Justice Thomas Goes Weird Again; Suggests Twitter Can't Moderate & Section 230 Violates 1st Amendment

from the supreme-Quart-justice dept

Today was a weird one for Justice Thomas. Along with his bizarre and confusing dissent in the Oracle/Google case, he has done another one of his random walks down conspiracy theory nonsense lane on an unbriefed issue in which he gets to, once again, attack the 1st Amendment. He's done this a few times now. Two years ago he did this in writing an unprovoked attack on the 1st Amendment regarding NY Times v. Sullivan. Last year, he did it with an unprovoked and bizarre attack on Section 230. And now he's done it again.

Today, the Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal on the Knight 1st Amendment Center case, in which both the District Court and the Appeals Court made it clear that when a government official, using social media in an official capacity, allows replies on a posting (such as a tweet), they are creating a public forum in that space, and therefore cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination -- including blocking individuals for speech they disagree with.

A bunch of very confused and clueless people have (incorrectly) taken to arguing that this somehow means that Twitter itself is a "public forum" and cannot moderate content. That has always been very, very wrong. The courts were clear that they were only talking about the space beneath a public official's statements. The simplest way to think of it is this: If the government rents out an event hall to let the President give a speech, it cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination in blocking people from coming into the hall to hear the speech. That does not mean the event hall itself is now permanently a public forum, or that the event hall owners cannot block people they have banned from their property from attending the speech, or any other events.

And, basically, the argument has stayed with very confused and clueless people... until today, when Justice Thomas decided to put it front and center. It's hard to state how ridiculous this is. Not for the first time, Justice Thomas seems to have become the old cranky uncle who believes in conspiracy theory nonsense. Everything about what he writes here would fit more neatly into a Breitbart comment section or an OANN rant. That it's coming from a Supreme Court Justice is just crazy. Let's break this down bit by bit.

Respondents have a point, for example, that some aspects of Mr. Trump’s account resemble a constitutionally protected public forum. But it seems rather odd to say that something is a government forum when a private company has unrestricted authority to do away with it.

Again, it does not seem odd at all. It's how it usually works. It's how it works in my example above, when the government makes use of a private forum. Private forums have their own property rights, in the same way that, say, a private baker can choose not to print a message it disagrees with on a cake, but the government itself could not write a law preventing that baker from printing protected messages on cakes. The whole nature of our Constitution is kinda based on the fact that the government has limited authority. It's bizarre that Thomas argues it's "rather odd" to say that the government has less authority than private entities. That's how it's always been.

The disparity between Twitter’s control and Mr. Trump’s control is stark, to say the least. Mr. Trump blocked several people from interacting with his messages. Twitter barred Mr. Trump not only from interacting with a few users, but removed him from the entire platform, thus barring all Twitter users from interacting with his messages

Again, this is exactly how it has always worked. A private building owner can choose not to rent to the President to give a speech. But if they do rent, the President cannot block attendees based on their viewpoints. This isn't difficult.

Thomas then goes on a long Fox News-style rant about how the big internet companies have too much power, and that the Supreme Court will need to rule on that at some point. He suggests -- again, despite no briefing or oral arguments on this matter, but clearly influenced by nutty conspiracy theorists -- that it could be argued that sites like Twitter are common carriers or subject to public accommodation rules. Again, this is heard quite frequently among the conspiracy theory Trumpist set, but no serious legal analysis has suggested this is even remotely accurate.

The long history in this country and in England of restricting the exclusion right of common carriers and places of public accommodation may save similar regulations today from triggering heightened scrutiny—especially where a restriction would not prohibit the company from speaking or force the company to endorse the speech. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 684 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 88 (1980). There is a fair argument that some digital platforms are sufficiently akin to common carriers or places of accommodation to be regulated in this manner.

In many ways, digital platforms that hold themselves out to the public resemble traditional common carriers. Though digital instead of physical, they are at bottom communications networks, and they “carry” information from one user to another. A traditional telephone company laid physical wires to create a network connecting people. Digital platforms lay information infrastructure that can be controlled in much the same way. And unlike newspapers, digital platforms hold themselves out as organizations that focus on distributing the speech of the broader public. Federal law dictates that companies cannot “be treated as the publisher or speaker” of information that they merely distribute. 110 Stat. 137, 47 U. S. C. §230(c)

The analogy to common carriers is even clearer for digital platforms that have dominant market share. Similar to utilities, today’s dominant digital platforms derive much of their value from network size. The Internet, of course, is a network. But these digital platforms are networks within that network. The Facebook suite of apps is valuable largely because 3 billion people use it. Google search—at 90% of the market share—is valuable relative to other search engines because more people use it, creating data that Google’s algorithm uses to refine and improve search results. These network effects entrench these companies. Ordinarily, the astronomical profit margins of these platforms—last year, Google brought in $182.5 billion total, $40.3 billion in net income—would induce new entrants into the market. That these companies have no comparable competitors highlights that the industries may have substantial barriers to entry.

There's a hidden dig at Section 230 at the end of that second paragraph above -- though one that completely misunderstand the nature of 230 and falsely suggests that it was intended to make these platforms act like common carriers (which is the exact opposite of the stated intention of the drafters of 230).

There's also a weird (and confusing) dig at Mark Zuckerberg, Larry Page & Sergey Brin -- claiming (incorrectly) that Zuckerberg has full control over Facebook and Brin & Page control all of Google.

To be sure, much activity on the Internet derives value from network effects. But dominant digital platforms are different. Unlike decentralized digital spheres, such as the e-mail protocol, control of these networks is highly concentrated. Although both companies are public, one person controls Facebook (Mark Zuckerberg), and just two control Google (Larry Page and Sergey Brin). No small group of people controls e-mail.

That's... not quite right. There is, again, a kernel of truth in the idea that siloed services are different than protocol-based distributed services. That's a point I make all the damn time. But the conclusion elides (1) how protocols are actually managed and (2) how much control those three individuals actually have. It is true that those three have special voting power over their shares, but that does not give them the level of control that Thomas suggests. This also ignores the fact that in the last few years -- despite Thomas' claims -- we have seen competitors springing up over and over again.

Then we get to the bit that is getting a ton of attention today. Thomas argues in a footnote that Section 230 itself might violate the 1st Amendment. We first saw this insane argument -- and debunked it -- a few months ago. It has no basis in reality. Yet here's Thomas:

For similar reasons, some commentators have suggested that immunity provisions like §230 could potentially violate the First Amendment to the extent those provisions pre-empt state laws that protect speech from private censorship. See Volokh, Might Federal Preemption of SpeechProtective State Laws Violate the First Amendment? The Volokh Conspiracy, Reason, Jan. 23, 2021. According to that argument, when a State creates a private right and a federal statute pre-empts that state law, “the federal statute is the source of the power and authority by which any private rights are lost or sacrificed.” Railway Employees v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, 232 (1956); accord, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 614–615 (1989).

