TSA Now Making Its Intrusive Searches Even More Gropey & Assaulty

from the hello-sexual-assault dept

For years we've pointed out the sheer insanity of the TSA's security theater, which is intrusive, insulting and does little to actually make us any safer. One aspect (of many) that has been particularly troubling is the way that the TSA has basically enabled sexual assault of travelers. If you felt that wasn't too bad, have no fear, the TSA is apparently increasing the sexual assaulty nature of these searches:

The new physical touching—for those selected to have a pat-down—will be be what the federal agency officially describes as a more “comprehensive” physical screening, according to a Transportation Security Administration spokesman.

Denver International Airport, for example, notified employees and flight crews on Thursday that the “more rigorous” searches “will be more thorough and may involve an officer making more intimate contact than before.”

Got that? I love the way they dance around the fact that this is randomly allowed sexual assault on people who just want to travel somewhere. But it's described as "physical touching" that is more "comprehensive" and "may involve an officer making more intimate contact."

So why are TSA agents allowed to get more gropey, just a year or so after it was discovered that some TSA agents were scheming specifically to be able to sexually assault travelers they found attractive? Well, it's because it's been revealed how useless TSA security theater is. Really. After yet another set of reports pointed out that all this security theater is useless, the TSA said "welp, the answer to that must be moar sexual assault!:

The change is partly a result of the agency’s study of a 2015 report that criticized aspects of TSA screening procedures. That audit, by the Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector General, drew headlines because airport officers had failed to detect handguns and other weapons.

This is madness. The answer to the TSA's awful and useless security theater should never be to give TSA agents more power to sexually assault travelers with "more intimate contact." This is not about security. This is about the TSA wanting to make it look like they're doing something, and apparently that includes groping strangers who are just trying to get somewhere. How the hell does sexually assaulting travelers make anyone any safer?

Filed Under: 4th amendment, groping, searches, security theater, sexual assault, tsa

Confirmed: TSA's Behavioral Detection Program Is Useless, Biased, And Based On Junk Science

from the come-fly-the-discriminatory-skies dept

Thanks to FOIA requests (and lawsuits), the ACLU has gathered enough documents to provide a comprehensive report [PDF] on the worthlessness of the TSA's "Behavioral Detection" program. Meant to give the agency a better way of proactively thwarting acts of terrorism, the program instead opts for lazy profiling, dubious readings of behavioral cues, and junk science.

The documents show the evolution of the behavior detection program and make clear the extent to which it is a program of surveillance of unsuspecting travelers based on unreliable indicators. “Behavior detection officers,” some of them dressed in plain clothes, scrutinize travelers at airports for over 90 behaviors that the TSA associates with stress, fear, or deception, looking for what the TSA calls signs of “mal-intent.” The reliability of these so-called indicators is not supported by the scientific studies in the TSA files. The behavior detection officers may then engage travelers in “casual conversation” that is actually an effort to probe the basis for any purported signs of deception. When the officers think they perceive those behaviors, they follow the travelers, subject them to additional screening, and at times bring in law enforcement officers who can investigate them further.

The TSA has repeatedly claimed that the behavior detection program is grounded in valid science, but the records that the ACLU obtained show that the TSA has in its possession a significant body of research that contradicts those claims. The records include numerous academic studies and articles that directly undermine the premise of the program: the notion that TSA officers can identify threats to aviation security with some reliability based on specific behaviors in an airport setting. In fact, the scientific literature in the TSA’s own files reinforces that deception detection is inherently unreliable, and that many of the behaviors the TSA is apparently relying on are actually useless in detecting deception. The documents further show that the TSA either overstated the scientific validity of behavior detection techniques in communications with members of Congress and government auditors, or did not disclose information that discredited the program’s scientific validity.

