Federal Court Says The DHS's Terrorist Watchlist Unconstitutionally Deprives Travelers Of Their Rights

from the fix-it-or-ditch-it dept

A federal court [PDF] has just declared the federal government's Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) unconstitutional. It's not that the government can't maintain a database of travelers it feels are enough of a threat to hassle repeatedly, it's that it can't do this without providing more information to, and better redress options for, those it has placed on this list.

Unlike the "No Fly List," TSDB placement doesn't necessarily prevent those on the list from traveling. It just means they'll be subjected to enhanced screening processes and detentions that can last for hours. Travelers are not informed when they are put on this list. Nor are they told whether or not they are on this list if they ask the government why they're being searched and detained every time they attempt to board a plane or return from a foreign country.

The guidelines for placement on the TSDB are vague. They're also something the government isn't willing to discuss. A nomination can be performed by almost any federal agent for almost any reason. This is how the US government ends up presiding over a so-called terrorist watchlist that contains children as young as four years old.

The sole avenue of redress provided by the government does not work. The DHS's Traveler Redress Inquiry Program was revised after being declared unconstitutional by this same court in 2015. The new version was considered adequate for travelers placed on the more restrictive "No Fly" list. But it isn't adequate for those the government feels are benign enough to be allowed to board planes, but somehow still dangerous enough to be subjected to lengthy interrogations and highly-intrusive searches.

The entire redress process is a black box. The DHS takes the complaint, determines whether or not the person is on the TSDB, and then tells the complainant nothing. Unlike the revamped redress process for the "No Fly" list, possible watchlist members are never told whether or not they're on the watchlist, or whether they're still on it after the government has taken a second look at their nomination.

The government tried to dodge this lawsuit by claiming two things: first, that traveling around the country without being hassled is not a right. Second, it said the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their non-litigation options, pointing to the very TRIPs process the court has declared unconstitutional. The court points out the plaintiffs are suffering real, ongoing harm due to their placement on this watchlist. That's enough to make the broken redress process the DHS offers unconstitutional.

Coupled with Plaintiffs' movement-related rights are their reputational interests and claims of reputational harm resulting from their placement on the TSDB. A person has certain rights with respect to governmental defamation that alters or extinguishes a right or status previously recognized by state law, known as a "stigma-plus."

[...]

Here, Plaintiffs' reputational interests implicated by their inclusion in the TSDB are substantial because of the extent to which TSDB information is disseminated, both in terms of the numbers of entities who have access to it and the wide range of purposes for which those entities use the information, including purposes far removed from border security or the screening of air travelers. For example, TSDB information is used in the screening of government employees and contractors, for which purpose access to the TSDB is provided to certain large private contractors to screen certain employees, as well as private sector employees with transportation and infrastructure functions.

Additionally, and significantly, the FBI shares an individual's TSDB status with over 18,000 state, local, county, city, university and college, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies and approximately 533 private entities for law enforcement purposes. These private entities include the police and security forces of private railroads, colleges, universities, hospitals, and prisons, as well as animal welfare organizations; information technology, fingerprint databases, and forensic analysis providers; and private probation and pretrial services. The dissemination of an individual's TSDB status to these entities would reasonably be expected to affect any interaction an individual on the Watchlist has with law enforcement agencies and private entities that use TSDB information to screen individuals they encounter in traffic stops, field interviews, house visits, municipal permit processes, firearm purchases, certain licensing applications, and other scenarios. For example, Plaintiffs might experience in other interactions with law enforcement agencies or affiliated private entities the same kinds of encounters they complain about at the border being surrounded by police, handcuffed in front of their families, and detained for many hours. In short, placement on the TSDB triggers an understandable response by law enforcement in even the most routine encounters with someone on the Watchlist that substantially increases the risk faced by that individual from the encounter.

Given what placement on the list takes away from those on it, the process provided by the DHS to seek redress is not Constitutionally adequate.

DHS TRIP, in its current form, provides no notice concerning whether a person has been included or remains in the TSDB, what criteria was applied in making that determination, or the evidence used to determine a person's TSDB status. Nor does the DHS TRIP process provide the Plaintiffs with an opportunity to rebut the evidence relied upon to assign them TSDB status. Give the consequences that issue out of a person's inclusion on the TSDB, the Court concludes that DHS TRIP, as it currently applies to an inquiry or challenge concerning inclusion on the TSDB, does not provide to a United States citizen a constitutionally adequate remedy under the Due Process Clause.

