Court Says Fifth Amendment Covers Smartphone Passcodes, But It's Hardly A Victory For Constitutional Rights

from the blueprint-for-fifth-amendment-evasion-currently-in-progress dept

A recent opinion issued in a prosecution by the Securities and Exchange Commission seems to indicate the government can't force members of the public to hand over passwords without violating the Fifth Amendment. But the details suggest something else: that this is limited to a very specific set of circumstances and is not in any way precedential, at least not at this point.

The courts have previously weighed in on the legality of forcing people to basically provide incriminating evidence against themselves through the compelled relinquishment of passwords. Back in 2013, a magistrate judge rejected an order compelling a defendant to decrypt a seized hard drive by providing the government with his password. A year later, the Massachusetts Supreme Court came to the opposite conclusion: that the compelled production of passwords did not have Fifth Amendment implications.

The DOJ has argued that it does have the right to demand passwords to unlock seized items and actually found a judge that agreed with it. In that case, the court found that unlocking a device was no different than producing documents at the government's request -- distancing it from the "compelled speech" against a person's own interests that the Fifth Amendment is supposed to guard against.

This case falls along those same lines, but the legal conclusions are a bit different.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is investigating Bonan and Nan Huang for insider trading. The two worked at the credit card company Capital One as data analysts. According to the complaint, the two allegedly used their jobs as data analysts to figure out sales trends at major U.S. companies and to trade stocks in those companies ahead of announced company earnings. According to the SEC, they turned a $150,000 investment into $2.8 million.

Capital One let its employees use company-owned smartphones for work. Every employee picked his own passcode, and for security reasons did not share the passcode with Capital One. When Capital One fired the defendants, the defendants returned their phones. Later, as part of the investigation, Capital One turned over the phones to the SEC. The SEC now wants to access the phones because it believes evidence of insider trading is stored inside them.

But here’s the problem: The SEC can’t get in. Neither can Capital One. Only the defendants know the passcodes. And the defendants have refused to disclose them. As much as Capital One may want to aid the SEC in prosecuting its former employees, it can't.

The SEC sought an order to compel the production of the passcodes. The suspects refused on Fifth Amendment grounds. This brings us to the tricky details of this case, which suggest it won't become an across-the-board Fifth Amendment-protected "right" to deny the government access to password-protected devices and storage.

The government argued for the compelled production of passwords using the "foregone conclusion" doctrine.

The doctrine, introduced in Fisher v. United States, says that the Fifth Amendment doesn’t block complying with a court order when the testimonial part of complying with a court order is a foregone conclusion. In other words, if the government already knows the testimonial part of complying with the order, and they’re not seeking to prove it from the order, then you can’t use the Fifth Amendment to avoid compliance with the order.

In the government's creative interpretation of the doctrine, the production of passcodes would be no more than the defendants acknowledging they used the phones Capital One supplied them with -- something the government already knows and which has been confirmed by Capital One. Therefore, there are no Fifth Amendment implications. The judge disagreed, correctly pointing out that the government was seeking access to documents possibly contained on the phones, rather than simply seeking to confirm what it already suspected: that the phones were used by the defendants.

By using one thing to achieve another, the government was stretching its "foregone conclusion" to cover any evidence discovered on the unlocked phones. If the defendants have reason to believe incriminating documents resided on those phones, they are well within their Fifth Amendment rights to refuse the government's request. Or so you would think.

Should the SEC ultimately succeed with this interpretation of the "foregone conclusion" doctrine, it will have compelled incriminating testimony. It claims that it's merely seeking to confirm ownership by seeing if the passcodes unlock the phones. But once they're unlocked, it can compel the production of documents. Should these prove to be incriminating, it already has the defendants' admissions that these are their cell phones.

So, this case is less about securing Fifth Amendment rights than the government exploring options on how to obtain permission to compel defendants to hand over access to possibly incriminating information. If the court holds firm in its view of the government's true aims, it will be a small win for constitutional rights but one unlikely to be applied broadly.

As Orin Kerr points out in a second post on the case, some unanswered questions point towards the government being able to successfully argue that simply providing a password to a locked device isn't self-incriminating testimony.