There are all sorts of oddities here. First, the citation of Eugene Volokh's piece entitled Might Federal Preemption of Speech-Protective State Laws Violate the First Amendment?. Not that I'm against the Supreme Court randomly citing smart blog posts from thoughtful commentators, but it's still... a little weird. And if you actually read Volokh's piece, which itself is a response to the Vivek Ramaswamy and Jed Rubenfeld Wall Street Journal op-ed that I mentioned above, it seems fairly skeptical of the idea that 230 could possibly violate the 1st Amendment. Instead, it's trying to set out the strongest possible argument for that, which Volokh seems to make reluctantly for the sake of argument, noting multiple times that he doesn't necessarily agree with it, and it relies on a Supreme Court ruling that he believes is incorrect.

But the biggest oddity of all is... what the fuck is he actually trying to say here? His argument is that 230 might be unconstitutional because it might "pre-empt state laws that protect speech from private censorship." Beyond putting a shiny gloss on Volokh's argument, private censorship is allowed. That's kind of important. I mean, Thomas wrote a whole concurrence in the Masterpiece Bakeshop case arguing this very point... in the other direction.

Either way, this is now the third time in which Justice Thomas has randomly mused about free speech in a way that seems designed to attack social media and in line with the nutty conspiracy theories seen on Fox News/OANN/Breitbart. It's almost as if he's living in a weird alternative reality bubble and disconnected from the real world. While he mentions it in passing in his weird dissent, he might want to actually reread the Halleck decision which he signed onto, and which makes it quite clear that private companies can moderate content how they see fit on their platforms.

Unfortunately, though, as with his last two random outbursts on these issues, it's likely we're going to see lots of confused and ignorant people citing Thomas' random unbriefed musings as proof that their nonsense has legitimacy.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, clarence thomas, content moderation, free speech, section 230
Companies: twitter

Appeals Court Judge Attacks Fundamental Principle Of 1st Amendment Law, Because He Thinks The Media Likes Democrats Too Much

from the ooooooh-boy dept

Two years ago, Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas shocked a lot of people by arguing -- somewhat out of nowhere -- that the Supreme Court should revisit the NY Times v. Sullivan ruling. If you're unaware, that 1964 ruling is perhaps the most important and fundamental Supreme Court ruling regarding the 1st Amendment. It's the case that established a few key principles and tests that are incredibly important in stopping vexatious, censorial SLAPP suits -- often by those in power, against those who criticize.

Now, a DC Circuit appeals court judge -- and close friend of Thomas's -- is suggesting that the court toss that standard. And his reasons are... um... something quite incredible. Apparently, he's mad that the media and big tech are mean to Republicans, and he's worried that Fox News and Rupert Murdoch aren't doing enough to fight back against those evil libs, who are "abusing" the 1st Amendment to spew lies about Republicans. As you'll see, the case in question isn't even about the media, the internet, or Democrats/Republicans at all. It's about a permit in Liberia to drill for oil. Really. But there's some background to go through first.

The key part of the Sullivan case is that, if the plaintiff is considered a "public figure," then they need to show "actual malice" to prove defamation. The actual malice standard is widely misunderstood. As I've heard it said, "actual malice" requires no actual malice. It doesn't mean that the person making the statements really dislikes who they're talking about. It means that the person making the statements knew that the statements were false, or made the statements "with reckless disregard for the truth." Once again, "reckless disregard for the truth" has a specific meaning that is not what you might think. In various cases, the Supreme Court has made it clear that this means that the person either had a "high degree of awareness" that the statements are probably false or "entertained serious doubts as to the truth" of the statements. In other words, it's not just that they didn't do due diligence. It's that they did, found evidence suggesting the content was false, and then still published anyway.

This is, obviously, a high bar to get over. But that's on purpose. That's how defamation law fits under the 1st Amendment (some might argue that defamation law itself should violate the 1st Amendment as it is, blatantly, law regarding speech -- but by limiting it to the most egregious situations, the courts have carved out how the two can fit together). Five years ago, 1st Amendment lawyer Ken White noted that there was no real concerted effort to change this standard, and it seemed unlikely that many judges would consider it.

Unlike, say, Roe v. Wade, nobody's been trying to chip away at Sullivan for 52 years. It's not a matter of controversy or pushback or questioning in judicial decisions. Though it's been the subject of academic debate, even judges with philosophical and structural quarrels with Sullivan apply it without suggesting it is vulnerable. Take the late Justice Scalia, for example. Scalia thought Sullivan was wrongly decided, but routinely applied it and its progeny in cases like the ones above. You can go shopping for judicial candidates whose writings or decisions suggest they will overturn Roe v. Wade, but it would be extremely difficult to find on... chemtrail-level, but several firm strides in that direction. Nor is the distinction between fact and opinion controversial — at least not from conservatives. There's been some back and forth over whether opinion is absolutely protected (no) or whether it might be defamatory if it implies provably false facts (yes) but there's no conservative movement to make insults and hyperbole subject to defamation analysis. The closest anyone gets to that are liberal academics who want to reinterpret the First Amendment to allow prohibitions of "hate speech" and other "hurtful" words. It seems unlikely that Trump would appoint any of these.

In short, there's no big eager group of "overturn Sullivan" judges waiting in the wings to be sent to the Supreme Court. The few academics who argue that way are likely more extreme on other issues than Trump would want.

And that's why Clarence Thomas's attack on the Sullivan standard was so shocking two years ago. It came basically out of nowhere. Thomas tried to make it all about "originalism", suggesting that if the framers of the Constitution didn't set up different standards for public figures, neither should the Supreme Court. Indeed, what was motivating Thomas' anger at the Sullivan standard seemed to be... that it let too many people be mean to public figures. He even seemed to argue that defamation law should be flipped to be more protective of public figures, since apparently those public figures are delicate little flowers who can't be forced to face pointed criticism. From his statement:

Far from increasing a public figure’s burden in a defamation action, the common law deemed libels against public figures to be, if anything, more serious and injurious than ordinary libels. See 3 Blackstone *124 (“Words also tending to scandalize a magistrate, or person in a public trust, are reputed more highly injurious than when spoken of a private man”); 4 id., at *150 (defining libels as “malicious defamations of any person, and especially a magistrate, made public by either printing, writing, signs, or pictures, in order to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule” (emphasis added)). Libel of a public official was deemed an offense “‘most dangerous to the people, and deserv[ing of] punishment, because the people may be deceived and reject the best citizens to their great injury, and it may be to the loss of their liberties.’”

In the two years since he wrote that, thankfully, there's been little other movement in the courts to attack the Sullivan standard. Indeed, as White had suggested, any move to do so seems to be viewed as blatantly conspiratorial. However, now an appeals court judge has done exactly what Thomas seemed to be signaling he wanted. And, perhaps not surprisingly, that judge happens to be not just a close friend of Clarence Thomas, but the judge who convinced Clarence Thomas to become a judge in the first place.

Judge Laurence Silberman has been on the DC Circuit since 1985, and has been on "senior status" since 2000. But apparently he's got a real bone to pick with the Sullivan standard. In an absolutely incredible back-and-forth majority opinion and dissent in a defamation case, it is made quite clear that Silberman hates the Sullivan actual malice standard, believes the media is super biased and mean to conservatives, and is no fan of the two other judges on the panel, Judge Sri Srinivasan (currently the Chief Judge on the DC Circuit) and Judge David Tatel.

