Judge Benchslaps Cops And Courts For Turning Law Enforcement Lies Into 'Objectively Reasonable' Mistakes

from the probable-cause-of-one's-own dept

It's always fun to read a good benchslap of cops who've tried to turn nothing at all into "probable cause." It doesn't happen very often because courts are far too obliging far too often. The standard law enforcement officers are held to -- objective reasonableness -- rarely seems reasonable, no matter how objectively you approach it.

This ruling [PDF] by a Florida federal court does not coddle the officer who made a mockery of both objective reasonableness and probable cause. You can tell this is headed into unconstitutional territory during the recounting of the events that led to the arrest of Jorge Sanchez. (via FourthAmendment.com)

Local officers were working with the DEA on a drug trafficking investigation. They decided to pull over someone heading away from the house they were surveilling. But the officers had nothing approaching probable cause. All they had was someone driving away from a house they suspected might be tied to drug sales. But that wasn't going to stop them from stopping Sanchez. So, they did what they had to do.

Deputy Steuerwald asked Sgt. Beuer to “develop his own probable cause and conduct a traffic stop on the car.”

This would be a lot more shocking if it wasn't nearly pretty much every pretextual stop ever. You can't fish unless you have someone else's (drivers) license in your hand, so any real or imagined traffic violation will do. Only this one was so imaginary the court's not having any of it.

Sgt. Beuer did so—or at least he thought he did (more on this later)—and pulled Sanchez over for violating the Florida “stop bar” statute.

The "more on this later" is the best part of the suppression order. The bogus stop led to a search of the vehicle and the arrest of Sanchez. None of that matters any more because Sgt. Beuer was objectively awful at creating probable cause.

The state's stop bar statute says this:

[E]very driver of a vehicle approaching a stop intersection indicated by a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering the intersection.

And here's what Sgt. Beuer testified Sanchez had done:

At the hearing, Sgt. Beuer identified this intersection and confirmed that Sanchez brought his vehicle to a complete stop at a position in relation to the stop sign as depicted in this photo.

There's no stop bar on the road and the vehicle is stopped "where the driver has a view of approaching traffic."

The government said Sgt. Beuer's lie was reasonable enough to generate probable cause for a stop. The court disagrees, using evidence Beuer agreed was true, as well as his own testimony about the stop.

While generally familiar with stop bars, and believing them to be fairly ubiquitous, Sgt. Beuer acknowledged he was not overly familiar with this area of Rockledge, Florida. (Doc. 30.) But Sgt. Beuer had walked back and forth on Skelly Drive at or near the intersection with Florida Avenue, so he had an opportunity to view the road surface condition and the general “lay of the land,” both in his vehicle and on foot.

Looking at the photographic evidence, which Sgt. Beuer accepts as properly depicting the scene (Doc. 31-5; Doc. 32-8, p. 8), it is difficult to imagine how a motorist might, at this particularly odd intersection, have any ability to see oncoming traffic from the left if stopped anywhere short of the point where Sgt. Beuer concedes Sanchez stopped his vehicle on this night. An added stop bar would have made the situation worse from a safety perspective.

This isn't even subjectively reasonable, says the court.

In short, it was not objectively reasonable for Sgt. Beuer to believe that Sanchez violated Florida Statute § 316.123 by failing to stop at a stop bar that not only was not there, but where there was nothing about this intersection to suggest it would be there—quite the contrary. When you add the fact that Sgt. Beuer actually traversed the area on foot, the reasonableness of his predication is further undermined.

Now, here's where the order gets really good. The court not only slaps the government, but judges who are far too willing to overlook blatant Constitutional violations by law enforcement officers because it's presumably too difficult to do police work and respect rights at the same time.

If these facts qualify as “objectively reasonable”, then the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable search and seizure is simply not applicable to a pretextual traffic stop. The Court should stop imbuing the “objectively reasonable” officer with a cloak of constitutional comfort for justifications that strain credulity and discount the facts out of deference to their necessary “game time decisions”. See Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1276. While deference is a necessary component of the analysis, it does not warrant a rubber stamp. The Fourth Amendment still has some teeth in a traffic stop.

Courts are supposed to act as a bulwark against government overreach, not as an enabler of unconstitutional behavior. But qualified immunity, the good faith exception, and other defenses cops can raise when accused of illegal behavior -- defenses that aren't available to citizens -- have turned the courts into an entity that rarely allows for the actual redress of grievances.