The DHS will need to fix its redress process. Again. What may have sufficed for the more restrictive "No Fly" list does not come close to being constitutional when it comes to its other, far more expansive, watchlist.

Filed Under: civil liberties, dhs, due process, terrorist screening watchlist, terrorist watchlist, travel, tsdb
Companies: cair

FBI Added Lulzsec Hactivist Jeremy Hammond To The Terrorist Watchlist A Year Before He Was Arrested

from the terrorism-is-just-things-we-don't-fully-comprehend dept

Jeremy Hammond -- a member of various Anonymous offshoots -- had the misfortune of being prosecuted in the United States. While his UK accomplices in the Stratfor hack were sentenced to 1-3 years, Hammond received a 10-year sentence (along with three years of supervised release) for his participation. The length of Hammond's sentence was mainly due to the CFAA (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) being a horribly-written law (and there's a possibility it will get much worse in the future), and the FBI's willingness to toss the hacktivist under the bus for the sins of Anonymous, while glossing over the fact that it was an FBI informant (Hector Monsegur, aka Sabu) who handed out hacking targets to Hammond.

Hammond's lengthy prison sentence may also have to do with other bad laws written by legislators who didn't have a full understanding of the issues they were attempting to address. A leaked document obtained by the Daily Dot [pdf link] shows the FBI put Hammond on the government's terrorist watchlist more than a year (Date/Time Entered: 1/19/2011) before he was arrested for the Stratfor hack.

A leaked document originating from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) reveals that Hammond was considered a "possible terrorist organization member," and indicates that he was placed on the multi-agency Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), alongside individuals suspected of ties to Al Qaeda, Somalia-based extremists al-Shabaab, and Colombia's leftist FARC guerilla movement.

Here's the pertinent information is all of its teletyped glory:



The document also includes Hammond's rap sheet, which up to that point, only includes fraud and unauthorized computer access related to the theft of credit card information from a conservative website. What it doesn't include is anything that might justify his addition to the terrorist watchlist -- unless the FBI considers protests to be a terrorist activity.

Of course, the government agencies that have the power to place US citizens on terrorist watchlists don't seem interested in providing justification for their decisions. Just having a vague sense of unease seems to be all the "evidence" any agent/official needs to declare a person a threat to this country. Nearly 40% of those currently on the government's terrorist watchlist have "no known affiliation to recognized terrorist groups."

The government has long shown it doesn't understand hacking and is no fan of activism -- generally viewing both activities as some sort of threat. So, on the watchlist Hammond went, something that presumably played a part in the prosecution's push for a decade-long sentence for the hacktivist. His actions and motives were often far from pure, but his imprisonment appears to be a result of the FBI throwing an unwitting operative onto the judicial scrapheap before moving onto its next sting operation.

Filed Under: anonymous, doj, fbi, jeremy hammond, lulzsec, terrorist watch list, tsdb

Court Tells DOJ To Stop Stalling And Figure Out If People Suing Over No Fly List Can Get Off

from the pick-up-the-pace dept

Back in June, we wrote about an important ruling from a court in Oregon that found the process of getting off the Homeland Security "no fly list" to be unconstitutional. The government has continued to try to stall over this, but the judge has basically told the Justice Department to speed things up and to tell the plaintiffs whether or not they're still on the list, so that further legal action can move forward, if necessary (and, yes, it's likely necessary). From the official ruling:

No later than October 10, 2014, Defendant shall identify to the Court and Plaintiffs which Plaintiffs, if any, will not be precluded as of that date from boarding a commercial aircraft flying over United States airspace.

The court tells the US government that as soon as it realizes any of the plaintiffs shouldn't be on the list it needs to inform them of that fact, and for those that remain on the list, it needs to give a detailed reason:

If Defendants determine after the interim substantive review of a Plaintiff's status that such Plaintiff is not presently eligible to fly over United States airspace, Defendants shall promptly and consistent with the Court's Opinion and Order of June 24, 2014:

(a) give such Plaintiff notice of that determination;

(b) give such Plaintiff an explanation of the reasons for that determination sufficient to permit the Plaintiff to provide Defendants relevant information responsive to such reasons; and

(c) consider any such responsive information provided before completing the substantive reconsideration of such Plaintiff's DHS TRIP redress inquiry as ordered herein.

