Understanding The 'Splinternet'

from the how-our-digital-world-fractures dept

In recent years, technologists have coined the phrase “splinternet” to describe the internet’s supposed evolution from a unified, borderless realm into a fragmented set of parallel internets, divided by national borders.

This assumes that the internet was, at one point, global in some meaningful sense. But the reality has always been more complex. From the stark digital divide for students during COVID-19 to Western companies enacting overly broad regional blocking in the name of “security,” the digital world never floated freely on a flat plane, untethered from political and geographical boundaries.

Yet, talk of a splinternet points to an important question: will the internet be more like one world (with some bumps along the way), or will it have semi-permeable borders that are tricky and expensive — perhaps even impossible — to cross?

To know whether (or how) the internet is becoming more fragmented first requires reliable methods for measuring internet fragmentation. The Daylight Security Research Lab has been working on this challenge for over a year with UC Berkeley’s Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity.

The internet is not a singular technology. It’s an ensemble, cobbled together from a variety of complementary tools and protocols. Each protocol sits on top of the one beneath it, creating "layers" of technologies that, together, we colloquially call “the internet.” In a recent column in the New York Times, for example, Shira Ovide describes fragmentation among companies providing digital services in India. This competition happens at the "content layer," which hosts the applications we interact with.

But this content layer locality is only one dimension of fragmentation. “Below” this layer, IPv6, an upgraded internet protocol system — the basic addressing system that allows computers to connect to the internet — rolls out unequally across the world. As older IPv4 addresses (in the style of 127.0.0.1) become increasingly scarce, internet outages could hit countries with low IPv6 penetration. Upgrading to IPv6 requires private- and, in some cases, public-sector investment so this divided access to the internet will break along lines of wealth.

“Above” these technical layers, regulations like Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Russian data locality laws fragment the internet at the "legal" or "social" layer. Russia’s laws require data about Russians to be stored in Russia and have enabled the Putin regime to disconnect from the wider internet as part of a “preparedness” drill. However, the GDPR has yielded a more subtle, bureaucratic flavor of fragmentation. As of 2018, about a third of major U.S. news sources blocked visitors from Europe to avoid GDPR regulations. While the policy merits of the GDPR can be debated, the regulation has undeniably made national borders matter more for the way data flows throughout the world.

Fragmentation can come at any layer of the internet stack. To capture this multifaceted reality, the Daylight Security Research Lab built a dataset to measure internet fragmentation through proxy measures based on four different layers of this stack.

Rather than revealing a world moving in one direction from "global" to "fragmented," the research reveals a more complex reality. Internet governance decisions produce diverse types of fragmentation. Some countries may have lots of data locality laws, while their content-layer patterns align with global norms. Other countries may exhibit the opposite pattern.

Across the five layers of the stack, the research mapped these fragmentation profiles with surprising results. On the one hand, countries expected to be different were surprisingly similar. Ask what Norway has in common with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, and Bahrain, and someone might guess, “aside from oil, not much.” However, these very different countries have very similar, country-specific browsing habits, degrees of network non-neutrality (e.g., government or ISP interference) and work on similar infrastructures. While the specific browsing habits are almost certainly different between Norway and Saudi Arabia, the way in which they are different from the supposedly “global” internet is itself similar.

On the other hand, similar countries can have a surprisingly different internet. Per popular imagination and some recent reports, China’s model of the internet — one in which blocking is pervasive and centralized— has set a precedent that other Belt & Road countries, like Laos and Indonesia, are following. But the data challenges that assumption. In fact, China stands out from all of the seven Belt & Road countries that were analyzed. China has more data locality laws, a higher degree of content layer locality and significantly higher observed network interference.

As the shape of internet governance changes, barriers and enablers to using these services shift as well. It becomes easier to carry out speech, commerce and other digital activities in “blocs” of interoperability, and harder to move across the borders between those blocs. For an app starting today in the United States, it may be easier to block users from EU countries than to learn about and comply with EU regulation. Imagining this small-scale conflict playing out on a larger scale, regulations can (and do) produce fundamentally different experiences on the internet.

In the meantime, as you read anecdotes claiming the internet is becoming one way or another, or that changes have some good or bad effect, remember the eternal truth about any complex system: it's complicated.

What are we to make of the weird parallels between Norway and Bahrain? And what does this multifaceted reality mean for businesses or policymakers? Our ability to answer these questions is limited by our lack of a common language for discussing the phenomena. To know what’s down the road for the web, we first need to measure it.