There's nothing good in the ACLU's findings. In addition to the contradictory lists of "behavioral indicators" that would make pretty much every traveler suspicious, the documents also include a "Behavioral Detection" presentation [PDF] that shows the compiler's inherent bias. For no appropriate reason, the presentation includes the following images:

Right above these questionable images is something just as questionable: a profile of "female suicide bombers" that pretty much encompasses the entirety of the female gender.

If you can't read/see the picture, the female suicide bomber profiles reads as follows:

Single, married, mothers or grandmothers

High school and college students

Working professionals such as lawyers, journalists, or medical practitioners

Devout or non-devout in religious beliefs

Intelligent, charming, and attractive

Very active in their cause

The cost of this program -- which simultaneously caters to biases while providing little in the way of useful targeting -- runs in the billions. In exchange, US taxpayers have received almost nothing that makes air travel safer. What they have obtained is the "opportunity" to be questioned without being detained, as TSA agents attempt to apply contradictory non-science to "casual" conversations most travelers feel compelled to engage in.

Engaging in mock-casual conversation with TSA agents is guaranteed to result in some level of suspicion, as it would be almost impossible not to.

The TSA’s list of behavioral indicators—long held secret but leaked to the press in March 2015—deepens our concerns about the program and calls into question whether it could ever be implemented neutrally and objectively. The list includes conduct as commonplace as being late for a flight, yawning, whistling, or rubbing one’s hands together. Other “indicators” are unavoidably subjective: appearing confused, “wearing improper attire,” “appearing not to understand questions,” or displaying “exaggerated emotions.”

In some cases, the TSA indicators place travelers in the difficult position of seeming deceptive to the TSA no matter what they do—whether they “give[] non-answers” to questions or they are “overly specific with answers”; whether they are “gazing down” or “constantly looking at other travelers or associates”; whether they have “no or little direct eye contact” or they have “widely open staring eyes.”

Putting agents in the position of sussing out potential terrorists with a long list of contradictory indicators does travelers and their safety no favors. When nothing can be reconciled against the TSA's disproven "science," agents are more likely to fall back on their own biases when vetting travelers. Hence the large number of non-white fliers "randomly" selected for additional screening.

The program hasn't made the TSA smarter or more nimble. All it's done is made flying even more unpleasant, especially for those that fit the "profile" the TSA provides… which is damn near everyone attempting to board a plane.

Filed Under: behavioral detection, dhs, junk science, searches, tsa
Companies: aclu

FBI, CBP Join Forces To Turn Airports Into Informant Recruiting Centers

from the which-do-you-prefer?-a.)-spying-for-us-or-b.)-being-arrested? dept

The FBI and CBP have been using the nation's borders as recruiting stations for informants. This phrasing makes it sound a lot more voluntary than it actually is. The Intercept has obtained documents showing how these two agencies work together to pressure foreign visitors into basically becoming spies for the United States.

The FBI gives CBP a list of countries of origin to watch out for among passengers, sometimes specifying other characteristics, such as travel history or age. It also briefs CPB officers on its intelligence requirements. The CBP sifts through its data to provide the bureau with a list of incoming travelers of potential interest. The FBI can then ask CBP to flag people for extra screening, questioning, and follow-up visits. According to the documents, the FBI uses the border questioning as a pretext to approach people it wants to turn informant and inserts itself into the immigration process by instructing agents on how to offer an “immigration relief dangle.”

These documents confirm what was alleged in a lawsuit filed by Rahinah Ibrahim two years ago. Her filing pointed out that the FBI has used threats in the past to secure cooperation, like revoking traveling privileges or trying to prosecute immigrants for minor crimes. Ibrahim's lawsuit had another allegation: the secret "no fly" list is also being used as a coercive tool, with agents threatening to add travelers' names to the list if they refused to go to work as informants.

The documents obtained here note that the joint recruiting efforts have expanded far past the nation's border. Some form exists in every airport in the nation. Travel to and from certain countries is flagged for extra scrutiny. The CBP collects extensive data on everything crossing US borders -- people or products -- and turns this over to the FBI with any potential targets pre-flagged. It also provides the FBI with a list of passengers expected to arrive from "countries of interest" at the nation's airports within the next 72 hours.

