Police Just Found Phone & USB Stick Belonging To Paris Suicide Bomber, After Misplacing It For Almost Two Years

from the but-encryption-is-the-problem dept

Remember how, right after the Paris bombings, people started blaming encryption for the attacks, despite the fact it was later revealed that most of the planning was done in the open and communication occurred via unencrypted SMS messages? As we noted, it seemed pretty clear that the bombings were an intelligence and law enforcement failure rather than an encryption problem.

Now, just to add more evidence to that conclusion in the most ridiculous way possible, apparently Brussels police just found a mobile phone and USB stick that had belonged to one of the suicide bombers in the Paris attacks, Brahim Abdeslam. The police had seized the phone and USB stick during a drug raid back in February of 2015... and promptly misplaced them entirely. They were found under a stack of papers. Really.

A cell phone belonging to Paris attacks suicide bomber Brahim Abdeslam that had been mislaid by Belgian police was found under a pile of documents in a Molenbeek police station, local media reported Tuesday.

Officers seized the phone and a USB stick belonging to Abdeslam during a drugs raid in Brussels in February 2015. Following the November 2015 attacks in Paris, authorities wanted to analyze the phone for details about the terror plot, but it could not be found.

According to local media, the phone was found by chance last week in Molenbeek, the area of Brussels where Abdeslam and others involved in the Paris and Brussels attacks lived.

And yet people want to blame encryption. And, yes, of course police make mistakes and misplace stuff, but perhaps law enforcement should be focused on trying to prevent those kinds of things by being more careful in how they handle evidence before they rush off to blame things like encryption.

This all gets back to a larger point that we've tried to make all along about the whole "going dark" thing: good police detective work will almost always beat out merely breaking into phones. Encryption is useful in protecting messages, but it doesn't hide all activity -- and those who are planning criminal or terrorist attacks quite frequently leave lots of other evidence around. Blaming encryption, rather than law enforcement and intelligence efforts, is a lazy solution. It's a way to cover up for a failure to do their jobs with the already quite powerful tools they have at their disposal.

Filed Under: brussels, encryption, going dark, law enforcement, lost, police

Brussels Terrorist Laptop Included Details Of Planned Attack In Unencrypted Folder Titled 'Target'

from the but-ban-encryption! dept

As the push to backdoor or ban encryption heats up, kneejerk politicians have rushed to embrace each and every recent attack and to immediately point fingers at encryption. Right after the Paris attacks, politicians started blaming encryption, even though evidence suggested they communicated by unencrypted SMS. Even months later, the press was ridiculously using the total lack of evidence of any encryption... as evidence of encryption. Then with the Brussels attacks from a few weeks ago politicians like Rep. Adam Schiff immediately tried to blame encryption insisting that "we can be sure that terrorists will continue to use what they perceive to be the most secure means to plot their attacks."

Of course, now it's being reported that a laptop seized from one of the suicide bombers in Brussels shows little attempt to actually hide plans of attacks. In fact, it showed that attack plans were kept in an unencrypted folder titled "Target." And the only attempt to "hide" it was that the computer had been thrown in the trash.

The bomber referred to striking Britain, the La Defense business district in Paris, and the ultra-conservative Catholic organisation, Civitas, in a folder titled “Target,” written in English, according to the source.

The laptop was found in the trash by police in Brussels shortly after the suicide bombings on March 22 that killed 32 people at the city’s airport and on a Metro train.

I'm wondering if Rep. Adam Schiff will now talk about the need to ban "folders" in operating systems?

Filed Under: attacks, brussels, encryption

Not 'Going Dark': 15 Out Of 15 Most Recent EU Terrorists Were Known To The Authorities In Multiple Ways

from the sure,-mass-surveillance-doesn't-work,-but-think-of-the-money-we-are-saving dept

Important information about recent terrorist attacks in Europe continues to emerge. Here's the latest news from Brussels, as reported by the Guardian:

Plans and photographs of the home and office of Belgium's prime minister, Charles Michel, have been found on a computer abandoned near a terrorist hideout in Brussels, according to Belgian sources.