Both the majority opinion, by Tatel with Srinivasan joining, and the dissent, snipe at the other side in quite pointed ways. But we'll get to that. First, the details of the case. Without going too deep into the weeds, it involves a deal in which Exxon sought to buy an oil drilling license from Liberia. There had been concerns about corruption regarding oil licensing deals in Liberia in the past -- including the very specific plot that Exxon was seeking to drill in. Liberia had put together a committee to help oversee these kinds of negotiations. After the deal -- the largest ever for Liberia -- was completed, the National Oil Company of Liberia awarded bonuses to the negotiators on the committee. Two of those negotiators, Christiana Tah and Randolph McClain, were Liberia's Minister of Justice and the CEO of the National Oil Company of Liberia. Each received a $35,000 bonus.

Global Witness, a non-profit that tries to highlight corruption and human rights violations related to "natural resource exploitation" put out a report alleging that these bonuses were bribes to get the deal to go through. Accusing someone of accepting a bribe is, at least on its face, a much more serious claim and could actually be defamatory (unlike many cases we see where people scream defamation over opinions). However, this case ran into a big problem: the lack of actual malice, which allowed the district court to dismiss the case relatively quickly (as an aside, Global Witness also sought to use DC's anti-SLAPP law, but unfortunately since the DC Circuit has said for years that DC's anti-SLAPP law cannot be used in federal court that failed at both the district and the appeals court level).

Here, the majority opinion explains (in quite readable fashion!) the actual malice standard, and why Tah and McClain failed to establish it. For those who want a nice summary of how actual malice works, the opinion is a good summation:

The actual malice standard is famously “daunting.” McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74 F.3d 1296, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1996). A plaintiff must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that the speaker made the statement “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Jankovic III, 822 F.3d at 589–90 (second part quoting New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80). “[A]lthough the concept of reckless disregard cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition,” the Supreme Court has “made clear that the defendant must have made the false publication with a high degree of awareness of probable falsity,” or “must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989) (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 688 (using these formulations interchangeably). The speaker’s failure to meet an objective standard of reasonableness is insufficient; rather the speaker must have actually “harbored subjective doubt.” Jankovic III, 822 F.3d at 589.

But soon after this, the barbs at Silberman begin. The ruling notes that Silberman seems to have his own objective in dissenting -- even highlighting that the plaintiffs in the case didn't even make the argument Silberman so desperately seems to want them to make.

The dissent thinks this is an easy case. “In Global Witness’s story,” the dissent asserts, “Exxon was the briber,” Dissenting Op. at 1, yet the report admits that “Global Witness ha[d] no evidence that Exxon directed NOCAL to pay Liberian officials, nor that Exxon knew such payments were occurring,” Report at 31.

Critically, however, neither Tah nor McClain advances this theory—in their briefing to us, they never even mention the sentence on which the dissent relies. They make four specific arguments in support of their claim that Global Witness possessed actual malice, supra at 8, not one of which is that Global Witness had no evidence that Exxon was the briber, and for good reason. At most, the report implies that NOCAL, not Exxon, was the briber, thus rendering any lack of evidence as to Exxon’s direction or knowledge of the payments totally irrelevant.

The opinion then even calls out Silberman for trying to coax the lawyers to make the argument he wanted them to make instead of the argument they were actually making:

Indeed, when our dissenting colleague surfaced his theory at oral argument, it was so foreign to appellants’ counsel that our colleague had to spoon-feed him after he failed to get the initial hint. See Oral Arg. Tr. at 10 (“Well, no, it’s worse. Isn’t it stronger than that, counsel? We have no evidence.”). As our dissenting colleague himself has made clear, “we do not consider arguments not presented to us.” Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB, 113 F.3d 1259, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc). Or put another way, “appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them.” Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Ooof. And, indeed, when you read the dissent, you can see why Tatel was so annoyed. Silberman pretty clearly has a point he wants to make and he's going to make it whether or not Tah and McClain raised the issue in the case or not. And that point is (1) the actual malice standard is bad, (2) mainstream media companies are bad because they support Democrats, (3) big tech is bad because it support Democrats, and (4) to some extent, Silberman thinks his colleagues on the bench are bad. Oh, but Fox News, Rupert Murdoch, and his buddy Clarence Thomas are all good. It's... quite incredible. I mean, check out this statement:

My disagreement with the district court is limited to the actual malice question (my disagreement with the Majority is much broader).

A key part of the disagreement is whether Exxon or NOCAL was considered the "briber" in this case, though the reason that's important seems fairly tortured, so I won't even get into it here. Suffice it to say, Silberman believes that the story Global Witness wrote is "inherently implausible" and therefore that should satisfy the standard for defamation. But in discussing it, Silberman again throws tremendous shade on his colleagues:

The Majority’s assertion that this argument was never made by the Appellants leads me to wonder whether we received the same briefs. In my copy, Appellants argue that “Global Witness subjectively knew that it had not been able to determine whether the payments of $35,000 to Christiana Tah and Randolph McClain were corrupt bribery payments. Yet . . . Global Witness proceeded to present to readers the defamatory message that in fact [] Tah and [] McClain had taken bribes.” Appellant Br. 36 (emphasis in original). That sounds to me a whole lot like accusing Global Witness of publishing its story with no evidence to back it up. The Majority, moreover, faults me for assessing the inherent (im)plausibility of Global Witness’s story, without a specific request from Tah and McClain to do so. But (as discussed) “inherently implausible” is a legal standard by which we assess Appellants’ arguments—not an argument to be advanced.

And from there, Silberman is off to the races, he spends a few pages accusing the majority of making stuff up, before finally getting around to the point he really wants to make. He wants to take Justice Thomas up on the offer to get rid of the actual malice standard entirely:

After observing my colleagues’ efforts to stretch the actual malice rule like a rubber band, I am prompted to urge the overruling of New York Times v. Sullivan. Justice Thomas has already persuasively demonstrated that New York Times was a policy-driven decision masquerading as constitutional law. See McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). The holding has no relation to the text, history, or structure of the Constitution, and it baldly constitutionalized an area of law refined over centuries of common law adjudication. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 380–88 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). As with the rest of the opinion, the actual malice requirement was simply cut from whole cloth. New York Times should be overruled on these grounds alone.