It's pretty clear the judge finds the whole no fly list situation to be ridiculous, and the fact that these people haven't been able to fly for years with no recourse problematic:

The Court notes the importance, complexity, and sensitivity of the issues raised and the remedies to be implemented in this matter preclude proceeding with undue haste. Nevertheless, in light of the fact that each Plaintiff has presumably been prevented from flying internationally and otherwise over United States airspace during the four years this matter has been pending, the Court concludes the time has come to resolve the claims of each Plaintiff on an individualized basis as soon as practicable.

It seems entirely likely that the DOJ and DHS will continue to try to stall and delay, but Judge Anna Brown makes it fairly clear in her ruling that she's not interested in stalling attempts and will not treat them kindly.

Filed Under: dhs, doj, no fly list, tsdb
Companies: aclu

Cheney Biographer, Fox News Contributor Put On DHS Terrorist Watchlist; Harry Reid's Spokesperson Says It's No Big Deal

from the oh-really? dept

Stephen Hayes, who is the official biographer of former Vice President Dick Cheney and who also authored an entire book promoting dubious claims that Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda had a close working relationship, is the sort of person who basically seems to support nearly all of our government's excesses in the supposed "war on terror." So, as some people noted, there seems to be a bit of irony in the fact that he has ended up on the DHS Terrorist Watchlist.

As we've discussed, the recently leaked guidelines about how you get on the watchlist shows that it's incredibly (and ridiculously) vague. It can be summed up as "someone at DHS thinks you did anything that might possibly be suspect, so onto the watchlist you go." That's why nearly half of the people on the list have no actual terrorist affiliation.

As for how Hayes ended up on the list, he claims it's because he recently booked a one-way flight to Istanbul for a cruise, returning to the US from Athens a few weeks later. Indeed, that seems likely. Marcy Wheeler has been pointing out for a while that one of the criteria to be put on the watchlist is merely "travel... to a locus of TERRORIST ACTIVITY" and apparently Istanbul counts.

In fact, Spencer Ackerman, at the Guardian, actually got US officials to quietly admit that those reports you've heard of 100 Americans "fighting for ISIS" is an almost entirely bogus claim based entirely on Americans who "travelled to Syria or attempted to travel to Syria over the past 18 months." In other words, if you're an American and you happened to travel to or near Syria, the US government claims you're fighting for ISIS -- even if, say, you went to provide humanitarian aid or to fight against ISIS. The US government doesn't care. Onto the "terrorist" list you go.

Speaking of not caring, when asked about Hayes being placed on the watchlist, Senator Harry Reid's long-time spokesperson (who previously worked for Senator Ted Kennedy) gave a "who cares?" response:

I have no idea and frankly don't really care why [a] Bush/Cheney apologist ended up on a TSA watch list -- Senator Kennedy was on a list as well

That is... an absolutely ridiculous response, and shows just how out of touch those in power have become. The proper response is that if people like both Stephen Hayes and Ted Kennedy are ending up on a terrorist watchlist something is seriously screwed up with that list and the process to get people on the list. Besides, isn't it a little disturbing that a person in power on one side of the traditional political spectrum shrugs off the government putting someone at the other end of that spectrum on a terrorist watchlist?

No one's legitimately worried about any harm done to Hayes for being on that list. He's going through the motions to get off the list, which I'm sure will work out just fine. Because he's white and a person of some influence with connections to famous politicians. But, as we've covered, if you happen to be Muslim, and happen to be put on the list it's nearly impossible to get off. Even if you're politically connected, being Muslim means that you can be put on a watchlist here in the US.

At some point you have to ask what is the point of all of this. It doesn't seem to be about making us any safer.

Filed Under: dhs, dick cheney, harry reid, homeland security, isis, james manley, stephen hayes, terrorist watchlist, travel, tsa, tsdb

As DOJ Hunts For 'Second Leaker,' Will It Also Explore Who Leaked The Intercept's Story To The AP?

from the questions-to-ponder dept

Earlier this week, Tim Cushing wrote about The Intercept's latest scoop, concerning the makeup of the US government's federal terrorist watchlist, and the fact that a large chunk of it isn't affiliated with any terrorist groups. While most of the article focused on that point, he made two other notes in passing -- the first was that it was obvious that this release was from a second leaker, not Snowden, and the second was about how the government "leaked" the story in a "friendlier" manner to the AP in order to beat The Intercept. We thought both of these asides were interesting, but they've both turned into big stories on their own.