The laptop was found in a bin near a flat in the Schaerbeek district that had been a makeshift bomb factory for the terrorists who killed 32 people and injured at least 340 in last week's suicide bombings at Brussels airport and the city metro.

Not unnaturally, perhaps, most commentary has been about the fact that Belgium's prime minister was apparently being considered as a target. But there's something else in this story that's interesting, not least because it's not explicit. The Belgian sources for this story have revealed that "plans and a photograph" were found on a computer. Assuming the laptop did indeed belong to the terrorists, that means one of two things: either the system did not use encryption at all, or that it was possible to bypass the protection. In either case, it looks like this is yet another demonstration that things are not "going dark" when it comes to terrorism, despite continued claims to the contrary.

Given how details about the attackers are coming through very sporadically, it can be hard to see the bigger picture. To address that issue, the German journalist Sascha Lobo has pulled together all the information he could find about lethal terrorist attacks carried out by Islamists over the last two years in Europe. Specifically, these were the attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014; the Paris attack on Charlie Hebdo and a Jewish supermarket in 2015; the attack on a cultural center and synagogue in Copenhagen in 2015; the second attack in Paris in November last year; and the recent attacks in Brussels.

The results of his research appear in the German news magazine Der Spiegel, but fortunately he has produced a tabulated form (with references) that doesn't require any knowledge of the German language to grasp. A glance is enough to see that every single one of the 15 attackers who have been identified was known to the authorities, often for multiple reasons. Indeed, as Lobo writes, it's even worse than it seems at first sight:

All 15 identified attackers were on terror warning lists or "Islamist instigator" lists in at least one European country. In addition, most were on other lists, such as no-fly lists. All 15 had been classified as violence-prone. 14 had known contacts with other radical Islamists (one of them was apparently radicalized only via the Internet). Twelve had taken trips to the "Islamic State" in Syria, or to al-Qaida in Iraq or Yemen. Ten had criminal records, most of them for violent crimes.

This is not a terrifying world where things are "going dark" for the authorities. This is not a situation where strong crypto made it impossible to know who was doing what. This is a world of persistent failure by the intelligence agencies and police to use the information they already had at their disposal. This is a world that wants to shift the blame to evil encryption, rather than admit that mass surveillance doesn't work, and is the wrong approach. Lobo offers a plausible explanation why this is still happening, despite the manifest inability of blanket snooping to spot obvious connections and use them to stop attacks:

Comprehensive surveillance appears as seemingly inexpensive because it is a solution that scales thanks to technology: troubleshooting at the press of a button. Directly linked with the aim of saving more and more, just as with the State in general. But classic investigative work, which is proven to work, is expensive and labor intensive. This leads to a failure by the authorities because of a faith in technology that is driven by economics.

In other words, it's much cheaper to call for even more automated mass spying than to address the problem properly by bringing in more trained personnel to carry out targeted surveillance of people who are known threats.

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Filed Under: belgium, brussels, encryption, going dark

Law Enforcement's Nemesis -- WhatsApp -- Is Also Law Enforcement's Best Friend

from the love/hate-as-needed dept

WhatsApp: a tool for evil.

David Cameron announced early last year that it was "unacceptable" that all communications could not be intercepted and read by intelligence services and law enforcement agencies. He stopped short of calling for a ban but strongly hinted this would be addressed in the Snooper's Charter.

This followed the head of the UK's GCHQ throwing both terrorism and child porn into the mix while vocally handwringing about encrypted communications -- portraying tech companies as callous accomplices of child abusers and jihadists.

In Brazil, WhatsApp was blocked and a Facebook executive arrested for refusing to hand over identifying information on its users.

And here in the US, the FBI has been dropping sealed hints that the popular messaging app may be the next recipient of one of its infamous All Writs orders.

Meanwhile, over in Belgium, it's law enforcement that's benefitted the most from the platform's existence. (h/t Frederic Jacobs)

"There were no orders and nobody really knew what to do. The mobile phone network was also out of order. Fortunately, Whatsapp worked. Without this app we we could not communicate at all," federal police spokesman Peter De Waele said as quoted by the media outlet.