Nick Merrill directs the Daylight Security Research Lab at the UC Berkeley Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity. His research is focused on identifying potential harms of technology, and to help others do the same.

Filed Under: borders, censorship, infrastructure, internet, interoperability, jurisdiction, open internet, splinternet

Supreme Court Says It's OK For Border Patrol Agents To Kill Mexican Citizens As Long As They Die In Mexico

from the precedent-controls-bullets-right-up-until-they-cross-an-imaginary-line dept

Border Patrol agents kill a lot of people, most of them citizens of another country. For years, agents have been able to open fire on people in moving vehicles and [checks Congressional report] people throwing rocks at them. New guidelines were handed down by the agency in 2014 following an outside investigation of the Border Patrol's use of force. The investigation contained many recommendations that could have resulted in fewer killings, but the Border Patrol rejected the conclusions and the suggested fixes.

So, the killings continue. And not much is being done to stop them. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stripped qualified immunity from a Border Patrol agent who fired at leaast 16 bullets across the border at a 16-year-old resident who was allegedly throwing rocks at him. Ten of them hit the teen, killing him. The court ruled this was basically murder, something clearly not covered by qualified immunity. The Fourth Amendment governs what US government employees do. It makes no difference that the victim was not a US citizen.

That finding is likely to be struck down if it makes its way to the Supreme Court. A similar case involving the killing of Mexican resident by a Border Patrol agent standing on US soil has just received the Supreme Court stamp of approval.

Fifteen-year-old Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca was shot and killed by Border Patrol agent Jesus Mesa, Jr. as he played with friends in a culvert along the US-Mexico border. According to Hernandez's survivors, he and his friends were running back and forth across the culvert to touch the US border fence before running back to the Mexican side of the culvert. Agent Mesa claimed the teen was "involved in an illegal border crossing attempt" and "pelting" him with rocks.

The shooting resulted in an international incident. The Mexican government wanted the agent extradited to face murder charges in Mexico, the country where the murder occurred, even if the bullets originated on the US side of the border. The US government, on the other hand, decided Agent Mesa had done nothing wrong - that his deadly actions were clearly justified by the presence of rocks and/or border-crossing attempts.

Hernandez's parents sued. The Fifth Circuit took two swings at the case (once at the Supreme Court's request) and both times refused to extend the scope of Bivens to cover an incident where a government agent on the US side of the border shot and killed someone on the other side.

The Supreme Court likewise has refused to read Bivens as supporting a lawsuit against US government employees on behalf of a citizen of a foreign country. The Supreme Court believes doing so would upset the delicate balance currently preserved by Mexican outrage and US government indifference. From the ruling [PDF]:

Both the United States and Mexico have legitimate and important interests that may be affected by the way in which this matter is handled. The United States has an interest in ensuring that agents assigned the difficult and important task of policing the border are held to standards and judged by procedures that satisfy United States law and do not undermine the agents’ effectiveness and morale. Mexico has an interest in exercising sovereignty over its territory and in protecting and obtaining justice for its nationals. It is not our task to arbitrate between them.

This sounds positively Solomonic until you read the next paragraph of the ruling, along with some context that isn't discussed in the ruling.

In the absence of judicial intervention, the United States and Mexico would attempt to reconcile their interests through diplomacy––and that has occurred. The broad issue of violence along the border, the occurrence of cross-border shootings, and this particular matter have been addressed through diplomatic channels. In 2014, Mexico and the United States established a joint Border Violence Prevention Council, and the two countries have addressed cross-border shootings through the United States-Mexico bilateral Human Rights Dialogue. Following the Justice Department investigation in the present case, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to “work with the Mexican government within existing mechanisms and agreements to prevent future incidents.”

That 2014 date is key. That's the same year the Border Patrol was given new use-of-force guidelines while simultaneously rejecting the findings of an outside investigation that said agents used their weapons far too often in situations that either didn't require deadly force (rock throwing) or created new dangers (shooting at moving vehicles). The US government also cleared Agent Mesa of any wrongdoing, which suggests it has zero desire to hold its own people accountable for extrajudicial killings of foreign citizens -- something that can be easily accomplished by firing bullets from the US side of the border into Mexico.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court recommends trying not to get shot on the wrong side of the border.

