforcement with some surveillance capabilities on phone networks (which the Federal Communications Commission later extended to broadband Internet access and two-way Voice over IP), it precluded the government from requiring “any specific design of equipment, facilities, services, features, or system configurations to be adopted by any manufacturer of telecommunications equipment.” Requiring Apple by court order to create and implement a work-around for the iPhone’s security features is, in fact, doing what CALEA prohibited.

While a big Constitutional battle may be more interesting (and more long lasting), it's possible that an argument like this one might win the actual lawsuit.

Of course, then the battle will shift back to Congress to try to update CALEA...

Filed Under: backdoors, calea, doj, encryption, fbi, hacking, iphone
Companies: apple

Remember When The FBI & NYPD Told People To Upgrade Their iPhones To Enable Stronger Security?

from the because-it-helps-stop-crime dept

Look, let's face facts here. For all the talk coming from the law enforcement community that they need backdoors into encryption to stop crime, they absolutely know that the reverse is true: strong encryption prevents crime. Lots of it. Strong encryption on phones makes stealing those phones a lot less worthwhile, because all the information on them is locked up. As we noted back in 2014, the FBI had a webpage advocating for mobile encryption to protect your phone's data: Of course, after that started to look inconvenient for the FBI, they quietly removed that page. I have a FOIA request in asking why, but the FBI has told me I shouldn't expect an answer for another year or two.

But it's not just the FBI. Trevor Timm alerts us to the amazing fact that just a couple of years ago, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) was literally roaming the streets, giving people fliers telling them to upgrade their iPhones to enable greater security features to protect against crime. Michael Hoffman tweeted a picture of the flier he received:

Four uniformed NYPD officers were at my subway stop tonight asking me to upgrade to iOS 7. Not a joke! pic.twitter.com/CGdR2RqtKJ

— Michael Hoffman (@Hoffm) September 21, 2013

If you can't read the flier, it says:

PUBLIC AWARENESS NOTICE
ATTENTION APPLE USERS!!!! As of Wednesday, September 18, 2013 the new iOS7 software update available for your Apple product brings added security to your devices.

By downloading the new operating system, should your device be lost or stolen it cannot be reprogrammed without an Apple ID and Password.

The download is FREE from Apple.

In other words, law enforcement in NYC absolutely knows that stronger security on phones prevents crime. And yet, Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance is running around pretending that these phones have created a crime wave in NY?

And, it appears that the data absolutely supports what the FBI and the NYPD apparently used to know, but are now pretending to forget. An article last summer by Kevin Bankston, laid out the details, noting that phone theft is a massive epidemic, with criminals swiping millions of phones -- and many of them then seeking to get access to the data on those phones. While the introduction of remote kill switches has helped reduce some of that, encryption is a much better solution.

So what happened? Did the FBI and NYPD really "forget" everything they knew two and a half years ago about encryption and how it stops crime?

Filed Under: encryption, fbi, iphone, nypd, security, theft
Companies: apple

Yes, The Backdoor That The FBI Is Requesting Can Work On Modern iPhones Too

from the beware dept

So... over the past couple days, plenty of folks (including us) have reported that the backdoor demanded by the FBI (and currently granted by a magistrate judge) would likely work on the older iPhone model in question, the iPhone 5C, but that it would not work on modern iPhones that have Apple's "Secure Enclave" -- basically a separate chip that stores the key. Plenty of reports -- including the Robert Graham post that we linked to, and a story by Bruce Schneier -- suggested that an attempt to follow through with the FBI's request in the presence of the Secure Enclave would effectively eliminate the key and make decryption nearly impossible.

However, earlier this morning Apple started telling a bunch of people, including reporters, that this is not true. Effectively they're saying that, yes, the new software could update the Secure Enclave firmware and keep the key intact -- meaning that this backdoor absolutely can be used against modern iPhones. One of the guys who helped design the whole Secure Enclave setup in the first place, John Kelley, has basically said the same thing, admitting that updating the firmware will not delete the key:

@AriX Not true, if Apple can be forced to modify iOS, they can be forced to modify SEP firmware as well. @trailofbits has SEP details wrong

— John Kelley (@JohnHedge) February 17, 2016

@AriX I have no clue where they got the idea that changing SPE firmware will destroy keys. SPE FW is just a signed blob on iOS System Part

— John Kelley (@JohnHedge) February 17, 2016

A blog post by Dan Guido -- which originally asserted that the Secure Enclave would be wiped on update -- now admits that's not true and, yes, this backdoor likely works on modern iPhones as well:

Apple can update the SE firmware, it does not require the phone passcode, and it does not wipe user data on update. Apple can disable the passcode delay and disable auto erase with a firmware update to the SE. After all, Apple has updated the SE with increased delays between passcode attempts and no phones were wiped.