He at least acknowledges that it would be "difficult" to get the Supreme Court to "overrule such a 'landmark' decision," noting correctly that it would "incur the wrath of press and media." And it would, because it would open up the media (and basically everyone else) to a bunch of censorial SLAPP suits. Silberman then reminisces about pushing the Supreme Court to overrule another "similarly illegitimate constitutional decision" -- one that has been quite important in allowing people whose civil rights were violated by police to seek redress. He goes on to whine that other judges, including then Supreme Court Justice Kennedy, got upset with him for urging such an overturning of precedent. Kennedy, responding to Silberman, suggested that "we must guard against disdain for the judicial system." Silberman seems to relish his contrarian position:

To the charge of disdain, I plead guilty. I readily admit that I have little regard for holdings of the Court that dress up policymaking in constitutional garb. That is the real attack on the Constitution, in which—it should go without saying—the Framers chose to allocate political power to the political branches. The notion that the Court should somehow act in a policy role as a Council of Revision is illegitimate. See 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 138, 140 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). It will be recalled that maintaining the Brezhnev doctrine strained the resources and legitimacy of the Soviet Union until it could no longer be sustained.

He then goes through the details of the Sullivan ruling, arguing that it was clear judicial activism, and insists that such a ruling would never have happened today. Then he complains that it has given the press way too much power:

There can be no doubt that the New York Times case has increased the power of the media. Although the institutional press, it could be argued, needed that protection to cover the civil rights movement, that power is now abused. In light of today’s very different challenges, I doubt the Court would invent the same rule.

As the case has subsequently been interpreted, it allows the press to cast false aspersions on public figures with near impunity.

And then it's all "those media orgs are so mean to my friends."

Although the bias against the Republican Party—not just controversial individuals—is rather shocking today, this is not new; it is a long-term, secular trend going back at least to the ’70s. (I do not mean to defend or criticize the behavior of any particular politician). Two of the three most influential papers (at least historically), The New York Times and The Washington Post, are virtually Democratic Party broadsheets. And the news section of The Wall Street Journal leans in the same direction. The orientation of these three papers is followed by The Associated Press and most large papers across the country (such as the Los Angeles Times, Miami Herald, and Boston Globe). Nearly all television—network and cable—is a Democratic Party trumpet. Even the government-supported National Public Radio follows along.

Uh... what?

Also, big tech is bad:

As has become apparent, Silicon Valley also has an enormous influence over the distribution of news. And it similarly filters news delivery in ways favorable to the Democratic Party. See Kaitlyn Tiffany, Twitter Goofed It, The Atlantic (2020) (“Within a few hours, Facebook announced that it would limit [a New York Post] story’s spread on its platform while its third-party fact-checkers somehow investigated the information. Soon after, Twitter took an even more dramatic stance: Without immediate public explanation, it completely banned users from posting the link to the story.”).

What does this have to do with a case regarding oil drilling in Liberia? You know as much as I do. But don't worry, Judge Silberman wants you to know that at least there's Rupert Murdoch to step in and balance the scales at least somewhat. Really. I'm not kidding.

To be sure, there are a few notable exceptions to Democratic Party ideological control: Fox News, The New York Post, and The Wall Street Journal’s editorial page. It should be sobering for those concerned about news bias that these institutions are controlled by a single man and his son. Will a lone holdout remain in what is otherwise a frighteningly orthodox media culture? After all, there are serious efforts to muzzle Fox News. And although upstart (mainly online) conservative networks have emerged in recent years, their visibility has been decidedly curtailed by Social Media, either by direct bans or content-based censorship.

He also has another footnote attacking the 1st Amendment rights of the internet companies, which he insists -- without any actual evidence, because none exists -- are "biased" against his Republican friends.

Of course, I do not take a position on the legality of big tech’s behavior. Some emphasize these companies are private and therefore not subject to the First Amendment. Yet—even if correct— it is not an adequate excuse for big tech’s bias. The First Amendment is more than just a legal provision: It embodies the most important value of American Democracy. Repression of political speech by large institutions with market power therefore is—I say this advisedly—fundamentally un-American. As one who lived through the McCarthy era, it is hard to fathom how honorable men and women can support such actions. One would hope that someone, in any institution, would emulate Margaret Chase Smith.

He then proceeds to complain about how the media and big tech are helping Democrats.

There can be little question that the overwhelming uniformity of news bias in the United States has an enormous political impact. That was empirically and persuasively demonstrated in Tim Groseclose’s insightful book, Left Turn: How Liberal Media Bias Distorts the American Mind (2011). Professor Groseclose showed that media bias is significantly to the left. Id. at 192–197; see also id. at 169–77. And this distorted market has the effect, according to Groseclose, of aiding Democratic Party candidates by 8–10% in the typical election. Id. at ix, 201–33. And now, a decade after this book’s publication, the press and media do not even pretend to be neutral news services.

It should be borne in mind that the first step taken by any potential authoritarian or dictatorial regime is to gain control of communications, particularly the delivery of news. It is fair to conclude, therefore, that one-party control of the press and media is a threat to a viable democracy. It may even give rise to countervailing extremism. The First Amendment guarantees a free press to foster a vibrant trade in ideas. But a biased press can distort the marketplace. And when the media has proven its willingness—if not eagerness—to so distort, it is a profound mistake to stand by unjustified legal rules that serve only to enhance the press’ power.

And that's how it closes. Even if there are legitimate reasons to question the "actual malice" standard, to go on an unhinged Fox News-style rant about "anti-conservative bias" seems particularly ridiculous. It sure looks like Silberman has been spending a bit too much time believing propaganda, and is seeking to torpedo a free press in response.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, actual malice, bias, big tech, clarence thomas, dc circuit, free speech, laurence silberman, liberia, media, news, oil drilling, section 230, supreme court

Clarence Thomas Doesn't Like Section 230, Adding To His Anti-Free Speech Legacy

from the really-now? dept

I'm not quite sure what has gotten into Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas lately, but he's been on quite a roll in terms of deciding he wants to toss out all sorts of well-settled precedents (including, in at least one case, his very own precedent). What's alarming, though, is that he seems particularly focused on hacking away at free speech and the 1st Amendment. Back in 2016, when people were discussing whether or Donald Trump could "open up" libel laws, lawyer Ken White noted that there was no real appetite among judges to attack free speech.

However, it certainly looks like Thomas has that appetite, and is trying to inspire others.

It started a year and a half ago, when he (basically out of nowhere) suggested that NYT v. Sullivan was no longer good law. That's the case that set up the well-established and well-recognized standards for defamation of a public figure. It's a key 1st Amendment case, because it sets the bar quite high in an effort to protect free speech about public figures -- saying that it can only be defamation if the speaker saying it knows that the statement is false, or says it with "reckless disregard" for whether or not it is false. While this makes it difficult for a public figure to win a defamation lawsuit, that's the point. If you believe in the 1st Amendment, then that standard needs to be quite high.

Today, Thomas decided to also suggest he believes that Section 230's 1st Amendment protecting elements have been interpreted too broadly, and suggests that he'd like to overturn nearly 25 years of "settled" law about how broadly 230 should be applied. He did this as part of the Court rejecting the petition in the Malwarebytes case. We'll have more on this case later, but as we've written in the past, it involves a troubling interpretation that says if moderation is used in a way deemed anti-competitive, 230 does not protect that moderation.

Thomas agrees with the decision to reject hearing that case, but then decides to signal his desire to basically undermine the original Section 230 ruling in Zeran v. AOL that set the bar, by noting that Section 230 provided a very broad immunity. That ruling was in the 4th Circuit, but basically every other appeals court that has ruled on 230 has adopted the Zeran standard. There is no circuit split, and the the Supreme Court has never directly examined the issue. Thomas suggests they should.

