Amazon To Hachette And Authors: Here, Let Us Explain Basic Price Elasticity To You

from the lower-price,-make-more-money-dimwits dept

Apparently Amazon's efforts earlier this month to make it abundantly clear that it's fight with Hachette is about helping, not harming authors still didn't quite make it through to authors who seem to reflexively hate Amazon (often for reasons that don't make much sense). So now Amazon has tried to be even more explicit, by taking the time to explain what price elasticity means, and how Amazon's plan would actually make authors more money. They lay it out pretty clearly, especially for those authors who maybe didn't do so well in economics classes:

A key objective is lower e-book prices. Many e-books are being released at $14.99 and even $19.99. That is unjustifiably high for an e-book. With an e-book, there's no printing, no over-printing, no need to forecast, no returns, no lost sales due to out-of-stock, no warehousing costs, no transportation costs, and there is no secondary market -- e-books cannot be resold as used books. E-books can be and should be less expensive.

It's also important to understand that e-books are highly price-elastic. This means that when the price goes up, customers buy much less. We've quantified the price elasticity of e-books from repeated measurements across many titles. For every copy an e-book would sell at $14.99, it would sell 1.74 copies if priced at $9.99. So, for example, if customers would buy 100,000 copies of a particular e-book at $14.99, then customers would buy 174,000 copies of that same e-book at $9.99. Total revenue at $14.99 would be $1,499,000. Total revenue at $9.99 is $1,738,000.

The important thing to note here is that at the lower price, total revenue increases 16%. This is good for all the parties involved:

• The customer is paying 33% less.
• The author is getting a royalty check 16% larger and being read by an audience that's 74% larger. And that 74% increase in copies sold makes it much more likely that the title will make it onto the national bestseller lists. (Any author who's trying to get on one of the national bestseller lists should insist to their publisher that their e-book be priced at $9.99 or lower.)
• Likewise, the higher total revenue generated at $9.99 is also good for the publisher and the retailer. At $9.99, even though the customer is paying less, the total pie is bigger and there is more to share amongst the parties.

Keep in mind that books don't just compete against books. Books compete against mobile games, television, movies, Facebook, blogs, free news sites and more. If we want a healthy reading culture, we have to work hard to be sure books actually are competitive against these other media types, and a big part of that is working hard to make books less expensive.

So, at $9.99, the total pie is bigger - how does Amazon propose to share that revenue pie? We believe 35% should go to the author, 35% to the publisher and 30% to Amazon. Is 30% reasonable? Yes. In fact, the 30% share of total revenue is what Hachette forced us to take in 2010 when they illegally colluded with their competitors to raise e-book prices. We had no problem with the 30% -- we did have a big problem with the price increases.

Amazon then goes one step further, driving a real wedge between Hachette and authors with the following paragraph:

One more note on our proposal for how the total revenue should be shared. While we believe 35% should go to the author and 35% to Hachette, the way this would actually work is that we would send 70% of the total revenue to Hachette, and they would decide how much to share with the author. We believe Hachette is sharing too small a portion with the author today, but ultimately that is not our call.

Are there legitimate concerns that some may have about Amazon's position in the marketplace? Absolutely. But it's fight with Hachette does not seem to be about that, but rather about setting up a deal that actually does make everyone better off. It appears that Hachette has been fighting that, in this ridiculous belief that ebooks have to be priced higher -- and that it should get to keep more and more of the money.

Filed Under: authors, books, ebooks, economics, price elasticity
Companies: amazon, hachette

EA Believes That Making A Lot Of Money Is Less Important Than Keeping Games Expensive

from the really-now? dept

One of the more bizarre things that we see in the debate over "piracy" is that when we ask people what's more important -- stopping piracy or making more money -- there are some who actually argue that stopping piracy is more important. I have to admit that I can't get my head around this concept, but apparently it extends even beyond the issue of "piracy" to the issue of pricing as well. vegetaman points us to an absolutely bizarre interview with the head of EA's Origin platform, David DeMartini, in which he's asked by GamesIndustry.biz how he feels about Valve's regular deep discounting of games, something we've discussed at length before. DeMartini is not impressed, claiming that it cheapens your intellectual property:

We won't be doing that. Obviously they think it's the right thing to do after a certain amount of time. I just think it cheapens your intellectual property. I know both sides of it, I understand it. If you want to sell a whole bunch of units, that is certainly a way to do that, to sell a whole bunch of stuff at a low price. The gamemakers work incredibly hard to make this intellectual property, and we're not trying to be Target. We're trying to be Nordstrom. When I say that, I mean good value - we're trying to give you a fair price point, and occasionally there will be things that are on sale you could look for a discount, just don't look for 75 percent off going-out-of-business sales.