Very handy, that. When cell infrastructure goes down, WhatsApp stays up. What law enforcement hates and fears because it can't capture readable content in transit is also useful when all hell breaks loose. Kill it off because you fear the unseen communications and you're going to end up hurting yourself.

As for Belgian law enforcement, they're likely not as fearful of WhatsApp's encryption as others. WhatsApp played a key part in a terrorist plot last summer -- but one that was disrupted by Belgian law enforcement.

According to Gaspard Sebag from Bloomberg, the European law enforcement in a joint effort with the FBI are monitoring the use of the popular messaging platform WhatsApp.

“Investigators said earlier they had detained 16 people in the anti-terror raids after working with U.S. authorities to monitor suspects’ communications on WhatsApp Inc.’s messaging service.” states Sebag.

The Belgian law enforcement raided two separate groups operating in Ostend and Louvain, and according various sources the messages exchanged on WhatsApp allowed the investigators to trace the group.

At the time I’m writing, Facebook who acquired WhatsApp, declined to comment the events, but security experts speculate that there is something wrong in the implementation of WhatsApp end-to-end (E2E) encryption started in November.

And even if the flaw is no longer present, intelligence/law enforcement agencies still have other options:

It seems that even if the messages are protected by the encryption implemented, the FBI or NSA are able to gather metadata on the server side that could be used to link WhatsApp users. The analysis of metadata allowed law enforcement to identify the network of the alleged suspects.

Not quite the monster Cameron, et al. have portrayed it as. And it's a great backup plan for those times when regular communication channels just aren't working.

Filed Under: brussels, communication, encryption
Companies: whatsapp

Once Again, The Brussels Attacks Were An Intelligence Community Failure, Not An 'Encryption' Problem

from the yet-again dept

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After the Paris attacks late last year, we noted that it was clear that they were evidence of an intelligence community failure, rather than an "encryption" problem -- which kind of explained why the intelligence community quickly tried to blame encryption. But, as we noted, most of the attackers were already known to the intelligence community and law enforcement -- and there's still little evidence that they used any encryption.

It's looking like the Brussels attacks are showing the same pattern. First, there were reports that Belgian law enforcement was well aware of the attackers and their connections.

In Brussels, one of two brothers who took part in Tuesday’s attacks on Zaventem airport and a subway train, which killed 31 people and injured hundreds more, had already been suspected of helping the Paris attackers, the federal prosecutors’ office said.

And another report noted that one of the brothers had been deported from Turkey a few months ago, and that Turkish officials had warned Belgium about his ties to terrorist groups.

Meanwhile, a more recent report says that US intelligence agencies were even more aware of the attackers:

U.S. security agencies had the names of the two suicide bombers who attacked Brussels airport in their databases as potential terror threats.

NBC News quoted U.S. officials who said that Khalid and Ibrahim El Bakraoui were known to U.S. counterterrorism authorities before Tuesday morning, when the pair and a third man detonated theor bombs at the airport and a train station.

So, once again, we see a situation where these guys were known (or should have been known) to law enforcement and intelligence, but they were still able to carry out their attack. And, yet, rather than blaming intelligence failures, politicians are blaming encryption again.

And, of course, the intelligence community will do what it always does: rather than admit it failed here, it will blame encryption or blame limits on surveillance and demand more powers. As we've noted in the past, no matter what the result, the intelligence community will always insist that more surveillance is the answer. If the surveillance works, to them it's evidence that they need more of it to do an even better job. If the surveillance fails (as in this case), then it's evidence that they need more surveillance to avoid such misses in the future. Anything to deflect from the fact that they had a ton of intelligence here, and still failed at stopping the attack.

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Filed Under: blame, brussels, encryption, going dark, intelligence community, law enforcement

Former DHS Secretary Says We Can Make Airports Safer From Terrorists By Rearranging Security Checkpoints

from the another-security-theater-script-rewrite-in-the-works dept

Another terrorist attack somewhere in the world* has provoked another round of punditry from former government officials on how to protect America from future attacks. Over the coming weeks, there will be no shortage of stupid ideas, useless ideas and pointless discussions about "heightened security" at any place people gather.