If this analysis is right, then the password is incriminating because it provides a link to the evidence. The government could grant the defendants immunity, but it would need to be use and derivative use immunity — that is, immunity not just from the actual testimony but from what the testimony would reveal.See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892). The defendants should win. That’s where Jonathan comes out, and it might be correct.

But I’m not sure. Here’s my question: Does the “link in the chain” test include a merely causal link — that is, a link in the chain to the evidence? Or does “link in the chain” mean that the testimony was part of the evidence of guilt but not enough to prove the entire offense — that is, a link within the body of evidence? If testimony is solely of value for its causal connection to evidence, and it has no evidentiary value itself, is the testimony incriminating?

If the government can argue that compelled production of passwords that leads to the discovery of incriminating material is merely causal (rather than the password itself being evidence of guilt), it may be able to skirt the Fifth Amendment entirely. This has obvious implications in the ongoing law enforcement war on encryption. With no firmly established legal footing for the argument that demanding passwords violates the Fifth Amendment, password-protected encryption will be ultimately no more safe than leaving everything unlocked and in plaintext.

So, while the court has -- for the moment -- denied the government's request to compel the production of passwords, the underlying legal entanglements don't exactly bode well for the future of the Fifth Amendment.

Filed Under: fifth amendment, passcodes, phone, self-incrimination

Rightscorp Claims Its Harassing Phone Calls Safeguarded By Multiple Constitutional Amendments

from the putting-the-'rights'-back-in-'rightscorp' dept

Third-party copyright troll Rightscorp is fighting a couple of lawsuits related to its alleged telephonic harassment of alleged infringers. One wonders what the ROI is on funding robocalling in pursuit of $10-20 "settlements" from suspected infringers. Whatever it is, the ROI is definitely edging further into the red, what with the company now paying lawyers to safeguard its "right" to harass and threaten people who won't pay up (or haven't even performed any infringing activity).

I don't make this assertion lightly. Multiple complaints made to the FCC back up the assertions being made in two class-action lawsuits. Rightscorp has responded to the allegations made in the lawsuit filed earlier this year, claiming the company willfully violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) in its "collection" efforts. (Note that most collection efforts revolve around unpaid bills -- something consumers previously agreed to pay in one form or another. Rightscorp's "collections" involve no agreement from consumers -- only accusations based on little more than snippets of torrent activity and an IP address. And yet, the company treats accused infringers as though this is unpaid debt, rather than the speculative wallet-rummaging it actually is.)

Rightscorp's response is hilarious -- although certainly not intentionally. First off, it denies pretty much every allegation except for the issuing of subpoenas and emails -- things nearly impossible to deny thanks to the paper trail they create.

Once it gets past that point, it starts issuing its affirmative defenses. According to Rightscorp, several Constitutional amendments enshrine its right to harass alleged infringers over the phone.

While the majority of its eleven defenses are questionable enough, the defenses 3-6 attack the law itself, claiming that TCPA is unconstitutional, namely it violates the First, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendments. Why is it so, Rightscorp doesn’t say.

From the filing:

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“the TCPA”), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227, upon which Plaintiffs’ claims rely, violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

[...]

The TCPA violates the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

[...]

The TCPA violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

It appears Rightscorp would rather have the court examine a law twice held to be constitutional than look into its "collection" activities.

The First Amendment argument isn't exactly novel. Rightscorp and Warner Bros. have previously argued that copyright trolling is free speech. But, in that case, at least it actually made an argument. The affirmative defense offered here is nothing more than literally "the law violates the First Amendment," something no court has held to this point.

Beyond that, the other affirmative Constitutional defenses offered by Rightscorp are probably going to be viewed as "novel" by the court -- something that's rarely a compliment when it's written in a judicial opinion. As of right now, they're not even arguments. They're just assertions. The real fun will begin when Rightscorp starts explaining how violating a consumer protection law is not just protected speech, but is safeguarded by the application of Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Filed Under: constitution, due process, fifth amendment, first amendment, harassment, robocalls
Companies: rightscorp

Judge Throws Out Lawsuit From Redditor Who Found An FBI Tracking Device On His Car

from the upvote-for-FBI-visit dept

Back in 2010, Redditor Yasir Afifi found an unusual device on his car while taking it in for an oil change.