Except that totally ignores the reality of the situation and suggests big trouble for the way EA does business. As Valve has made clear, when it does those deep discounts, the increase in sales greatly surpasses the revenue made prior to those discounts. That's not a "going out of business" sale. It's a "let's make a hell of a lot more money" sale.

I'm honestly at a complete loss here. DeMartini literally seems to be claiming that making less money is a better business strategy because it doesn't "cheapen your intellectual property." Apparently the man is entirely unfamiliar with price elasticity, and how lowering your price can lead to more revenue (something which most people think is a good thing). So here's a case where we aren't even talking about "piracy," but instead DeMartini's assessment of what games must be priced at -- and against what the market says is the profit maximizing price. In what world is it a smart business strategy to keep prices high if it's guaranteed to make you less money... all because you want some perceived "value" to be higher, even if fewer people want to buy it?

Filed Under: david demartini, origin platform, price elasticity, pricing, video games
Companies: electronic arts, valve

Maybe Super Cheap Video Games Are Helping, Not Destroying, The Video Game Industry

from the hello-price-elasticity dept

One of the early economics lessons you learn in any competent intro econ class is the concept of elasticity. The basic concept is how much does demand increase for a product if you lower the price. If a product is highly elastic, decreasing the price can often earn you more money. A simplified version of this: I have a widget that I want to sell for $100 dollars, but only one person is willing to pay that price. With that pricing, I'd make $100 (gross) on the widget. However, if I were to drop the price to $1, let's say 1,000 people are willing to buy at that price. Then, I'd make $1,000 (gross) on the widget. So, even though producers often fear lowering the price, if there's strong elasticity, lowering the price can often make you much more money (and, yes, the marginal cost matters here as well).

We've seen over and over again that video games appear to have very high price elasticity of demand. Two years ago, we wrote about some experiments by Valve, where it tried lowering prices of games by 10%, 25%, 50% and 75% -- and saw the increase in sales at a stupendous rate. While the 10% decrease only resulted in 35% higher gross revenue (already pretty good!), at a 75% discount, the gross revenue shot up by 1470%. Think about that, for a second. Basically, dropping the price by 75% increased revenue by almost a factor of 15. Not bad.

Last year, we saw a similar experiment that also had great results. An online video game store in Sweden tried dropping its prices by 75% and saw an increase in sales of 5500% (in unit sales). When looking at the gross revenue, it appears that it came out approximately to a similar 1300% increase.

And now we have some more examples. Capitalist Lion Tamer points us to an article that looks at some super popular iOS (iPhone/iPad) apps that drastically cut their price, but saw their gross revenue shoot way up because of it.

Street Fighter IV for iOS recently slashed its price by a breathtaking 90% overnight, from £5.99 to 59p. Within 48 hours its position in the overall Top-Grossing chart (that's the list of all apps, not just games) instantly rocketed from 116 to 2. Coincidence or magic? You decide. But that's not all.

And just to reiterate -- we're monitoring the Top-Grossing chart, ie the one measuring money made, NOT the ordinary numer-of-sales one, where SFIV currently sits comfortably on top of everything else. What that means is that the game's sales have increased by dramatically more than 1,000% (because it would have had to sell 10 times as many just to hold the No.116 position at the new price, never mind climb 114 places).

And yet, time and time again we hear how execs at big entertainment companies feel the need to keep raising prices. Hell, we just mentioned how Nintendo's President Reggie Fils-Aime was complaining that cheap games might kill the industry. Apparently, they don't teach basic economics to folks who become president of Nintendo.

Filed Under: business models, economics, price elasticity, pricing, video games

Online Gaming Store Lowers Prices 75%, Sees Sales Shoot Up 5500%

from the price-elasticity dept

We were just talking about how some in the recording industry are realizing that raising prices on downloadable songs may have been a mistake (just as the book publishing world is pushing to raise ebook prices -- despite a fair bit of evidence that people actually are expecting prices to go in the other direction). It's as if they don't understand price elasticity and how you can quite often maximize revenue by lowering price.

In the video game world, at least, they seem more open to this concept. Last year we wrote about Valve reporting on some numbers that showed the more they reduced the price, the greater the money they brought in. In the case of reducing the price by 75%, Valve found sales increased 1470%. Not bad! But apparently an online video gaming store in Sweden has them beat.

Rasmus Larsson points us to a report from an online gaming store that also reduced prices by 75% and saw sales increase by an astounding 5500% (Google translation from the original). A similar test, with a price decrease of 50% saw sales increase 533%. Interestingly, after each price decrease, the company put the price back up again and saw a (slight) sales increase at the higher price too. As the article notes "the price is marketing."

Filed Under: digital goods, marketing, price, price elasticity, video games