The CBP is supposedly in the border-securing business and the FBI in the law enforcement business, but these directives turn them both into intelligence agencies. This has made both agencies far more interested in recruitment and data harvesting than their original directives. The documents show that the CBP tends to grab the most data, starting with basic traveler information. There is no predetermined endpoint to the CBP's investigative work. Secondary screenings at borders could run from a few minutes to several hours, depending on how much the CBP wants to harvest.

The CBP materials indicate that as part of secondary inspections, CBP can search “pocket litter,” documents, and cellphones. The April 2012 presentation promises a “full cell dump, including #s, text messages, pictures, etc.” at certain airports.

Everything is passed on to the Joint Terrorism Task Force, which then starts the uglier work of pushing certain travelers into becoming informants, using both carrots, sticks and, in some cases, visits to their homes. Immigration revocation threats are common. So is the promise of benefits. But in both cases, the FBI -- working with CBP info -- is using motivations it can't actually offer or revoke.

When potential informants are not U.S. citizens, they may be particularly vulnerable to pressure from the FBI. Indeed, the bureau is counting on people thinking that FBI involvement in immigration decisions is normal, the documents indicate. In reality, FBI agents are expressly forbidden from promising immigration benefits to potential informants or threatening deportation.

The agency apparently believes deceiving foreign citizens during the recruitment process causes zero damage.

“If subject is deemed ‘recruitable,’” the slides state, then a “series of overt interviews set into motion.” If the person is “not recruitable,” then “NO HARM. Subject believes that the interview is part of the immigration process.”

This is why these recruitment efforts work. The FBI is counting on the ignorance of visiting travelers to help it turn visitors into informants. A suspicionless detention in which several invasive questions are asked is considered to be "no harm," and the FBI will just move on to the next suggestion from CBP. And even if they think this might have been out of the ordinary, what are they going to do? Complain to another person in uniform and hope that the implied threats of deportation are bogus?

Filed Under: airports, cbp, fbi, informants, recruiting, tsa

Half Of TSA's 30,000 Employees Accused Of Misconduct; Nearly A Third Multiple Times

from the too-big-to-fix dept

The TSA is a multibillion dollar agency with nearly zero redeemable qualities. It can only act in hindsight, does almost nothing to make traveling safer, and seemingly devotes most of its screening efforts to toddlers, cancer patients, and ensuring carry-on liquids do not exceed three ounces.

What it lacks in competency, it makes up in misconduct. Lines at security checkpoints have slowed to a crawl. Making it through the tedious, invasive process sometimes means inadvertently "donating" expensive electronics to sticky-fingered agents. The TSA's morale is generally on par with Congress' approval rates. And, when it's all said and done, the people hired to protect travelers just plain suck at their job.

Despite the Transportation Security Administration's ten-point action plan to reduce long lines at airports across the country, lengthy queues remain. Now, the TSA's summer may be getting even worse: According to a recent report from the House Homeland Security Commission entitled "Misconduct at TSA Threatens the Security of the Flying Public", nearly half of the TSA’s 60,000 employees have been cited for misconduct in recent years.

As Katherine LaGrave of the Conde Nast Traveler points out, the problem is only getting worse. Complaints are up 28% over the last three years, with larger airports averaging a complaint a week. Long lines may be causing a spike in the complaints, but the misconduct detailed in the report has very little to do directly with this issue.

Attendance issues are part of the problem, but the offenses listed in the report range from missing work to smuggling drugs/humans to "engaging in child pornography activities." Although processes are in place to handle disciplinary issues, they are both bureaucratic and inconsistently applied. Worse, the investigation found that the agency has no specific process in place to fire problem employees.