CNN later confirmed that US government officials are now searching for the second leaker (though "second" may not be accurate either...), more or less confirming what many people had been suspecting. Meanwhile, the "scoop spoiling" by the federal government actually resulted in a semi-apology from the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) who gave the scoop to the AP. The NCTC claimed it had been working with the AP on a story for a while, and after seeing what The Intercept was doing, felt it needed to give them the heads up, though it also says it could have handled the situation better. Of course, this also makes it more likely that The Intercept won't bother giving the government much time (if any) to respond on future stories. Why risk the chance of having the government spoil the scoop again?

However, with all this concern about the "second leaker," Chris Soghoian asks a very good question. If the Justice Department is going to go hunting for whoever leaked the information to The Intercept, will it similarly go after whoever at NCTC was apparently providing the same basic information to the Associated Press? Or how about the person who told CNN that the US government believes there's a "second leaker"? Because that information is also a leak, and potentially a big one, given that it will alert the leaker that the government is searching for him or her.

Somehow, we don't think the DOJ will be too concerned about those leaks. "Official" leaks happen all the time and no one cares. It's just the leaks that make the government look bad that somehow are seen as criminal.

Filed Under: government leaks, leaker, leaks, terrorism, tsdb, watchlist
Companies: associated press, cnn, the intercept

Nearly 40% Of Those On The Government's Terrorist Watchlist Have 'No Affiliation With Recognized Terrorism Groups'

from the idk-lol dept

Another leak has surfaced at The Intercept, notably a non-Snowden leak ("obtained from a source in the intelligence community") that shows the utter ridiculousness of the government's terrorist watchlist. Nothing states it better than the universal shrug judiciously applied to the 280,000 people that make up the largest portion of the chart.

The culmination of post-9/11 policies and the steady erosion of civil liberties in the service of "fighting terrorism" has opened up nearly 300,000 people to additional scrutiny because ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ .

The list has increased 10-fold during Obama's stay in office, growing from 47,000 at the end of Bush's term to 680,000, 40% of whom the government is sure represent some sort of a threat, even if it can't quantify that in any specific way.

When U.S. officials refer to "the watchlist," they typically mean the TSDB, an unclassified pool of information shared across the intelligence community and the military, as well as local law enforcement, foreign governments, and private contractors. According to the government's watchlisting guidelines, published by The Intercept last month, officials don't need"concrete facts" or "irrefutable evidence" to secretly place someone on the list—only a vague and elastic standard of "reasonable suspicion."

It's long been noted that articulable facts are unwanted guests in the War on Terrorism (and War on Drugs) discussion. Instead, hunches and gut feelings are elevated to places formerly occupied by Fourth Amendment protections.

This group of people, shrugged into "nomination" by a variety of government agencies, is then shared with law enforcement, private contractors and foreign governments. That's at least 280,000 people being vetted with impunity by a variety of TSDB end users -- people who are deemed too dangerous to go unsurveilled but not dangerous enough to arrest or investigate further.

If there's any good news here, it's that at least some form of filtering is used to keep the database from swelling exponentially.

Most people placed on the government's watchlist begin in a larger, classified system known as the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). The TIDE database actually allows for targeting people based on far less evidence than the already lax standards used for placing people on the watchlist. A more expansive—and invasive—database, TIDE's information is shared across the U.S. intelligence community, as well as with commando units from the Special Operations Command and with domestic agencies such as the New York City Police Department.

Those running TIDE have actually celebrated the fact that they recently added the millionth name to the database, failing to see that the constantly-increasing database is actually an admission of failure. If the system was working, the number of names should remain nearly constant, as those who aren't threats are removed from the list (something which apparently never happens) and those that are threats are rounded up (or otherwise disposed of).

And there seems to be a hint of racial profiling contained within the TSDB numbers.

The top five U.S. cities represented on the main watchlist for "known or suspected terrorists" are New York; Dearborn, Mich.; Houston; San Diego; and Chicago. At 96,000 residents, Dearborn is much smaller than the other cities in the top five, suggesting that its significant Muslim population—40 percent of its population is of Arab descent, according to the U.S. Census Bureau—has been disproportionately targeted for watchlisting.

Beyond this nearly-suspicionless watchlisting, there's further privacy concerns, prompted by the addition of millions of pieces of biometric data from American citizens, something that ramped up immediately following the Boston Bombing.