I've asked some security folks if it's possible that future iPhones could be designed to work the way people thought the Secure Enclave worked, and the basic answer appears to be "that's a fairly difficult problem." People have some ideas of how it might work, but all came back with reasons why it might not. I asked one security expert if there was a way for Apple to build a more secure version that was immune to such an FBI request, and the response was: "I don't know. I sure hope so."

Update: I should add that this backdoor still just makes it easier for the FBI to then try to brute force a user's PIN or passcode. If the user sets a significantly strong passcode, you have a better chance of protecting your data, but that's on the user (and, also, many users likely find it hellishly inconvenient to have a strong passcode on their phone).

Filed Under: backdoors, crypto, doj, encryption, fbi, going dark, iphone, secure enclave
Companies: apple

White House Is Either Lying About Apple Order Or Doesn't Understand What A Backdoor Is

from the semantic-bullshit dept

During a White House press briefing on Wednesday, Press Secretary Josh Earnest apparently kept brushing aside questions about the order to Apple to remove certain security features that would enable the FBI to brute force the passcode and decrypt the contents of Syed Farook's iPhone. However, eventually he insisted that the DOJ is not asking for a backdoor:

In a briefing with reporters, White House spokesman Josh Earnest deferred to the Justice Department but said it's important to recognize that the government is not asking Apple to redesign its product or "create a new backdoor to its products."

Earnest said the case was instead about federal investigators learning "as much as they can about this one case."

But that's bullshit -- and thankfully, at least some in the media are pointing this out.

As FBI Director James Comey has done saying he wants "front doors" rather than "back doors," the White House is playing word games that suggest they're either being deliberately misleading or they don't understand the basics of what's happening. Neither scenario makes the White House look very good.

The application and the order absolutely are about forcing Apple to create a backdoor. It is a specific backdoor, but the whole point is to undermine key security features that protect the users of the devices. The fact that it would just be targeted towards this one phone is basically meaningless in this context. The issue is that a court can order a tech company to deliberately undermine its own security and expose content on a device. That's a backdoor.

And, importantly, it's a backdoor that other countries will demand as well. China has already been using the US "debate" over backdooring encryption to support its own demands for backdoored encryption, and the results of this legal fight will absolutely be used by plenty of authoritarian countries to argue that they, too, can demand such backdoors.

As the NY Times notes, China is quite interested in this particular fight:

China is watching the dispute closely. Analysts say that the Chinese government does take cues from the United States when it comes to encryption regulations, and that it would most likely demand that multinational companies provide accommodations similar to those in the United States.

Last year, Beijing backed off several proposals that would have mandated that foreign firms provide encryption keys for devices sold in China after heavy pressure from foreign trade groups. Nonetheless, a Chinese antiterrorism law passed in December required foreign firms to hand over technical information and to aid with decryption when the police demand it in terrorism-related cases.

Any move towards deliberately forcing tech companies to undermine security and privacy protections for users absolutely is a backdoor and will be used by countries with much less regard for the privacy of its citizenry.

Filed Under: backdoor, doj, encryption, fbi, going dark, iphone, josh earnets, white house
Companies: apple

Apple Responds To Order To Help Decrypt Phone, As More Details Come To Light

from the both-not-as-bad-and-just-as-bad dept

Update: Please see our more recent article detailing why it appears that this attack could apply to more modern iPhones as well.

Last night, we wrote about a judge's order commanding Apple to help the FBI effectively decrypt the contents of Syed Farook's iPhone 5C. Farook, of course, along with his wife, was responsible for the San Bernardino attacks a few months ago. Many of the initial reports about the order suggested that it simply ordered Apple to break the encryption -- which made many people scoff. However, as we noted, that was not accurate. Instead, it was ordering something much more specific: that Apple create a special firmware that would disable two distinct security features within iOS -- one that would effectively wipe the encrypted contents following 10 failed attempts at entering the unlocking PIN (by throwing away the stored decryption key) and a second one that would progressively slow down the amount of time between repeated attempts at entering the PIN.