Congress has repeatedly declined to authorize the award of damages against federal officials for injury inflicted outside U. S. borders. For example, recovery under 42 U. S. C. §1983 is available only to “citizen[s] of the United States or other person[s] within the jurisdiction thereof.” The Federal Tort Claims Act bars “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country.” 28 U. S. C. §2680(k). And the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, note following 28 U. S. C. §1350, cannot be used by an alien to sue a United States officer. When Congress has provided compensation for injuries suffered by aliens outside the United States, it has done so by empowering Executive Branch officials to make payments under circumstances found to be appropriate. See, e.g., Foreign Claims Act, 10 U. S. C. §2734. Congress’s decision not to allow suit in these contexts further indicates that the Judiciary should not create a cause of action that extends across U. S. borders either.

The 5-4 majority says too much is at stake in terms of border security and international relations to come to any other conclusion. Since it's not going to legislate from the bench, US government employees can kill people in other countries without fear of being held personally responsible for their rights violations until Congress steps in -- something it's obviously in no hurry to do.

The concurrence, written by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, is mainly annoyed the Court wasted time discussing a Congressionally-created escape hatch for federal officers and suggests tossing the Bivens doctrine altogether, further limiting lawsuits brought against federal officers/agents for Constitutional violations.

The dissent, however, points out this isn't an extension of Bivens across the border. While Hernandez may have died in Mexico, the bullets were fired by an officer on United States soil.

Rogue U. S. officer conduct falls within a familiar, not a “new,” Bivens setting. Even if the setting could be characterized as “new,” plaintiffs lack recourse to alternative remedies, and no “special factors” counsel against a Bivens remedy. Neither U. S. foreign policy nor national security is in fact endangered by the litigation. Moreover, concerns attending the application of our law to conduct occurring abroad are not involved, for plaintiffs seek the application of U. S. law to conduct occurring inside our borders.

Even the government concurred a Bivens action could be brought against Agent Mesa if one key element had been satisfied.

The complaint states that Mesa engaged in that very conduct; it alleged, specifically, that Hernández was unarmed and posed no threat to Mesa or others. For these reasons, as Mesa acknowledged at oral argument, Hernández’s parents could have maintained a Bivens action had the bullet hit Hernández while he was running up or down the United States side of the embankment.

"Wrong place, wrong time" shouldn't be the determining factor.

The only salient difference here: the fortuity that the bullet happened to strike Hernández on the Mexican side of the embankment. But Hernández’s location at the precise moment the bullet landed should not matter one whit.

[...]

Mesa’s allegedly unwarranted deployment of deadly force occurred on United States soil. It scarcely makes sense for a remedy trained on deterring rogue officer conduct to turn upon a happenstance subsequent to the conduct—a bullet landing in one half of a culvert, not the other.

If Bivens is neutered, there's nothing left for plaintiffs. And the agency benefitting from this already does next to nothing to deter misconduct by its agents.

Regrettably, the death of Hernández is not an isolated incident. Cf. Rodriguez, 899 F. 3d, at 727 (complaint alleged that border agent fired 14 to 30 bullets across the border, killing a 16-year-old boy); Brief for Immigrant and Civil Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae 26–28 (describing various incidents of allegedly unconstitutional conduct by border and immigration officers); Brief for Border Network for Human Rights et al. as Amici Curiae 8–15 (listing individuals killed by border agents). One report reviewed over 800 complaints of alleged physical, verbal, or sexual abuse lodged against Border Patrol agents between 2009 and 2012; in 97% of the complaints resulting in formal decisions, no action was taken.

Zero accountability, blessed by two government branches. Here's the third branch doing the same thing. The message it sends is this: if you're going to kill a Mexican citizen, make sure they're still in Mexico. And that message means the case coming up from the Ninth Circuit is going to give another Border Patrol agent a free pass on taking a foreigner's life.

Filed Under: bivens, borders, cbp, jurisdiction, mexico, shooting, sovereignty, supreme court, us

Travelers To New Zealand Now Face $3,000 Fines If They Don't Give Their Device Passwords To Customs Agents

from the Eye-of-Sauron-experience dept

New Zealand's "digital strip searches" of travelers' electronic devices are now backed by law. When we covered this last year, customs officials were already seizing devices and performing invasive searches. But a new twist has been added with the enactment of New Zealand's most recent customs law: compelled password production.

Travelers entering New Zealand who refuse to disclose passwords for their digital devices during forced searches could face prosecution and fines of more than $3,000, a move that border officials said Tuesday made the country the first to impose such penalties.

“We’re not aware of any other country that has legislated for the potential of a penalty to be applied if people do not divulge their passwords,” said Terry Brown, a New Zealand Customs spokesman. Border officials, he said, believe the new fine is an “appropriate remedy” aimed at balancing individuals’ privacy and national security.