Filed Under: benchslap, dea, florida, law enforcement, objectively reasonable, police, probable cause

Slow-Played Benchslap Order Just Keeps Getting Better

from the building-up dept

There are two schools of thought on drafting a benchslap. One method involves laying out the most egregious behavior of the target right up front to set the tone for the scathing punishment to follow. The other, subtler method involves slow-playing the transgressions in a glorious crescendo of suspect conduct.

Senior Judge Victor Musleh of the 5th Judicial Circuit in Lake County, Florida ascribes to the latter school. When his February 28th order in Wells Fargo v. Granger hit the ATL tips inbox, I thought it was a mild story. But this page-turner of an order raised the stakes with each paragraph….

The subject of Judge Musleh’s order is Mark Stopa of the Stopa Law Firm (and a Fantasy Sports guru). From the first page, Judge Musleh lets the reader know that there are “many” problems in this case, but singles out a straight-forward technical issue as though it’s the most troubling.

As a preliminary matter, this Court finds that Defendants’ Motion is in many respects misleading, insulting, and contains too many falsehoods to list. However, one aspect that is especially troubling to the Court is that Defense Counsel has signed his name as a member of The Florida Bar to a Motion that he purports to be verified by Defendant Jeffrey Granger. Defendant Granger has averred under penalty of perjury that the facts in the Motion are true and correct, and yet Defendant Granger Was not present for the events in question, either in person or via telephone, and thus has no personal knowledge of What took place. It is therefore impossible for Defendant Granger to swear to the veracity of the Motion and has subjected himself, through counsel’s misguided need to verify his Motion, to a charge of perjury at most and sanctions detrimental to his ease for misleading this Court, at the very least.

Signing a document that purports to be verified when it’s not is a transgression, but nothing too exciting. I almost stopped reading here. But that would have been a mistake.

Defense counsel Stopa apparently believes that this Court is able to conjure a written Order of denial on rulings out of thin air as he asked for a written Order on his denied Motions in order to pursue appellate relief and now complains that the Court did not accommodate him.

Feel the snark dripping off the page. But still this is pretty standard slap-fighting so far. But then the order points out that Stopa got belligerent in a hearing. And here’s the follow-up:

Mr. Stopa then launched into an argument regarding the courtroom facilities and the fact that he was denied entrance to the court proceedings prior to being called for the instant case. Prior to calling the case, the undersigned judge and court personnel could hear loud banging on the door outside the conference room where the proceedings were being held and a loud voice demanding entry.

This is a full-on freak out. In a courthouse. Banging on doors and petulantly complaining that the facilities are not up to his standards. Judges can begin to feel a little too high and mighty, but they are entitled to expect that the lawyers won’t bang on the doors of the courtroom and kvetch about the decor.

Even more egregious than the falsehoods perpetuated in his Motion regarding the court proceedings are Mr. Stopa’s allegations that the undersigned “physically assaulted” him.

Now, most people would have led with that part of the story, but Judge Musleh is a goddamned master storyteller.

These are serious allegations whose purpose is unknown other than to discredit the reputation of a member of the judiciary, whose rulings he did not appreciate. Unlike his allegations, Mr. Stopa did not remain in his chair and speak in a normal tone of voice. He rose from his seat and addressed the court in a loud, arrogant, and extremely uncivil tone. He had to be warned by the court bailiff to calm down. As court had been in session for approximately four hours with only a minute break, the undersigned did rise, walk around the conference table in Mr. Stopa’s direction in order to stretch his legs, and intended to leave the room. But due to Mr. Stopa’s continuing diatribe, the undersigned circled the table and returned to his seat. While the undersigned may have pointed a finger in Mr. Stopa’s direction from several feet away while attempting to answer Mr. Stopa’s outbursts, in no way did the Court physically assault Mr. Stopa or prevent him from leaving the room. The allegations of physical assault and intimidation are preposterous and untrue.

The real kicker to this whole order is that Judge Musleh had already recused himself from the case. But Stopa refused to wait to receive notice of the Judge’s recusal and filed his motion to disqualify in the interim, prompting Judge Musleh to fire off this order that concludes by dismissing Stopa’s motion as moot.

And that’s really the most satisfying moment. When you realize the Judge went to all this trouble, not because he had to, but because he really thought the lawyer deserved it.