Late last night, Apple's Tim Cook also posted a very direct Message to Our Customers that highlights the importance of strong encryption and why this order is such a problem (some of which we'll discuss below).

Compromising the security of our personal information can ultimately put our personal safety at risk. That is why encryption has become so important to all of us.

For many years, we have used encryption to protect our customers’ personal data because we believe it’s the only way to keep their information safe. We have even put that data out of our own reach, because we believe the contents of your iPhone are none of our business.

He notes -- as I did in my original post -- that the FBI is demanding (and the court has agreed) to force Apple to create a backdoor and that creates a number of concerns:

Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. In the wrong hands, this software — which does not exist today — would have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession.

The FBI may use different words to describe this tool, but make no mistake: Building a version of iOS that bypasses security in this way would undeniably create a backdoor. And while the government may argue that its use would be limited to this case, there is no way to guarantee such control.

Some would argue that building a backdoor for just one iPhone is a simple, clean-cut solution. But it ignores both the basics of digital security and the significance of what the government is demanding in this case.

In today’s digital world, the “key” to an encrypted system is a piece of information that unlocks the data, and it is only as secure as the protections around it. Once the information is known, or a way to bypass the code is revealed, the encryption can be defeated by anyone with that knowledge.

The government suggests this tool could only be used once, on one phone. But that’s simply not true. Once created, the technique could be used over and over again, on any number of devices. In the physical world, it would be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks — from restaurants and banks to stores and homes. No reasonable person would find that acceptable.

Having spent a bunch of time overnight reading through the details of the DOJ's original application, as well as reading through a few public discussions by security experts and, especially, Robert Graham's useful thoughts about the order as well, I have some further thoughts -- including that I think Cook may be slightly overstating his case with his comments, because it's not actually clear that the backdoor the FBI is asking for would actually work on most modern iPhones, though it might work on older phones. However, the larger concerns about the order are still very much valid.

1. One of the concerns I raised last night was probably inaccurate: that this could force Apple into creating a tool that would put many people's privacy at risk. The order does seem fairly specific to just this phone. Yes, as Cook notes, if Apple is forced to do this and Apple does it successfully, that would open up similar orders for other phones, but the impact of that may be somewhat limited in that it only applies to older phones, and quite possibly older iPhones that have not updated their operating systems.
2. It does seem clear that if this were a newer iPhone, which includes Apple's "Security Enclave" system, this request would likely be impossible to meet. It's quite interesting to read the details of how Apple's security now works, where the Security Enclave basically cuts off this possibility, because the firmware update itself would wipe out the encryption key, effectively making it impossible to decrypt the content. It's also possible that even in the older phone this order is still impossible, if the operating system was properly updated -- in part because they may not be able to update the firmware without putting in the passcode, which is the problem they want this new firmware to solve.
3. I keep seeing people say "why can't they just copy the contents of the memory and brute force it elsewhere" but that's not possible with the iPhone, since a part of the key comes from the hardware itself, and there doesn't appear to be any way to extract it (and Apple does not keep it).
4. The whole focus seems to be on allowing the FBI to bruteforce the passcode, which is in the realm of possibility should the two impediments above be removed, as opposed to bruteforce cracking AES encryption, which is not currently in the realm of possibility.

Graham disagrees with me over whether this is about decrypting or a backdoor -- but to some extent that's just semantics (and Cook agrees with me that it's a backdoor). They're not asking for a systemwide backdoor -- and, indeed, it appears this approach wouldn't work at all with more recent iPhones. However, the reason I focused on a backdoor, rather than direct decryption, is that the way most people were discussing "decryption" indicated that they seemed to think the court was ordering the impossible, which was "crack the keys you don't have access to." Instead, they are asking for a backdoor -- just a narrow one that can only be used for this phone and would be ineffective against most modern iPhones. And then that backdoor will be used to brute force the passcode, which would then decrypt the content of Farook's iPhone.