*"World" = Western Europe only

None of it will matter. Security has never really been scaled back anywhere since the 9/11 attacks -- certainly not to the levels seen prior to September 2001. There's only so much security anyone can actually provide but endless off-Broadway productions of security theater to be explored.

Michael Chertoff -- head of the Chertoff Group and former Homeland Security secretary -- spoke to CBS This Morning about what might need to be done to make airports more secure. Chertoff is right about one thing: TSA checkpoints create a tempting target of massed humans -- all waiting for their chance to be probed, scanned and groped by government employees.

“Well I have to say this is something I’ve spoken to people about for some time. The actual portion of the airport before the checkpoint is not really controlled by the federal government, it’s controlled by the local authorities. And it has increasingly become vulnerable, because as people wait to go through security they actually congregate there.”

I'm not sure the local boys will appreciate this dig at their security skills. But Chertoff's "solution" is just a literal expansion of federal government territory.

“And so now there’s an effort I think on the part of TSA to start to move the airports into pushing the security envelope back. We’ve seen some of that in terms of not allowing you to park in front of the terminal, but I think we’re going to have to step that up.”

So… move the target. Instead of being deep inside the airport, it will be closer to the entrance. As Gawker's Alex Pareene notes, at some point you can't push the envelope back any further. And there's no expansion point that will magically protect fliers from terrorist attacks.

Ah. Of course. We’ll “push the security envelope back.” The old checkpoints created crowds, sure, but once we move the security checkpoints back, just a bit bit further (to just before you enter the airport, I guess), it will be much safer for everyone, at least once everyone gets past the new checkpoints. Maybe eventually we can push the security envelope back to before you get in your car to go to the airport—your garage door, maybe?

Push people closer to the entrance. Make them more vulnerable to car bombs/larger groups of attackers. Push the envelope all the way out to the connecting roads. Same problem but with the added bonus of intrusive vehicle searches for everyone heading to the airport, whether they're planning to fly or not. There's no point where traveler safety suddenly spikes. Every nudge of the envelope opens as many attack vectors as it shuts down.

That's the ridiculousness of the TSA. It has done almost nothing to make flying safer. The only thing anyone can say for sure is that the TSA has made flying more annoying.

Maybe they'll move the checkpoints. Maybe they won't. Airplanes aren't the target. People are. And people are everywhere. To paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, you can't save all of the people all of the time, but you can make most of them miserable most of the time. That's how the DHS works. Actions must always be followed by reactions specifically tailored to address the parameters of the last attack or perceived threat. Somehow, we'll be safer by staying one step behind and ceding control to the government.

Filed Under: brussels, checkpoints, dhs, michael chertoff, security, security theater, tsa

Before We Even Know The Details, Politicians Rush To Blame Encryption For Brussels Attacks

from the it's-almost-like-you-have-an-agenda... dept

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You may remember that, right after the Paris attacks late last year, politicians rushed in to demonize encryption as the culprit, and to demand backdooring encryption before the blood was even dry. Of course, it later turned out that there was no evidence that they used encryption at all, but rather it appears that they communicated by unencrypted means. Just yesterday, we noted that the press was still insisting encryption was used, and using the lack of any evidence as evidence for the fact they must have used encryption (hint: that's not how encryption works...).

So, it should hardly be a surprise that following this morning's tragic attacks in Brussels that have left dozens dead and many more injured, that encryption haters, based on absolutely nothing, have rushed in to attack encryption again. The first up was Rep. Adam Schiff, who quickly insisted that he had no actual facts on the matter, but we should be concerned about encryption:

“We do not know yet what role, if any, encrypted communications played in these attacks,” Rep. Adam Schiff (D-Calif.) said in a statement.

“But we can be sure that terrorists will continue to use what they perceive to be the most secure means to plot their attacks,” he added.

Schiff, of course, is the same guy who just a few months ago was loudly promoting CISA, saying we needed it to protect our privacy from hackers. Of course CISA doesn't do that. You know what does? Encryption. The very encryption Schiff now wants to blame.