Order Responding To Renewed Verified Motion To Disqualify [Wells Fargo v. Granger, 5th Judicial Circuit, Florida]

More stories from Above The Law:

• Not Even Robots Want To Go To Jury Duty!
• Why The ABA Is Resistant To Change
• How Much Does It Cost To Name ALL THE THINGS At A Law School?

Filed Under: benchslap, judges

Benchslapping Judge... Benchslapped By Higher Judge

from the judgefight! dept

Well, well. We recently wrote about how district court judge Sam Sparks was attracting some attention for his rather humorous, but caustic, "benchslaps" of lawyers whom he felt were misbehaving, including inviting them to a sarcastically named "kindergarten party." We, like others, did wonder if perhaps the judge was going too far. Apparently, some of his superiors felt the same way. After the story showed up on various blogs, the chief judge of the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Edith Jones, who oversees Sparks' district, sent him a private email, which has now been leaked, scolding him for his benchslappings:

"Dear Sam, It has not escaped my attention, or that of my colleagues or, I am told, nationally known blog sites that you have issued several 'cute' orders in the past few weeks. The order attached below is the most recent. Frankly, this kind of rhetoric is not funny. In fact, it is so caustic, demeaning, and gratuitous that it casts more disrespect on the judiciary than on the now-besmirched reputation of the counsel. It suggests either that the judge is simply indulging himself at the expense of counsel or that he is fighting with counsel in what, as Judge Gee used to say, is surely not a fair contest. It suggests bias against counsel. No doubt, none of us has been consistently above reproach in our professional communications with counsel. We are all prone to human error. But no judge who writes an order should allow such rhetoric to overcome common sense. Ultimately, this kind of excess, as I noted, reflects badly on all of us. I urge you to think before you write. Sincerely, Edith Jones."

Consider the benchslapper benchslapped. Though, I disagree on one point. It was pretty funny, even if it may not have been appropriate.

Filed Under: benchslap, edith jones, judges, sam sparks

Benchslapped: Judge Invites Lawyers To 'Kindergarten Party' To Learn How To Be A Lawyer

from the ouch dept

Judge Sam Sparks of the US District Court in Western Texas (not the patent troll haven of Eastern Texas) apparently has quite a way with words when it comes to criticizing lawyers for questionable activities in his court. As the folks at AboveTheLaw like to put it, he's the "king of the benchslaps." One of his more recent such benchslaps is really worth reading. Via Paul Alan Levy, we learn that Judge Sparks was apparently displeased about the actions of some lawyers and decided to invite them to a "kindergarten party."
In case you can't read it, the relevant part:

Greetings and Salutations!

You are invited to a kindergarten party on THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 2011, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2 of the United States Courthouse, 200 W. Eighth Street, Austin, Texas.

The party will feature many exciting and informative lessons, including:

• How to telephone and communicate with a lawyer
• How to enter into reasonable agreements about deposition dates
• How to limit depositions to reasonable subject matter
• Why it is neither cute nor clever to attempt to quash a subpoena for technical failures of service when notice is reasonably given; and
• An advanced seminar on not wasting the time of a busy federal judge and his staff because you are unable to practice law at the level of a first year law student.

Invitation to this exclusive event is not RSVP. Please remember to bring a sack lunch! The United States Marshals have beds available if necessary, so you may wish to bring a toothbrush in case the party runs late.

Of course, while incredibly amusing, David Lat does ask if this goes too far:

Has Judge Sparks gone too far? Is he being too hard on lawyers for, well, doing what lawyers do?

And is Judge Sparks’s snark excessive? Don’t get us wrong; it’s amusing to compare lawyers to kindergarteners — which Judge Sparks has been doing since 2004 (subscription). But is Judge Sparks trying too hard to entertain? These are judicial orders, not blog posts (where snark and entertainment are welcome).

On the other hand, and in defense of Judge Sparks, judicial orders and opinions can be pretty dry and boring. Can you fault a judge for trying to make them more engaging?

It's a good question. I really don't have much of a problem with a little snark and humor in a judicial order -- especially if lawyers are being particularly ridiculous. But, there is certainly the risk that the attention these kinds of orders get only encourages judges to use them when it's not particularly appropriate. Assuming that a judge like Judge Sparks knows when it's time to break out the benchslap and when to keep it reined in, I don't see anything wrong with it.

Filed Under: benchslap, judges, lawyers, sam sparks