That said, there are still serious concerns. While the DOJ insists that its use of the 18th Century All Writs Act in this case is pretty ordinary and standard, they're exaggerating in the extreme. Some of the previous examples they discuss do include requirements to use certain machinery in order to execute a warrant, but that's quite different from ordering Apple to write entirely new software. The DOJ again insists that there are examples of All Writs Act requests in the past that have required software, but it's notable that when the DOJ says this, it does not immediately cite any cases, but rather says just that sometimes providers have to "write code in order to gather information in response to subpoenas or other process." There's a pretty big difference between writing some scraping or search code, which this implies, and creating a special firmware as the DOJ is asking for in this case.

Also, as Cook notes, the unprecedented nature of this is that it's not at all similar to previous cases, because this would involve actively undermining the security of devices, rather than just helping to gather information that is readily available.

In fact, even more ridiculous is the idea, as laid out in the DOJ's application for this order, that this will not be burdensome to Apple simply because Apple writes software:

While the order in this case requires Apple to provide modified software, modifying an operating system - writing software code - is not an unreasonable burden for a company that writes software code as part of its regular business.

Uh, yeah, it can be when what you're asking for is fairly complex and may not even be possible depending on the specifics of the way the security in the iPhone 5C is designed. And, seriously, just saying "Apple writes software, therefore any request for it to write software is not burdensome" is ridiculous on its face.

There's a separate question, raised by people such as Chris Soghoian, about whether or not this particular use of the All Writs Act to force Apple to use its code signing keys to "sign" this new firmware violates the First Amendment in compelling speech. It will be interesting to see if Apple raises this issue in its inevitable appeal of the order.

In the end, this is both a big deal and potentially not a big deal. It's a big deal in that after a few previous attempts to use the All Writs Act to force Apple to "decrypt" content on a phone, a court has not only done so, but done so with fairly specific instructions on what Apple has to do to create a very specific bit of software that removes a couple security features. That raises a bunch of legal questions, that I would imagine Apple will quickly raise in response as well. However, from a technological standpoint, it appears that many of these questions will soon be moot, so long as people have more modern and updated phones. But the bigger concern, as Cook notes, is the precedent here that a court can order, at the behest of the FBI, that a tech company undermine the security of a device. As he notes, once you start down that slippery slope it's not hard to see where that can lead:

The implications of the government’s demands are chilling. If the government can use the All Writs Act to make it easier to unlock your iPhone, it would have the power to reach into anyone’s device to capture their data. The government could extend this breach of privacy and demand that Apple build surveillance software to intercept your messages, access your health records or financial data, track your location, or even access your phone’s microphone or camera without your knowledge.

This particular legal battle is going to get very, very interesting.

Filed Under: all writs act, backdoors, decryption, doj, encryption, fbi, going dark, iphone, syed farook, tim cook
Companies: apple

Idiot Phone Thief Uploads His Selfies, Plural, To His Victim's iCloud Account

from the face-time dept

Earlier this year, I wrote about a dumb criminal who reportedly broke into someone's home and incriminated himself by taking a selfie with his victim's phone. Our always helpful community did the digging they so dig to do and uncovered that the story had since been debunked. Many of you must have thought that this should have been obvious. After all, some of you surely thought, even the most idiotic bad guys aren't going to go out of their way to photograph themselves in the midst of committing their crimes.

Ah, sweet vindication is such a wonderful side-dish in a main course of schadenfreude. Not only has a recent dumb criminal proved he's perfectly willing to take a selfie with a phone he stole from his victim, but he's been taking multiple selfies. All these self-incriminating bits of narcissism are, of course, being uploaded to the victim's iCloud account and are currently being shared by police, who I imagine are also rolling around on the ground laughing.

Police in Stockton, Calif. are sharing the photo of a man they say stole a victim's iPhone. The police have identified the man because he's continued to take selfie photos that show up on the victim's iCloud account.

Oh, yes, and there have been all kinds of follow up reports on this, indicating that I won't be getting egg on my face this go around. In the meantime, the police are of course blasting this wonderful gentleman's self-portrait all over social media and local news. I expect he'll be in custody shortly, if he isn't already. Look now upon the face of a mastermind.

And, as I said, the selfies reportedly are still rolling in. Here's to our unnamed phone thief getting a nice, big mirror in his holding cell.