Other Redditors surmised it was some sort of tracking device -- something that was confirmed a few days later when two SUVs full of cops and FBI agents showed up to reclaim it. While doing so, the FBI agent also asked the sort of probing questions that make the agency an indispensable part of our nation's counterterrorism efforts. From the ruling by Judge Beryl Howell:

The agents also asked the plaintiff other questions, including “whether he was a national security threat, whether he was having financial difficulties, [and] whether he had been to Yemen . . . .”

They also said other, more unsettling things:

After returning the GPS device, defendant Kanaan made several comments to the plaintiff that indicated to the plaintiff that the FBI had knowledge of the plaintiff’s movements, including commenting on certain restaurants at which the plaintiff ate, a friend with whom he associated, and a new job at which he worked. Id. at ¶ 46. At the end of the encounter, the plaintiff alleges that defendant Kanaan suggested to him that he was not a national security threat and that he was no longer of use to the FBI.

Apparently, part of the justification for deploying this tracking device was a comment one of Afifi's friends had left at Reddit -- a comment that skewers a lot of unproductive terrorism hysteria (and the agencies that thrive in this atmosphere).

bombing a mall seems so easy to do. i mean all you really need is a bomb, a regular outfit so you arent the crazy guy in a trench coat trying to blow up a mall and a shopping bag. i mean if terrorism were actually a legitimate threat, think about how many fucking malls would have blown up already.. you can put a bag in a million different places, there would be no way to foresee the next target, and really no way to prevent it unless CTU gets some intel at the last minute in which case every city but LA is fucked...so...yea...now i'm surely bugged : /

End result? A tracking device on Afifi's car, and for something he didn't even write. So, he sued the FBI and the DOJ for violating his First, Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The suit was stayed by the court while the Supreme Court sorted out US v. Jones -- a case dealing with warrantless GPS tracking. Unfortunately, the Court returned not much in the way of a decision, stating that GPS tracking did constitute a "search," but didn't go so far as to add a warrant requirement, suggesting the longer the tracking lasts, the worse it is constitutionally.

Whether or not this was warrantless surveillance isn't answered in Howell's decision. None of Afifi's claims survive. Qualified immunity nullifies Afifi's First and Fourth Amendment Bivens claims with an assist from the circuit courts' split on warrantless GPS tracking. As the events in question took place nearly two years ahead of the Supreme Court's decision, Howell defers to the rulings in place at that time (2010) as governing the agents' actions.

[T]he warrantless use of a GPS device was lawful under Ninth Circuit precedent at the time of its use in the present case. In other words, the individual defendants’ warrantless use of the GPS device was valid in California, the jurisdiction in which the individual defendants used the GPS device.

Afifi's First Amendment claim also goes down, seeing as there's no judicial precedent for chilling speech with a GPS tracker.

The plaintiff has failed to cite a single case from any Circuit holding that the warrantless use of a GPS device violates an individual’s First Amendment rights. To be sure, the qualified immunity analysis does not require a “case directly on point,” Al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2083, but a court must take caution in properly defining the scope of the right violated (“We have repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.”). [...] The plaintiff’s inability to cite a single case in support of his contention that the warrantless use of a GPS device violated his First Amendment rights dooms his claim.

Afifi's claim of Privacy Act violations caused by the FBI's continued retention of his case records after closing the investigation doesn't fare any better. There's plenty of precedent out there stating that relevant investigative records are forever even if the investigation isn't.

In addition, the fact that the investigation into the plaintiff is now closed does not render the records invalid under Section (e)(7). The D.C. Circuit has held that an agency may maintain records from an authorized investigation even after that investigation was closed, because “[m]aterials may continue to be relevant to a law enforcement activity long after a particular investigation undertaken pursuant to that activity has been closed...”

The present case is no different. The records now in the FBI’s possession may permit the FBI to verify or evaluate any new intelligence received, assess the reliability of other sources, and ensure accountability regarding how the FBI responded to the information it received.