But the obvious takeaway from this report is that the TSA is not improving. It's getting worse, despite the institution of an action plan and added layers of direct oversight. The report also cautions that this will never improve, at least not if the TSA continues to ignore internal issues. It notes that misconduct allegations have increased by nearly 29% in the last three years but opened investigations not increased, but have actually gone down 15% over the same period.

Then there's this:

Almost half of TSA’s entire workforce allegedly committed misconduct, and almost half of that number allegedly did so repeatedly. According to TSA data, from fiscal year 2013 through 2015, almost 27,000 unique employees had an allegation of misconduct filed against them. Moreover, about half of those employees had two or more misconduct allegations filed against them, with some employees having 14, 16, and 18 allegations. In fact, 1,270 employees had five or more misconduct allegations filed against them.

The TSA knows -- or should know -- who its problem employees are. It just isn't willing to do anything about them.

The TSA's toxic culture didn't form in a vacuum. It started at the top, thanks to legislators granting the agency far too much power and demanding far too little in terms of accountability in return. The TSA has crafted policies containing several exploitable loopholes for upper management to abuse. TSA officials are unwilling to fix internal issues, and have provided nothing to Congressional oversight when questioned about the agency's disciplinary problems.

On March 10, 2016, Chairman McCaul requested data from TSA on the number of directed reassignments that have taken place to understand the depth of this type of misconduct and to give TSA an opportunity to present information in its defense. However, almost four months later, TSA has only provided about half of the requested data stating that it has required manual review of case files. If this information is not readily available to provide to Congress, it is likely not readily available to TSA decision-makers, and indicates that TSA is not providing oversight of these types of reassignments.

The agency refuses to track misconduct on its own, suggesting it would rather have a bunch of warm bodies in place than anyone truly interested in the important job they've been entrusted with. Everything rolls downhill from there. If the agency is unwilling to do even the minimum to curb misconduct, it should come as no surprise that it's become host to a large number of misbehaving employees. Fifteen years of mismanagement has turned a response to a horrific attack into a playground for people who like lots of power and zero accountability.

Filed Under: abuse, misconduct, security, security theater, tsa

TSA Scores Another PR Win With Assault Of Nineteen Year Old Brain Tumor Patient On Her Way To Treatment

from the there-is-a-dumpster-fire-that-never-goes-out dept

The TSA -- still reeling from an investigation showing agents couldn't find explosives in a fireworks factory and mounting complaints about long screening lines stemming from its unofficial work slowdown, one that began shortly after the agency's inception -- has decided to generate more positive PR by brutalizing a disabled nineteen-year-old girl with a brain tumor.

If this sounds like broad satire of the often-thuggish agency rather than real life, read on and be amazed/dismayed. First, let's take a quick look at the threat to traveler safety TSA agents neutralized at the Memphis International Airport.

The unarmed nineteen-year-old somehow set off the metal detectors. TSA agents swiftly moved in to secure the threat, blowing right past Hannah Cohen's mother, who tried to inform them that sudden, violent motions were not going to be exactly helpful. (via Raw Story)

“They wanted to do further scanning, she was reluctant, she didn't understand what they were about to do," said her mother Shirley Cohen.

Cohen told us she tried to tell TSA agents her daughter is partially deaf, blind in one eye, paralyzed, and easily confused, but said she was kept at a distance by police.

Hannah Cohen -- suffering from multiple physical ailments -- reacted badly. She tried to run. The TSA reacted the only way it knows how.

She's trying to get away from them but in the next instant, one of them had her down on the ground and hit her head on the floor. There was blood everywhere,” said Cohen.

Rather than chalk this up to a big, bloody misunderstanding, the TSA and local authorities worked together to lock Hannah up overnight while her and her family's baggage continued on to Chattanooga without them. Charges were dropped, but that's not going to be the end of it. Cohen has filed a lawsuit against the TSA and Memphis law enforcement agencies.

The TSA, meanwhile, took immediate steps to mitigate the damage by stating that Hannah's parents should have called ahead if it didn't want their child terrorized and tackled.