Filed Under: cloud, criminals, icloud, iphone, selfies, thief

DailyDirt: Hmm.That's Not Really Chinese

from the urls-we-dig-up dept

The Chinese get credit for a lot of things: fireworks, the printing press, bird flu (do not want).... But some things that everyone thinks are Chinese, aren't really Chinese. Here are just a few examples.

• There's a nine-note melody that immediately signals a Chinese (or generic Asian) stereotype, but where did it come from? Prof Charles Hiroshi Garrett and other curious internet detectives try to track down the origins of this oriental riff, finding that it's not actually Chinese and could be heard in 1847 in a show called The Grand Chinese Spectacle of Aladdin, or The Wonderful Lamp. [url]
• Chinese food in the US frequently comes with a fortune cookie, but those little desserts actually originated in 19th-century Japan. Fortune cookies were once sold in Japanese confectionery shops in San Francisco before WWII, but then, uh, Japanese Americans were taken away and Chinese businesses took over the fortune cookie industry. [url]
• The common knowledge is that iPhones are made in China, but technically, the devices are mostly just assembled there. Of the estimated $178.96 wholesale cost of an iPhone, only about 3.6%, or $6.50 of assembly is done in China. The iPhone is obviously sold (and designed) by an entirely US company, and its components are made in several different Asian and European countries. [url]

If you'd like to read more awesome and interesting stuff, check out this unrelated (but not entirely random!) Techdirt post via StumbleUpon.

Filed Under: asian, chinese, chinese food, fake, fortune cookies, iphone, japanese, melody, oriental riff, stereotype

NYPD Officers Expect Public To Be Stupider Than They Are; Justify Shutting Down Recording With 'iPhones Are Guns' Claim

from the you-can't-fix-stupid,-you-can-only-assign-it-to-desk-duty dept

When the appeal to authority fallacy doesn't work, try appealing to ludicrousness. That seems to be the M.O. in play here. NYPD officers arrested a bicyclist for running a red light, but that arrest wasn't effected until the bicyclist attempted to film the interaction. Here's all ten seconds of it before the cop shut the arrestee's impromptu shooting down.

Will Paybarah, the scofflaw in question, received this memorable explanation for the hasty neutralizing of his iPhone while sitting in the back seat of the unmarked squad car.

I was told by another officer while in the car that recording a police officer was illegal because people are using iPhones as guns and shooting cops through the camera lens...I told him that I have the right to be recording a cop and he said that there were incidents, specifically in uptown Manhattan where a kid shot a cop with his iPhone. Straight face. Very serious.

Now, it's true that recording footage is often slangily referred as "shooting footage," and that cops are increasingly on the receiving end of these types of "shootings." But there has yet to be any evidence produced that indicates phones and cameras are being converted into guns on any sort of mass scale or that these new hybrids are so common that this "fear" has a rational basis.

A kid may have "shot" a cop with his iPhone, but without any data to back up this claim, the only thing taking a hit was the officer's mistaken belief that public service is afforded an expectation of privacy. Cops telling citizens this sort of cop-centric urban legend to defend the trampling of the First Amendment indicates that they believe citizens are idiots.

Paybarah, meanwhile, spent 13 hours in lockup over a red light infraction. Well, not entirely. By the time the cop was finished effecting the arrest of the person holding the theoretically weaponized iPhone, charges of resisting arrest, obstruction and criminal mischief had been added -- charges that are just as malleable as cops' minds.

Cops walk or drive by plenty of people holding "weapons" in plain sight, all of them unlicensed and potentially deadly. An overwhelming majority of the public wouldn't even consider leaving the house without being "strapped," and yet, months and years go by without cops being shot in the face by iGuns. Perhaps the police chalk up this low rate of deadly incidents to their expedient neutralization of camera gun wielders. The price of freedom is eternal vigilance and all that, and the cops can't be expected to protect the freedoms they'll take from you if they're constantly being "shot" by armed citizens.

Better safe than sorry -- that's the real intent of the Constitution. An officer getting home safe (and unrecorded) at the end of every shift is a far worthier goal than the vague rights pre-supposed to idiot citizens by a handful of amendments.

Maybe the cops should switch out their service pieces for deadly cameras -- you know, in order to keep up with "the streets" in the arms race. That way, the next time they get drunk and start shooting, the end result will be nothing more than a bunch of shitty Instagrams.

Filed Under: filming police, guns, iphone, nypd, phones