Howell also points out that challenges to warrantless searches generally result in suppression of evidence, not nullification of entire investigations. Afifi's claims that he is being locked out by potential employers because of his run-in with the FBI are dismissed as "self-inflicted" -- not because Afifi had the misfortune of being acquainted with a person whose Reddit comment drew FBI heat, but because he "reported his confrontation with the FBI agents to local and national media, and the media published numerous stories about the encounter."

The moral of this tale seems to be that if you discover a tracking device on your vehicle, there's no faster way to be rid of it than posting pictures of it on a heavily-trafficked website. (As opposed to, say, throwing it in a lake, as one commenter suggested.) You may not find relief through the courts, but at least you'll be ensured of some form of closure.

Filed Under: beryl howell, cars, doj, fbi, fifth amendment, first amendment, fourth amendment, gps, privacy, surveillance, tracking, tracking device, yasir afifi

EFF Files Massive Lawsuit Over NSA Surveillance: Gun Rights, Civil Liberties Groups, Religious Groups Team Up

from the one-to-watch dept

While there have been a number of lawsuits already filed over the NSA's surveillance program, the EFF has just jumped in in a big way. Representing a variety of advocacy groups, religious groups and even a gun maker, the lawsuit makes the case that the dragnet surveillance violates the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The plaintiffs in the case include the First Unitarian Church of LA, Greenpeace, Calguns, the Bill of Rights Defense Committee, California Association of Federal Firearms Licensees, Council on American Islamic Relations, the Franklin Armory, Free Press, Tech Freedom, Public Knowledge, the Free Software Foundation, Human Rights Watch, the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), the Open Technology Institute, People for the American Way and Students for Sensible Drug Policy. It's a pretty wide-ranging group of folks who don't normally agree on much (in fact, some of them probably disagree with each other, vehemently, on a number of issues). But they've come together for this.

The First Amendment argument is basically that this is chilling these organizations' right to communicate anonymously:

Defendants have violated and are violating the First Amendment free speech and free association rights of Plaintiffs, their members, and their staffs, including the right to communicate anonymously, the right to associate privately, and the right to engage in political advocacy free from government interference.

By their acts alleged herein, Defendants have chilled and/or threaten to chill the legal associations and speech of Plaintiffs, their members, and their staffs, by among other things, compelling the disclosure of their political and other associations.

Of the three main arguments, this is the one that I think may be the weakest, and the easiest for the courts to dismiss -- but I hope I'm wrong. The Fourth Amendment claim is clearly the strongest:

Plaintiffs have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their telephone communications, including in their telephone communications information.

By the acts alleged herein, Defendants have violated Plaintiffs' reasonable expectations of privacy and denied Plaintiffs their right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, including, but not limited to, obtaining per se unreasonable general warrants. Defendants have further violated Plaintiffs' rights by failing to apply to a court for, and for a court to issue, a warrant prior to any search and seizure as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.

And then there's the Fifth Amendment argument, that we've been hearing a few people make recently:

Plaintiffs, their members, and their staffs have an informational privacy interest in their telephone communications information, which reveals sensitive information about their personal, political, and religious activities and which Plaintiffs do not ordinarily disclose to the public or the government. This privacy interest is protected by state and federal laws relating to privacy of communications records and the substantive and procedural right to due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

Defendants through their Associational Tracking Program secretly collect, acquire, retain, search, and use the bulk telephone communications information of Plaintiffs, their members and their staff without providing notice to them, or process by which they could seek redress. Defendants provide no process adequate to protect their interests.

As part of this 5th Amendment argument, they point out that secret FISA Court interpretations of the law would seem to violate basic due process as well.

This legal interpretation of 50 U.S.C. § 1861 is not available to the general public, including Plaintiffs, their members and their staff, leaving them and all other persons uncertain about where a reasonable expectation of privacy from government intrusion begins and ends and specifically what conduct may subject them to electronic surveillance.

This secret legal interpretation of 50 U.S.C. § 1861, together with provisions of the FISA statutory scheme that insulate legal interpretations from public disclosure and adversarial process, fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement and/or intelligence collection.

The secret legal interpretation of 50 U.S.C. § 1861 used in the Associational Tracking Program and related surveillance progras causes section 1861 to be unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment and the rule of law. The statute on its face gives no notice that it could be construed to authorize the bulk collection of telephone communications information for use in future investigations that do not yet exist.