There's an interesting juxtaposition in the spokesman's comments, suggesting mandatory password divulgement -- something no other free world country is doing -- is striking the right balance between privacy and national security.

The law applies to incoming visitors and returning citizens. The fine kicks in when password demands are refused, which also likely means the seizure of locked devices indefinitely. Supposedly, unlocked devices are searched for local files only -- with phones put into airplane mode -- but that's still an incredibly invasive search predicated on nothing more than someone's arrival in New Zealand.

Government officials are justifying the compelled password production with bad examples and terrible analogies. The so-called "Privacy Commissioner" tried to equate cellphones and other digital devices potentially containing thousands of personal files and communications with something containing the few belongings someone takes with them while traveling. (via Boing Boing)

Privacy Commissioner John Edwards had some influence over the drafting of the legislation and said he was "pretty comfortable" with where the law stood.

"There's a good balance between ensuring that our borders are protected ... and [that people] are not subject to unreasonable search of their devices."

"You know when you come into the country that you can be asked to open your suitcase and that a Customs officer can look at everything in there."

Socks, underwear... 700 personal photos, a few thousand personal communications… yeah, it's all pretty much the same thing. This is like saying customs can demand your house keys and dig through your belongings simply because you traveled out of New Zealand and returned home.

The inadvertent hilarity comes from the Customs Minister, who is probably even less concerned about personal privacy than the Privacy Commissioner is.

Customs Minister Kris Faafoi said the power to search electronic devices was necessary.

"A lot of the organised crime groups are becoming a lot more sophisticated in the ways they're trying to get things across the border.

"And if we do think they're up to that kind of business, then getting intelligence from smartphones and computers can be useful for a prosecution."

There are plenty of ways to get digital "things" across the border without carrying them on your person in some sort of electronic "suitcase" you know customs officials are going to take from you as soon as you enter the country. This may help catch some dumb criminals, but it's not going to have much of an effect on the "sophisticated" organized crime groups.

What will happen is lots of people not connected to any criminal enterprise will have their devices seized and searched just because. The new fine will discourage visitors from refusing Customs' advances, allowing officials to paw through their digital goods just like they do their clothing. And all the government can offer in response is that the ends justifies the means.

Filed Under: borders, customs, device searches, new zealand, passwords, privacy

Canadian Courts Edging Towards A Warrant Requirement For Device Searches At Borders

from the putting-it-a-step-ahead-of-the-Land-of-the-Free dept

The problem with border searches making a mockery of rights respected (for the most part) elsewhere in the nation isn't limited to the United States. Up in Canada, courts (and lawyers) are asking the same questions: how well are old, pre-smartphone laws holding up to today's reality? Everyone already knows what the answer is: not well. The question is: when will the Canadian government do anything about it?

Canadians -- like Americans -- have the right to be free of unreasonable searches. Unfortunately, just like in America, this right seems to evaporate when one approaches the border. According to the Canadian customs law, border guards can search a lot of stuff travelers carry without a warrant.

[S]ection 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act… gives border officers the power to, "at any time up to the time of release, examine any goods that have been imported and open or cause to be opened any package or container of imported goods and take samples of imported goods in reasonable amounts."

According to the government, this means smartphones, tablets, and laptops should be treated as "containers," with the "entire lives" stored within being nothing more than items in a box. The Canadian government has chosen to equate smartphones with briefcases, arguing the incredible amount of personal information stored on phones is just a stack of papers. It's not much different than the arguments made on this side of the border, where the government has equated smartphones to pants pockets or address books, even though smartphones contain boxes full of documents (metaphorically) -- often far more information than anyone actually keeps physically in their homes.

Border security is a bit different than regular law enforcement. Law enforcement is able to empty the pockets of detainees and make limited searches of backpacks, luggage, etc. for officer safety reasons -- mainly to prevent overlooking a weapon that could be used against them. This analogy fails when it's a smartphone, which can't be used as a weapon. Outdated analogies are part of the reason the US Supreme Court erected a warrant requirement for cellphone searches. Canadian courts appear to be headed in the same direction, but the border location of these searches complicates matters.

Unlike a briefcase or a filing cabinet, judges have found, a smartphone can contain "immense amounts of information" that touch a person's "biographical core."

They've acknowledged that laptops create detailed logs and trails of data that can be used to retrace a person's steps in ways that physical documents can't.

And lawyers have successfully argued that smartphones and laptops, far from being static stores of information, are in fact portals to the near-limitless volumes of data stored in the cloud — from social media profiles to email accounts and file-sharing apps.