Sari Koshetz of TSA released a statement that said, “Passengers can call ahead of time to learn more about the screening process for their particular needs or medical situation.”

No apology. No admission that this might have been handled better. No recognition that the agents' failure to listen to Hannah Cohen's mother might have resulted in a brain tumor patient covered in less blood and fear. Just a bit of victim blaming where the TSA implies that agents may not have reacted so badly to a metal detector beep if only they'd been informed ahead of time that the alarm would go off and Hannah Cohen would react badly to swiftly escalating screening efforts.

The most ridiculous thing about the spokesperson's comment is that we're supposed to believe the TSA will listen to parents of disabled travelers if they call ahead -- when it's plainly apparent they won't listen to them when they're STANDING RIGHT NEXT TO THEM.

Filed Under: security, tsa

Baltimore Transit Officials Won't Release Footage Of Freddie Gray Protests Because Everything Is Always About 'Terrorism'

from the an-excuse-with-a-universal-adapter dept

The excuse that worked so well for so long -- "because terrorism" -- seems to have lost its luster. Despite having a locked iPhone tied to a mass shooting with terrorist overtones, the FBI was unable to budge the needle on encryption backdoors or magical "lawful access" crypto keys.

However, that doesn't mean any number of government entities aren't willing to use the ever present "threat" of terrorism as fuel for their various civil liberties-endangering bonfires. Or that they won't use it as a profoundly cheap excuse to withhold information from the American public -- like the Indiana State Police's refusal to turn over Stingray docs because doing so might allow terrorists to plan attacks on cherished annual state events like the Mule Day Parade.

The Maryland Transit Authority has been ducking a Public Information Act (PIA) request from the Baltimore Sun for nearly a year at this point. The paper asked for surveillance footage from the Mondawin Metro station, captured in April of last year as police shut down mass transit in anticipation of protests following the death of Freddie Gray in the back of Baltimore PD van.

The MTA's first refusal utilized another very popular law enforcement excuse.

In denying the Sun's first PIA request last year, the MTA said that the office of Baltimore State's Attorney Marilyn Mosby had asked it not to release the footage because it was still being used in criminal investigations.

The Sun took this in stride and issued another request almost a year later.

The Sun sent the MTA another PIA request for the footage last month, noting that there is a statute of limitations of one year for misdemeanor charges, and that it had been a year since the incident in question — limiting the number of pending investigations there could be.

If some footage remained relevant to open investigations, The Sun said, that footage could be redacted and the rest made available.

The MTA's bluff had been called but it still had no interest in turning over the requested footage. So, it reached for the bluff that can never be called -- because it is existential, wholly subjective, and without an expiration date.

When the MTA responded last week, it made no mention of pending investigations in the state's attorney's office. It said instead that the footage could not be released because of Homeland Security concerns.

If you thought that was the end of the stupidity, you're mistaken. The Sun asked for clarification -- did this mean the MTA would never release footage from its security cameras? The MTA clarified with a bullshit-laden buck pass:

The MTA responded Friday, explaining that The Sun would have to ask the federal Transportation Security Administration for written permission to review any of the footage from the cameras, because they were funded through Homeland Security grants.

The MTA controls the cameras. It acquired them with grant money, but they are still the sole property of the MTA. The TSA is a completely unconnected third party. The DHS hands out grant money, not the TSA. And even if the TSA was somehow connected because of the grant, the footage requested only involved local law enforcement.

But it gets even worse. Even if the Sun were able to talk the TSA into granting permission (that really isn't its to grant) for the release of the requested footage, the MTA would still refuse to hand it over.

[I]f The Sun were to get that permission, it said, the MTA still would deny the footage based on its belief that the footage "would reveal the facility's safety and support systems, surveillance techniques, and security systems and technologies," as well as "jeopardize the security of the facility; facilitate the planning of a terrorist attack; and endanger the life or physical safety of the public."