As mentioned, there are a number of similar lawsuits, and I wouldn't be surprised to see some of them lumped together at some point, but this one should be an interesting one to follow.

Filed Under: due process, fifth amendment, first amendment, fourth amendment, free speech, gun rights, nsa, nsa surveillance, privacy
Companies: calguns, eff, first unitarian church of la, franklin armory, greenpeace, human rights watch, public knowledge

Judge Says Giving Up Your Password May Be A 5th Amendment Violation

from the protect-your-data dept

Courts have gone back and forth over the years concerning whether or not being forced to give up your password to reveal encrypted data is a violation of the Fifth Amendment. Now there's been yet another decision saying that someone cannot be forced to give up their password, because it likely violates their Fifth Amendment rights.

This is a close call, but I conclude that Feldman’s act of production, which would necessarily require his using a password of some type to decrypt the storage device, would be tantamount to telling the government something it does not already know with ‘reasonably particularity’—namely, that Feldman has personal access to and control over the encrypted storage devices. Accordingly, in my opinion, Fifth Amendment protection is available to Feldman. Stated another way, ordering Feldman to decrypt the storage devices would be in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.

It's definitely a good thing to see courts getting this right. Being forced to give up your passwords and encryption is quite a slippery slope. It's good to see judges pushing back.

Filed Under: fifth amendment

School Administrator Brushes Off 'Constitutional Niceties' Like Fifth Amendment Rights For Students

from the granting-rights-means-ceding-control----can't-have-that dept

For many school administrators, the default mode is to limit the rights of students while enforcing very broadly-worded policies. The default mode may start shifting, though, as more courts are reminding administrators that, while students' rights may be more constrained than those of adults, they're not nonexistent.

Recently, a court reminded a Minnesota school district that demanding a student's Facebook password was a violation of her First and Fourth Amendment rights. The judge stated:

For more than forty years, the United States courts have recognized that students do not check their First Amendment rights at the schoolhouse door.

In an on-going case in Kentucky, the state supreme court is trying to determine whether students are entitled to Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections, specifically those related to "Miranda rights." (via Reason)

The Kentucky Supreme Court is considering a case from Nelson County that could require school officials to give the Miranda warning – You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you ... – when questioning a student with a school resource officer present.

Miranda warnings are required when a subject is in custody – when a suspect thinks he’s not free to leave – and at issue is whether a student grilled in the principal’s office inherently fits that description.

This is an interesting question. Students being detained in principals' offices are generally granted "release" at the discretion of the administrator. It's certainly not a formal detainment, like being placed in a holding cell, but it certainly isn't optional either. The U.S. Supreme Court has said that a person is in custody when "the circumstances would lead a reasonable person to conclude he was not free to leave." This would seem to be the normal conclusion a student would draw from a mandatory visit to the principal's office.

In a brief for N.C., assistant public advocate Robert Strong says that when a student is sent to the principal’s office, “He is not allowed to leave until the principal says so.” In other words, a reasonable student would conclude he was in custody, “given the coercive nature of the principal’s office,” Strong says.

This case sprung out of an incident at a Nelson County school in which a student gave another student some prescription painkillers. The "school resource officer" (actually an armed deputy sheriff) charged the student with illegally dispensing a controlled substance. The student was sentenced in a juvenile court to 45 days in an adult prison (?). His appeal (which was denied) argued that his statement should have been suppressed because he wasn't read his Miranda rights before being questioned.

There's actually some related precedent for this case. The U.S. Supreme Court handed down a ruling on students and Miranda warnings last year in a case from North Carolina, stating that the student's age must be considered when determining whether they have a right to a Miranda warning.

The facts of that case, in which a 13-year-old was interviewed by police at school about a series of neighborhood thefts, were “eerily” similar to N.C.’s case, Strong said. The boy was escorted by an armed school resource officer to an office, where he was interviewed by the officer with an assistant principal present. Neither gave him a Miranda warning.

The U.S. Supreme Court noted the purpose behind Miranda is to keep subjects from being coerced into giving false confessions, to which children are particularly prone. “A reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to go,” Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote for the court.