In the aftermath of last year's Boston Marathon bombing, the Directorate of Terrorist Identities began an aggressive program to collect biometric data and other information on all Americans on the TIDE list. "This project includes record by record research of each person in relevant Department of State and [intelligence community] databases, as well as bulk data requests for information," the documents note.

The DTI also worked on the subsequent Chicago Marathon, performing "deep dives" for biometric and other data on people in the Midwest whose names were on the TIDE list. In the process, the directorate pulled the TIDE records of every person with an Illinois, Indiana, or Wisconsin driver license.

That the many agencies tasked with counterterrorism are operating on instinct rather than articulable suspicion is nothing surprising. The large number of people with "no known terrorist affiliation" being added to a terrorist watchlist is the natural progression of bad policies with 12 years of momentum behind them.

As an additional note, it appears the US government attempted to "scoop" The Intercept by leaking a much more friendly recap of the leaked watchlist details to the AP, at least according to the this tweet by Jeremy Scahill, one of the post's authors.

US government, pissed we were publishing our story, tried to undermine us by leaking it to other news organization right before we published

— jeremy scahill (@jeremyscahill) August 5, 2014

If you can't read the tweet, it says:

US government, pissed we were publishing our story, tried to undermine us by leaking it to other news organization right before we published

A look at the AP piece seems to confirm this, as it presents something more akin to press release than a serious dive into the numbers. (More confirmation at the Huffington Post. The government claims its scoop "theft" was a "mistake.") It also makes no mention of the information appearing at The Intercept first. The AP's "story" presents this as mostly a triumph by the government, with only the briefest aside about privacy or civil liberties concerns.

This excerpt is indicative of the (very short) article's credulousness:

The database's growth is a result of the government's response to a failed attempt to blow up a commercial airliner over Detroit on Christmas Day in 2009. The terror operative's name was included in the database before the attack, but it was not on a list that would have prevented him from getting on a U.S.-bound airplane. Since then, the government has lowered the standards for placing someone on the no-fly list and intelligence agencies have become more diligent about submitting names to the TIDE database.

The database was created after the 9/11 terror attacks when it became clear that the government's terror watch list was ineffective. The watch list was once maintained in a rolodex and in paper notebooks, according to redacted photographs provided by the National Counterterrorism Center.

And here's the entirety of the "discussion" about the possible negative of an inflated, nearly-suspicionless watchlist of terrorist suspects.

The government does not need evidence that links someone to terrorism in order for the person to be included in the database. This is among the reasons the database and subsequent terror watch lists have been criticized by privacy advocates.

The AP says it has "learned," but it looks more like it was handed some talking points and an ultra-tight deadline. With thousands of news outlets pulling in the AP feed, this will allow the government to get out ahead of the leak, or at the very least, present a cohesive media presence that presents a "fair" portrayal of its out-of-control counterterrorism databases.

Filed Under: dhs, homeland security, terrorist watchlist, terrorists, tsdb, watchlist

Why Was The DOJ So Fearful Of Its Terrorist Watchlist Guidelines Being Made Public?

from the not-because-it-helps-terrorists dept

Having already discussed The Intercept's publication of the federal government's guidelines for declaring people terrorists to put on its various watchlists (including the infamous "no fly list"), it's raising some serious questions about why the DOJ had been fighting so hard to keep these guidelines from coming out. As we've discussed, in basically any case challenging the various government watchlists, the DOJ has freaked out and claimed "state secrets" to try to get the cases thrown out entirely.

Just a few months ago, Attorney General Eric Holder directly claimed that revealing these guidelines would be helping the terrorists. In that legal filing, Holder does the "state secrets" dance and then says:

I agree with the FBI that the Watchlisting Guidance, although unclassified, contains national security information that, if disclosed, for the reasons discussed in the FBI's classified declaration, could cause significant harm to national security.... If the Guidance were released, it would provide a clear roadmap to undermine the Government's screening efforts, a key counterterrorism measure, and thus, its disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause significant harm to national security.

Of course, now that the Watchlisting Guidance is out, we can take a look and see if that's actually true. And... Holder's statements, not surprisingly, appear to be completely bogus. The Guidelines are so vague and so broad that it gives no real indication of how to get around them or whether or not any particular person is likely to be placed on the list.