This is the problem with public records laws. The government still maintains far too much control. Officials may occasionally talk big about "presumption of transparency," but when push comes to shove, its agencies like these doing all the pushing and shoving -- and routinely delivering the government equivalent of the playground rebuttal: "Make me."

Filed Under: baltimore, foia, freddie gray, protests, terrorism, transit, tsa

FOIA Documents Expose Details On TSA's $47,000 Coin Flipping App

from the but-with-at-least-as-much-possible-groin-grabbing-as-Tinder! dept

Time for yet another episode of "Your Tax Dollars Faffing About." According to documents liberated by Kevin Burke, the TSA spent a ridiculous amount of money on an iPad app that randomly generates a left or right arrow.

They sent me two documents. The first is a disclaimer about how they had to black out some of the information. The second is the contract between the TSA and IBM. And there's the payment:

Later today Pratheek Rebala reached out to mention that this data is available publicly, and there were 8 other payments as part of the same award, totaling $1.4 million; the document I have is one part, totaling $336,000. Furthermore, there were 4 bids for the contract and IBM won the bidding.

Because these are FOIA documents, some information has not been freed. (See: FOIA Exemption: SOP) This makes it difficult to narrow down the amount of the contract that went just to the random number/arrow generator.

Here's a blurry photo of the app in use, overseen by a TSA agent wearing the regulation genital-fondling gloves.


The TSA -- presumably appropriately shamed for spending $1.4 million on an app someone could build for several hundred thousand dollars less/without IBM's awesome computing power during their spare time -- began reaching out to those covering this story with a correction.

Taxpayers: the $1.4 million may have been blown on a left/right arrow app in total, but only ~$50,000 went directly to the development of the TSA's random number generator.

The total development cost for the randomizer app was $47,400, a TSA spokesperson told Mashable, which was part of the $336,413.59 contract.

No further details were provided. This clarification suggests the TSA only comically overpaid for its "randomizer" rather than tragicomically overpaid for its digital coin flipper.

It's not that the app doesn't serve a purpose -- although it does so in an overpriced, underwhelming fashion. The TSA had two concerns to address. First, it didn't want to be viewed as "profiling" when "randomly" selecting people for extra scrutiny, as it had in the past.

You're OK.
You're OK.
You're… brown. Come this way.
You're OK.
You're OK.
You're… an infant. Please follow me.

Second, it had to actually randomize the outcome to deter would-be terrorists from gaming the system and bypassing the Director's Cut of the TSA's Security Theater.

So, it handled it as government agencies are supposed to. It made a list of requirements, opened up the floor for bidding, awarded the contract, and (most likely) watched deadlines and budget targets sail past like passengers granted instant Pre-Check approval just because the lines were getting a little long.

Now, it's probably not quite as ridiculous as it first appears -- all of this money devoted to a left/right arrow generator. The app would need to be both tamper-proof and idiot-proof and combining the TSA and IBM on a project is going to generate a lot of overhead costs. The total may also include the purchase of a few hundred iPads, which aren't exactly easy on the wallet.

But in the end, it's $50,000 for a random number generator with a lackluster front-end being run by a Wal-Mart greeter but for potential terrorists. And to date, it has yet to direct a would-be terrorist into the waiting arms of secondary screeners.

Filed Under: foia, tsa

Former DHS Secretary Says We Can Make Airports Safer From Terrorists By Rearranging Security Checkpoints

from the another-security-theater-script-rewrite-in-the-works dept

Another terrorist attack somewhere in the world* has provoked another round of punditry from former government officials on how to protect America from future attacks. Over the coming weeks, there will be no shortage of stupid ideas, useless ideas and pointless discussions about "heightened security" at any place people gather.

*"World" = Western Europe only

None of it will matter. Security has never really been scaled back anywhere since the 9/11 attacks -- certainly not to the levels seen prior to September 2001. There's only so much security anyone can actually provide but endless off-Broadway productions of security theater to be explored.