Most students are probably unaware of their rights and administrators seem mostly unwilling to pass on that information. It's easier for adminstration if the students operate under the assumption that their rights are limited to whatever the school policies grant them. When students are being interrogated like suspected criminals, with an armed officer present, it would seem they should be granted the same rights as other criminals (especially if the end result is a stay at an adult prison) and be given a Miranda warning before any questioning occurs. This seems like the least the school could do. But, as statements by the administration director show, the district has no interest in granting students these rights.

Simple investigations would be hamstrung and schools would be less safe if principals, every time they question a student, “must look into a crystal ball and predict, ‘This could lead to criminal charges, I have to Mirandize this child,’ ” said Wayne Young, executive director of the Kentucky Association of School Administrators.

If you're bringing an armed member of law enforcement into the room, it would seem that you've already made that determination, or have gathered enough evidence to warrant their presence. But schools with law enforcement on staff have been known to bring them along for nearly any reason, possible criminal offense or no. The case mentioned above dealt with some supposedly "bullying" statements made on Facebook about a member of the school's staff and that interrogation involved three members of administration and a law enforcement officer armed with a taser. To handle one teenage girl.

And as for the feeling that "simple investigations" would be "hamstrung" by the Miranda warning? Too bad. The police have to do it and their investigations usually concern something more threatening to safety than Facebook status updates and painkiller distribution.

Young isn't done, though. He takes the same hardline many in law enforcement and various intelligence agencies do. Alleged criminals don't deserve rights.

“If a crime is being committed in school, if somebody is handing out pain medication, I don’t think we should be troubled with constitutional niceties.”

He said courts have given schools leeway on student free-speech issues and searches, which don’t require warrants in schools, because of the importance of maintaining safety and order on campus. “The goal is to protect all children, and it doesn’t bother me if a child’s constitutional protections are limited, if it is to protect all children,” he said.

That's the same excuse used by everyone from the local school to the NSA: "safety" trumps "constitutional protections." The fact that Young refers to Constitutional rights as "niceties" reveals the condescending and dismissive attitude he has for those under his control. It's little wonder he believes that students shouldn't be read the Miranda warning, as "niceties" like the Fifth and Sixth Amendment simply get in the way of "safety" and "order." (Without Godwin-ing anything, it's a bit chilling to hear someone openly value "order" over "personal freedoms.")

Young's fears that apprising students of their Miranda rights will upset order or compromise safety are irrational. Paul Holland, dean at Seattle University Law and a Youth Advocacy Clinic instructor, believes that if school administration is going to collaborate with law enforcement when questioning students, they should "err on the side of advising students of their rights."

Holland said the fear that safety would be compromised is ill-founded because the Miranda doctrine already contains an exception when there is an imminent threat – such as for questions about the existence or location of weapons on school grounds.

Even if a student’s answers are suppressed because of a Miranda violation and couldn’t be used in a criminal case, they still could be used to suspend or expel a student, he points out in “Schooling Miranda: Policing Interrogation in the 21st Century Schoolhouse.”

It is also likely that most students will waive their right to remain silent or to an attorney, he said. “Thus, the amount of information lost to Miranda would be slight.”

Advising students of their Miranda rights is granting them a modicum of control, something Nelson County's administrators seem loathe to do. This sort of atmosphere pervades many school districts, thanks to overreaching anti-bullying policies and a general push for greater control of every aspect of their students' actions, on or off campus. If actual dangerous suspects are granted this right, however begrudgingly, why is it such a problem to extend it to students?

Filed Under: constitution, fifth amendment, schools

Verizon's Bizarre Constitutional Argument: Net Neutrality Rules Violate Its First & Fifth Amendment Rights?

from the um,-no... dept

Verizon is continuing to fight back against the FCC's (relatively weak) net neutrality rules with a few different arguments. It has one key argument that I think is a relatively strong one: which is that the FCC probably does not have a mandate to regulate in this way. That's something that Congress could conceivably change, but it certainly does look like the FCC tried to overstep its bounds in putting out the rules that it did. That said, Verizon goes even further to make some bizarre constitutional claims, including that net neutrality rules violates its free speech (First Amendment) rights, as well as its Fifth Amendment rights by "taking" its property. Neither Constitutional argument should hold up.