Not one to be left out, Senator Dianne Feinstein jumped in with a thinly veiled statement in support of her supposedly soon to be released bill, mandating backdoors in encryption:

“We must use all the tools at our disposal to fight back,” Sen. Dianne Feinstein, California Democrat and vice chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said in a statement on Tuesday. “The way to prevent attacks like this is to develop good intelligence and always be vigilant.”

"All the tools" likely means including her plans to break encryption.

And, of course, the many in the press are no help at all. There have been reports that a talking head on NPR blamed encryption this morning, while a NY Times reporter, Rukmini Callimachi -- who was the lead reporter on that ridiculous article yesterday insisting that the lack of encryption was evidence of encryption -- is tweeting up a storm claiming that ISIS is now encouraging the use of encryption, even though the questionably-sourced document she links to (which is written in English?!?) isn't actually recommending encryption, but things like Tor and VPNs, which are designed to merely mask your IP address.

26. ISIS is now advising its "brothers" in Belgium to only go online with encryption. (Thanks @MichaelSSmithII) pic.twitter.com/eWb4SD3INi

— Rukmini Callimachi (@rcallimachi) March 22, 2016

It's like she sees encryption in absolutely anything. Meanwhile, as a number of other commenters have pointed out, if "ISIS brothers" actually follow the advice in that document, it will only likely help them get caught, as a sudden and abrupt change in behavior is a pretty good way for law enforcement to make you a suspect. And, really, encouraging people to jump onto tools like Tor that they don't understand, but which they think will keep them safe, almost certainly will lead to ridiculously bad implementations that make it easier to spot what they're doing.

Either way, in the wake of yet another attack we're left with people who don't understand and dislike encryption, rushing to demonize it for no good reason at all.

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Filed Under: adam schiff, attacks, blame, brussels, dianne feinstein, encryption, isis, rukmini callimachi

Water Cannons Turned On Peaceful TTIP Protestors In Brussels As Public Barred From Negotiations

from the first-signs-of-panic dept

The TAFTA/TTIP negotiations remain almost totally lacking in real transparency, with little information about what exactly is happening behind closed doors being released to the public -- and most of that coming from the EU side. This has naturally forced those excluded from the inner circle to speculate about what might be going on -- and, inevitably, to fear the worst. According to the US Ambassador to the EU, Anthony Gardner, and the EU Commissioner responsible for TTIP, Karel De Gucht, that's unacceptable:

The ambassador and commissioner agreed that NGOs and civil society organisations were spreading disinformation about TTIP through social media, such as Twitter and Facebook. De Gucht said that a number of campaigners were "spreading rumours on false grounds."

Gardner added: "There's a void [in information]. The void is being filled more and more by social media."

That's interesting not just for the refusal to admit that it's lack of transparency that is creating this void, but also for the barely-concealed fear of social media, probably because it can't be controlled in the way that traditional media can. Gardner and De Gucht made their comments in Brussels, where they were both speaking at the European Business Summit, which describes itself as:

Europe's key meeting place for business leaders and decision makers, where Business and Politics Shape the Future.

Business, politics -- but not civil society, which, as usual, was not invited to shape the future. So, instead, it was forced to stay outside the meeting, on the streets. Here's what happened while business and politics were busy inside:

This Thursday morning over a thousand people were in the streets of Brussels, attempting to peacefully protest against austerity and the proposed great transatlantic market (TTIP) which were being discussed in the absence of citizens at the European Business Summit.

In an unprovoked move 281 people were violently arrested, including Belgian and European parliamentarians and candidates, senior trade union officials, farmers and many elderly citizens.

As one of those involved noted:

"We came into the streets because our political leaders are not listening. It seems they've only got ears for big business and their representatives who co-organised the European Business Summit. And to be treated so brutally, as if we were violent criminals -- when our actions were entirely peaceful."

Although that press release may not come from a totally objective source -- the D19-20 Alliance is an anti-austerity group -- reports and images on other sites confirm that the Belgian police were extremely heavy-handed, deploying water cannons and tying demonstrators' wrists together behind their backs for what seems to have been a polite and low-key peaceful protest. This extraordinarily disproportionate reaction would indicate an increasing nervousness on the part of the authorities that Europe is about to see a wave of mass demonstrations against TTIP just as happened with ACTA, leading to this brutal and ham-fisted attempt to nip it in the bud.