Michael Chertoff -- head of the Chertoff Group and former Homeland Security secretary -- spoke to CBS This Morning about what might need to be done to make airports more secure. Chertoff is right about one thing: TSA checkpoints create a tempting target of massed humans -- all waiting for their chance to be probed, scanned and groped by government employees.

“Well I have to say this is something I’ve spoken to people about for some time. The actual portion of the airport before the checkpoint is not really controlled by the federal government, it’s controlled by the local authorities. And it has increasingly become vulnerable, because as people wait to go through security they actually congregate there.”

I'm not sure the local boys will appreciate this dig at their security skills. But Chertoff's "solution" is just a literal expansion of federal government territory.

“And so now there’s an effort I think on the part of TSA to start to move the airports into pushing the security envelope back. We’ve seen some of that in terms of not allowing you to park in front of the terminal, but I think we’re going to have to step that up.”

So… move the target. Instead of being deep inside the airport, it will be closer to the entrance. As Gawker's Alex Pareene notes, at some point you can't push the envelope back any further. And there's no expansion point that will magically protect fliers from terrorist attacks.

Ah. Of course. We’ll “push the security envelope back.” The old checkpoints created crowds, sure, but once we move the security checkpoints back, just a bit bit further (to just before you enter the airport, I guess), it will be much safer for everyone, at least once everyone gets past the new checkpoints. Maybe eventually we can push the security envelope back to before you get in your car to go to the airport—your garage door, maybe?

Push people closer to the entrance. Make them more vulnerable to car bombs/larger groups of attackers. Push the envelope all the way out to the connecting roads. Same problem but with the added bonus of intrusive vehicle searches for everyone heading to the airport, whether they're planning to fly or not. There's no point where traveler safety suddenly spikes. Every nudge of the envelope opens as many attack vectors as it shuts down.

That's the ridiculousness of the TSA. It has done almost nothing to make flying safer. The only thing anyone can say for sure is that the TSA has made flying more annoying.

Maybe they'll move the checkpoints. Maybe they won't. Airplanes aren't the target. People are. And people are everywhere. To paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, you can't save all of the people all of the time, but you can make most of them miserable most of the time. That's how the DHS works. Actions must always be followed by reactions specifically tailored to address the parameters of the last attack or perceived threat. Somehow, we'll be safer by staying one step behind and ceding control to the government.

Filed Under: brussels, checkpoints, dhs, michael chertoff, security, security theater, tsa

Techdirt Crowdsourcing: How Will The TSA Idiotically Respond To The Laptop Terror Bomb?

from the giving-them-ideas dept

The terrorism arms race marches on, apparently. You may have heard of the recent attack on a passenger plane taking off from Somalia. By all accounts, the attacker managed to get onto the plane with a laptop that contained a bomb, which he detonated during takeoff. The result? The bomber was sucked out of the hole he created in the plane and died, while a couple of other passengers were mildly wounded. The universe, it seems, is not without either a sense of justice or humor.

Still, you absolutely know that this will create a typical shitstorm at the TSA. Security theater stops for nobody, after all, and this latest attempt is sure to put a focus on any computer devices passengers are bringing with them on flights. Laptops and tablets are already screened by the TSA, of course, but somehow this guy got on the plane with his bomb-filled notebook. Even though it happened outside the US (so not directly a TSA failing), it's not difficult to expect that things are predictably and stupidly going to get more strict on the rest of us. We thought it might be fun to engage in a little crowdsourcing of predictions as to what the TSA reaction will be. In our writing room, your esteemed Techdirt writers came up with some ideas to help you get started:

• If you have not upgraded to Windows 10, passengers will be forced to do so at the security checkpoint.
• If you run a machine using Linux, yeah, you're not getting on the damn plane.
• The TSA will have a special USB key that it will plug into every computer. It won't actually detect explosives, but it will download any nude photos you have of yourself on the machine for TSA employees to enjoy. They love that shit, after all.
• All laptops must be in a vaccuum sealed plastic bag and cannot be opened until the plane has landed.
• Any laptop over a certain weight will immediately be tossed in the same bin as all of the breast milk, insulin, and contact solution.
• If your machine contains a copy of Minesweeper, you are shot on sight.