The First Amendment argument is based on the idea that this somehow blocks Verizon's ability to communicate its ideas:

The First Amendment protects not only traditional speakers, but other participants in the “communication of ideas.”... For example, it protects those transmitting the speech of others, and those who “exercis[e] editorial discretion” in selecting which speech to transmit and how to transmit it.... Broadband providers engage in and transmit speech, and the rules—which limit broadband providers’ own speech and compel carriage of others’ speech—cannot survive scrutiny.

Broadband providers transmit their own speech both by developing their own content and by partnering with other content providers and adopting that speech as their own. For example, they develop video services, which draw information from, and are then made available over, the Internet. Many also select or create content for their own over-the-top video services or offer applications that provide access to particular content. They also transmit the speech of others: each day millions of individuals use the Internet to promote their own opinions and ideas and to explore those of others, and broadband providers convey those communications.

In performing these functions, broadband providers possess “editorial discretion.” Just as a newspaper is entitled to decide which content to publish and where, broadband providers may feature some content over others. Although broadband providers have generally exercised their discretion to allow all content in an undifferentiated manner... they nonetheless possess discretion that these rules preclude them from exercising. For example, they could distinguish their own content from that of other speakers or offer that capability to others. In fact, some types of speech, such as live streaming high-definition video, could benefit from (or may only be available with) differential treatment, such as prioritization. Broadband providers could also give differential pricing or priority access to their over-the-top video services or other applications they provide, or otherwise feature that content.... Indeed, the FCC’s concern that broadband providers will differentiate among various content presumes that they will exercise editorial discretion.

The Order’s broad “prophylactic rules” infringe broadband providers’ protected speech rights. They strip providers of control over which speech they transmit and how they transmit it, and they compel the carriage of others’ speech. They also limit the means by which providers can secure additional revenue, which impairs their ability to deploy new networks and capabilities (or to expand the size of existing ones), thereby limiting their ability to speak and deliver speech. And they make clear that even “specialized services,” such as video services, will be subject to the Order’s restrictions if the FCC decides that such services are “retarding the growth of ... broadband Internet access service,” or if broadband providers merely “advertis[e]” these services to consumers as “Internet” services, ... thus constraining their marketing speech as well.

This is, to put it mildly, a silly argument. Telling Verizon that it can't hinder certain services from working online is not a free speech issue. Verizon is both overclaiming its own abilities as an internet service provider and twisting the First Amendment in a bizarre way. As Stacey Higginbotham noted, this argument "ignores the fact that under net neutrality mandated non-discrimination Verizon’s packets and speech are just as likely to reach the end user as Netflix’s or Google’s." But it's even worse than that. Verizon is effectively arguing that if it chooses not to allow a certain service to exist online that is a form of expression. Think of it this way: say Verizon decided to block Skype, because Skype is eating into its local telephone business. According to Verizon, that decision is a form of expression and the government can't block that, since that "expression" is protected. The "newspaper" analogy that Verizon offers is completely specious, because the internet isn't a newspaper where there's a single publisher who chooses what goes in. The whole argument is ludicrous.

The second argument -- that this is somehow against the "takings clause" of the Fifth Amendment (blocking the government "taking" property without compensation) -- is equally bizarre. It involves Verizon claiming that the government would be "invading" its network and "taking" property without compensation:

The Order also violates the Fifth Amendment. It grants the equivalent of a permanent easement on private broadband networks for the use of others without just compensation—a per se taking.... “In essence,” edge providers “receive an unlimited, continuous right of access to broadband providers’ private property for free,” which “allows them to physically invade broadband networks with their electronic signals and permanently occupy portions of network capacity.” D. Lyons, Virtual Takings: The Coming Fifth Amendment Challenge to Net Neutrality Regulation.... The resulting occupation is physical, for increases in network traffic consume available capacity and ultimately require the acquisition or construction of additional capacity.

Even without a physical occupation, the rules constitute a regulatory taking because they “interfere[] with [broadband providers’] distinct investment-backed expectations.”.... Providers have invested billions in broadband infrastructure on the understanding that they can manage access to network facilities and use those facilities to offer the products that their customers want. These rules sharply curb providers’ ability to do so, thereby frustrating their substantial and reasonable investment-backed expectations.

