Judge Tosses Laughably Stupid SLAPP Lawsuit The Trump Campaign Filed Against The NY Times
from the because-it-was-never-meant-to-win dept
A little over a year ago we wrote about a laughably stupid SLAPP suit that the Trump campaign, represented by Charles Harder, filed against the NY Times. As we noted at the time, the lawsuit appeared to have no intention of succeeding -- it was purely performative nonsense. The lawsuit claimed that an opinion piece by Max Frankel was defamatory because it noted that whether or not there was any explicit collusion between the Trump Campaign and Russia, it didn't matter, since both sides seemed to expect certain outcomes and allowed them to act accordingly.
We also pointed out that the lawsuit completely misrepresented the article, pretending that Frankel's thesis -- again, that there didn't need to be any explicit deal -- was Frankel saying that there was "collusion" between the two. The case made no sense no matter how you looked at it. Frankel's article was an opinion piece -- and opinions aren't defamatory. It didn't allege what the campaign's lawsuit says it alleged, and there was no way in hell it could possibly meet the actual malice standard necessary for defamation.
It took a year, but the Supreme Court of New York (which, contrary to its name, is more like a district court), has tossed out the lawsuit, though denying the NY Times' request for sanctions against Harder. As we expected, this was not a difficult decision for the court to come to. First, it was obviously opinion, and thus not defamatory:
First, while the complaint alleges that the terms used in the article, such as “deal” and “quid pro quo,” are defamatory and false, Mr. Frankel’s commentary in his article is nonactionable opinion, and the overall context in which the article was published, in the opinion section of the newspaper, signaled to the reader that “the broader social context and surrounding circumstances [indicate] that what is being read . . . is likely to be opinion, not fact.” Gross v. N.Y. Times Co., 82 N.Y.2d 146, 153 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This is because “[t]he dispositive inquiry, under either Federal or New York law, is ‘whether a reasonable [reader] could have concluded that [the articles were] conveying facts about the plaintiff.’” 83 N.Y.2d at 152 (alterations in original) (quoting 600 W. 115th St. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 80 N.Y.2d 130, 139 (1992)); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) (finding that statements of opinion are not actionable because “there is no such thing as a false idea”).
Then there's the actual malice problem -- in that the campaign failed to make any real arguments that would show that Frankel knew his statements were false or were made with reckless disregard for the truth (meaning he had substantial doubts about their truth):
Third, even if Mr. Frankel’s commentary was actionable as factual assertions, and even if such assertions were of and concerning the Trump campaign, the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to support the requirement that the Times published the challenged statements with actual malice, meaning “knowledge that [the statements] were false, or [made] with reckless disregard for the truth.”... In this regard, bias, or ulterior motive does not constitute actual malice... This heavy burden exists because news organizations function as a platform for facilitating constitutionally protected speech on issues of public concern and courts will not impose defamation liability against these entities absent a clear showing of actual malice.
There was one other reason for the dismissal... which I am a bit confused about. The judge claims that the Campaign (the plaintiff in this case) has no standing, since the comments in the article were not about it:
Second, the challenged statements are not “of and concerning” plaintiff, which is a necessary element for a defamation action. For example, in Lazore v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 61 A.D.3d 440 (1st Dep’t 2009), the Appellate Division, First Department dismissed a complaint alleging defamation because “the offending statements were directed against a governing body . . . , rather than against its individual members.” 61 A.D.3d at *1. Further, a corporate entity has no standing to sue over statements that concern an entity’s employees or affiliates, but not the entity itself.... Here, the focus of Mr. Frankel’s column was the former President’s associates and family members, not the Trump campaign itself.
I find that a lot less compelling, since the thrust of the article was about the Campaign, as represented by the President's associates and family members, but either way this case was getting dismissed for the other reasons.
As for sanctions, the judge rejects them... with no explanation at all. However, with New York now having a shiny new more useful anti-SLAPP law, I do wonder if the Times might now use that to seek fees...
Filed Under: 1st amendment, actual malice, anti-slapp, charles harder, defamation, donald trump, max frankel, new york, opinion, slapp, standing