To be clear, while there are dozens (or perhaps more than that) of kooky and crazy interpretations out there of Section 230, Thomas's critique of the interpretation is much more measured. That doesn't mean that it's correct. Indeed, I think it's wrong on multiple accounts. But it's not wrong in the completely nonsense sort of ways that so much 230 analysis is these days. First, he discusses what 230 is and how it came about, including a discussion about historical distributor liability (much of which we discussed in our recent Greenhouse post about online liability before 230).

In short, pre-230, there was publisher liability and distributor liability -- which were two separate concepts. Under distributor liability, you could be held liable if you had knowledge of illegal products that you were distributing. The Zeran ruling more or less said that the concept of distributor liability is gone on the internet. It ruled that Section 230 created a broad immunity for internet distributors. For what it's worth, the authors of Section 230, Chris Cox and Ron Wyden, have long said that this was the correct interpretation of the law they wrote.

The key argument that Thomas makes is that Section 230 was not designed to completely eliminate the concept of "distributor liability." He argues that a strict reading of 230 would retain a separate form of distributor liability, and that Zeran went too far:

Courts have discarded the longstanding distinction between “publisher” liability and “distributor” liability. Although the text of §230(c)(1) grants immunity only from “publisher” or “speaker” liability, the first appellate court to consider the statute held that it eliminates distributor liability too—that is, §230 confers immunity even when a company distributes content that it knows is illegal. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F. 3d 327, 331–334 (CA4 1997). In reaching this conclusion, the court stressed that permitting distributor liability “would defeat the two primary purposes of the statute,” namely, “immuniz[ing] service providers” and encouraging “selfregulation.” Id., at 331, 334. And subsequent decisions, citing Zeran, have adopted this holding as a categorical rule across all contexts....

To be sure, recognizing some overlap between publishers and distributors is not unheard of. Sources sometimes use language that arguably blurs the distinction between publishers and distributors. One source respectively refers to them as “primary publishers” and “secondary publishersor disseminators,” explaining that distributors can be “charged with publication.”

But he disagrees with this interpretation and gives three reasons to question the prevailing understanding of 230:

First, Congress expressly imposed distributor liability in the very same Act that included §230. Section 502 of the Communications Decency Act makes it a crime to “knowingly . . . display” obscene material to children, even if a third party created that content. 110 Stat. 133–134 (codified at 47 U. S. C. §223(d)). This section is enforceable by civil remedy. 47 U. S. C. §207. It is odd to hold, as courts have, that Congress implicitly eliminated distributor liability in the very Act in which Congress explicitly imposed it.

This is... an ahistorical reading of the situation. As Chris Cox has explained in great detail, 230 was never meant to be understood in connection with the rest of the Communications Decency Act (all of which the Supreme Court tossed out as unconstitutional in Reno v. ACLU). 230 was meant as an alternative approach to the clearly unconstitutional approach that Senator Exon wanted with the CDA, which was a plan to try to ban all pornographic and offensive material on the internet. Cox and Wyden realized that approach would not work and would be problematic, and presented 230 as an alternative. Through some maneuvering during the conference to align the House and Senate bills, the two approaches got mashed together.

But -- and this is kind of important -- the Exon approach of creating a ridiculous strict form of distributor liability was thrown out as unconstitutional, leaving just the Cox/Wyden approach which says there is no distributor liability. Thomas ignores this aspect of the history, and acts as if the intention all along was that 230 was meant to somehow work together with the rest of the CDA. That was not the intention.

Second, Congress enacted §230 just one year after Stratton Oakmont used the terms “publisher” and “distributor,” instead of “primary publisher” and “secondary publisher.” If, as courts suggest, Stratton Oakmont was the legal backdrop on which Congress legislated, e.g., FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F. 3d 1187, 1195 (CA10 2009), one might expect Congress to use the same terms Stratton Oakmont used.

Again, this is a very weird statement. It suggests that 230 wasn't designed to overturn Stratton Oakmont. But here we don't even need to ask the authors of 230 to explain why that's wrong, because the Congressional Report regarding the law said explicitly that it was written to overturn Stratton Oakmont. For Thomas to suggest this was not the case is just... odd? From the Congressional Report:

This section provides ``Good Samaritan'' protections from civil liability for providers or users of an interactive computer service for actions to restrict or to enable restriction of access to objectionable online material. One of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton- Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they have restricted access to objectionable material. The conferees believe that such decisions create serious obstacles to the important federal policy of empowering parents to determine the content of communications their children receive through interactive computer services.

I recognize that Justices like Thomas like to ignore the Congressional record in reading laws, but it does seem weird for him to suggest that it wasn't meant to overturn Stratton Oakmont when the record literally says the exact opposite.

Third, had Congress wanted to eliminate both publisher and distributor liability, it could have simply created a categorical immunity in §230(c)(1): No provider “shall be held liable” for information provided by a third party. After all, it used that exact categorical language in the very next subsection, which governs removal of content. §230(c)(2).Where Congress uses a particular phrase in one subsection and a different phrase in another, we ordinarily presume that the difference is meaningful.

This is the one point that is actually the strongest argument from Thomas, though it's still not good. Most people recognize that the drafting differences between (c)(1) and (c)(2) of Section 230 are awkward in that they are not parallel. But Thomas tries to read way too much into that awkwardness, and ignores (again) what the Congressional record says, what the authors of the statute say, and how the various courts have interpreted the law.

Separately, this seems to ignore the intent of (c)(2), which is more targeted at tool makers/filter creators than the companies that host content. As law professor Derek Bambauer highlights in a useful thread, (c)(1) was to protect websites and (c)(2) was designed to protect tool makers.

For what it's worth, as Neil Chilson notes, while Thomas is busy trying to strictly interpret the law based on what he sees in the text, he inadvertently slips in his own language into the statute that is not there. Specifically, Thomas claims that 230 was only meant to apply to companies that "unknowingly" leave up illegal third-party content. But "unknowingly" is nowhere in the statute. So it's a bit odd for him to insist that he can only interpret strictly based on what's in the law, when he's also out there adding his own words to the statute.

Thomas then suggests that the courts could take a much broader reading of (f)(3) of the law (which is a key element of the NTIA's petition to the FCC), which says that a platform can still be liable for content that it "in whole or in part" helps in the "creation or development." He highlights two cases where many believe that language was stretched (Batzel and Dirty World). In both of those cases, someone deliberately chose to pass along potentially defamatory content (one to a mailing list and the other to a blog) with minimal commentary. In both cases, 230 was deemed to protect it.