We know our community can do much better than the above, however, so feel free to comment with your own predictions for how the TSA will battle the scourge of laptop explosives that probably don't actually exist. As a side note, one wonders how useless all of that in-flight WiFi equipment is going to be in the near future.

Filed Under: bombs, laptops, security theater, tsa

DEA So Forfeiture-Focused It Hired A TSA Screener To Check Travelers And Baggage For 'Guilty' Cash

from the if-drug-trafficking-dips,-so-do-the-opportunities-to-grab-cash,-so... dept

Here you are: written evidence that asset forfeiture leads to law enforcement activity, rather than the other way around. (h/t Brad Heath)

The DEA has already been blasted by the DOJ's Inspector General for its confidential informant program. The DEA's informants were paid when they weren't producing intel. They were paid and sheltered from prosecution when they committed criminal acts falling outside their purview as informants. And the entire program was adrift in a sea of corruption and chaos, subject to no real oversight. To top it all off, Inspector General Michael Horowitz had to battle the DEA for every document and piece of relevant information just to arrive at these conclusions.

It's not just common criminals being added to the DEA's payroll as confidential informants. It's also other government employees. The DEA isn't running a government employee-focused sting, however. It's just looking for money. More eyes mean more money. And the eyes that will see the most money in transit will be those located at commuter hubs.

First off, the one-page report (which follows up its comprehensive report on the DEA's informant program) notes that the DEA is throwing away tax dollars by paying a TSA agent to do something they should be doing anyway: reporting evidence of criminal activity to law enforcement.

The OIG determined that registering a TSA Security Screener as a CS violated DEA policy, which precludes registering as a CS “employees of U.S. law enforcement agencies who are working solely in their official capacity with DEA.” The OIG also found that TSA Security Screeners are obligated to report to law enforcement suspected criminal activity that they observe in the course of their duties. Therefore, by registering a TSA Security Screener as a CS, the DEA agreed to pay for information that the screener was already obligated to provide to law enforcement.

So, that's misuse of funds. Now we get to the reason the DEA felt compelled to throw tax dollars at a fellow government employee.

The OIG further determined that asking the TSA Security Screener to notify the DEA of passengers carrying large sums of money in exchange for a reward based on money seized by the DEA violated the DEA’s interdiction manual, and could have violated individuals’ protection against unreasonable searches and seizures if it led to a subsequent DEA enforcement action.

Judging from the DEA's enthusiasm for confiscating cash from travelers, it's highly unlikely this is a unique arrangement. This one just happened to get exposed.

For those of you playing along at home by counting your remaining tax dollars, there is an upside: the DEA is apparently so inept at choosing confidential informants that no money ever exchanged hands (from the DEA to the TSA screener or, it would seem, from travelers to the DEA).

While the OIG concluded that the DEA violated its policies by registering the TSA Security Screener as a CS and by offering the screener a reward for money seized based on information he provided, the OIG found that the TSA Security Screener did not provide DEA any actionable information while a CS, and was not paid any money by the DEA. The CS was deactivated for inability to provide any useful information.

This short summary shows the DEA's real interest is in cash seizures, not eliminating drug trafficking. It's so obsessed with the immediacy of cash forfeitures that it's willing to cut other government employees in on the deal. The incentives are already severely perverted. Drafting a security screener as a Junior G-Man on a contingency basis shifts that person's focus from airline security to eyeballing carry-on baggage for non-threatening cash. This partnership makes each participant weaker and we, the taxpayers, are paying for both.

Filed Under: asset forfeiture, cash, dea, tsa