It was in this context that a Manitoba provincial court judge last year made a significant ruling: just as Section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects Canadians from unreasonable search and seizure, that right should also apply at the border when an officer asks to search your smartphone or laptop.

If this decision is upheld, there would be a warrant requirement for cellphone searches, even at the border. This would place Canada ahead of the US in terms of privacy protections. While there is a warrant requirement in place for cellphone searches of arrestees, courts in the US have held national security priorities trump the Fourth Amendment at the border. In response, there's been a surge in the number of devices searched without a warrant, jumping from 5,000 to nearly 20,000 from 2015 to 2016 -- and nearly 5,000 PER MONTH have been searched so far this year.

And while all the discussion about warrantless device searches at the border tends to revolve around national security, three of the four cases seeking to challenge the Canadian government's stance on device searches deal with child porn. The fourth involves drug trafficking. Not exactly as advertised when pitched to the public. Cases where privacy protections would have demanded a warrant have been exempted thanks solely to the physical location of the search.

Filed Under: borders, canada, device searches, privcy, warrants

FBI's Hacking Tool Found To Have Compromised Dozens Of Computers In Austria

from the because-someone-in-Virginia-inadvertently-said-it-could-do-this dept

The FBI is already having problems here at home with the hacking tool it deployed during its dark web child porn investigation. A few judges have ruled that the warrant used to deploy the Network Investigative Technique (NIT) was invalid because the FBI's "search" of computers around the United States violated Rule 41(b)'s jurisdictional limits.

Now, we'll get to see how this stacks up against international law. It's already common knowledge that the FBI obtained user information from computers around the world during its two weeks operating as the site administrator for the seized Playpen server. More information is now coming to light, thanks (inadvertently) to a foreign government's inquiries into domestic anti-child porn efforts. Joseph Cox of Motherboard has the details:

Earlier this year, Austrian MPs sent a letter to the country's parliament, asking for more information on child pornography and sex tourism cases. In response, politician Johanna Mikl-Leitner wrote that Austrian authorities cooperated in Operation Pacifier, showing for the first time that the FBI hacked computers in the country.

According to her letter, a list of 50 Austrian IP addresses were evaluated by a federal intelligence unit and used to pursue suspects of possession and distribution of child pornography. The IP addresses led investigators to “countless child pornography files,” according to a translation of the letter, which is dated March 2016. “Extensive investigations are still underway,” it continues.

Local law enforcement appears to be unconcerned that the FBI has exceeded its Rule 41(b) grasp. It took the tips delivered to it by the FBI's NIT and has carried out investigations of its own, collaborating with Europol. Apparently, the FBI's lack of explicit permission -- either from the local US magistrate judge or from foreign governments -- isn't considered problematic when used to scoop up offenders few are willing to defend. Europol and the FBI have refused to comment on how far the Playpen/NIT net was cast, but it apparently includes Greece, Chile, Denmark, and Colombia -- along with possible (but unconfirmed) Playpen users located in Turkey and the UK.

Obviously, the Virginia magistrate who signed the FBI's warrant application had no idea how far its NIT would reach. To be fair, the FBI likely had no idea either, as it was dealing exclusively with users whose originating locations had been obscured by the Tor browser. That being said, the FBI gave no indication in its affidavit that it would possibly be carrying out extraterritorial searches, traveling far beyond the magistrate's jurisdiction and into computers located in multiple foreign countries.

To "fix" this limitation, the FBI is firmly behind the current, mostly-downhill push to strip jurisdictional limits from Rule 41, leaving it free to perform this hacking without being second-guessed by federal judges during prosecutions. That other countries are more than happy to partake in the results of possibly illegal actions doesn't say much about their willingness to protect their own citizens from US law enforcement overreach. Or, at least, it shows there are certain suspects they're not interested in protecting -- even if it means creating a slippery slope they may regret later, when the FBI starts coming after alleged criminals not so universally reviled.

Filed Under: austria, borders, fbi, hacking, malware, nit, rule 41

Customs Agents, Local Doctor Subject 18-Year-Old To Vaginal, Rectal Probing In Search Of Nonexistent Drugs

from the CBP-demands-development-of-additional-orifices-to-violate dept

The Constitution-free buffer zone near our nation's borders ensures those who wander too far away from the center of our country will be robbed of their rights, thanks to ongoing wars vs. drugs and terrorism. They may also be robbed of their dignity.