But from the beginning, courts have held that §230(c)(1) protects the “exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.” E.g., Zeran, 129 F. 3d, at 330 (emphasis added); cf. id., at 332 (stating also that §230(c)(1) protects the decision to “edit”). Only later did courts wrestle with the language in §230(f )(3) suggesting providers areliable for content they help develop “in part.” To harmonize that text with the interpretation that §230(c)(1) protects “traditional editorial functions,” courts relied on policy arguments to narrowly construe §230(f )(3) to cover only substantial or material edits and additions. E.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F. 3d 1018, 1031, and n. 18 (CA9 2003) (“[A] central purpose of the Act was to protect from liability service providers and users who take some affirmative steps to edit the material posted”).

Under this interpretation, a company can solicit thousands of potentially defamatory statements, “selec[t] and edi[t] . . . for publication” several of those statements, add commentary, and then feature the final product prominently over other submissions—all while enjoying immunity. Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC, 755 F. 3d 398, 403, 410, 416 (CA6 2014) (interpreting “development” narrowly to “preserv[e] the broad immunity th[at §230] provides for website operators’ exercise of traditional publisher functions”). To say that editing a statement and adding commentary in this context does not“creat[e] or develo[p]” the final product, even in part, isdubious.

There are, in fact, even some supporters of Section 230 who argue that Batzel and Dirty World were perhaps decided incorrectly, though I disagree. The key issue is that in neither Batzel nor Dirty World did the defendants in those cases create or develop the allegedly defamatory content. They did add commentary -- and would and should be liable if that commentary itself were defamatory. But in passing along the content, they took no part in the creation or development of it. Curation is different that creation or development.

And, indeed, this is why the Roommates case (which Thomas also mentions in passing) turns out to be important. While I initially disagreed with the ruling, in retrospect, I think it was exactly right. In Roommates, the company did not have 230 protections specifically on the content it developed (in that case, a pull down menu about race, that it was argued could violate fair housing laws). The pull down itself was created by the company, and thus it was liable for it. That standard makes a lot of sense, even if Thomas brushes it off. With regards to the Batzel or Dirty World cases, and the interpretation regarding "editing," the story would be different if the editing was what introduced the allegedly defamatory content. But if that content was from the 3rd party, 230 protects the service provider or user.

From there, Thomas argues that the broad interpretation of (c)(1) has more or less obliterated (c)(2):

The decisions that broadly interpret §230(c)(1) to protect traditional publisher functions also eviscerated the narrower liability shield Congress included in the statute. Section 230(c)(2)(A) encourages companies to create content guidelines and protects those companies that “in good faith . . . restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.” Taken together, both provisions in §230(c) most naturally read to protect companies when they unknowingly decline to exercise editorial functions to edit or remove third-party content, §230(c)(1), and when they decide to exercise those editorial functions in good faith, §230(c)(2)(A).

Notice, again, that Thomas inserts an "unknowingly" where it does not exist.

But by construing §230(c)(1) to protect any decision to edit or remove content, Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F. 3d 1096, 1105 (CA9 2009), courts have curtailed the limits Congress placed on decisions to remove content, see e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 2017 WL 2210029, *3 (MD Fla., Feb. 8, 2017) (rejecting the interpretation that §230(c)(1) protects removal decisions because it would “swallo[w] the more specific immunity in (c)(2)”). With no limits on an Internet company’s discretion to take down material, §230 now apparently protects companies who racially discriminate in removing content. Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 697 Fed. Appx. 526 (CA9 2017), aff ’g144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1094 (ND Cal. 2015) (concluding that “‘any activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune’” under §230(c)(1)).

Except that courts have regularly declined to read the law quite as broadly as Thomas suggests they have here.

Courts also have extended §230 to protect companies from a broad array of traditional product-defect claims. In one case, for example, several victims of human trafficking alleged that an Internet company that allowed users to post classified ads for “Escorts” deliberately structured its website to facilitate illegal human trafficking. Among other things, the company “tailored its posting requirements to make sex trafficking easier,” accepted anonymous payments, failed to verify e-mails, and stripped metadata from photographs to make crimes harder to track. Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F. 3d 12, 16–21 (CA1 2016).Bound by precedent creating a “capacious conception of what it means to treat a website operator as the publisher or speaker,” the court held that §230 protected these website design decisions and thus barred these claims. Id., at 19; see also M. A. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1048 (ED Mo. 2011).

This somewhat salacious interpretation of what happened is also not entirely accurate. Under a Roommates standard, if the actions of Backpage were actually directly a part of the development of illegal content, then it could have been found liable. The issue here is that it was a lot more complicated, and the moderation decisions had non-nefarious, reasonable interpretations that Thomas has chosen to ignore. And, of course, it also leaves out that Backpage was eventually taken down and its execs are facing (somewhat complicated) criminal charges.

Consider also a recent decision granting full immunity to a company for recommending content by terrorists. Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F. 3d 53, 65 (CA2 2019), cert. denied,590 U. S. —— (2020). The court first pressed the policy argument that, to pursue “Congress’s objectives, . . . the text of Section 230(c)(1) should be construed broadly in favor of immunity.” 934 F. 3d, at 64. It then granted immunity, reasoning that recommending content “is an essential result of publishing.” Id., at 66. Unconvinced, the dissent noted that, even if all publisher conduct is protected by §230(c)(1), it “strains the English language to say that in targeting and recommending these writings to users . . . Facebook is acting as ‘the publisher of . . . information provided by another information content provider.’” Id., at 76– 77 (Katzmann, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting inpart) (quoting §230(c)(1)).

Remember, the Force case involves the family member of a person killed by terrorists who blamed Facebook, despite there being no connection at all between Facebook and the terrorists who killed the family member. It was just "this person was killed by terrorists" and "some terrorists have at times used Facebook." Section 230 was designed for exactly these kinds of cases.

More troubling, of course, is that Thomas ignores the interplay of the 1st Amendment and Section 230 in cases like this. Facebook's recommendation algorithm is still protected under the 1st Amendment. Section 230 acts as a procedural shield to help get bad 1st Amendment cases dismissed early.

Other examples abound. One court granted immunity on a design-defect claim concerning a dating application that allegedly lacked basic safety features to prevent harassment and impersonation. Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 Fed. Appx. 586, 591 (CA2 2019), cert. denied, 589 U. S. —— (2019). Another granted immunity on a claim that a social media company defectively designed its product by creating a feature that encouraged reckless driving. Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1107, 1113 (CD Cal. 2020).

Again, Thomas is selectively choosing these examples. He ignores the Doe v. Internet Brands case that went the other way, suggesting that courts have not read the law quite as broadly as he insists they have. It also ignores the facts of the two cases he describes, which are not at all how he's presented them (we've explained how both the Herrick case and the Lemmon case have been mis-portrayed, and their facts show why the 230 rulings were proper).

A common thread through all these cases is that the plaintiffs were not necessarily trying to hold the defendants liable “as the publisher or speaker” of third-party content. §230(c)(1). Nor did their claims seek to hold defendants liable for removing content in good faith. §230(c)(2). Their claims rested instead on alleged product design flaws—that is, the defendant’s own misconduct. Cf. Accusearch, 570 F. 3d, at 1204 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (stating that §230 should not apply when the plaintiff sues over a defendant’s “conduct rather than for the content of the information”). Yet courts, filtering their decisions through the policy argument that “Section 230(c)(1) should be construed broadly,” Force, 934 F. 3d, at 64, give defendants immunity.

