Former Bush Speechwriter: Ed Snowden Is A 'Shameless Espionage Pornographer'

from the ignoring-the-facts-to-hang-a-moniker dept

Marc Thiessen, contributor to the American Enterprise Institute's blog and, perhaps more relevantly, former speechwriter for George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, has issues with the New York Times' latest NSA leak. As he sees it, there's no "public interest" angle to justify revealing the NSA's ability to compromise computers not connected to the internet.

The Times reports, “There is no evidence that the N.S.A. has implanted its software or used its radio frequency technology inside the United States.” And an NSA spokeswoman, Vanee Vines, says, “N.S.A.’s activities are focused and specifically deployed against — and only against — valid foreign intelligence targets in response to intelligence requirements.”

So what is the redeeming social value of the story? What “abuse” is being revealed? What threat to American civil liberties has been exposed here? Why is this something the public needs to know?

The answers are: None. None. None. And it isn’t.

As he sees it, revealing this allows terrorists to alter their hardware habits to further avoid surveillance. The American public, however, is supposedly completely unaffected, at least according to the New York Times' conclusions and an NSA spokeswoman's statement. Whether or not one agrees with Thiessen's claim that there's nothing here that warrants exposure to the general public, where he goes next is just completely wrong.

As one former senior intelligence official told me recently, stories like this are nothing more than “espionage porn.” They serve no greater social purpose than to titillate.

And the man behind so many of these revelations, Edward Snowden, is nothing more than the Larry Flynt of the intelligence world – a shameless espionage pornographer.

Except for one big difference: pornography is legal. Sharing America’s espionage secrets is a crime.

"Espionage porn" is a nifty catchphrase and some leaks have been less "revealing" than others. But to label Snowden an "espionage pornographer" makes two assumptions -- one of them questionable and the other laughable. To call Snowden's leaks "espionage" rather than whistleblowing is to buy into the NSA's and the administration's stance. There's plenty of gray area between those two terms and sometimes what the government pursues as "illegal" is nothing more than inconvenient. (See also: the panic proceeding Manning's leaks and the multiple deaths and diplomatic fallout that failed to occur.)

Pinning this particular release on Snowden and painting him as a "pornographer" is willful ignorance in search of a tantalizing pull quote. Snowden isn't guiding the release of these leaks. The entities he turned the documents over to are. If anyone's a "espionage pornographer," it's the New York Times -- the outlet that decided to publish these documents. If Thiessen wants to argue this release serves no greater interest than "titillating" the public, fine. But don't pin it on the guy who isn't making editorial decisions.

But this is just more of Thiessen's ongoing antipathy towards the former NSA analyst. He responded to the NSA's supposed consideration of granting Snowden amnesty for the return of the documents (as if that were possible) with this:

Amnesty? Have they lost their minds? Snowden is a traitor to his country, who is responsible for the most damaging theft and release of classified information in American history. His actions have exposed not only the NSA terrorist surveillance programs, but our intelligence collection efforts against foreign governments, including Russia and China. He has aided our enemies, shared intelligence with potential adversaries, and has damaged our ability to defend against future terrorist attacks. Maybe we offer him life in prison instead of a firing squad, but amnesty? That would be insanity.

Almost everything Thiessen says here is debatable, at best. "Aided our enemies" is just a talking point used to justify espionage charges. Little evidence exists that our enemies are in a better position to harm us than they were pre-leaks.

"Sharing" documents with "potential adversaries" sounds worse than it is. Any public release of these documents would "share" with "potential adversaries." That's the nature of publication. Anyone (excluding certain government employees) can read it. And that's a whole lot of speculation to pack into one short sentence. How can anyone logically worry about "potential" adversaries, especially when the US seems to have plenty of existent adversaries.

And the last part -- "damaged our ability to defend against future terrorist attacks" -- is just ridiculous. Even the NSA itself is having trouble coming up with examples of how its programs have averted attacks. The longer this goes on, the weaker these arguments become.

Thiessen doesn't care for Snowden or his leaks. That's fine. He disagrees with others about what is or isn't "public interest." Again, that's a matter of opinion. (Although, given his general stance on Snowden, I'm of the opinion that no document that has been released meets his standard for "public interest," at least not if weighed against all the speculative "damage" it does to national security.) But when he blames Snowden for a New York Times' editorial decision, he's just taking a cheap swing at the target he likes least.

Filed Under: ed snowden, espionage, espionage pornographer, marc thiessen, whistleblower

It's Come To This: Commentators Arguing That The Press Commits A Crime In Exposing NSA Surveillance

from the sad dept

Marc Thiessen, a former speechwriter for President Bush, apparently really hates it when government overreach is exposed. We last mentioned him when he attacked Wikileaks in the aftermath of its publishing of various State Department cables. Now, with the new NSA surveillance scandal, he's back (of course) and taking the lovely position that it's perfectly fine to charge journalists who publish information about NSA surveillance with crimes.