Once again, this argument seems disconnected from reality. Considering that much more aggressive "must carry" rules have been deemed Constitutional, it's hard to see how this argument makes any sense at all. Also, just from a common sense perspective, it fails on a few fronts. First, there's nothing being "taken" here. There is no "easement," just a restriction on how Verizon could run the network. If Verizon's argument here prevailed, you could potentially argue that any regulation that restricted how a company acted was a form of a "taking." But that's silly.

Even more to the point: while Verizon likes to go on and on about how these are its private networks that it spent so much time and money installing, what it conveniently leaves out are all of the massive government subsidies and rights-of-way that were provided. In some cases, Verizon received massive public gifts in terms of subsidies to build this network. One could easily make the argument that those entitle the government to place a few requirements on the network, considering that the network likely wouldn't exist without those subsidies and rights-of-way.

That said, I still agree that the FCC's mandate likely does not allow the kind of regulations it put forth here. But that doesn't make the Constitutional arguments any less silly.

Filed Under: congress, fcc, fifth amendment, first amendment, net neutrality
Companies: verizon

Congress Begins To Wonder Why ICE & DOJ Censored A Popular Hip Hop Blog For A Year

from the asking-good-questions dept

We already discussed the RIAA's attempt to downplay its role in helping the feds seize and censor the popular hiphop blog Dajaz1.com. It seems the feds are also trying to brush this off as if it's nothing important. According to a comment they gave Ben Sistario at the NY Times:

Ross Feinstein, a spokesman for Immigration and Customs Enforcement said Sunday that government officials had followed all proper procedures in the case of Dajaz1, which was one of more than 760 sites seized.

That really makes you wonder. How is it possible that they could have followed "all proper procedures" when the end result is that they stopped a popular blog from publishing for well over a year, without ever actually filing a lawsuit? If that's the "proper procedure" then the procedure is what most people call "unconstitutional."

Thankfully, it appears some are noticing this. Senator Ron Wyden clearly understood what's going on and told Techdirt:

"The domain name seizures show that some agencies in the Obama administration care more about the interests of Hollywood studios and the big record labels than due process, transparency, and accountability. It is hard to believe that ICE and DOJ had Dajaz1's Fifth amendment rights in mind when they seized their property and held it for more than a year without ever being able to build a case."

Rep. Zoe Lofgren spoke out about the case to Politico, pointing out that the seizure appears to break the law:

"A blog has the same protections as a newspaper or magazine, and yet ICE saw fit to seize this site for over a year for dubious reasons," Lofgren told MT. "It's an outrageous abuse of First Amendment and due process rights, raising serious questions about why the Department of Justice allowed this seizure to continue when the government clearly did not have probable cause."

Indeed. With Wyden concerned about the Fifth Amendment and Lofgren concerned about the First... I'm guessing that this isn't the end of the discussion around this particular seizure.

Filed Under: censorship, dajaz1, doj, fifth amendment, first amendment, ice, ron wyden, seizure, zoe lofgren
Companies: riaa

Judge Says Americans Can Be Forced To Decrypt Laptops

from the 5th-amendment-begone dept

A few years ago, we wrote about a case, in which a court found that a defendant could not be forced to give up his encryption key for encrypted files on his computer, because that would be a violation of the 5th Amendment. The argument was that the key was a form of speech, and that speech would self-incriminate the person. However, in a new case, a judge has said that it is not a 5th Amendment violation if a defendant is required to decrypt their laptop, even if that laptop contains incriminating information. The difference here? The key. In the first case, the question was over whether or not the defendant had to hand over the key. In this case, there was no request for the key -- just to decrypt the hard drive. As the court saw it, this was no different than demanding a defendant hand over documents related to a case, something that obviously happens all the time. It does seem like a fine line (and perhaps a meaningless distinction if law enforcement now knows to do the latter, rather than the former). Either way, the defendant in this case, Ramona Fricosu, accused of being part of a mortgage scam, is intending to appeal. It would be interesting to see the Supreme Court eventually weigh in, but I would guess that they'll side with this particular ruling.

Filed Under: decryption, encryption, fifth amendment