What the guidelines do show, however, is the level of extra scrutiny people on the list are subject to. And, as we noted, much of that certainly appears to violate the 4th Amendment (or, at the very least, open itself up to a pretty clear 4th Amendment challenge in the courts). So, once again, it seems like Holder's real reason to declare "state secrets" had little to do with "national security" and a hell of a lot to do with "DOJ security" in keeping its illegal and unconstitutional practices from further public and judicial scrutiny.

Filed Under: doj, eric holder, no fly list, terrorism watchlist, terrorist, tsdb, watchlist, watchlisting guidance

Revealed: What Kind Of 'Extra Scrutiny' The Government Gives To Folks On The Terrorist Watchlist

from the we're-about-to-go-through-your-lives dept

We've already written about The Intercept's publication of the US government's guidelines for declaring you a possible terrorist subject to extra scrutiny whenever you run into a government official. But we wanted to do a second post on the part that focuses on just what kind of extra scrutiny you get if you're on the list. Basically, it's dig through every aspect of this person's life that you can:

In addition to data like fingerprints, travel itineraries, identification documents and gun licenses, the rules encourage screeners to acquire health insurance information, drug prescriptions, “any cards with an electronic strip on it (hotel cards, grocery cards, gift cards, frequent flyer cards),” cellphones, email addresses, binoculars, peroxide, bank account numbers, pay stubs, academic transcripts, parking and speeding tickets, and want ads. The digital information singled out for collection includes social media accounts, cell phone lists, speed dial numbers, laptop images, thumb drives, iPods, Kindles, and cameras. All of the information is then uploaded to the TIDE database.

Screeners are also instructed to collect data on any “pocket litter,” scuba gear, EZ Passes, library cards, and the titles of any books, along with information about their condition—”e.g., new, dog-eared, annotated, unopened.” Business cards and conference materials are also targeted, as well as “anything with an account number” and information about any gold or jewelry worn by the watchlisted individual. Even “animal information”—details about pets from veterinarians or tracking chips—is requested. The rulebook also encourages the collection of biometric or biographical data about the travel partners of watchlisted individuals.

In the wake of last month's Wurie decision at the Supreme Court, I'm curious how much of that is now violating the subject's 4th Amendment rights... It seems likely that at least someone is going to challenge these rules.

Filed Under: extra scrutiny, no fly list, terrorism, terrorists, tsa, tsdb, watchlist

The Intercept Reveals The US Government's Guidebook For Declaring You're A Terrorist Or Putting You On The No Fly List

from the because-you-just-might-be-a-terrorist dept

Jeremy Scahill and Ryan Deveraux, over at The Intercept have a giant scoop: the full 166-page guidebook that US law enforcement uses to declare someone a terrorist who deserves to be on one of its various watchlists from the no-fly list to the "terrorist screening database." We've had plenty of stories about the no fly list and the TSDB, and the ridiculous lengths that the US government has gone to to keep anyone from knowing if or why they're in any of these databases -- leading to a series of lawsuits from individuals who were put on that list under very questionable circumstances.

We were happy last month to see that the process for getting off of these watchlists was declared unconstitutional, but the lawsuits over these watchlists suggest that they are prone to abuse and error. We were particularly disturbed to find out in a recent lawsuit that the US government actually has a secret exception to reasonable suspicion for putting people on the list.

The document released by The Intercept is quite revealing, and shows that President Obama has massively expanded the criteria for getting people onto the list. In fact, as the report notes, the President "quietly approved" an expansion "authorizing a secret process that requires neither “concrete facts” nor “irrefutable evidence” to designate an American or foreigner as a terrorist."

The new guidelines allow individuals to be designated as representatives of terror organizations without any evidence they are actually connected to such organizations, and it gives a single White House official the unilateral authority to place “entire categories” of people the government is tracking onto the no fly and selectee lists. It broadens the authority of government officials to “nominate” people to the watchlists based on what is vaguely described as “fragmentary information.” It also allows for dead people to be watchlisted.

As you might imagine, given all the stories about people being put on various watchlists even though they're clearly not terrorists, the guidelines are crazy expansive:

The document’s definition of “terrorist” activity includes actions that fall far short of bombing or hijacking. In addition to expected crimes, such as assassination or hostage-taking, the guidelines also define destruction of government property and damaging computers used by financial institutions as activities meriting placement on a list. They also define as terrorism any act that is “dangerous” to property and intended to influence government policy through intimidation.