Greenwald’s crime is violating 18 USC § 798, which makes it a criminal act to publish classified information revealing government cryptography or communications intelligence.

The law is absolutely clear. It states: “Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes , or uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States any classified information— (1) concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign government; or (2) concerning the design, construction, use, maintenance, or repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or prepared or planned for use by the United States or any foreign government for cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes; or (3) concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government; or (4) obtained by the processes of communication intelligence from the communications of any foreign government, knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes— Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.”

Of course, there's also that fancy First Amendment, which Thiessen would prefer to ignore:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

It would appear that 18 USC 798 is exactly what is forbidden by the First Amendment. It is a law abridging the freedom of the press and freedom of speech. Defenders of Thiessen and the NSA will point out that there are lots of times the courts have said this is okay, but I'm not sure what kind of defense that is, other than nitpicking why the First Amendment is something to ignore. Personally, I think that the First Amendment is fairly important, and worry about any laws that appear to push back on the basic concept of it.

Filed Under: first amendment, free speech, journalism, leaks, marc thiessen, nsa, nsa surveillance

How Political Pundits Get Confused When They Don't Understand That Wikileaks Is Distributed

from the good-luck-there dept

We've mentioned Marc Thiessen's rather hilariously clueless position on Wikileaks a few times in the past. He's the former Bush speech writer, who has advocated "shutting down" Wikileaks and was reasonably mocked for the cluelessness of that statement. He's also advocated using the US military to hunt down Julian Assange. His latest is a response to those who mocked his idea of shutting down Wikileaks. He claims that he's absolutely sure it's possible. His reasoning? The whole Stuxnet worm thing:

Some say attacking WikiLeaks would be fruitless. Really? In the past year, the Iranian nuclear system has been crippled by a computer worm called "Stuxnet," which has attacked Iran's industrial systems and the personal computers of Iranian nuclear scientists. To this day, no one has traced the origin of the worm. Imagine the impact on WikiLeaks's ability to distribute additional classified information if its systems were suddenly and mysteriously infected by a worm that would fry the computer of anyone who downloaded the documents. WikiLeaks would probably have very few future visitors to its Web site.

Ah, cluelessness in its pure, distilled form. This is why we noted a few weeks back how the political class doesn't seem to understand the difference between centralized systems and distributed systems. It's demonstrated simply in this one paragraph that seems to assume that Wikileaks is centralized around its website. Frankly, I don't know if I've ever even gone to the Wikileaks website directly. The website is somewhat meaningless for what Wikileaks is doing.

Filed Under: distributed, marc thiessen, wikileaks
Companies: wikileaks

Clueless Commentators Think That It's Possible To Stop Wikileaks

from the good-luck-with-that dept

Marc Thiessen is a former Bush speechwriter, who seems to have tried to make a second career out of saying really clueless things as loudly as possible. Lately he's been on a rampage against Wikileaks, first suggesting that it somehow made sense to use US military power to track down and capture Wikileaks founder Julian Assange. This resulted in a reporter pointing out that Thiessen's response to Wikileaks is like the RIAA's response to Napster: destined to backfire due to a basic misunderstanding of the internet.

Apparently Thiessen either didn't read or understand that response. Or, perhaps in the business of being loud and wrong, he just doesn't care. He's since written a few more pieces attacking Wikileaks, including directly blaming it for an Afghan tribal leader being killed... though in the very next sentence he admits he doesn't know if that had anything to do with Wikileaks. Accuse first, find out the truth later, huh?

But, last Friday, Thiessen moved things up a notch on the RIAA-repeatifier, and suggested that with Assange's recent promise to release the remaining 15,000 documents in the recent collection -- after scrubbing them of identifying information -- the US should somehow "shut down" Wikileaks. Yeah, good luck with that. Kevin Poulsen, over at Wired, does a nice job educating Thiessen once again on what a clueless statement that is. You can't just shut down Wikileaks, and any attempt to do so would only get the material in question significantly more attention.

First of all, a US court once tried to shut down Wikileaks over a minor issue which, in turn, got the documents in question a lot more attention and eventually resulted in a dropped lawsuit. But, more importantly, for the brief time that the site was supposed to be blocked, it didn't take long for many, many, many people around the world to make sure it was not blocked at all. Just imagine the response if the US federal government tried to shut down Wikileaks? It would get a tremendous amount of attention, and would do absolutely nothing to stop the dissemination of the files in question.

It's amazing that anyone can claim to be knowledgeable about these things and suggest a brute force solution that would so obviously backfire. But, then again, the RIAA did do the same sort of thing for nearly a decade, and still is so dizzy from the backlash that it hasn't figured out what it did wrong.

Filed Under: information, marc thiessen, wikileaks