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Filed Under: brussels, karel de gucht, protests, social media, tafta, ttip

Brussels, London And Berkeley: Some Upcoming Events

from the bouncing-around dept

Here's a quick rundown on some upcoming events I'm involved in, leading off with a very exciting keynote brainstorming workshop at the INNOVATE / ACTIVATE conference in Berkeley on April 21st. As some of you know, we've run a bunch of brainstorming workshops either at our own events or as part of other events (as we're doing here). In this case, we'll be doing a brainstorming workshop around the question of "What does a proactive intellectual property agenda mean?" This is a question that has received a lot of attention over the past few months, since the SOPA fight. Lots of people who were involved in that battle came out of it wanting to do something positive to move the debates about IP towards fixing the problems associated with it, rather than just reacting defensively to efforts to expand a broken system. So we're going to brainstorm some ideas. The session will kick off with three (very) brief talks to get people thinking out of the box -- one by Nicole Ozer from the ACLU, one by Mike McGeary from Engine Advocacy, and one by me. From there, everyone will go into breakout groups with a specific brainstorming task for an hour, and then we'll regroup and discuss what the different groups came up with. These events are always thought-provoking and a lot of fun. I'd suggest coming to check it out, but I've been told that the event is already sold out.

Separately, this coming week, I'll be in Belgium on Wednesday, April 11th, taking part in a stakeholder hearing about ACTA at the European Parliament (which looks like it will be streamed live online). Two days later, I'll be in London, where I'll be hosting a discussion with Coadec talking about our recent Sky is Rising report (and I'm sure I'll also be discussing other policy/tech/business model issues as well). If you're unfamiliar with Coadec, it's a wonderful, UK-based organization, focused on helping the innovation community get involved and engaged in policy issues in the UK. That one is free and open to the public, so please come and join us. It should be a lot of fun.

Filed Under: berkeley, brainstorming, brussels, events, london

Self-Regulation: Should Online Companies Police The Internet?

from the who-needs-evidence? dept

For anyone in Belgium on Wednesday, here's an afternoon event open to all that might be of interest: "'Self'-regulation: Should online companies police the internet?" If you can't make it to the European Parliament in Brussels, there's also a live video stream available.

It turns out that the seminar has an interesting connection with Techdirt. Back in September, we wrote about a proposed law in Italy that might lead to people losing their Internet connection after just one accusation of unauthorized sharing. Somebody who noticed this article was Marietje Schaake, the Member of the European Parliament who has organized the seminar to discuss self-regulation. She even mentioned the fact in a written question to European Commission:

Via the press, it has come to my attention that the Italian Parliament is currently considering a draft law under which Internet users may be disconnected and blacklisted if they have been accused of an intellectual property infringement. The accusation does not necessarily need to originate from the rights holder of the work in question.

The draft law, as proposed, violates several EC laws and principles, including:

� Article 1(3a) of the telecoms package, amending Framework Directive 2002/21/EC,
� Article 6 ECHR concerning a fair trial,
� Article 10 ECHR concerning the freedom to seek, receive and impart information,
� the principles of necessity and proportionality, and
� depending on implementation, the intermediary liability exemptions in the e-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC.

1. Does the Commission agree that the Italian proposal is in violation of EC laws and principles? If not, why not?

2. What concrete action will the Commission undertake to put a halt to measures being implemented by Member States whereby citizens may be disconnected from the Internet?

The Commission has now replied [pdf], although its answer is not particularly helpful:

The Commission has not yet received the notification of the draft law to which the Honourable Member refers.

However, it does add the following interesting comment:

limitations of end-users' access and use of electronic communications networks must be subject to adequate procedural safeguards, which ensures that these cannot be enacted on the basis of mere accusations alone.

That provides a clue as to why the copyright industries are so keen for online companies to "police" themselves in Europe: it avoids the need for accusations - or proof - altogether.

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Filed Under: brussels, internet, marietje schaake, regulation