This is an odd statement for Thomas to be making, as the supposedly conservative wing of the Supreme Court, of which Thomas is a key member, has been the one that has pulled the court further and further into arguing that conduct can be expression and thus protected under the 1st Amendment. Yet here, he's now suddenly complaining that the courts have been ruling similarly with regards to 230. Indeed, this is so odd a position that I'd guess he might find more support from the supposedly "left wing" of the Court for this particular argument.

None of this means that Section 230 will be picked apart by the Supreme Court. Thomas is just one Justice, and it's unclear if any of the others agree with him. And, to date, the court has shown little interest exploring these issues. You need more than one Justice on board to do very much. Still, this is a concerning argument, and again suggests that Thomas is, perhaps, one of the least free-expression-supportive Justices on the Supreme Court.

Filed Under: cda 230, clarence thomas, free speech, intermediary liability, section 230, supreme court

Devin Nunes Asks Appeals Court To Invalidate Bedrock Supreme Court 1st Amendment Ruling

from the protect-and-defend-the-constitution dept

A year and a half ago, Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas indicated that he thought that NY Times v. Sullivan was wrongly decided. This is perhaps the most important 1st Amendment ruling from the Supreme Court ever, and establishes the "actual malice" standard for defamation of public figures. There's more to it than this, but the ruling basically says that for it to be defamation of a public figure, whoever is making the statement should more or less know that the information they're passing along is false. It's a high standard, but that's in order to protect the 1st Amendment. Unfortunately, Thomas seems to think that it's time to revisit the issue:

We should not continue to reflexively apply this policy driven approach to the Constitution. Instead, we should carefully examine the original meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. If the Constitution does not require public figures to satisfy an actual-malice standard in state-law defamation suits, then neither should we.

Of course, if we go back and "carefully examine the original meaning of the First and Fourteenth" Amendment, it's possible one could conclude that all of defamation law violates the 1st Amendment in suppressing speech (the 14th Amendment part just extends the 1st Amendment restrictions beyond Congress to state laws as well). But still, as we discussed at the time, this was surprising from Thomas, as there seems to be basically no interest anywhere else in revisiting the NYTimes v. Sullivan ruling. It's not like other instances where you have a bunch of people itching to revisit old cases.

The question, then, is whether or not anyone would take up Thomas's publicized desire to revisit this standard. And apparently he's found a taker in... Rep. Devin Nunes. As you'll recall, Devin Nunes has been filing a series of SLAPP suits against the media and his critics. The cases haven't been going well for him at all. A couple of months ago, a judge easily tossed out one of Nunes' cases. This one, filed in Iowa (a state without an anti-SLAPP law) against Esquire magazine and reporter Ryan Lizza over a great article, "Devin Nunes’s Family Farm Is Hiding a Politically Explosive Secret.

As the judge pointed out, nothing in the complaint alleges anything possibly defamatory.

The statements at issue also do not assert provably false facts, nor do they imply the existence of undisclosed facts. The statements that plaintiff has a secret, hid or concealed his family’s move, or conspired with others to hide the move do not have “precise core meaning for which a consensus of understanding exists.” ... There is no precise meaning for how many people can know a fact for it to remain a “secret” nor is there an accepted line between “hiding” or “concealing” a fact and simply declining to publicize it. Likewise, in this context there is no precise meaning of “conspiracy.” For the same reasons, the challenged statements are not “objectively capable of proof or disproof[.]”...

Nunes and his lawyer, Steven Biss, have since appealed that ruling to the 8th Circuit appeals court (first noted by Nunes' hometown Fresno Bee, whose parent company Nunes is suing in a different case). The full appeal is not yet public (for reasons I don't understand it shows in the docket, but is not available to download). What is available, however, is a Designation and Statement of the Issues, which at least details what Nunes will be arguing in the appeal. And the key point? They're attacking the NYT v. Sullivan standard:

1. Did the District Court follow the proper standard in evaluating Nunes’s amended complaint or did the District Court view the amended complaint in a light most favorable to the Defendants?

2. Is New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) good law? Does the United States Constitution require public figures to satisfy an actual-malice standard in state-law defamation suits? Should Sullivan be reconsidered and overturned?

3. Did the District Court err in applying Sullivan in this case?

4. Did Nunes plausibly allege that the Defendants published the Article with actual malice?

Those are the first four of 14 issues with the other issues basically saying that even if Lizza's articles don't state any defamatory facts, Nunes wants the court to say that "rhetorical questions" in the article "imply the existence of defamatory facts." All of this seems unlikely to be successful. Extremely unlikely.

In general, courts will avoid dealing with deeper constitutional questions, especially when cases can be dealt with in a more straightforward manner, and this case can be (and was) easily dismissed because nothing in the article is a defamatory statement of fact. And, of course, it's not for an appeals court to tell the Supreme Court that its earlier ruling was "bad law." Of course, the goal here seems to be to get the Supreme Court to revisit NYT v. Sullivan, as Thomas as suggested is necessary. So, chances are they know this is a loser in the appeals court, but are hoping that they can then appeal it to the Supreme Court later. That... also seems unlikely to work. While Thomas has indicated he's interested in revisiting this standard, it would be surprising if any of the other Justices agree. And it seems likely that the entirety of the media industry would blow its lid if this issue was up for revisiting at the Supreme Court.

But, really, this is quite telling. Nunes seems to think that he -- a public elected official -- should not have to face mean comments about himself. That's ridiculous. He's a public official. He should grow a thicker skin, not try to destroy the 1st Amendment because his ego can't take people highlighting his family trying to quietly hide the fact that they moved their farm from California to Iowa.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, 8th circuit, actual malice, clarence thomas, defamation, devin nunes, esquire, free speech, nyt v. sullivan, ryan lizza, steven biss

Justice Thomas Is Apparently Serious About Completely Upturning Over 50 Years Of 1st Amendment Law

from the opening-up-our-libel-laws dept

It appears that Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas has decided to drop quite a First Amendment bombshell this morning -- suggesting that over half of a century of "settled" First Amendment law might not be so settled.

But, first, back during the 2016 campaign, then candidate Donald Trump uttered his famous "big idea" to "open up" libel laws in response to his displeasure that some of the media was criticizing much of his usual nonsense. This was, quite clearly, an attack on the 1st Amendment -- and it was those strong 1st amendment protections for free speech that have actually helped protect Trump himself from multiple lawsuits.

However, when discussing Trump's original promise to "open up" libel laws, many people pointed out that there really wasn't very much he could do. The 1st Amendment is the 1st Amendment -- not something that Trump can easily change. And specific defamation laws are from each state, not the federal government (and must be bounded by what the 1st Amendment allows). We did note that there were some ways that Trump could create free speech problems, but it was generally agreed upon that it was unlikely to happen in the courts. In 2016, Ken "Popehat" White had a detailed post on how it was exceedingly unlikely that the courts would change the key aspects of 1st Amendment law, with a particular focus on New York Times v. Sullivan, which is the seminal 1964 Supreme Court ruling credited with creating a "re-birth of the 1st Amendment."