There's apparently very little law enforcement personnel won't do when in pursuit of drugs. The gloves come off, only to be replaced with other gloves, which are then forcefully inserted into every orifice on a "suspect's" body. We saw this happen to New Mexico native David Eckert back in 2013. The list of invasions and indignities perpetrated on him by the Deming police and a far-too-compliant "medical professional" is long, ugly and comprehensive.

1. Eckert's abdominal area was x-rayed; no narcotics were found.
2. Doctors then performed an exam of Eckert's anus with their fingers; no narcotics were found.
3. Doctors performed a second exam of Eckert's anus with their fingers; no narcotics were found.
4. Doctors penetrated Eckert's anus to insert an enema. Eckert was forced to defecate in front of doctors and police officers. Eckert watched as doctors searched his stool. No narcotics were found.
5. Doctors penetrated Eckert's anus to insert an enema a second time. Eckert was forced to defecate in front of doctors and police officers. Eckert watched as doctors searched his stool. No narcotics were found.
6. Doctors penetrated Eckert's anus to insert an enema a third time. Eckert was forced to defecate in front of doctors and police officers. Eckert watched as doctors searched his stool. No narcotics were found.
7. Doctors then x-rayed Eckert again; no narcotics were found.
8. Doctors prepared Eckert for surgery, sedated him, and then performed a colonoscopy where a scope with a camera was inserted into Eckert's anus, rectum, colon, and large intestines. No narcotics were found.

The police obtained no drugs, but Eckert obtained a $1.6 million settlement.

Perhaps that sort of payoff is in 18-year-old Ashley Cervantes' future. Cervantes did nothing more than cross the border to eat breakfast in Nogales, Mexico. Upon her return, things went from bad to worse to nightmarish. [via Cyrus Farivar, Ars Technica]

The litany of abuses inflicted on her during a 7-hour search for nonexistent drugs mirrors that of Eckert's. From the lawsuit [PDF]:

The CBP Agent became more aggressive in his questions and accusations. That CBP Agent directed Ashley to follow him to a “detention” room, ostensibly for additional questioning. Over the course of the next few hours, Ashley:

a. was handcuffed to a chair;

b. had a number of CBP K9’s sniff her person (a violation of CBP policy, which prohibits the use of K9’s on a person); and,

c. was taken into a separate room, patted down, and asked to squat so female investigators could visually inspect her.

At no point was Cervantes advised of her Miranda rights, because forget it, Jake, it's Bordertown. The CBP's inability to locate the drugs the agent fervently believed Cervantes was smuggling into the country didn't result in the conclusion of the search. Instead, efforts escalated under the theory that Cervantes was just particularly skilled in the art of concealing drugs.

First, the CBP agent deployed his own questionable medical skills to fill out a "Treatment Authorization Request." In this Immigration Health Services' form, the agent "diagnosed" Cervantes as a "potential internal carrier of foreign substances" and ordered up an X-ray. Cervantes was placed in a CBP van and taken to Holy Cross Hospital, where an all-too-willing accomplice was found in the form of Dr. Patrick F. Martinez. Once there, more questionable paperwork was completed by those involved.

The Holy Cross records from Ashley’s time at the facility include a number of factual inaccuracies, including inaccurately setting out that Ashley was accompanied by her mother and arrived in a private vehicle. In reality, Ashley was transported in a CBP vehicle. Her handcuffs were not removed until she changed into a hospital gown for the alleged purpose of undergoing an X-Ray.

Cervantes never underwent an X-ray. Instead, she underwent a series of non-consensual penetrations -- something most people refer to as "rape."

Dr. Martinez, a male physician, entered Ashley’s room and, after asking a few cursory questions, brutally invaded her body on a warrantless and unjustified search for contraband.

Dr. Martinez forcefully and digitally probed Ashley’s vagina and anus.

Ashley had never before been to a gynecologist and, for the remainder of her life, will always remember that her first pelvic and rectal exams were under the most inhumane circumstances imaginable to a U.S. citizen at a hospital on U.S. soil.

[...]

The searches conducted by the CBP Agents, Holy Cross and Dr. Martinez injured Ashley physically, mentally and emotionally. Her labia, vaginal opening, and anus were left raw and sore and she felt violated, demeaned and powerless as a result of the searches.

Seven hours. No drugs. Multiple penetrations. No warrants. No consent. And all of this will likely be OK -- or at least not enough to leap the "qualified immunity" hurdle.