And obviously this goes way beyond just boarding (or not boarding) airplanes. As the report notes, if you're pulled over for speeding and the police run your name, if you're on the watchlist, the police will get a notification, leading them to automatically think that you're a suspected terrorist. The guidelines also contradict themselves directly. At first it says that:

To meet the REASONABLE SUSPICION standard, the NOMINATOR, based on the totality of the circumstances, must rely upon articulable intelligence or information which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrants a determination that an individual is known or suspected to be or has been knowingly engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

Okay. So you need to have a factual basis for reasonable suspicion, right? Wrong:

In determining whether a REASONABLE SUSPICION exists, due weight should be given to the specific reasonable inferences that a NOMINATOR is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his/her experience and not on unfounded suspicions or hunches. Although irrefutable evidence or concrete facts are not necessary, to be reasonable, suspicion should be as clear and as fully developed as circumstances permit.

So, it can't just be a hunch. It has to be a really good hunch seems to be the lesson.

The report also likely reveals the "secret" exceptions to reasonable suspicion that the judge refused to reveal in the Rahinah Ibrahim case we wrote about. She was kept on the watchlist despite there being no reasonable suspicion. One of the exceptions is the "family member" loophole (which some had suggested was likely the issue in the comments to our story about Ibrahim). But it appears the exceptions are much broader:

There are a number of loopholes for putting people onto the watchlists even if reasonable suspicion cannot be met.

One is clearly defined: The immediate family of suspected terrorists—their spouses, children, parents, or siblings—may be watchlisted without any suspicion that they themselves are engaged in terrorist activity. But another loophole is quite broad—”associates” who have a defined relationship with a suspected terrorist, but whose involvement in terrorist activity is not known. A third loophole is broader still—individuals with “a possible nexus” to terrorism, but for whom there is not enough “derogatory information” to meet the reasonable suspicion standard.

And then there's the fact that the new "threat-based expedited upgrade" program, which was put in place following the US failing to notice that the famed "underwear bomber" got on his plane despite being on the watchlist. So, rather than recognize that the list was broken, the administration just added a new category, allowing a single White House official the unilateral power to elevate entire "categories of people" into a special list for extra scrutiny.

This extraordinary power for “categorical watchlisting”—otherwise known as profiling—is vested in the assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism, a position formerly held by CIA Director John Brennan that does not require Senate confirmation.

The rulebook does not indicate what “categories of people” have been subjected to threat-based upgrades. It is not clear, for example, whether a category might be as broad as military-age males from Yemen. The guidelines do make clear that American citizens and green card holders are subject to such upgrades, though government officials are required to review their status in an “expedited” procedure. Upgrades can remain in effect for 72 hours before being reviewed by a small committee of senior officials. If approved, they can remain in place for 30 days before a renewal is required, and can continue “until the threat no longer exists.”

Basically, as most people suspected, it appears the government has broad and, until now, secret powers to effectively ruin someone's life by placing them on one of these watchlists... with no legitimate way to get off.

Filed Under: dhs, doj, guidebook, no fly list, reasonable suspicion, terorrism, terrorist watchlist, tsdb, us government, watchlist

The Crazy Redactions Of The No Fly List Decision: The Kafkaesque 'On-Off-On' Redactions

from the dig-in dept

So, we already highlighted the key information revealed and the newly unredacted version of the court's ruling in the Rehinah Ibrahim "no fly list" case (namely: that the US has a "secret exception" by which it can put people into the terrorist screening database despite no "reasonable suspicion" that they're a threat). However, seeing as we had noted some of the bizarre redactions in the original, and now that we have the unredacted version, I figured we could look at some of the more bizarre redactions now that they've been revealed. Let's start with what might have been the most hilarious redaction from the original If you can't read it, it's:

Given the Kafkaesque [REDACTED] treatment imposed on Dr. Ibrahim, the government is further ordered expressly to tell Dr. Ibrahim [REDACTED] (always subject, of course, to future developments and evidence that might [REDACTED]). This relief is appropriate and warranted because of the confusion generated by the government's own mistake and the very real misapprehension on her part that the later visa denials are traceable to her erroneous 2004 placement on the no-fly list, suggesting (reasonably from her viewpoint) that she somehow remains on the no-fly list.