As Ken wrote in his piece, NYT v. Sullivan is so settled that there's basically no movement at all to change it.

Unlike, say, Roe v. Wade, nobody's been trying to chip away at Sullivan for 52 years. It's not a matter of controversy or pushback or questioning in judicial decisions. Though it's been the subject of academic debate, even judges with philosophical and structural quarrels with Sullivan apply it without suggesting it is vulnerable. Take the late Justice Scalia, for example. Scalia thought Sullivan was wrongly decided, but routinely applied it and its progeny in cases like the ones above.¹ You can go shopping for judicial candidates whose writings or decisions suggest they will overturn Roe v. Wade, but it would be extremely difficult to find on... chemtrail-level, but several firm strides in that direction. Nor is the distinction between fact and opinion controversial — at least not from conservatives. There's been some back and forth over whether opinion is absolutely protected (no) or whether it might be defamatory if it implies provably false facts (yes) but there's no conservative movement to make insults and hyperbole subject to defamation analysis. The closest anyone gets to that are liberal academics who want to reinterpret the First Amendment to allow prohibitions of "hate speech" and other "hurtful" words. It seems unlikely that Trump would appoint any of these.

In short, there's no big eager group of "overturn Sullivan" judges waiting in the wings to be sent to the Supreme Court. The few academics who argue that way are likely more extreme on other issues than Trump would want.

The key bit of NYT v. Sullivan was to establish that there's a very high bar in defamation cases involving a "public figure." Specifically, the standard the Supreme Court established is that in such cases, a plaintiff need to show "actual malice" -- which doesn't just mean that the defendant really dislikes the plaintiff. The actual malice standard isn't actually about "actual malice," but rather that the speaker made the statements knowing they were false, or exercising "reckless disregard" for whether or not they were true. The Supreme Court established that this high bar was necessary to satisfy the First Amendment, and guarantee that no laws were made that infringed up on the right of free expression.

So, the bombshell this week was a concurrence by Justice Thomas in denying a petition to rehear a defamation case concerning Bill Cosby and one of his accusers. The specifics of the case revolved around whether or not the accuser qualified as a "public figure" and thus had to clear the higher bar as established by the NYT's case. The 1st Circuit had ruled in 2017 that McKee was a public figure. The cert petition tried to challenge that decision. The Supreme Court decided not to hear it, which isn't all that surprising. What was surprising is that Thomas decided to use this decision not to hear the case (with which he agreed) to assert something much more controversial: that NYT v. Sullivan was bad law and shouldn't bind the court:

New York Times and the Court’s decisions extending it were policy-driven decisions masquerading as constitutional law. Instead of simply applying the First Amendment as it was understood by the people who ratified it, the Court fashioned its own “‘federal rule[s]’” by balancing the “competing values at stake in defamation suits.” Gertz, supra, at 334, 348 (quoting New York Times, supra, at 279).

We should not continue to reflexively apply this policydriven approach to the Constitution. Instead, we should carefully examine the original meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. If the Constitution does not require public figures to satisfy an actual-malice standard in state-law defamation suits, then neither should we.

As Ken White had written in his piece, this is somewhat surprising -- bordering, but not quite, on chemtrails level nuttiness. Thomas goes on for pages explaining why he disagrees with the ruling in Sullivan, first arguing that because the standard itself is not in the Constitution, there's no Constitutional support for it:

But the Court also addressed “the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State’s power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.” Id., at 256. The Court took it upon itself “to define the proper accommodation between” two competing interests—“the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment.” Gertz, 418 U. S., at 325 (majority opinion). It consulted a variety of materials to assist it in its analysis: “general proposition[s]” about the value of free speech and the inevitability of false statements, New York Times, 376 U. S., at 269– 272, and n. 13; judicial decisions involving criminal contempt and official immunity, id., at 272–273, 282–283; public responses to the Sedition Act of 1798, id., at 273– 277; comparisons of civil libel damages to criminal fines, id., at 277–278; policy arguments against “selfcensorship,” id., at 278–279; the “consensus of scholarly opinion,” id., at 280, n. 20; and state defamation laws, id., at 280–282. These materials led the Court to promulgate a “federal rule” that “prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id., at 279–280. Although the Court held that its newly minted actual-malice rule was “required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments,” id., at 283, it made no attempt to base that rule on the original understanding of those provisions.

That's a... somewhat bizarre version of Constitutional originalism, and would suggest that basically none of the standards the Supreme Court has established in its history have any merit. Yikes.

New York Times was “the first major step in what proved to be a seemingly irreversible process of constitutionalizing the entire law of libel and slander.”

Well, yeah. Because, by definition, libel and slander impact speech, and the 1st Amendment says that you can't pass laws that prohibit free expression. So, unless Thomas is actually arguing that all defamation law is unconstitutional (which would be an even more extreme position), then this argument makes no sense. But he's not arguing that at all. It goes on for pages, talking about how early in the US's history libel laws were super important -- especially in protecting the reputations of famous people:

Far from increasing a public figure’s burden in a defamation action, the common law deemed libels against public figures to be, if anything, more serious and injurious than ordinary libels. See 3 Blackstone *124 (“Words also tending to scandalize a magistrate, or person in a public trust, are reputed more highly injurious than when spoken of a private man”); 4 id., at *150 (defining libels as “malicious defamations of any person, and especially a magistrate, made public by either printing, writing, signs, or pictures, in order to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule” (emphasis added)). Libel of a public official was deemed an offense “‘most dangerous to the people, and deserv[ing of] punishment, because the people may be deceived and reject the best citizens to their great injury, and it may be to the loss of their liberties.’”

After talking about a bunch of highly questionable cases from a century or so before the NY Times decision, Thomas concludes with the claim that states are more than capable of "balancing" the rights of free expression with "reputational harms":

We did not begin meddling in this area until 1964, nearly 175 years after the First Amendment was ratified. The States are perfectly capable of striking an acceptable balance between encouraging robust public discourse and providing a meaningful remedy for reputational harm. We should reconsider our jurisprudence in this area.

This is an ahistorical take on reality. Defamation laws were routinely used by the powerful to silence criticism. Indeed, that is still the case in many other countries that don't have a standard akin to the actual malice standard in the US. We routinely write about speech squelching cases in places like the UK and Australia. As the Atlantic's coverage of the 50th anniversary of the NYT v. Sullivan decision states:

If there were no Sullivan, there likely would not have been a release of the Pentagon Papers or a rigorous investigation into Watergate or much of any withering criticism of government that appears today in any medium.

The NYT v. Sullivan is a supremely important case in establishing the 1st Amendment as truly protecting free speech -- and specifically protecting the rights of anyone to criticize public officials. It is disappointing and somewhat shocking that any Supreme Court Justice is willing to even consider going back on that standard. Hopefully, the other 8 Justices retain their recognition of its importance.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, actual malice, bill cosby, clarence thomas, defamation, free speech, libel, mckee, nyt v sullivan