The courts have frequently held that the Fourth Amendment is nothing to get too concerned about near our nation's borders, what with drugs and terrorism on the loose. If the courts find it acceptable for the CBP to seize laptops and other devices and search them without a warrant, it stands to reason they'll probably find seizing and searching the lower half of a human being without probable cause to be just one of those things that happen in service of the public's "best interest."

Filed Under: 4th amendment, ashley cervantes, borders, cbp, customs and border patrol, searches

Google To France: No You Don't Get To Censor The Global Internet

from the well-this-could-get-interesting dept

As we've been covering here at Techdirt, French regulators have been pushing Google to censor the global internet whenever it receives "right to be forgotten" requests. If you don't recall, two years ago, there was a dangerous ruling in the EU that effectively said that people could demand Google remove certain links from showing up when people searched on their names. This "right to be forgotten" is now being abused by a ton of people trying to hide true information they just don't like being known. Google grudgingly has agreed to this, having little choice to do otherwise. But it initially did so only on Google's EU domain searches. Last year, a French regulator said that it needed to apply globally. Google said no, explaining why this was a "troubling development that risks serious chilling effects on the web."

French regulators responded with "don't care, do it!" Google tried to appease the French regulators earlier this year with a small change where even if you went to Google.com, say, from France (rather than the default of Google.fr), Google would still censor the links based on your IP address. And, again, the French regulators said not good enough, and told Google it needed to censor globally. It also issued a fine.

As we noted at the time, Google immediately said it planned to appeal and that's now officially in motion, as was explained in a writeup on Google's own blog (and was also published in France's Le Monde newspaper).

As a matter of both law and principle, we disagree with this demand. We comply with the laws of the countries in which we operate. But if French law applies globally, how long will it be until other countries - perhaps less open and democratic - start demanding that their laws regulating information likewise have global reach? This order could lead to a global race to the bottom, harming access to information that is perfectly lawful to view in one’s own country. For example, this could prevent French citizens from seeing content that is perfectly legal in France. This is not just a hypothetical concern. We have received demands from governments to remove content globally on various grounds -- and we have resisted, even if that has sometimes led to the blocking of our services.

This is a big, big deal for how the global internet will function. Giving the most censorious and autocratic countries veto powers over the global internet should obviously raise serious concerns among everyone -- even those among you who hate or fear Google.

Filed Under: borders, censorship, france, free speech, internet, jurisdiction, right to be forgotten
Companies: google

Court: Your Fourth And Fifth Amendment Rights No Longer Exist If You Leave The Country

from the a-blank-check-for-extraterritorial-abuse dept

The DC Appeals Court has just come to an unfortunate conclusion: because terrorism exists, your rights as a citizen will not be upheld if you travel outside of the United States. This summary of the case is from Lawfare's David Ryan, whose article claims this is a "victory" for the DOJ, rather than a loss for the American public.

The plaintiff, Amir Meshal, is a U.S. citizen and resident of New Jersey. According to the allegations in his complaint, he traveled to Somalia in 2006 to broaden his understanding of Islam, but fled to Kenya soon after because of violent unrest. In January 2007, a joint U.S.-Kenyan-Ethiopian law enforcement operation apprehended him and transported him to Nairobi. Over the next four months, the defendants allegedly violated Meshal’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by secretly detaining and interrogating him, threatening him with torture and death, denying him access to counsel, and moving him across the borders of three African countries without legal process. The FBI eventually released Meshal, and the U.S. never charged him with any crime.

Meshal sued the FBI for violating his rights, bringing a Bivens action against the involved agents. This action is supposed to remedy unlawful searches and seizures that occur during criminal investigations. Meshal's case, however, raised previously-unaddressed issues. First, Bivens has never been applied to extraterritorial incidents. Second, the tort -- while addressing actions taken during criminal investigations -- has never been raised in the context of criminal investigations with national security implications. Because of this, the court (somewhat reluctantly) found that Meshal could not seek damages under Bivens.

As we understand it, the Supreme Court has taken a case-by-case approach in determining whether to recognize a Bivens cause of action. We therefore need not decide, categorically, whether a Bivens action can lie against federal law enforcement officials conducting non-terrorism criminal investigations against American citizens abroad. Nor do we decide whether a Bivens action is available for plaintiffs claiming wrongdoing committed by federal law enforcement officers during a terrorism investigation occurring within the United States. Our holding is context specific.

Unfortunately, this means Meshal cannot seek redress under any existing judicial precedent.

Once we identify a new context, the decision whether to recognize a Bivens remedy requires us to first consider whether an alternative remedial scheme is available and next determine whether special factors counsel hesitation in creating a Bivens remedy. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550.