Now those redactions have been uncovered, and here's what we see (with the redacted portions in yellow): And the text version, with redacted portions underlined:

Given the Kafkaesque on-off-on-list treatment imposed on Dr. Ibrahim, the government is further ordered expressly to tell Dr. Ibrahim that she is no longer on the no-fly list and has not been on it since 2005 (always subject, of course, to future developments and evidence that might warrant reinstating her to the list). This relief is appropriate and warranted because of the confusion generated by the government's own mistake and the very real misapprehension on her part that the later visa denials are traceable to her erroneous 2004 placement on the no-fly list, suggesting (reasonably from her viewpoint) that she somehow remains on the no-fly list.

Many people rightly mocked the original version as the Kafkaesque nature of the situation appeared to be increased by that particularly hilarious looking redaction. Of course, now having seen all the redactions, we can see the true reason behind it. It appears that, despite all of this, Ibrahim is still in the Terror Screening Database (TSDB), for some secret reason, even though everyone admits she's no threat. And that secret reason is apparently unrelated to the original mistake.

In other words, the purpose of all those original redactions was to misleadingly suggest that Ibrahim had been cleared from all lists, but the "on-off-on-list" aspect was actually hidden in the redacted version. Now that it's all been revealed, reading between the lines, we see that Ibrahim is only being cleared from some lists and databases, while remaining in others that likely prevent her from ever returning to the US. In other words, the redactions were created to mislead the public into believing that Ibrahim has been totally cleared, when the reality is she's still in the same basic position -- other than the fact that she now knows she's in the TSDB rather than the no fly list, which she was removed from all the way back in 2005.

Still, other redactions seem equally bizarre. Take this one: The unredacted version says:

Government counsel has conceded at trial that Dr. Ibrahim is not a threat to our national security. She does not pose (and has not posed) a threat of committing an act of international or domestic terrorism with respect to an aircraft, a threat to airline passenger or civil aviation security, or a threat of domestic terrorism. This the government admits and this order finds.

Why was that redacted? Perhaps the government thought the reasons someone might be put on the list needed to be secret? But, did anyone doubt that any of the things listed above were considered reasons why you might be put on the no fly list or the terrorist screening database? This identical redaction was done later in the ruling as well, again enforcing the idea that the government sought to hide the fact that you have to be a threat to one of those three things to be placed on the lists. But it also hid the fact that even if you were not one of those things, you can still be placed in the Terrorist Screening Database for a "secret exception" to the reasonable suspicion requirement.

Another bizarre one, concerning an attempt in 2006 to have her removed from all lists: The unredacted version:

In a form dated February 10, 2006, an unidentified government agent requested that Dr. Ibrahim be "Remove[ d) From ALL Watchlisting Supported Systems (For terrorist subjects: due to closure of case AND no nexus to terrorism)" (TX 10). For the question "Is the individual qualified for placement on the no fly list," the "No" box was checked. For the question, "If no, is the individual qualified for placement on the selectee list," the "No" box was checked.

Can anyone explain why this was redacted? It makes no sense at all.

There is also a lengthy discussion of how the US blocked Ibrahim's daughter, Raihan Binti Mustafa Kamal, from flying to the US for the trial and then lied about it. We noted how bizarre it was that Judge William Alsup's entire discussion of what happened there was redacted. Now seeing the full version, it is, once again, entirely unclear why it was redacted in the first place. The unredacted parts do show more screwups by the US, in which Homeland Security falsely flagged Kamal based on rules that are not supposed to apply to US citizens, even though she is a US citizen. In fact, it notes that Customs and Border Patrol realized in six minutes that she was a US citizen, but then there was a series of other confusions that resulted in her not being allowed to board the flight.

Unfortunately, despite considerable anger on Judge Alsup's part, when all of this came out, it appears that, in the end, he did nothing about this, other than make sure that Kamal's own record in the TSDB was "updated... to reflect that she was a United States citizen."

In the end, the revelation of these redactions do reveal that Ibrahim still appears to be unable to come to the US, and also suggests that the US government tried to use redactions to hide this fact -- allowing the public to believe that Ibrahim had been entirely cleared, when she had not been. It also sought to hide, as mentioned in our earlier post, that the DOJ has some "secret exception" that allows them to basically destroy someone's life, even if there's no reasonable suspicion that they're a terrorist threat of any kind.

Filed Under: kafakesque, no fly, no fly list, rahinah ibrahim, redactions, tsdb