Meshal has no alternative remedy; the government does not claim otherwise. See Meshal, 47 F. Supp. 3d at 122 (“The parties agree that Mr. Meshal has no alternative remedy for his constitutional claims.”). Meshal, backed by a number of law professors appearing as amici curiae, argues that, when the choice is between damages or nothing, a Bivens cause of action must lie. The Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly held that “even in the absence of an alternative” remedy, courts should not afford Bivens remedies if “any special factors counsel[ ] hesitation.”

The lower court, along with the dissent in this decision, finds this situation unsatisfactory. But as the appeals court sees it, the lack of a remedy for the violation of Meshal's rights under these specific circumstances is a problem that must be solved by other government entities

There are no definitive answers to these competing visions of congressional action. We are not foreclosing either interpretation, but in a case where the thumb is heavy on the scale against recognizing a Bivens remedy, uncertain interpretations of what Congress did in 1973 and 1988 cannot overcome the weight of authority against expanding Bivens. In any event, if the courts, as amici argue, have radically misunderstood the nature and scope of Bivens remedies, a course correction must come from the Supreme Court, which has repeatedly rejected calls for a broad application of Bivens. Because we follow its lead, we will ship our oars until that Court decides the scope of the remedy it created.

If people like Meshal are to have recourse to damages for alleged constitutional violations committed during a terrorism investigation occurring abroad, either Congress or the Supreme Court must specify the scope of the remedy.

The court doesn't appear thrilled with the conclusions it has reached. "Our hands are tied" decisions are seldom satisfactory, especially for plaintiffs.

The dissenting opinion -- written by Judge Cornelia Pillard -- points out just how bizarre the court's conclusion is.

Had Meshal suffered these injuries in the United States, there is no dispute that he could have sought redress under Bivens. If Meshal’s tormentors had been foreign officials, he could have sought a remedy under the Torture Victim Protection Act. Yet the majority holds that because of unspecified national security and foreign policy concerns, a United States citizen who was arbitrarily detained, tortured, and threatened with disappearance by United States law enforcement agents in Africa must be denied any remedy whatsoever.

But the decision stands. And for the DOJ, it means its agencies will have a lot of leeway in the handling of US citizens it detains in other countries. Americans' rights are effectively nullified if the detainment is declared to be in the interest of national security. The majority opinion -- while dismissing Meshal's case -- states its sympathy for his situation and agrees that US citizenship has "inherent value." Unfortunately, its conclusion here appends a national security asterisk to that assertion, furthering the notion that civil liberties should nearly always grant the right of way to the War on Terror.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, 5th amendment, amir meshal, borders, citizens, doj, fbi, rights

Homeland Security Detains Stockton Mayor, Forces Him To Hand Over His Passwords

from the home-of-the-free dept

Anthony Silva, the mayor of Stockton, California, recently went to China for a mayor's conference. On his return to San Francisco airport he was detained by Homeland Security, and then had his two laptops and his mobile phone confiscated. They refused to show him any sort of warrant (of course) and then refused to let him leave until he agreed to hand over his password:

“A few minutes later, DHS agents confiscated all my electronic devices including my personal cell phone. Unfortunately, they were not willing or able to produce a search warrant or any court documents suggesting they had a legal right to take my property. In addition, they were persistent about requiring my passwords for all devices,” Silva said.

Silva was not allowed to leave the airport until he gave his passwords to the agents, which the mayor’s personal attorney, Mark Reichel, claimed is illegal.

The mayor said the agents told him confiscating property from travelers at the airport was “in fact routine and not unusual,” and promised to return the items within a few days.

To some extent what the DHS told him is true. It's not that unusual, but it's not that common either. But forcing him to turn over the passwords is unusual, and not standard practice. Besides, courts have been growing increasingly less impressed with Homeland Security's willingness to ignore the Constitution at the border.

The feds, of course, refuse to say anything, saying they cannot confirm or deny anything. Silva first claimed that he's "happy to cooperate and comply with these inspection procedures if they are in fact routine and legal," but pretty quickly notes how ridiculous all of this is:

"I think the American people should be extremely concerned about their personal rights and privacy," he said. "As I was being searched at the airport, there was a Latino couple to my left, and an Asian couple to my right also being aggressively searched. I briefly had to remind myself that this was not North Korea or Nazi Germany. This is the land of the Free."

So they keep telling us.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, anthony silva, borders, california, cbp, china, dhs, homeland security, laptops, mayor, passwords, stockton